Did God die on the cross?

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Lane,

Have you consulted Vos? In Vol. 3 (Christology) of Reformed Dogmatics, Vos notes that “the concept of death includes...Separation of the source of life for the body, because the soul can no longer retain in its organic connection. This was also the case with Christ.”

He goes on to note that “If the concept of death is separation, dissolution, then this characteristic must come to light in the strongest possible way. Hence the soul and body must be torn apart.”

In the context of eternal death relative to temporal death, Vos compares and contrasts Christ with the lost. Both suffer both types of death, whereas only the elect suffer only temporal death. Regarding the lost, Vos speaks of soul and body being reunited (which presupposes a severed union) upon the temporal death [the intermediate state] giving way to the fullest expression of eternal death in the reunited body and soul. He also observes the order of things. Christ suffered eternal death, then temporal death. The lost experience the same two but in reverse order. In both cases, only in eternal death does the body soul composite remain intact.

Any appeal to mystical union of believers’ bodies dying in union with Christ has no relevant bearing on the anthropological subject at hand because although the bodies of believers die in Christ, the bodies of the lost don’t. Therefore, any appeal to mystical union of body and soul, if it’s to make a point about how body and soul relate to personhood, must apply to all humanity in the intermediate state. It must apply to quick and the dead. It must transcend union with Christ.
How are you defining temporal death?
 
How are you defining temporal death?

For Vos temporal death is the separation of the body from the soul. Eternal death is the punishment of death that is received when body and soul are united. For Christ, eternal death was first, then he underwent temporal death. Those who die before his coming will experience temporal death prior to eternal death, the final death in which body and soul are reunited.
 
You're absolutely right. John Brown gives a clear statement of the view that I have expressed, which in no way contradicts the definition of death as the separation of soul and body.



That line feels a little ironic!

While I appreciate the explanation about what it would take to get us to "indwelling" in post #54, I haven't used the word. I certainly have no objection if you want to critique positions I haven't argued for, but I don't see why I would need to be involved in that process.

Pastor,

All good at my end, but I would like to say a few things.

My interaction with you began when you posted this:

“According to WLC 86, the bodies of believers "even in death continue united to Christ." What is true of the members, in this regard, is also true of the head. The death of Christ involved the separation of human soul and body, not the separation of divine person from human body.”

My initial response was somewhat exhaustive since I wasn’t clear on what you were trying to say. If you were trying to argue something, then it was an invalid argument. Therefore, I’m sincerely confident you were not trying to argue but merely stating your position, which of course I have no problem with you doing.

You stated four primary premises, none of which were built upon the others. But for an obvious reason you also invoked WLC 86. As I pointed out in various places (more acutely in a post to Lane), WLC 86 isn’t terribly germane given that any appeal to it doesn’t take into account the lack of mystical union the bodies of unbelievers have in the intermediate state. Accordingly, we can’t use it to make a universal anthropological claim. Nor does it save the hypostatic union, which I’ll try to address in more detail below.

Your post entailed:

Believers’ bodies die in Christ
“True for its members” —> Christ’s body died in Christ
Christ’s body and soul were separated in death
The divine person was never separated from his body


If death entails a separation of a person from his body, then the Second person did not die if, as you suggest, the divine person was never separated from his body. More specifically, if death entails a person being separated from his body, then a person with two natures would have to experience both natures (the totality of the person) being separated from his body. If one objects to the conclusion, then he ought to revise the premise regarding the nature of death.

Regardless, such a conclusion that the divine nature was separated from the lifeless corpse hardly undermines the hypostatic union. The hypostatic union is not so fragile as to depend upon the human body to keep the union of two natures in one person intact. But some here have suggested as much, which is precisely why the mystical union of dead bodies to Christ was introduced through WLC 86.

It’s rather apparent that some here believe that to remain orthodox in our Christology we must maintain: (i) mystical (yet non ontic) union of body and soul in temporal death + (ii) the divine nature unseparated from the body for those three days. In that way, it’s believed we maintain the hypostatic union, hence the appeal to WLC 86, which supposedly establishes how we might keep intact the personhood of created persons (with an exception for the lost). Hence your, “According to WLC 86, the bodies of believers ‘even in death continue united to Christ.’ What is true of the members, in this regard, is also true of the head.”

As I understand your position, the most you can claim is (a) only Christ’s humanity was separated from his body and the Second Person did not die, or (b) death doesn’t always entail separation of a person from his body.

[Of course (b) is true for those who remain at the time of the second advent. So, we should probably refine (b) to (b*) the intermediate state between death and resurrection doesn’t always entail separation of a person from his body.]

Therefore, your choices are (a) or (*b), not your (c) “Denying the death of a person would certainly be a significant problem. But I haven't made that denial, nor has Tim.”

Your denial of the death of the Second Person is certainly implicit unless you embrace (*b), or something consistent with (*b). Your position is indeed salvageable, in which case you’d be predicating to the person that which he does only in his humanity.

Your position is that a Person died, but only in his humanity. My only point from the very beginning has been, it’s not necessary to qualify the Son’s death in that way. Reason being, the whole Person no longer inhabited the body. The corpse was utterly lifeless, lest the body was not an actual corpse. The Son for three days did not perform divine acts through a body. The body was dead because all life, two natures, one person abandon it in the grave. Notwithstanding, no violence was done to the hypostatic union but we maintain the integrity of death.
 
@RWD
I'm having trouble following your reasoning in this thread. A few things would help me:

1. Do you agree with @BayouHuguenot in post #46?

2. Do you think anyone is disagreeing with the assertion that the parts of Christ's human nature were separated in death (body and soul)?

3. Is life a prerequisite for being united? Can the divine nature be united to a lifeless body without a soul?

4. Death is the separation of body and soul. When body and soul are separated, the person is dead. Death is not the separation of a person from a body as you suggest (post #66) but a soul from a body. If I understand correctly, you are conflating person and soul which is leading to misunderstanding and confusion. A person is not a part of humanity.
 

“Death is the separation of body and soul. When body and soul are separated, the person is dead. Death is not the separation of a person from a body as you suggest (post #66) but a soul from a body.”
Brother Tim,

1. You should then agree that your construct entails a false dichotomy between person and soul if it is true that, “I = my soul” & “souls = persons”. I know you reject those equivalencies, so let’s agree on that. In other words, your construct obviously rejects “I = my soul” & souls = persons”. Fair enough?

2. If death is not separation of a person from his body (as you maintain), then you should also agree that such a construct as yours renders unintelligible the proposition, “Saint Paul, the person, is in heaven (without his natural body)”. After all, for you, “Death is not the separation of a person from a body...but a soul from a body.”

3. Given your construct, you must instead say the opposite, “Saint Paul, the person, is not in heaven awaiting the resurrection of his body.” The reason being, for you: upon death only the soul departs the body.

4. You believe the soul lives on. You believe the person dies. You believe the body dies. Since I’m sure you rightly recognize that the body is not the person and you deny the person leaves his body as his soul, you seem to be left with a situation in which persons no longer exist or persons lay in the grave. But if persons do exist in the intermediate state, then where? The grave contains the dead body. Heaven contains the souls made perfect, but where are the persons? Also, are there lost persons in torment or only lost souls?


“If I understand correctly, you are conflating person and soul which is leading to misunderstanding and confusion.”

I don’t believe I’m conflating anything, or if I am I don’t think it has been demonstrated.

Maybe look at it this way. Clear the slate...

I believe it’s perfectly intelligible to assert:

p, It’s unnatural for persons in the intermediate state to to be separated from their bodies. (That seems pretty plain to me.)

Yet we would never assert p*:

P*, It’s unnatural for persons in the intermediate state to to be separated from their souls.

Why is it that p makes sense whereas p* doesn’t? I would humbly submit that the reason p makes sense and p* doesn’t is precisely because: “I = my soul” & “souls = persons”. See Vos, Volume ii (Anthropology).
 
“Death is the separation of body and soul. When body and soul are separated, the person is dead. Death is not the separation of a person from a body as you suggest (post #66) but a soul from a body.”
Brother Tim,

1. You should then agree that your construct entails a false dichotomy between person and soul if it is true that, “I = my soul” & “souls = persons”. I know you reject those equivalencies, so let’s agree on that. In other words, your construct obviously rejects “I = my soul” & souls = persons”. Fair enough?

2. If death is not separation of a person from his body (as you maintain), then you should also agree that such a construct as yours renders unintelligible the proposition, “Saint Paul, the person, is in heaven (without his natural body)”. After all, for you, “Death is not the separation of a person from a body...but a soul from a body.”

3. Given your construct, you must instead say the opposite, “Saint Paul, the person, is not in heaven awaiting the resurrection of his body.” The reason being, for you: upon death only the soul departs the body.

4. You believe the soul lives on. You believe the person dies. You believe the body dies. Since I’m sure you rightly recognize that the body is not the person and you deny the person leaves his body as his soul, you seem to be left with a situation in which persons no longer exist or persons lay in the grave. But if persons do exist in the intermediate state, then where? The grave contains the dead body. Heaven contains the souls made perfect, but where are the persons? Also, are there lost persons in torment or only lost souls?


“If I understand correctly, you are conflating person and soul which is leading to misunderstanding and confusion.”

I don’t believe I’m conflating anything, or if I am I don’t think it has been demonstrated.

Maybe look at it this way. Clear the slate...

I believe it’s perfectly intelligible to assert:

p, It’s unnatural for persons in the intermediate state to to be separated from their bodies. (That seems pretty plain to me.)

Yet we would never assert p*:

P*, It’s unnatural for persons in the intermediate state to to be separated from their souls.

Why is it that p makes sense whereas p* doesn’t? I would humbly submit that the reason p makes sense and p* doesn’t is precisely because: “I = my soul” & “souls = persons”. See Vos, Volume ii (Anthropology).

For my clarity before any other responses, could you please answer whether or not you agree with the assertion in post 46?
 
For my clarity before any other responses, could you please answer whether or not you agree with the assertion in post 46?

No, I won’t oblige because I think what would better serve the discussion between us is you get back to me on my previous post to you. What I wrote to you pretty much brings you to a crossroad and the concepts don’t require nuance. If you’re after clarity, I think my post leads you where you need to go first. Whereas post 46, I can readily interpret it in a way that’s agreeable to me. And, I see no substantive difference between 46 and this analog: “The human soul of Paul and his body are separated from each other, but they are still united to Paul the person.”

The philosophical distinctions surrounding union are much more nuanced than what I most recently posted you. So, that you’re even asking whether I agree or not with 46 tells me that you might not be recognizing different ways 46 might be understood. Whereas my last post, I think, fleshes out some things in a more obvious way. It think it warrants your response.
 
Is my body still mine as a person who lays in the grave even though my Soul is with the Lord? I think it is. Am I wrong?

I am sorry if this confuses things.
 
Is my body still mine as a person who lays in the grave even though my Soul is with the Lord? I think it is. Am I wrong?

Absent from the body, present with the Lord. It’s your body in the grave but you as person have been delivered from the body of death. You, as a person, will be reunited to an incorruptible body on the last day.
 
ZU
our own body shall be raised up and glorified by God.

Indeed. My post wasn’t stated well. Thanks for that. It’ll be our body. This corruption must put on incorruption! But it’s not precisely the same body. There’ll be identity but also vast difference. For instance, physical birth defects will be no longer.
 
No, I won’t oblige because I think what would better serve the discussion between us is you get back to me on my previous post to you. What I wrote to you pretty much brings you to a crossroad and the concepts don’t require nuance. If you’re after clarity, I think my post leads you where you need to go first. Whereas post 46, I can readily interpret it in a way that’s agreeable to me. And, I see no substantive difference between 46 and this analog: “The human soul of Paul and his body are separated from each other, but they are still united to Paul the person.”

The philosophical distinctions surrounding union are much more nuanced than what I most recently posted you. So, that you’re even asking whether I agree or not with 46 tells me that you might not be recognizing different ways 46 might be understood. Whereas my last post, I think, fleshes out some things in a more obvious way. It think it warrants your response.

I am sorry, but I'm having trouble making heads or tails out of your position. I cannot even understand how you would answer post 46 in the affirmative. If I'm going to respond, I do need some more information so I can even understand what I'm responding to. If you are unwilling, I guess that means we are at an impasse.

I've been asking since post #49...
 
I am sorry, but I'm having trouble making heads or tails out of your position. I cannot even understand how you would answer post 46 in the affirmative. If I'm going to respond, I do need some more information so I can even understand what I'm responding to. If you are unwilling, I guess that means we are at an impasse.

I've been asking since post #49...

What is it about post 68 you don’t grasp? I ask because, I don’t think you’re grasping the ramifications of your own position, which I flesh out for you in 68.
 
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“Death is the separation of body and soul. When body and soul are separated, the person is dead. Death is not the separation of a person from a body as you suggest (post #66) but a soul from a body.”
Brother Tim,

1. You should then agree that your construct entails a false dichotomy between person and soul if it is true that, “I = my soul” & “souls = persons”. I know you reject those equivalencies, so let’s agree on that. In other words, your construct obviously rejects “I = my soul” & souls = persons”. Fair enough?

2. If death is not separation of a person from his body (as you maintain), then you should also agree that such a construct as yours renders unintelligible the proposition, “Saint Paul, the person, is in heaven (without his natural body)”. After all, for you, “Death is not the separation of a person from a body...but a soul from a body.”

3. Given your construct, you must instead say the opposite, “Saint Paul, the person, is not in heaven awaiting the resurrection of his body.” The reason being, for you: upon death only the soul departs the body.

4. You believe the soul lives on. You believe the person dies. You believe the body dies. Since I’m sure you rightly recognize that the body is not the person and you deny the person leaves his body as his soul, you seem to be left with a situation in which persons no longer exist or persons lay in the grave. But if persons do exist in the intermediate state, then where? The grave contains the dead body. Heaven contains the souls made perfect, but where are the persons? Also, are there lost persons in torment or only lost souls?


“If I understand correctly, you are conflating person and soul which is leading to misunderstanding and confusion.”

I don’t believe I’m conflating anything, or if I am I don’t think it has been demonstrated.

Maybe look at it this way. Clear the slate...

I believe it’s perfectly intelligible to assert:

p, It’s unnatural for persons in the intermediate state to to be separated from their bodies. (That seems pretty plain to me.)

Yet we would never assert p*:

P*, It’s unnatural for persons in the intermediate state to to be separated from their souls.

Why is it that p makes sense whereas p* doesn’t? I would humbly submit that the reason p makes sense and p* doesn’t is precisely because: “I = my soul” & “souls = persons”. See Vos, Volume ii (Anthropology).
Would not the real us be then our souls, as we're crested by God in our physical bodies at conception?
 
The human soul of Christ and his body are separated from each other, but they are still united to the divine person so that the hypostatic union isn't broken.
That union of His divine and human are forever linked due to the Incarnation, correct?
 
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What is it about post 68 you don’t grasp? I ask because, I don’t think you’re grasping the ramifications of your own position, which I flesh out for you in 68.

I think it's unfortunate and unhelpful that you are unwilling to answer a simple question. However, I will attempt to answer you. I will also try to put two and two together and work off certain assumptions about your position since you are unwilling to make them explicit for whatever reason.

1. You should then agree that your construct entails a false dichotomy between person and soul if it is true that, “I = my soul” & “souls = persons”. I know you reject those equivalencies, so let’s agree on that. In other words, your construct obviously rejects “I = my soul” & souls = persons”. Fair enough?

This is not entirely accurate. In the unity of our person, body and soul, what is said of either part is true of the person. For example, I am six feet tall. This refers specifically to my body and therefore is true of my person, though has very little to do with my soul. I can likewise speak to those attributes that are true of my soul-- even after death-- and say that I am in heaven, though separated from my body. Your construction above is only true if personal attributes are only described as that which involves soul and body (e.g. walking, since it necessitates both volition and physical movement). Since personal attributes are true even when they refer to one part of our humanity, I do not reject the proposition you pose above.

2. If death is not separation of a person from his body (as you maintain), then you should also agree that such a construct as yours renders unintelligible the proposition, “Saint Paul, the person, is in heaven (without his natural body)”. After all, for you, “Death is not the separation of a person from a body...but a soul from a body.”

Based on my rejection of your first proposition, saying that Paul is in heaven poses no problem.

3. Given your construct, you must instead say the opposite, “Saint Paul, the person, is not in heaven awaiting the resurrection of his body.” The reason being, for you: upon death only the soul departs the body.

Again, since these propositions are built off of a fallacious premise, there is again no real problem. Saint Paul is in heaven. It does not follow that his complete person is in heaven. It is also true that Saint Paul is dead and in the grave. Human persons are made of both material and immaterial substances.

4. You believe the soul lives on. You believe the person dies. You believe the body dies. Since I’m sure you rightly recognize that the body is not the person and you deny the person leaves his body as his soul, you seem to be left with a situation in which persons no longer exist or persons lay in the grave. But if persons do exist in the intermediate state, then where? The grave contains the dead body. Heaven contains the souls made perfect, but where are the persons? Also, are there lost persons in torment or only lost souls?

Here is the crux of the problem. You have equated personhood exclusively with the soul. It would seem to logically follow that the body has no real part in the essence of mankind, only their souls according to your argumentation. It now makes perfect sense that you can discard unity between the lifeless body of Christ with the divine nature since the person, in your line of reasoning, is consubstantial with the soul and not the body. Unfortunately, the logical theological errors of this doctrine are many.

So let me try to clear up the remainder of your post:

I believe it’s perfectly intelligible to assert:

p, It’s unnatural for persons in the intermediate state to to be separated from their bodies. (That seems pretty plain to me.)

Persons in the intermediate state are not complete persons. They are waiting to be reunited with their bodies.

Yet we would never assert p*:

P*, It’s unnatural for persons in the intermediate state to to be separated from their souls.

A complete person is made of body and soul. Your argumentation suggests that the essence of personhood is the soul, which allows you to take the leap that a soul in heaven is a person in heaven, yet a body on earth has nothing to do with a person. Since a human person is a) made of two parts and b) the attributes of each part are true of the person, then c) we can affirm that the souls in heaven are not existing in absence of their person.

Why is it that p makes sense whereas p* doesn’t? I would humbly submit that the reason p makes sense and p* doesn’t is precisely because: “I = my soul” & “souls = persons”.

The conundrum here should be irrelevant at this point.

Finally, your appeal to Paul's being out of the body and present with the Lord (2 Cor. 5:8) hardly substantiates your point, since it is the soul that is the concious part of the body. It does not follow that soul = person any more than body = person. Body + soul = person.

I would still appreciate a concise answer to your thoughts on @BayouHuguenot 's post #46. I am confused as to your reasons for not answering this simple question. I'll leave my imagination as to the reason out of it.

Blessings,

Tim
 
Does anyone here know about William Lane Craig's neo-Apollinarian Christology? How does this effect the doctrine we are discussing. if that is off topic please forgive me.

Tim, Thanks for expressing my concerns. I have always struggled with understanding all this stuff.
 
Does anyone here know about William Lane Craig's neo-Apollinarian Christology? How does this effect the doctrine we are discussing. if that is off topic please forgive me.

Tim, Thanks for expressing my concerns. I have always struggled with understanding all this stuff.

It's troubling. It means he has trouble affirming a full humanity of Christ. I know why he says it, and it is in response to a tough issue, but I think he takes the wrong conclusion.
 
It's troubling. It means he has trouble affirming a full humanity of Christ. I know why he says it, and it is in response to a tough issue, but I think he takes the wrong conclusion.
Does he think it was the divine person who animated the human body? This was a question I learned about. Why is that incorrect if you can help me here?
 
One more question. How does that effect our doctrine of the hypostatic union? My Son and I are reading this thread intently as we are also discussing Sin and Temptation as it relates to Christ and us.
 
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