Deification vs Divinization, the same or different?

[Ed Walsh]

For you word-nerds,

I'm sending thr following email message to a friend I highly respect. But I wanted to hear your opinion of my question first.

No, I'm not delusional, I don't think many people will be interested in this topic. I'm just looking for one of you that's got this nailed to help me out. And I really don't need any warnings about our Eastern friends. ;-)

Thanks,

EW
~~~~~~~

Re: Deification vs Divinization

Yesterday, I was thinking about these two words and how similar they are, if not identical, except deification can have a somewhat negative connotation, while divinization seems less problematic with English speaking Americans. Then this morning I looked it up and got the following result. To my way of thinking they exaggerate the differences, nevertheless I think the definitions supports my suspicion.

Take a look and tell me if you think they are more similar than below, or are they truly interchangeable, being only a matter of a judgment call based on the audience you are addressing?

I have a paid subscription to chat GPT Plus. It does some pretty cool things.
~~~~~~~

The words "deification" and "divinization" are closely related but not identical in definition:

Deification refers to the act of making someone or something into a god or treating them with extreme reverence as if they were divine. It is often used in contexts where a person or entity is elevated to an exalted or worshipped status.

Divinization, while similar, specifically means the process of making someone divine or god-like, often used in theological contexts to describe the elevation of a human being to a divine level, such as in Christian theology where humans are said to partake in the divine nature through sanctification.

 

[Ed Walsh]

I asked the AI if it could use both in a sentence that underscores their differences and or similarities. Here's the answer I got.
~~~~~~~

Certainly! Here are sentences that illustrate the differences between "deification" and "divinization":

Deification: In ancient Rome, the deification of Julius Caesar established a precedent for the Roman emperors that followed, who were often elevated to the status of gods after their deaths.

Divinization: The concept of divinization in Eastern Orthodox Christianity suggests that through grace and participation in the sacraments, believers can partake in the divine nature, gradually transforming into a likeness of God.

These sentences highlight how "deification" often refers to the act of worshipping or exalting a figure as a deity, typically after death, in a more secular or historical context. In contrast, "divinization" is used more specifically in theological contexts, describing a transformative process towards divine likeness.

 

[RamistThomist]

the English translation isn’t that important. It comes down to what theosis means

But in the literature deification is used more than divinization

 

[Ed Walsh]

the English translation isn’t that important. It comes down to what theosis means

But in the literature deification is used more than divinization

I knew I could count on you, @RamistThomist – And being the first at that was also anticipated. ;-)
Thanks.

 

[EvanF]

I agree with the definitions of deification. "Divinization" is a more recent coining that mixes Latin and Greek roots, so it has no long-established definition and is probably seen as more malleable and unladen by authors.

If you're discussing the meaning of "theosis" as used by EO, it's important to know that the word is a noun derived from a verb meaning to deify, in the literal English sense, and was used by ancient pagan writers with this sense. No doubt the EO will object that this is not quite how they use it, never the less its use by Christians is problematic at best.

 

[Ed Walsh]

If you're discussing the meaning of "theosis" as used by EO, it's important to know that the word is a noun derived from a verb meaning to deify, in the literal English sense, and was used by ancient pagan writers with this sense. No doubt the EO will object that this is not quite how they use it, never the less its use by Christians is problematic at best.

In my own layman's way, I was aware of the theosis/deification tie-in, but I also remember how it felt the first few minutes when I heard the term in ref. to the EO. I have also seen a few lazy, wave-your-hand-and-it's-gone (hasty generalization) rejections of all EO theology (if that is what it is called)

Thanks to you, Evan, and @RamistThomist, AKA Jacob, for your insights. I'm pretty satisfied with the results and will default to the well-precedented deification. But still, with laymen like me, I will no doubt include some precising definition(s).

I've heard enough.

Thanks.

 

[Hugues Pierre]

Good afternoon brother,

If I'm not wrong, in the EO theology the believer is made partaker of the divine energies.
They use to make a strong distinction between the incomprehensible essence of God and his communicable energies.

Divinization: The concept of divinization in Eastern Orthodox Christianity suggests that through grace and participation in the sacraments, believers can partake in the divine nature, gradually transforming into a likeness of God.

 

[Knight]

The words are synonmyous:

Deification in the Eastern Orthodox Tradition, pgs. xii, 5:

Since neither of the words “deification” or “divinization” occurs in the Bible, most books about this theme tend to draw on “patristic literature”— that is, on the Fathers of the Church writing from the second century up to the fifteenth century in the Greek East and up to the tenth century in the Latin West. They make up a huge subject area. “Deification” (theosis/theopoiesis) is a theme of the Eastern Fathers, and this subject area is now rich in treatments of this theme in Greek “patristics.”

...The expressions “deification” and “divinization” are translations of two Greek words found in the early Church Fathers: theosis means “the state of being a god” and theopoiesis means “being made into a god.” These words do not occur in Scripture. The Greek Fathers used them in order to express the great height to which God in his goodness wishes to raise us. The words convey the idea of immortality or everlasting life, and of a sharing in the very life of God. Salvation is bound up with the doctrine of deification. The Orthodox tradition sees us as needing salvation from sin and death. Sin is moral. In French books on the subject, the Greek words are translated by “divinization.” Sometimes this word may be found in English works, too. For the sake of consistency, I refer to the idea expressed by the Greek words with “deification” throughout.

From pg. 39:

Our movement toward God in love is, at least in its first steps, ours, our free created energies moving toward the goodness and beauty of God. Human beings are made like God in that we are absolutely free to choose in our relationships. Thus we can refuse God. For those who choose God, a union of free will and grace takes place called synergy. Synergy means a joining of energies: the uncreated energies of God are united with the created energies of the human person.

Thus, the Eastern Orthodox concept of theosis/deification/divinization presupposes a particular concept of "synergy" between God's energies and ours: a co-operation. If that were the end of the matter, Reformed theology might be amenable to this insofar as "synergy" (i.e. co-operation) is endorsed by some Reformed theologians in the realm of progressive sanctification.

However, Eastern Orthodoxy denies the Reformed understanding of the monergistic basis, regeneration, as that alone in virtue of which any semblance of "synergy" between God and sinners becomes possible. The erroneous rejection of monergism is likely due to the faulty understanding Eastern Orthodoxy has of original sin. Thus, the thoroughgoing "synergism" particular to the underpinnings of Eastern Orthodoxy denies sola gratia and, as such, is not able to be harmonized with Reformed theology.

 

[Ploutos]

@Knight - is the notion of divine energies, and their communication to us, compatible with Reformed theology? The early patristic idea of sharing in the life of God seems simple enough, but with later developments in EO theology, this seems to turn into a blurring between what it's like to be God and not-God... if I am understanding correctly.

 

[Knight]

@Knight - is the notion of divine energies, and their communication to us, compatible with Reformed theology? The early patristic idea of sharing in the life of God seems simple enough, but with later developments in EO theology, this seems to turn into a blurring between what it's like to be God and not-God... if I am understanding correctly.

It's funny that this thread shows up as I have been writing on this very question. I may add more later:

I don't have an issue with an "essence-energy" distinction. For example, I don't think "what God is" is the same as "what God does." At the end of this discussion on divine simplicity, my own view landed in the vicinity of a Scotist view that the divine attributes, which I do believe are essentially attributable to God, are formally but not really distinct (where for them to be "really" distinct would connote separability; cf. Muller on pgs. 284ff. here).

But on Eastern Orthodoxy, the "essence-energies" distinction entails a divine essence "beyond being" or "superessential" such that no virtues can be predicated of it; that is, God's righteous actions, operations, or energies do not necessarily imply or reflect a righteous nature, character, or essence. It's one thing to say God is incomprehensible (with which I would, of course, agree). But compare this to the principle that one can know a man by his fruit; here, Calvinism seems more amenable to a theological-anthropological parallel than Eastern Orthodoxy.

To frame this point another way, take what noted Eastern Orthodox apologist Perry Robinson says in this video at minute mark 52 (link):

If somebody wanted to think that God was - you know, like hyper voluntarism - that God had no nature at all, maybe you would be stuck with the kind of reading that Rogers offers, right? That God has no inherent moral value at all. The other thing is, you know, the contrast between the ethical and the ontological. I just thought that begged the question: which theory of ethics? Well if you're a Kantian or a Mill, you know, Utilitarian, sure, maybe. Or, you know, some kind of voluntarist, divine command theory. But if you're a virtue theorist, you think that morality is not opposed to ontology in that way. Why? Because the virtues are actual states of the Soul.

Robinson's criticism of hyper voluntarism is excellent and mirrors what I have said elsewhere on this board (link). But despite his pushback against theological voluntarism, Robinson is in no position to discuss whether God's "nature" has intrinsic moral value, for Eastern Orthodoxy rejects our ability to know the essence of the Father, Son, or Spirit in any sense. Doesn't Robinson think it is a category error to apply ontological analysis to God (cf. link, comment 181)?

This question anticipates the Eastern Orthodox apologist thought that God's "nature" sometimes refers to His energies rather than His essence - which is suspect anyways, for their view of 2 Peter 1:4 appears to be exegetically strained (does "nature" mean "operations" or "actions" in other passages?). In fact, Robinson's inconsistency in asking ontological questions about that which cannot be known only serves to highlight the problem for Eastern Orthodox apologists who speak of the "divine" energies as manifesting, being "around," or in any way relating to the "divine" essence. If we can't know anything of the "divine essence," then is it coherent to speak of "divine" life in which we are said to "participate"? Steve Hays of Triablogue has written some good material on this.

Thus, Eastern Orthodox apologists tend to contradict themselves. To take one other example, Russ Manion - Perry Robinson's mentor (and who draws quite a lot from Van Til, Clark, and Bahnsen) - once wrote a fictional dialog between two metaphysical naturalists. Towards the end of the dialog, as the "protagonist" becomes more open to the idea of supernaturalism, he offers the following reflections against the skepticism of his metaphysical naturalist colleague:

What if there did exist an eternal being who’s very character was what we call moral and rational? What if he conceived and planed a created order? What if he then executed that plan and extended his rational and moral attributes to it? What if he then created other minds who, like his, were not mechanistically locked into the created order, but able to transcend and observe it? And what if he gave these minds the rational operational apparatus to evaluate their observations, to weigh them, compare them, and rationally extrapolate? Wouldn’t they then be able to learn and know?” “Wouldn’t knowledge then be possible? Wouldn’t the fact that nature was created as a rational system explain why it corresponds to rationality and why science is possible? Wouldn’t this solve the problems associated with determinism? Wouldn’t this allow us to say something is true for reasons rather than causes? Wouldn’t we be free to choose to believe the truth, rather than determined to believe what ever we are determined to believe? Wouldn’t this freedom make us morally accountable? That is, since we are ourselves the final determiners of our behavior, wouldn’t the final responsibility for our decisions lie with us?

Notice that he alludes to an "eternal being" with a "character" and "attributes." This cannot be the god of Eastern Orthodoxy, though, for reasons already mentioned above: the god of Eastern Orthodoxy is supposed to utterly transcend metaphysics and epistemology.

 

[Ploutos]

Do you think EO intends for its apophaticism to be taken in such an absolute and literal manner?

 

[Aretha]

the English translation isn’t that important. It comes down to what theosis means

But in the literature deification is used more than divinization

Can it be that we see it in the Bible too? Examples of both "deification" and "divinization"

Deification is illustrated by passages such as Psalm 82:6-7 and John 10:34-36, where humans are referred to as gods.
Divinization is illustrated by passages such as 2 Peter 1:4 and Genesis 1:26-27, where it speaks of participating in the divine nature and being created in the image of God.

---

Perplexity.ai is saying about Theosis

Key Aspects of Theosis​

1. Transformative Process: Theosis involves a gradual transformation of the believer, becoming more like God in character and being filled with divine grace.
2. Synergy: It is achieved through a cooperation (synergy) between human effort and God's uncreated energies. Human beings participate in God's divine nature without becoming divine in essence.
3. Stages: The process includes several stages:
   • Katharsis (Purification): Cleansing of sins and passions.
   • Theoria (Illumination): Enlightenment and deeper understanding of God.
   • Theosis (Union with God): The ultimate goal, where one becomes united with God.

 

[Knight]

Do you think EO intends for its apophaticism to be taken in such an absolute and literal manner?

I do not believe I am misrepresenting Eastern Orthodoxy. Take apologist David Erhan's video on the subject:

 

[RamistThomist]

Deification is illustrated by passages such as Psalm 82:6-7 and John 10:34-36, where humans are referred to as gods.
Divinization is illustrated by passages such as 2 Peter 1:4 and Genesis 1:26-27, where it speaks of participating in the divine nature and being created in the image of God.

Technically true, but I think we are making more of the English nuances than the Greek words actually suggest.

 

[Ploutos]

@Knight - it might be fool-hardy to try to comprehend this in relation to the Reformed categories with which I'm more familiar, so bear with me here. It sounds like the EO doctrine of the unknowability of God is roughly analogous to our doctrine of God's incomprehensibility. The EO just carry it farther by denying any positive knowledge of God, whereas we allow analogical knowledge.

It also sounds like their doctrine of essence/energy roughly parallels our idea of ontological/economic data about God. Is that too much of a stretch?

Last question - how much of a spectrum is there in EO on this issue, particularly regarding how "absolute" this apophaticism is? Again acknowledging the problems of trying to relate this to pre-existing categories, but I could imagine a non-Reformed person trying to elaborate our doctrine of predestination and failing both at doing it justice and at representing the variety of nuances within the Reformed world on the topic. We don't literally believe that God sends people to hell against their wishes, but I can see how an outsider might come to represent our viewpoint that way.

 

[Knight]

@Knight - it might be fool-hardy to try to comprehend this in relation to the Reformed categories with which I'm more familiar, so bear with me here. It sounds like the EO doctrine of the unknowability of God is roughly analogous to our doctrine of God's incomprehensibility. The EO just carry it farther by denying any positive knowledge of God, whereas we allow analogical knowledge.

It also sounds like their doctrine of essence/energy roughly parallels our idea of ontological/economic data about God. Is that too much of a stretch?

Last question - how much of a spectrum is there in EO on this issue, particularly regarding how "absolute" this apophaticism is? Again acknowledging the problems of trying to relate this to pre-existing categories, but I could imagine a non-Reformed person trying to elaborate our doctrine of predestination and failing both at doing it justice and at representing the variety of nuances within the Reformed world on the topic. We don't literally believe that God sends people to hell against their wishes, but I can see how an outsider might come to represent our viewpoint that way.

To answer your last question first: while I've made it a point to listen to and read about Eastern Orthodoxy, I only have so much exposure to their apologists, but I have tried to avoid low-hanging fruit. You might find a scholarly Eastern Orthodox response to questions regarding apophaticism more balanced (link), although I think they reduce to the admissions made by Erhan.

Better still is to use that which Eastern Orthodox apologists themselves consider binding: their councils. Take the following remarks from the florilegia in the Palamite synod of 1351, one of a series which are cumulatively regarded as their so-called "9th ecumenical council" and, at any rate, is dogmatically definitive for them (link, cf. link):

And again the same saint [Dionysius] says: “Now we must go on to that which is truly the theological essential name of that which truly is; but only this will we mention, that the aim of the discourse is not to reveal the superessential essence, insofar as it is superessential; for this is ineffable and unknowable and altogether impossible to reveal, and transcends the oneness itself; but to praise the procession of the divinely originated source of being which gives essence to all beings.” But the glorious Maximus in his Scholia says: “By procession here he means the divine energy, which has created every essence.”

My own thought is that the earlier link I provided to Muller's work suggests certain areas of theology proper have not been confessionally circumscribed: divine simplicity is one such area. If the Reformed view is not monolithic - and actually, I think this is to our apologetic advantage - it is difficult to know how to begin to answer your other questions. Others on this board are, I am sure, better equipped to compare what I've cited from the Eastern Orthodox side to historical, Reformed thought.

I will say that I have witnessed some Eastern Orthodox apologists particularly attempt to appropriate Reformed presuppositionalism (link). To this end, I have argued two points:

1) Their apologetics attempts to deny "the concept of epistemic neutrality... fails to situate the explanation for... denial within the context of a Reformed anthropology, particularly the doctrine of original sin."

2) Insofar as the Eastern Orthodox apologists I have in mind have more particularly attempted to appropriate "Van Tilian" presuppositionalism, they inherit what I consider to be unfortunate elements of it. That is, I am not a Van Tilian - as is obvious from a recent thread (link) - so even if Eastern Orthodoxy could appropriate Van Tilian presuppositionalism, I would say, "so much the worse for the Eastern Orthodox apologist."

Your allusion to "analogical knowledge" suggests we might fall on different sides of this question. If so, to be honest, it is not surprising that you wonder whether there is some parallel between "the unknowability of God is roughly analogous to [Van Til's] doctrine of God's incomprehensibility." On the contrary, that is very perceptive on your part!

Indeed, I too have had the thought that the attractiveness of Van Til's epistemology to some Eastern Orthodox apologists might go hand-in-hand with an unstated parallel in thought regarding theology proper. This just shows the inter-relatedness of such issues as have been raised in our discussion and how one's beliefs about one doctrine will (or should) impact his beliefs about other doctrines. It is also why I said earlier that I lean more towards a Scotistic view of divine simplicity rather than a Thomistic one.

Of course, Van Til would have denied any doctrinal affinity with Aquinas - and the same goes for Eastern Orthodox apologists! - but I think that just intimates a high irony in these discussions: when one pinpoints one's reasons for denying the possibility of univocal knowledge, he might find himself amongst some strange bedfellows!

 

[Ploutos]

To answer your last question first: while I've made it a point to listen to and read about Eastern Orthodoxy, I only have so much exposure to their apologists, but I have tried to avoid low-hanging fruit. You might find a scholarly Eastern Orthodox response to questions regarding apophaticism more balanced (link), although I think they reduce to the admissions made by Erhan.

Better still is to use that which Eastern Orthodox apologists themselves consider binding: their councils. Take the following remarks from the florilegia in the Palamite synod of 1351, one of a series which are cumulatively regarded as their so-called "9th ecumenical council" and, at any rate, is dogmatically definitive for them (link, cf. link):



My own thought is that the earlier link I provided to Muller's work suggests certain areas of theology proper have not been confessionally circumscribed: divine simplicity is one such area. If the Reformed view is not monolithic - and actually, I think this is to our apologetic advantage - it is difficult to know how to begin to answer your other questions. Others on this board are, I am sure, better equipped to compare what I've cited from the Eastern Orthodox side to historical, Reformed thought.

I will say that I have witnessed some Eastern Orthodox apologists particularly attempt to appropriate Reformed presuppositionalism (link). To this end, I have argued two points:

1) Their apologetics attempts to deny "the concept of epistemic neutrality... fails to situate the explanation for... denial within the context of a Reformed anthropology, particularly the doctrine of original sin."

2) Insofar as the Eastern Orthodox apologists I have in mind have more particularly attempted to appropriate "Van Tilian" presuppositionalism, they inherit what I consider to be unfortunate elements of it. That is, I am not a Van Tilian - as is obvious from a recent thread (link) - so even if Eastern Orthodoxy could appropriate Van Tilian presuppositionalism, I would say, "so much the worse for the Eastern Orthodox apologist."

Your allusion to "analogical knowledge" suggests we might fall on different sides of this question. If so, to be honest, it is not surprising that you wonder whether there is some parallel between "the unknowability of God is roughly analogous to [Van Til's] doctrine of God's incomprehensibility." On the contrary, that is very perceptive on your part!

Indeed, I too have had the thought that the attractiveness of Van Til's epistemology to some Eastern Orthodox apologists might go hand-in-hand with an unstated parallel in thought regarding theology proper. This just shows the inter-relatedness of such issues as have been raised in our discussion and how one's beliefs about one doctrine will (or should) impact his beliefs about other doctrines. It is also why I said earlier that I lean more towards a Scotistic view of divine simplicity rather than a Thomistic one.

Of course, Van Til would have denied any doctrinal affinity with Aquinas - and the same goes for Eastern Orthodox apologists! - but I think that just intimates a high irony in these discussions: when one pinpoints one's reasons for denying the possibility of univocal knowledge, he might find himself amongst some strange bedfellows!

Sadly, I'm not well-versed enough in either Van Tillian thought or Eastern Orthodoxy to know how perceptive I've been, nor am I certain where my current thinking on God's incomprehensibility, and the idea of analogical knowledge, fall in relation to others. Based on what I have read of Van Til, and what has been discussed on this board, I have tended to think that I would not line up with Van Til based on his apparent confusion of epistemology and apologetics (or, as Jacob puts it, order of being and order of knowing).

I wasn't so much attempting to find common ground between Reformed theology and EO as much as to explore whether some of the categories they use might be similar, even if we then use them differently. I would think that anyone short of an avowed rationalist would acknowledge some sort of divine incomprehensibility, so I was wondering if one could place the two on a spectrum, with EO simply taking incomprehensibility much farther than we do to the point of saying "we can't know anything" - or, alternatively, if the two schools are thinking in a way that's so categorically different that one can't draw parallels between a Reformed notion of divine incomprehensibility and what the EO are talking about.

I will try to watch the Erhan video at some point and see if I can make an effort to understand the language of EO thinking on its own terms, rather than trying to relate everything to what I already know.

 

[MW]

The words "deification" and "divinization" are closely related but not identical in definition:

As Jacob said, that might be true with English, but with respect to theosis the idea is concrete. It is participation in divine glory, life, etc. Personally I steer clear of both the language and the concept. We enjoy God through a mediated revelation which is accommodated to our human limitations, John 1:18.

 

[Knight]

I wasn't so much attempting to find common ground between Reformed theology and EO as much as to explore whether some of the categories they use might be similar, even if we then use them differently. I would think that anyone short of an avowed rationalist would acknowledge some sort of divine incomprehensibility, so I was wondering if one could place the two on a spectrum, with EO simply taking incomprehensibility much farther than we do to the point of saying "we can't know anything" - or, alternatively, if the two schools are thinking in a way that's so categorically different that one can't draw parallels between a Reformed notion of divine incomprehensibility and what the EO are talking about.

Any knowledge of "God" referred to within Eastern Orthodoxy will refer to divine "energies" rather than essence. Even in the clip I reference of Tikhon Pino - very well-respected and is said to by Perry Robinson to be the only scholar alive who has read the entire Palamite corpus - says:

We say that God is unknown and that He's unknowable but we also say simultaneously that He's revealed Himself to us. And to get beyond all the theoretical metaphysical language, He's revealed himself to us in his Son, in the in the human incarnation that is Jesus Christ which is God on earth. And so we encounter this in order for God to pass on the powers that that God has - and the attributes that God has - onto us as his adoptive children. And God is completely generous in this He does not hold back. And this is where we get the language of divinization or deification: it's God giving us all the titles and all the powers that He's known by when He adopts us as sons. And this is only possible because He became a human being and enacted that transfer.

What are the "titles" and "powers" by which "God" is known? His "energies," per the Palamite synods I link to above. That is, Eastern Orthodoxy thinks "God" may refer to the "energies," so it really can be confusing for one who isn't familiar with their terminology.

Their typical tack - and why I suspect they would reject any comparison to Van Til in respect to theology proper - is to say that the "energies" by which "God" is known and in which we "participate" are "uncreated." For example, they will say the light on the Mount of Transfiguration literally is visible, uncreated, divine glory (link). You will find an excellent response to this by Steve Hays in the comment section here.

Separately, there are some potential lines of engagement I've considered that still relate to theology proper. For example, Maximus the Confessor is one of the theologians they hold in most high esteem. If that's the case, though, then what do Eastern Orthodox apologists who reject the aseity of the Son and Spirit - see Jay Dyer (cf. mark 2:00:45 here) or David Erhan (cf. here) - do with the following statement by Maximus (link)?

Mystical theology teaches us, who through faith have been adopted by grace and brought to the knowledge of truth, to recognize one nature and power of the Divinity, that is to say, one God contemplated in Father, Son and Holy Spirit. It teaches us to know God as a single unoriginate Intellect, self-existent, the begetter of a single, self-existent, unoriginate Logos, and the source of a single everlasting life, self-existent as the Holy Spirit: a Trinity in Unity and a Unity in Trinity. The Divinity is not one thing in another thing: the Trinity is not in the Unity like an accident in a substance or vice versa, for God is without qualities. The Divinity is not one thing and another thing: the Unity does not differ from the Trinity by distinction of nature; the nature is simple and single in both. Nor in the Divinity is one thing dependent on or prior to another: the Trinity is not distinguished from the Unity, or the Unity from the Trinity, by inferiority of power; nor is the Unity distinguished from the Trinity as something common and general abstracted in a purely conceptual manner from the particulars in which it occurs: it is a substantively self-subsistent essence and a truly self-consolidating power. Nor in the Divinity has one thing come into being through another: there is within it no such mediating relationship as that of cause and effect, since it is altogether identical with itself and free from relationships. Nor in the Divinity is one thing derived from another: the Trinity does not derive from the Unity, since it is ungenerated and self-manifested. On the contrary, the Unity and the Trinity are both affirmed and conceived as truly one and the same, the first denoting the principle of essence, the second the mode of existence. The whole is the single Unity, not divided by the Persons; and the whole is also the single Trinity, the Persons of which are not confused by the Unity. Thus polytheism is not introduced by division of the Unity or disbelief in the true God by confusion of the Persons.

I'm no expert on Calvin, but I think his affirmation of triple-autotheism is much more in line with what Maximus says here than Eastern Orthodox apologists would like... and they might perhaps bite this bullet.

 

[jwright82]

Good website on archetypal/ectypal theology

https://theologiainvia.wordpress.com/tag/archetypalectypal-theology/. Hope this works. This is a website with great quotes on the archetypal/ectypal distinction in theology. This is a foundational distinction in theology, enjoy!

www.puritanboard.com

This should be a good thread on the archetypal/ectypal distinction, which anyone can read to see how "catholic" the idea is. It may or may not correspond to the essence/energies distinction in EO. Michael Horton uses the EO formula from time to time, for what it's worth.
The A/E distinction is where we get a doctrine of analogical knowledge of God from, last I recall. As far as diefication goes I don't know if there's a direct overlap between the two distinctions. But in my naive opinion on EO the A/E distinction is the place to start from a Reformed perspective to evaluate EO.

 

[jwright82]

What Kind of Knowledge Can We Have About God? - Amy Mantravadi

In an article on theology proper for the Reformation21 blog, I previously discussed the various ways God reveals himself to us. Having determined how we can know God, we must … Continue Reading

amymantravadi.com

Excellent article on this subject. Not only on analogical knowledge but on it's pedigree in theology.
From what I understand Ed even though the E/e distinction may be more or less as helpful as a Reformed (Western catholic) distinction, they still held to a Creator/creature distinction. We become "like God but not essentially God". I could be wrong and Jacob and Knight are far more qualified to answer from the EO perspective than I am. My two cents but I think that by beginning from our heritage and working over to evaluate EO's heritage my be better for people to get their heads around and Jacob and Knight can fill in the blanks.

 

[jwright82]

The Divine Energies, Divine Simplicity And Reformed Orthodoxy

Directed Study Dr. Michael Horton 05 / 28 / 10 In this paper I will give a summary of various approaches to the Doctrine of God from the early and late (or High) periods of Reformed theology. Spec…

wspapers.wordpress.com

A good paper by Michael Horton on this subject, I'll look up diefication next. I start with the prolegomena issues first because whatever is in fact meant by diefication if it violates the Creator/creature distinction it's no good. But if it doesn't than it might be useful in some way. The Lutheran Jordan Cooper wrote a book on diefication that he inserted "Chritification" in it's place. Just off the top of my head though.
https://www.amazon.com/Christification-Lutheran-Approach-Jordan-Cooper-ebook/dp/B00MG2TYDY/. here's his book.

https://www.modernreformation.org/resources/essays/when-we-become-beautiful.

Excellent paper on a Reformed view of diefication but not a critique of EO'S view. But I think again, though not calling for a wholesale embrace of the Eastern's doctrine, as long as the doctrine doesn't cross the Creator/creature distinction there may may be wiggle room for it. Horton has said before that the problem is in collapsing glorification with justification, like the RCC's collapsing sanctification with justification.
The only safeguard is to work out the C/c distinction along catholic/confessional Protestant lines in the prolegomena first and then whatever corollaries there are. By that I mean the C/c is essential to our epistemological/ontological situation to understand were we stand in our union with Christ, and all the benefits of that.
But even as our knowledge of God is analogical (like God's knowledge) so we are becoming like Christ analogically (we'll never be divine for instance). It's no different than becoming "one flesh in marriage with our spouse", it's not that in paradise we'll stop being independent but the same but it's an analogical union. I hope I make sense. I don't deal with EO enough to say what they mean by it. So I'm open to corrections from anyone. I don't think for most EO diefication is some kind of pantheistic union with the divine, which is why maintaining the C/c in all vital to orthodox doctrine.

 

[MW]

The Divine Energies, Divine Simplicity And Reformed Orthodoxy

Directed Study Dr. Michael Horton 05 / 28 / 10 In this paper I will give a summary of various approaches to the Doctrine of God from the early and late (or High) periods of Reformed theology. Spec…

wspapers.wordpress.com

A good paper by Michael Horton on this subject, I'll look up diefication next. I start with the prolegomena issues first because whatever is in fact meant by diefication if it violates the Creator/creature distinction it's no good. But if it doesn't than it might be useful in some way. The Lutheran Jordan Cooper wrote a book on diefication that he inserted "Chritification" in it's place. Just off the top of my head though.
https://www.amazon.com/Christification-Lutheran-Approach-Jordan-Cooper-ebook/dp/B00MG2TYDY/. here's his book.

I have the impression that was written by a student under Horton's direction, but I may be wrong. At any rate, it is very in-depth and a good exploration of the similarities and differences.

The reformed reaction to Andreas Osiander effectively set the trajectory of reformed theology away from the idea that God communicates anything essentially divine to man.

 

[jwright82]

I have the impression that was written by a student under Horton's direction, but I may be wrong. At any rate, it is very in-depth and a good exploration of the similarities and differences.

The reformed reaction to Andreas Osiander effectively set the trajectory of reformed theology away from the idea that God communicates anything essentially divine to man.

I see. Yeah I think you're right about authorship. Andreas Osiander, didn't the Lutheran's heavily react to him?

 

[MW]

I see. Yeah I think you're right about authorship. Andreas Osiander, didn't the Lutheran's heavily react to him?

Yes, but Calvin especially targets him. Osiander taught a believer is justified by God's essential righteousness indwelling him.

 

[Ed Walsh]

The reformed reaction to Andreas Osiander effectively set the trajectory of reformed theology away from the idea that God communicates anything essentially divine to man.

I am convinced that I know God. A knowing that is warm and true to my innermost being. But I never–and I mean never have even been tempted to think He is communicating anything–and I mean anything beyond what is written. We know about Him that we may know Him. To stop short of that will lead to an unsatisfied life, at best, or if pride takes over, we run the danger of becoming what Michale Reeves calls an "Evangelical Pharisees" at worst. But as I ponder the wonder of He that liveth, the One who was dead, and behold is alive for evermore, I can tremble and fear Him who loves me, but I always assume––and that with a joy unspeakable which is full of glory––that there are many flaws in my thinking and meditating. But He, He is above all blessing and praise. (Nehemiah 9:5)

 

[MW]

I am convinced that I know God. A knowing that is warm and true to my innermost being. But I never–and I mean never have even been tempted to think He is communicating anything–and I mean anything beyond what is written.

Ed, that is a good way of balancing it out. Those who speak of being deified do not enjoy true access to God. This may be the reason why they depend on a range of images, ceremonies, and mediators. We can be content with the Spirit and the Scriptures to lead us to the accessible knowledge of God.