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What are the implications of nominalism for Christian theology? Is it the majority (or minority) view among the Reformed? And what are your personal thoughts?
What are the implications of nominalism for Christian theology? Is it the majority (or minority) view among the Reformed? And what are your personal thoughts?
.At best you can find some Reformers using Scotist language
The implications of nominalism are quite terrible: there are no real attributes of God.
.At best you can find some Reformers using Scotist language
Scotism is the classic antithesis of nominalism.
The implications of nominalism are quite terrible: there are no real attributes of God.
Not necessarily. Nominalism could be seen as a helpful theory of language in terms of Divine simplicity. Nominalism essentially treats all language as analogical.
Okay. I'll think of that. For some reason I was thinking of Scotus as in the nominalist tradition.
Yes, and more broadly also. I've been thinking lately about the existence of uncreated abstract entities (e.g., numbers). I realize however that such a position probably has some serious implications on theology.What are the implications of nominalism for Christian theology? Is it the majority (or minority) view among the Reformed? And what are your personal thoughts?
Are you thinking of "nominalism" in terms of the "realist" v "nominalist" contentions of the middle ages?
Yes, and more broadly also. I've been thinking lately about the existence of uncreated abstract entities (e.g., numbers). I realize however that such a position probably has some serious implications on theology.
So one can be a nominalist with regard to the existence (or non-existence rather) of uncreated universals and be an epistemological realist, believing that our minds have direct access to the material world, correct?Yes, and more broadly also. I've been thinking lately about the existence of uncreated abstract entities (e.g., numbers). I realize however that such a position probably has some serious implications on theology.
Those who trace the threads of reformed scholasticism back to the middle ages generally see an appropriation of both philosophies. Because of the Creator-creature ontological difference all human concepts are "nominalist" and based on a creationist worldview. This means man cannot know the essence of things, but only their created qualities as revealed by God. However, there is also an appropriation of a realist epistemology in the areas of cognition, perception, etc. True knowledge corresponds to the authentic structures and conditions of human life. Hence the knowledge of things is not arbitrary but rationally and morally binding.
There is a similar appropriation of the voluntarist/necessarian traditions.
As numerical values are applicable to finite things they must be a part of the creation. At the same time, there is such a necessity of them in connection with finite things that they carry rational and ethical value which is binding on men. The same would apply to the laws of logic and scientific principles.
Let me know if my thinking is correct: If universals don't exist, divine simplicity would no longer suffer from having to claim the identity of certain attributes of God, because we are speaking of God analogically. God is simple in se but we can ascribe attributes to him by talking about him analogically, as he has revealed himself in his works and revelation. These attributes, however, are not referring to timeless universals.Nominalism could be seen as a helpful theory of language in terms of Divine simplicity. Nominalism essentially treats all language as analogical.
So one can be a nominalist with regard to the existence (or non-existence rather) of uncreated universals and be an epistemological realist, believing that our minds have direct access to the material world, correct?
Let me know if my thinking is correct: If universals don't exist, divine simplicity would no longer suffer from having to claim the identity of certain attributes of God, because we are speaking of God analogically. God is simple in se but we can ascribe attributes to him by talking about him analogically, as he has revealed himself in his works and revelation. These attributes, however, are not referring to timeless universals.
I see where that helps in thinking about divine simplicity. It seems that the Platonic view of universals would have a hard time reconciling divine simplicity.
What's the upshot of a moderate realist position (Thomas' position?)? How does it differ from both the conceptualist position and the nominalist position?
Is the moderate realist position also the position of Aristotle? By contemplation of an object our mental faculties form universal concepts that, although the product of our thought, have an real correspondence with reality. Conceptualism would say that we have these concepts exist in our mind, but we cannot be sure on whether or not they correspond to reality.What's the upshot of a moderate realist position (Thomas' position?)? How does it differ from both the conceptualist position and the nominalist position?
It maintains that universals are essentially contingent but still subsistent. Johannes Duns Scotus' work is essentially an attempt to make sense of this idea. Basically, for an object, its instantiation of property X is distinguished both from the universal X and the X of another object by a principle of individuation, which is the essence of the ibject in question. If all that seems overly complex to you, then you understand Occam's objection.
Is the moderate realist position also the position of Aristotle?
Conceptualism would say that we have these concepts exist in our mind, but we cannot be sure on whether or not they correspond to reality.
How would these concepts correspond to reality? Analogically so? And am I right that your charge against realism is that it's inconceivable to think of contingent universals, since if they are conceivable, they ought to exist in some sense apart from whether or not they have any instantiation in reality? I think a solution might be that non-instantiated universals that are possible (and all of them for that matter) exist in the mind of God. Thus we do not have the problem of co-eternal subsistent entities existing apart from God, and we salvage a moderate realism.Is the moderate realist position also the position of Aristotle?
Maybe. The whole medieval debate on this was within Aristotle's framework. The main point in Aristotle is that the universals arise from the particulars rather than the other way round.
Conceptualism would say that we have these concepts exist in our mind, but we cannot be sure on whether or not they correspond to reality.
Not quite. The concepts describe real things and do, on the whole, correspond to reality, but they don't have subsistence. Universals exist as concepts rather than as subsistent entities.
My objection to realism is that we don't seem to have a clear understanding of what it would mean for a universal not to exist at all. Subsistent things are either necessary or contingent. Since God is the only entity with necessary existence, universals, if they were subsistent, would be contingent. But part of contingency is that a contingent thing might or might not exist. The problem is that if a universal is possible, then it exists in some sense. So either a) there are necessarily subsistent entities that are not identical with God (false) b) universals are not subsistent but only have conceptual existence.
How would these concepts correspond to reality? Analogically so?
I think a solution might be that non-instantiated universals that are possible (and all of them for that matter) exist in the mind of God.