Well I suppose when our terminology is all precise then we can have real Christian unity...
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Originally posted by SemperFideles
Well I suppose when our terminology is all precise then we can have real Christian unity...
i. When we find an "apparent contradiction" we should *try* to resolve it, yes. As Van Til says above, "man should employ this law to the Scriptures.
Here then is a situation which is inadequately described as amazing. There is a problem which has baffled the greatest theologians in history. Not even Holy Scripture offers a solution. But Dr. Clark asserts unblushingly that for his thinking the problem has ceased to be a problem. Here is something phenomenal. What accounts for it? The most charitable, and no doubt the correct, explanation is that Dr. Clark has come under the spell of rationalism. It is difficult indeed to escape the conclusion that by his refusal to permit the Scriptural teaching of divine sovereignty and the Scriptural teaching of human responsibility to stand alongside each other, and by his claim that he has fully reconciled them with each other before the bar of human reason, Dr. Clark has fallen into the error of rationalism [The Clark-Van Til Controversy, 23].
ii. I dont know if we *must* resolve it. Should, yes, but not necessarily must.
iii. We can and should embrace it. I had said, what happens if Scripture clearly teaches x and y. Let's assume that both x and y appear to contradict eachother. What do we do?
Try to resolve it, sure. But what if you can't? Do you reject the clear teachings of Scripture, or do you reject one for the other?
I am thankful for the above. The more the Clarkian shows that his own mind is the authority, the more he brings that system in to disrepute.
It's not slander if the charge is accurate. You don't need Scripture to see rationalistic methodology. Even Spinoza used the Scriptures for some things. Your history is simplistic and misrepresents the facts. I guess the whole OPC was so stupid as to not see through Van Tils inability to do anything more than just name call. Take comfort that you can trust in your hero over the ruling of the duly appointed authority of elders in God's Church. As long as Clark and his followers insist he wasn't under the spell of rationalism then it must be so.Originally posted by Sean
The reason the Complainants slandered Dr. Clark as a "œrationalist" was that he claimed to harmonize two doctrines of Scripture which they, the Vantilians, claimed could not be harmonized. What else could the Vantilians do except slander?
Originally posted by SemperFideles
It's not slander if the charge is accurate. You don't need Scripture to see rationalistic methodology. Even Spinoza used the Scriptures for some things. Your history is simplistic and misrepresents the facts. I guess the whole OPC was so stupid as to not see through Van Tils inability to do anything more than just name call. Take comfort that you can trust in your hero over the ruling of the duly appointed authority of elders in God's Church. As long as Clark and his followers insist he wasn't under the spell of rationalism then it must be so.Originally posted by Sean
The reason the Complainants slandered Dr. Clark as a "œrationalist" was that he claimed to harmonize two doctrines of Scripture which they, the Vantilians, claimed could not be harmonized. What else could the Vantilians do except slander?
Originally posted by Paul manata
Originally posted by Jeff_Bartel
Originally posted by SemperFideles
It's not slander if the charge is accurate. You don't need Scripture to see rationalistic methodology. Even Spinoza used the Scriptures for some things. Your history is simplistic and misrepresents the facts. I guess the whole OPC was so stupid as to not see through Van Tils inability to do anything more than just name call. Take comfort that you can trust in your hero over the ruling of the duly appointed authority of elders in God's Church. As long as Clark and his followers insist he wasn't under the spell of rationalism then it must be so.Originally posted by Sean
The reason the Complainants slandered Dr. Clark as a "œrationalist" was that he claimed to harmonize two doctrines of Scripture which they, the Vantilians, claimed could not be harmonized. What else could the Vantilians do except slander?
I don't understand the charge of "rationalism" in this case. Is it the charge of being "too logical?" If so, is there even such a thing?
Clark "escaped" the paradox by denying free will.
Indeed, his own account seems paradoxical.
Clark says men are responsible because God says so and who are we to talk back to God.
Sorry, but I don't find asserting a dogmatic position utterly convincing.
I mean, men are free because God says so, who are we to argue with God. Anyone can play that game.
If desire to make the facts fit, no matter what is denied, just so man can have ease in your epistemic life, is your program, I'd say that's rationalism.
Originally posted by BobVigneault
I loved the dog poop illustration though. Great job!
Originally posted by Paul manata
"Man has no free will for salvation is of grace and God is sovereign." RRR p.242
"Man is responsible because God calls him to account; man is responsible because the supreme being can punish him for disobedience." RRR p. 241
Originally posted by Civbert
The issue that people get stuck on can be put this way: if (as the bible says) man is totally deprived by nature, and has no capacity to do any spiritual good - how can man be punished for his sins? But the question itself begs the question. It assumes that it is self-evident that the only thing we can be rightly punished for doing, are the things we are free to not do. But there is no argument that you can make that will come to that conclusion. There is not rational link between free will and responsibility. Everyone who runs into that "paradox" brings this presumptions unquestioningly to the table.
Man has no free will for salvation is of grace and God is sovereign." RRR p.242
"Man is responsible because God calls him to account; man is responsible because the supreme being can punish him for disobedience." RRR p. 241
In other news, my dog is morally responsible for pooping on the carpet because I can punish him and I call him to account.
Furthermore, God is sovereign even over your "in a sense" freeness that man has. God is soveriegn *over all.* So, God determines, plans, foreordains that "in a sense" free actions of man.
Still tricky.
Now, if you deny man's freedom (Clark) then you have a tidy resolution, or you can deny God's sovereignty (Arminians) and have a tidy resolution.
Or, you can hold both, historic Calvinism
Originally posted by Paul manata
...
Well, we'll be getting in to this, but it's not as simple as you'd like, sorry.
G.I. WIlliamson, in excellant commentary on the confession writes,
"It is all too common to bring the railing accusation against the reformed faith that it denies free will. Many reject the reformed faith out of hand because they assume that divine sovereignty cancels all true human liberty and responsibility. Yet, ironically, no other system of teaching safeguards true human liberty and responsibility as does the reformed faith."
I mean, you guys may be right, but let's not pretend that you're espousing orthodox reformed teaching on the subject, you're not. At least face it and admit it.
9:1 God hath endued the will of man with that natural liberty, that is neither forced, nor by any absolute necessity of nature determined to good or evil (Deu_30:19; Mat_17:12; Jam_1:14).
9:2 Man, in his state of innocency, had freedom and power to will and to do that which was good, and well pleasing to God (Gen_1:26; Ecc_7:29); but yet mutably, so that he might fall from it (Gen_2:16, Gen_2:17; Gen_3:6).
9:3 Man, by his fall into a state of sin, hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation (Joh_15:5; Rom_5:6; Rom_8:7): so as, a natural man, being altogether averse from that good (Rom_3:10, Rom_3:12), and dead in sin (Eph_2:1, Eph_2:5; Col_2:13), is not able, by his own strength, to convert himself, or to prepare himself thereunto (Joh_6:44, Joh_6:65; 1Co_2:14; Eph_2:2-5; Tit_3:3-5).
9:4 When God converts a sinner, and translates him into the state of grace, He freeth him from his natural bondage under sin (Joh_8:34, Joh_8:36; Col_1:13); and, by His grace alone, enables him freely to will and to do that which is spiritually good (Rom_6:18, Rom_6:22; Phi_2:13); yet so, as that by reason of his remaining corruption, he doth not perfectly, nor only, will that which is good, but doth also will that which is evil (Rom_7:15, Rom_7:18, Rom_7:19, Rom_7:21, Rom_7:23; Gal_5:17).
9:5 The will of man is made perfectly and immutably free to do good alone, in the state of glory only (Eph_4:13; Heb_12:23; 1Jo_3:2; Jud_1:24).
Originally posted by Paul manata
Originally posted by Jeff_Bartel
Originally posted by Civbert
The issue that people get stuck on can be put this way: if (as the bible says) man is totally deprived by nature, and has no capacity to do any spiritual good - how can man be punished for his sins? But the question itself begs the question. It assumes that it is self-evident that the only thing we can be rightly punished for doing, are the things we are free to not do. But there is no argument that you can make that will come to that conclusion. There is not rational link between free will and responsibility. Everyone who runs into that "paradox" brings this presumptions unquestioningly to the table.
The only way this becomes a "paradox" is if you define responsibility as "autonomy" which Calvinists know is false. Responsiblity to these people should be defined as an autonomous person committing sins of their own autonomous free will.
But is this how responsibility should be defined? Does the bible define responsibility this way? Calvinists should say "no." If responsibility does not rest on this, then the paradox suddenly disappears.
Well, we'll be getting in to this, but it's not as simple as you'd like, sorry.
G.I. WIlliamson, in excellant commentary on the confession writes,
"It is all too common to bring the railing accusation against the reformed faith that it denies free will. Many reject the reformed faith out of hand because they assume that divine sovereignty cancels all true human liberty and responsibility. Yet, ironically, no other system of teaching safeguards true human liberty and responsibility as does the reformed faith."
I mean, you guys may be right, but let's not pretend that you're espousing orthodox reformed teaching on the subject, you're not. At least face it and admit it.
Freedom may be defined as "the absence of external coercion." If a man is not forced by any power outside himself to do that which is contrary to "what he wants to do," then we may properly say that he is "free." The wonder of God's predestination is that God does leave men free in this sense, even though he predstines everthing that every man will ever do. Some people use the word "freedom" in another sense, however, which is false in the extreme. They mean, by the "freedom" of man, that man has the power to do good or evil at any moment of time. To say that a man is able to do good or evil, is very diferent [sic] from saying that a man is at liberty to do what he desires. We believe that man has liberty but not ability to do what is right. For the truth is that man, while free from coercion from the "outside" is not free from the control of his own nature. He who is evil by nature must of necessity do evil (just as a corrupt tree must of necessity produce corrupt fruit, Mt. 7:17-19). Just as we may say that God is good and therefore cannot do evil, so we may say that man (by nature) is evil and cannot (of himself) do good.
The Scripture references [to WCF Chapter III, Section I] show clearly that God controls the wills of men"¦
This does not mean that violence was done to the will of the creatures. It was not as if the men wanted to adopt Ahithophel´s plan and were forced to follow Hushai against their desires. Their psychological processes issued in a desire to follow Hushai´s plan. But it must be noted that God established psychological processes just as truly as he established physical processes.
This ties in with the next phrase, "œnor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established."
"¦He [God] does not arrange things or control history apart from secondary causes.
Originally posted by Paul manata
Originally posted by Jeff_Bartel
I think there is some equivication of "free-will" on this thread. We must keep them seperate!
I asked for a definition above.
Freedom may be defined as "the absence of external coercion." If a man is not forced by any power outside himself to do that which is contrary to "what he wants to do," then we may properly say that he is "free."
Originally posted by Paul manata
Fine, God *determines* that a man will truly do what the man *wants* to do.
*The man* wanted to do it, by his own free agency, yet God determined that it would happen and not anything else.
*The man* chose to do bad. No one coerced him. He really *chose it.* He had *two* (or 3 ...n!) options. He *really* had these options. Yet God determiend that he would have a *real* choice but only choose A rather than B (or c ...z). He *never* would have chosen B, yet his choosing A was free.
Seems paradoxical to me.
Originally posted by Paul manata
We should try to resolve them, if we can.
Originally posted by Paul manata
Why is it problematic to belive both statement if you can't resolve them? It's not clear to me. Van Til's point was on propositions which *logically presupposed* other doctrines. These, therefore, could not be given up.
Again, I pose the question: If Scripture teaches x and y, and x and y are clear, and x and y appear to contradict, what do you do if you can't resolve it?
Originally posted by Paul manata
We know it's not a contradiction all together because *there are no contradictions all together.* This should not be brought up anymore.
Anyway, I can throw it back on you: how do you know your modification is correct. Rational consistency does not = truth as shown by this:
1) The moon is made of green cheese.
2) Hitler signed the death warrent for Jews.
These are consistent, but (1) is not true.
More to the point, then:
3) JFK was assasinated in 1963.
4) JFK was not assasinatied in 1963
can be resolved by this:
5) JFK was not assasinated in 1963, he's renting a room from me, next door to Elvis.
Thus (4) and (5) resolved a contradiction, but they're not true.
Therefore, how do you know that because you've supposedly resolved the apparent contradiction you've taught correct doctrine? Resolving apparent contradiction by false propositions does not, therefore, *in reality* take away the original paradox.
The person knows it must be a paradox, his misunderstanding, etc., but the presuppositionalist *knows* (on the basis of Divine revelation, which is a precondition for knowing anything at all) that it *can't* be a contradiction.
Originally posted by Paul manata
Lastly, Clark didn't *resolve* the *admitted* paradox by consigning it to God's secret will. You *cannot* resolve it because it's God's *secret* will (He's not told us all, yet). Therefore there are paradoxes in Scripture that you *can't* resolve. So, do you reject that God wills and does not will certain things in his secret council? "But how could God will and not will murder." Clark says, "Deut. 29:29"! That's not a resolution, and it's an admission that God wills and not-wills something. Is going to Deut. 29:29, say, fideism?
Sean, when can I start charging for all the lessons I've been (and will be) giving you?
Originally posted by Paul manata
The statements are NOT "illogical" to me. They might be "apparently illogical."
Seriously, they're not illogical, and I don't see how they have to be. Why, because I know that's it's "in one sense and not another." The problem is, that God has not revealed the different senses. I try to "not go beyond what is written."
But the point is that if there is an "apparent" contradiction, then apparently one of the statements is false, and you can not (and do not) believe both. Now, if you mean by "apparent" that it is not a clear contradiction, then you are uncertain if you understand one or the other position clearly, but given some particular readings, they leads to a contradiction. Well whatever those particular readings are, you know they can not both be true - and you certainly do not believe they are both true as you apparently now read them.Originally posted by Paul manata
Question for this person:
If you accept a paradox in scripture as true without resolving it:
How do you know that you are understanding it correctly? Since we know that the Scriptures do not contradict itself, one could easily have a false view of one side of the "paradox" and by modifying it to the correct Biblical view would then eliminate the paradox altogether.
Originally posted by Paul manata
Why is it problematic to believe both statement if you can't resolve them? It's not clear to me. Van Til's point was on propositions which *logically presupposed* other doctrines. These, therefore, could not be given up.
Again, I pose the question: If Scripture teaches x and y, and x and y are clear, and x and y appear to contradict, what do you do if you can't resolve it?
Originally posted by Paul manata
We know it's not a contradiction all together because *there are no contradictions all together.* This should not be brought up anymore.
No one's saying that rational consistency makes all things true. But logical contradiction means something is false.Originally posted by Paul manata
Anyway, I can throw it back on you: how do you know your modification is correct. Rational consistency does not = truth as shown by this:
1) The moon is made of green cheese.
2) Hitler signed the death warrant for Jews.
These are consistent, but (1) is not true.
So you are saying the (5) showed that (4) is false?Originally posted by Paul manata
More to the point, then:
3) JFK was assassinated in 1963.
4) JFK was not assassinated in 1963
can be resolved by this:
5) JFK was not assassinated in 1963, he's renting a room from me, next door to Elvis.
Thus (4) and (5) resolved a contradiction, but they're not true.
Originally posted by Paul manata
Therefore, how do you know that because you've supposedly resolved the apparent contradiction you've taught correct doctrine? Resolving apparent contradiction by false propositions does not, therefore, *in reality* take away the original paradox.
No, he knows that contradictions do not exist in Scripture because Scripture is true, and contradiction by definition mean one of two statements are false and the other true. What he knows is that if it appears to be a contradiction - then his understanding is flawed. And he does not believe he understands correctly the Scriptures the he thinks mean X and Y.Originally posted by Paul manata
The person knows it must be a paradox, his misunderstanding, etc., but the presuppositionalist *knows* (on the basis of Divine revelation, which is a precondition for knowing anything at all) that it *can't* be a contradiction.
Originally posted by Paul manata
Lastly, Clark didn't *resolve* the *admitted* paradox by consigning it to God's secret will. You *cannot* resolve it because it's God's *secret* will (He's not told us all, yet). Therefore there are paradoxes in Scripture that you *can't* resolve.
Originally posted by Paul manata
So, do you reject that God wills and does not will certain things in his secret council? "But how could God will and not will murder." Clark says, "Deut. 29:29"! That's not a resolution, and it's an admission that God wills and not-wills something. Is going to Deut. 29:29, say, fideism?
Originally posted by Paul manata...
Lastly, resolve the whole "Clark Paradox." That is, man AND God both take "the first" step, when "first" implies, well, the first.
God "initiated man;s choices *before* man did. man "initated" the choice *after* God di, yet they *both* took the first step. Must be a Det 29:29 thing.
Originally posted by Paul manata
"God wills X in one sense and wills Y in another."
Well, of course. That's why it's not a real contradiction. (btw, I was talking now about Clark's definition of "choice" as something *initiating* and *determining* an action. God initated and determined it and so did man. Seems paradoxical).
But your answer "resolved" nothing.
If x and y are taught clearly, do you believe, disbelieve, or suspend belief? Sounds like "suspend belief." Thus we see that you'll only believe what your mind can rationalize. Thanks for the admission. I think that is a very important stance for people to see the Clarkians taking.
Originally posted by Paul manata
...
Hence we can conclude the debate, i think. You've brought up a good point: What do both camps do with the paradoxes:
VT: Embrace the Bible, embrace the paradox.
Clark: Approach the scriptures agnistically, until man's finite, fallen, and sinful mind can "resolve" the paradox. Who cares if the resolution is correct or not, as long as we have cognitive rest. (I'll have to flesh this out a bit in my own thinking, but this may be because of Clark's commitment to the coherence theory of truth - which has many, many problems (e.g., contradictory systems can be deemed *equally* rational, etc).
[Edited on 5-18-2006 by Paul manata]
Originally posted by Paul manata
"God wills X in one sense and wills Y in another."
...
Seriously, they're not illogical, and I don't see how they have to be. Why, because I know that's it's "in one sense and not another." The problem is, that God has not revealed the different senses. I try to "not go beyond what is written."
I never equivocated.
Clark "escaped" the paradox by denying free will.
Indeed, his own account seems paradoxical.
Clark says men are responsible because God says so and who are we to talk back to God.
Sorry, but I don't find asserting a dogmatic position utterly convincing.
I mean, men are free because God says so, who are we to argue with God. Anyone can play that game.
If desire to make the facts fit, no matter what is denied, just so man can have ease in your epistemic life, is your program, I'd say that's rationalism.
"Man has no free will for salvation is of grace and God is sovereign." RRR p.242
"Man is responsible because God calls him to account; man is responsible because the supreme being can punish him for disobedience." RRR p. 241
In other news, my dog is morally responsible for pooping on the carpet because I can punish him and I call him to account.
Furthermore, God is sovereign even over your "in a sense" freeness that man has. God is soveriegn *over all.* So, God determines, plans, foreordains that "in a sense" free actions of man.
Still tricky.
Now, if you deny man's freedom (Clark) then you have a tidy resolution, or you can deny God's sovereignty (Arminians) and have a tidy resolution.
Or, you can hold both, historic Calvinism.
Regarding choices, I simply said that to "choose" sin freely (free as in Clark's, Confessions, Williamson's term) implies, well, two or more options, or else how is it a choice?
Regarding "power" to choose, well I can't point that out in the confession but, as Clark says, the confession was not meant to be a technical philosophical treatise. Power can be moral or metaphysical (Clark agrees). Man is not morally able to choose but is metaphysically able. So, you'd have to define what you meant here. At any rate, it wasn't my problem but your lack of knowledge on the subject.
I believe the subsequent posts show the paradox (and even a new paradox in Clark's "answer.") So, sending us to Clark got us involved in more paradox. You can of course *say* that Clark resolved it, just like Jeff says. I, on the other hand, tried to argue for my position. Maybe it's axiomatic that Clark resolved the problem and that's why you think you don't need to argue?
At any rate, make the proper adjustments to your bill.
Originally posted by Paul manata
I never equivocated, though.
If Clark's position was that of the WCF, et al., then fine.
At worst I misunderstood Clark.
At any rate, though, I've still not seen how he "resolves" anything.
Simply saying man is accountable because God says so, *resolves* nothing. Van Til et al would of course agree with that, but it's trivial.
I still need to pick up Reymond's text, unfortunately.
So:
1) I think my position is clear.
2. I didn't see the paradox resolved.
3) I've shown Van Til is not "irrational" for holding to his view, even if he's wrong.
4) I've brough up some paradoxes that have not been attempted to be resolved.
6) I've admitted that God determines the choice man makes, so I've not equivocated.