Chalcedonian Christology: A Question

[Knight]

I have a question about Christology I am hoping others are able to answer. As a point of departure, I will cite a footnote from Lane Tipton's article, Incarnation, Inspiration, and Pneumatology: A Reformed Incarnational Analogy (which one can read here). Italic is his emphases, bold and underline are my own:

Louis Berkhof writes, "The Logos furnishes the basis for the personality of Christ. It would not be correct, however, to say that the person of the Mediator is divine only. The incarnation constituted him a complex person, constituted of two natures ... The human nature has its personal existence in the person of the Logos. It is in-personal rather than impersonal ... His human nature is not lacking in any of the essential qualities belonging to that nature, and also has individuality, that is personal subsistence, in the person of the Son of God ... the Logos assumed a human nature that was not personalized, that did not exist by itself" (Systematic Theology [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986], 322, emphasis added). In addition, Francis Turretin makes precisely the same point when he observes, "By this union ... the human nature (which was destitute of proper personality and was without subsistence [anypostatos] because otherwise it would have been a person) was assumed into the person of the Logos ... (the Logos may be said to have communicated his own subsistence to the flesh by assuming it into the unity of his own hypostasis so that the flesh is not a hypostasis, but real [enypostatos]; not existing separately, but sustained in the Logos [as an instrument and adjunct personality joined to it] in order to accomplish the work of redemption)" (Institutes of Elenctic Theology, vol. II [Phillipsburg, New Jersey: P&R, 1994], 311, 317, emphasis added). Herman Bavinck summarizes anhypostatic Christology within the Reformed tradition with characteristic penetration: "This, now, is how Christ's human nature is united with the person of the Son. The Son does not just become a person in and through human nature, for he was that from eternity. He needed neither the creation nor the incarnation to arrive at himself, to become a personality, a spirit, or a mind. The incarnation does mean, however, that the human nature that was formed in and from Mary did not for an instant exist by and for itself, but from the very first moment of conception was united with and incorporated in the person of the Son. The Son increated it in himself and, by creating, assumed it in himself. Yet that human nature is not for that reason incomplete, as Nestorius and nowadays still Dorner assert. For though it did not complete itself with a personality and selfhood of its own, it was nevertheless from the start personal in the Logos" (Reformed Dogmatics: Sin and Salvation in Christ [Grand Rapids: Baker, 2006], 306-307, emphasis added). John Murray observes: " ... the consciousness of his intradivine Sonship is in the foreground as defining the person that he is. And the inference would seem to be that our Lord's self-identity and self-consciousness can never be thought of in terms of human nature alone. Personality cannot be predicated of him except as it draws within its scope his specifically divine identity. There are two centres of consciousness but not of self-consciousness" ("The Person of Christ" in Collected Writings of John Murray [Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Banner of Truth, 1977], II:138, emphasis added). John Owen makes virtually identical observations when he says, "We deny that the human nature of Christ had any such subsistence of its own as to give it a proper personality, being from the time of its conception assumed into the subsistence with the Son of God" (The Works of John Owen, vol. 12 [Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Banner of Truth, 1979], 210, emphasis added). In addition, Owen makes a critical and nuanced distinction between the assumption of the human nature and hypostatic union proper (cf. Works, I:225-226 [my thanks to Carl Trueman for these references from Owen]). The quotations above, spanning the 17th to the 20th century, represent the historic Reformed doctrine of anhypostatic Christology. Revisionists, who are impacted by actualistic ontology and deny the Logos asarkos and extra Calvinisticum (e.g., Bruce McCormack, "Grace and Being: The Role of Gracious Election in Karl Barth's Theological Ontology" in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth, ed. John Webster [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000], 97-102), may assert that the quotations above do not express the historic Reformed view on the matter. Such a position, however, would prove indefensible if primary sources were properly understood.

Miaphysites argue against this version of Chalcedonian Christology as follows:

If the human nature is "incorporated in the person of the Son" and "has individuality, that is personal subsistence, in the person of the Son of God," then the hypostasis of the Son has changed. Is this inference correct?

If so, second question: if the hypostasis of the Son is a mode of the divine essence, then if the hypostasis of the Son has changed, has not the mode of the divine essence changed?

 

[MW]

If the human nature is "incorporated in the person of the Son" and "has individuality, that is personal subsistence, in the person of the Son of God," then the hypostasis of the Son has changed. Is this inference correct?

Anhypostatic means it is not personal in itself. This points to the fact that the Son did not take over a human person. Enhypostatic means the human nature was personalised by the Son. This is important because it means the human nature wasn't a mere appearance.

There are a few avenues taken to explain why this is not a change. First, all relations between God and the creature are not really in God but only in the creature (hence creation is not a change in God); therefore the hypostatic union is not "in" God but in the creature. That will open up the usual debates about divine simplicity. Then we must distinguish that it was not the divine nature, but a divine person that assumed human nature, so that the divine nature itself was unchanged. With the groundwork laid we are ready to affirm that the assumption of human nature conveyed no new perfection to the divine person but He remained the same. The Chalcedonian formula ensures we understand there are two entre distinct natures without change to either of them. Beyond this we are bound to recognise that it is incomprehensible to us how such a thing could be.

If anything a "single nature" Christology is bound to explain how Christ can be true man without a change being introduced into the divine nature. And this has been deemed an impossibility in historical theology.

 

[Pomopu]

Thanks for that lucid response, Rev. Winzer. Very helpful.

 

[Knight]

Anhypostatic means it is not personal in itself. This points to the fact that the Son did not take over a human person. Enhypostatic means the human nature was personalised by the Son. This is important because it means the human nature wasn't a mere appearance.

There are a few avenues taken to explain why this is not a change. First, all relations between God and the creature are not really in God but only in the creature (hence creation is not a change in God); therefore the hypostatic union is not "in" God but in the creature. That will open up the usual debates about divine simplicity. Then we must distinguish that it was not the divine nature, but a divine person that assumed human nature, so that the divine nature itself was unchanged. With the groundwork laid we are ready to affirm that the assumption of human nature conveyed no new perfection to the divine person but He remained the same. The Chalcedonian formula ensures we understand there are two entre distinct natures without change to either of them. Beyond this we are bound to recognise that it is incomprehensible to us how such a thing could be.

Can you elaborate on how the bold above is reconcilable with statements from Reformed theologians in the OP such as:

"His human nature... has individuality, that is personal subsistence, in the person of the Son of God."

"...the human nature... was assumed into the person of the Logos."

"...the human nature... was united with and incorporated in the person of the Son. The Son increated it in himself and, by creating, assumed it in himself."

For these men, is not the human nature "in" the Son? What you have said seems to imply that this isn't possible (if the Son is a mode of the divine essence). But I am happy to be corrected, and thank you for engaging.

If anything a "single nature" Christology is bound to explain how Christ can be true man without a change being introduced into the divine nature. And this has been deemed an impossibility in historical theology.

Eutychianism is certainly impossible.

Miaphysites, following Cyril of Alexandria, teach a divine-human composite "nature" with really distinct parts (like body-soul). They would say the soul does not change when it recomposes with our resurrection bodies after the intermediate state; just so, when we consider the Incarnate Son, the divine part did not change when united or composed with a human part. It's just that these parts of the composite Christ ought not be enumerated as two subsistences or individuals (which they sometimes call "natures" - the amount of terminological, historical baggage makes this issue more challenging) in reality but only conceptually or theoretically.

 

[Ploutos]

Miaphysites, following Cyril of Alexandria, teach a divine-human composite "nature" with really distinct parts (like body-soul). They would say the soul does not change when it recomposes with our resurrection bodies after the intermediate state; just so, when we consider the Incarnate Son, the divine part did not change when united or composed with a human part. It's just that these parts of the composite Christ ought not be enumerated as two subsistences or individuals (which they sometimes call "natures" - the amount of terminological, historical baggage makes this issue more challenging) in reality but only conceptually or theoretically.

Tell me you want to affirm the full divinity and humanity of Christ without affirming the full divinity and humanity of Christ. That's what I have to say to modern day Miaphysites.

 

[Knight]

Tell me you want to affirm the full divinity and humanity of Christ without affirming the full divinity and humanity of Christ. That's what I have to say to modern day Metaphysics.

Cyril lived in the 5th century, for whatever you want to say about his modern day followers.

If "nature" can mean "hypostasis" in some formative, Christological contexts in church history, I can understand why one who accepts a union of natures/hypostases wouldn't want to enumerate two natures/hypostases after the union. That's a terminological question.

The difficulty for strict, Cyrillian miaphysites - as I see it - pertains to the operations of Christ. That is, they can't deny that Christ assumed a human will (Apollinarianism), and they can't deny that said will is really distinct from His divine will. Yet they deny two wills.

Their defense is that the will (singular) of Christ is composite, that "will is enumerated not by the faculty proper to essence, but by its act, and since there is one joint motion of the Active principle of the Divinity moving the lesser principle of the Humanity, there is One theandric intellect/will."

What this means is that they have very different and, I think, exegetically suspect ways of understanding, say, Mark 13:32, Luke 2:52, etc. - despite that they are able to find some support for their views in Cyril and so forth.

 

[Ploutos]

Cyril lived in the 5th century, when this doctrine was still being formulated. I accept that there is linguistic and terminological baggage here, and that this played a role in the refusal of some parts of Christendom to accept the Chalecdonian formulation. But it sure looks like his modern day followers are trying to flesh out all the implications of orthodox Chalcedonian Christology without accepting orthodox Chalcedonian Christology.

 

[Knight]

Cyril lived in the 5th century, when this doctrine was still being formulated. I accept that there is linguistic and terminological baggage here, and that this played a role in the refusal of some parts of Christendom to accept the Chalecdonian formulation. But it sure looks like his modern day followers are trying to flesh out all the implications of orthodox Chalcedonian Christology without accepting orthodox Chalcedonian Christology.

I understand your perspective. Theirs would be that modern day "followers" of Leo's Tome - Chalcedonians - are trying to flesh out all the implications of Ephesian Christology without accepting the council of Ephesus (e.g. Cyril's 3rd anathema).

In response to both perspectives, I would note that the more one reads of the early church councils, the more one sees the reality of political and ulterior motivations. This is as much true for miaphysites as anyone else. Dr. Richard Price, who translated the documents of Ephesus 431, says (minute mark 8:31):

Now, in the case of Ephesus, there's a particular curiosity because there were the council's bishops all summoned. The emperor intended they all meet together, come to a common mind. Well, they didn't meet together! Cyril opened the with the majority of the bishops there on his side before the Syrians arrived. The Syrians arrived and set up a rival council. They have in one city (Ephesus) two rival councils going on, attacking and condemning each other. Strictly speaking, the council never properly met. Now, after after the council, the Syrians came - Cyril's council which was certainly the majority one, condemned Nestorius - and the Syrians came to accept that condemnation, which means a gradual acceptance by everybody of this council as ecumenical. And that is standard by the time you reach Ephesus in 451. But the problem remains for us. Can we really call this council ecumenical? But it never properly met! The bishops never properly met together. [Here, the interviewer asks, "and when you when you say the bishops never properly met together, can you maybe just briefly expand on that?" Price responds,] Well, bishops meeting together means they meet together and discuss together, debate together, and vote together. When you've got the council split into two parts that anathematize each other, that's pretty funny as a ecumenical council. And the emperor - I said the ecumenical council is, in a sense, an imperial council - and the emperor Theodosius II never ruled. He never said, "This. I count this council. This half of it is genuine and the other is not." No, he though accepted some of the decrees of the Cyrillian - the majority - council, he never made any ruling as to which of the council really had his full backing and authority.

On the whole, I find these sorts of observations to make for excellent arguments for sola scriptura and WCF 34.4. Church history is subordinate to exegetical and systematic theology.

 

[RamistThomist]

I understand your perspective. Theirs would be that modern day "followers" of Leo's Tome - Chalcedonians - are trying to flesh out all the implications of Ephesian Christology without accepting the council of Ephesus (e.g. Cyril's 3rd anathema).

In response to both perspectives, I would note that the more one reads of the early church councils, the more one sees the reality of political and ulterior motivations. This is as much true for miaphysites as anyone else. Dr. Richard Price, who translated the documents of Ephesus 431, says (minute mark 8:31):



On the whole, I find these sorts of observations to make for excellent arguments for sola scriptura and WCF 34.4. Church history is subordinate to exegetical and systematic theology.

I really wrestled with the claims of Oriental Orthodox for a few years (never in danger of "switching," though). Some of their sharper apologists can show parallels between what the Council of Ephesus condemned as Nestorian and what Pope Leo said in his Tome. Moreover, Chalcedon didn't settle as many problems as we would have liked.

OOs can point to passages in Gregory of Nazianzus, Nyssa, and Irenaeus which speak of a "Mixture" of divine and human in Jesus. All three of these theologians are superior to anyone at Chalcedon. In terms of analytic theology, they would say that the divine hypostasis (glossed as "concrete reality") assumes certain human properties, but these properties never create a third term, neither divine nor human.

But there is an obvious problem: it is not clear how, say, God the Father, doesn't have access also to these human properties attached to the divine hypostasis.

 

[RamistThomist]

It is funny to watch these discord Eastern Orthodox teenagers, after bullying some Reformed soccer mom online, try to debate someone like Daniel Kakish. Kakish, a Miaphysite, then teaches them humility.

 

[Knight]

I really wrestled with the claims of Oriental Orthodox for a few years (never in danger of "switching," though). Some of their sharper apologists can show parallels between what the Council of Ephesus condemned as Nestorian and what Pope Leo said in his Tome. Moreover, Chalcedon didn't settle as many problems as we would have liked.

OOs can point to passages in Gregory of Nazianzus, Nyssa, and Irenaeus which speak of a "Mixture" of divine and human in Jesus. All three of these theologians are superior to anyone at Chalcedon. In terms of analytic theology, they would say that the divine hypostasis (glossed as "concrete reality") assumes certain human properties, but these properties never create a third term, neither divine nor human.

But there is an obvious problem: it is not clear how, say, God the Father, doesn't have access also to these human properties attached to the divine hypostasis.

I agree with much of what you said. Regarding your posed problem, wouldn't they just say that there are three divine hypostases and only one of them united with a human hypostasis (en theoria, since the human hypostasis never really independently subsisted)?

 

[MW]

Can you elaborate on how the bold above is reconcilable with statements from Reformed theologians in the OP such as:

"His human nature... has individuality, that is personal subsistence, in the person of the Son of God."

"...the human nature... was assumed into the person of the Logos."

"...the human nature... was united with and incorporated in the person of the Son. The Son increated it in himself and, by creating, assumed it in himself."

For these men, is not the human nature "in" the Son? What you have said seems to imply that this isn't possible (if the Son is a mode of the divine essence). But I am happy to be corrected, and thank you for engaging.

The Son is a mode of subsisting; He is not a mode of the divine essence. One is Trinitarianism; the other is the heresy of Modalism.

There is an infinite distance between God and the creature. God is; human nature becomes. God is most pure act; human nature is potential. God is necessary; human nature is contingent. God is infinite; human nature is finite. There is no sense in which a created thing like human nature could really be in God. It can only be "in Him" in the same way that we say that "In Him we live and move and have our being." It can never be more than it is. Natures are what natures are.

Human nature is in the Person who is God by reason of "union." Mary is the mother of our Lord; not of His divine nature, but of the human nature of the Person who is the Lord. That nature has not undergone any change; it has simply been taken up into a personal union. We use the word "personal union" to distinguish it from an "essential" union.

Eutychianism is certainly impossible.

Miaphysites, following Cyril of Alexandria, teach a divine-human composite "nature" with really distinct parts (like body-soul). They would say the soul does not change when it recomposes with our resurrection bodies after the intermediate state; just so, when we consider the Incarnate Son, the divine part did not change when united or composed with a human part. It's just that these parts of the composite Christ ought not be enumerated as two subsistences or individuals (which they sometimes call "natures" - the amount of terminological, historical baggage makes this issue more challenging) in reality but only conceptually or theoretically.

Miaphysites claim to follow Cyril; in reality they seize on a few unguarded statements where Cyril was desirous to affirm the union of natures. Their use of "nature" exposes their error for anyone who examines it in the light of Chalcedon. A nature is what a nature is. Once it becomes "composite" it is made a different nature. Don't allow their word salads to confuse you.

 

[Knight]

The Son is a mode of subsisting; He is not a mode of the divine essence. One is Trinitarianism; the other is the heresy of Modalism.

Good clarification of what I intended, thank you.

There is an infinite distance between God and the creature. God is; human nature becomes. God is most pure act; human nature is potential. God is necessary; human nature is contingent. God is infinite; human nature is finite. There is no sense in which a created thing like human nature could really be in God. It can only be "in Him" in the same way that we say that "In Him we live and move and have our being." It can never be more than it is. Natures are what natures are.

Human nature is in the Person who is God by reason of "union." Mary is the mother of our Lord; not of His divine nature, but of the human nature of the Person who is the Lord. That nature has not undergone any change; it has simply been taken up into a personal union. We use the word "personal union" to distinguish it from an "essential" union.

The bold indicates to me that you think the hypostasis of the Son changed. Is that right? If not, can you clarify what you mean by the bold?

Miaphysites claim to follow Cyril; in reality they seize on a few unguarded statements where Cyril was desirous to affirm the union of natures. Their use of "nature" exposes their error for anyone who examines it in the light of Chalcedon. A nature is what a nature is. Once it becomes "composite" it is made a different nature. Don't allow their word salads to confuse you.

They use nature as a contranym. In some contexts, they say "nature" refers to ousia. In other contexts, to hypostasis. It's the latter in which Cyril (and they) understand mia physis (one "nature").

Are you using "nature" with a single, univocal meaning? If so, what is it?

"Once it becomes "composite" it is made a different nature" - however you answer the above questions, can you then apply your reasoning in this quote to the body/soul analogy? For example, as I said in the post to which you replied, I mentioned that after the intermediate state, a Christian's soul will recompose with his resurrection body. One's soul once again becomes one part of a composite. Does that make the soul "a different nature"? Or what else would you say is thereby "made a different nature"?

 

[MW]

The bold indicates to me that you think the hypostasis of the Son changed. Is that right? If not, can you clarify what you mean by the bold?

The bold was clarified with "by reason of union." Again, natures are what they are. Properties belong to the nature. There was no change of properties; therefore no change of nature. Divine properties remained divine properties. Human properties belonged to the human nature, and the nature as a whole was united to the person. Personal union is essential to the formula.

Are you using "nature" with a single, univocal meaning? If so, what is it?

A working definition is the basic properties of a thing, or a thing having characteristic properties.

 

[MW]

can you then apply your reasoning in this quote to the body/soul analogy? For example, as I said in the post to which you replied, I mentioned that after the intermediate state, a Christian's soul will recompose with his resurrection body. One's soul once again becomes one part of a composite. Does that make the soul "a different nature"? Or what else would you say is thereby "made a different nature"?

Body and soul are composite parts from a substance dualist perspective. The divine and human are united "personally" in the Son. Two different things. The analogy is sometimes used to illustrate the "possibility" of such an union, not to describe what the union itself is.

 

[MW]

On the interpretation of Cyril, note Hans van Loon's conclusion after his painstaking study in The Diophysite Christology of Cyril of Alexandria, pp. 578-579:

The final conclusion of this study is that Cyril of Alexandria is not the miaphysite theologian he is often made out to be. Before the reunion with the Antiochenes, he hardly spoke of ‘one nature’ of the incarnate Word. His language is much more dyophysite. In the writings investigated, the word φύσις hardly ever—probably never—means ‘separate existence’; it rather has three main senses: (1) it may refer to a common nature, to the reality which is shared by individuals which are consubstantial; or (2) to an individual nature, which combines individual existence—not necessarily separate existence—with essence; or (3) to all the individuals belonging to a common nature combined. In his trinitarian theology Cyril has adopted the usage of the Cappadocians, and φύσις normally indicates the divine common nature, and sometimes the Godhead as such. In christological contexts, the term can take on each of the three senses.

Other language in Cyril’s christological texts is at times incorrectly regarded as miaphysite. Expressions like ‘natural union’ and ‘natural unity’ are dyophysite in that they denote the coming together of two natures, two entities that belong to the Aristotelian category of substance. They do not imply that the result is one nature, but rather that the two natures are combined into one separate reality.

 

[Ploutos]

I understand your perspective. Theirs would be that modern day "followers" of Leo's Tome - Chalcedonians - are trying to flesh out all the implications of Ephesian Christology without accepting the council of Ephesus (e.g. Cyril's 3rd anathema).

In response to both perspectives, I would note that the more one reads of the early church councils, the more one sees the reality of political and ulterior motivations. This is as much true for miaphysites as anyone else. Dr. Richard Price, who translated the documents of Ephesus 431, says (minute mark 8:31):



On the whole, I find these sorts of observations to make for excellent arguments for sola scriptura and WCF 34.4. Church history is subordinate to exegetical and systematic theology.

This is concerning to me because this kind of reasoning can lead to an individualistic biblicism. I don't think you would do that, but it sets the stage.

The political machinations behind so many seminal events in church history should neither be hidden away out of embarrassment nor proclaimed as the only relevant facts. Hagiography is just as damaging as deconstructionism in the end. For one thing, if you try to sift through the politics to find an "innocent" party, you won't. No side of this or other debates comes out looking God. But for another thing, the dirty political realities are how God has chosen to work in his church - sometimes in spite of them, sometimes because of them. If we believe simultaneously in the sinfulness of man and in the credibility of God's promise to build and preserve his church, then it is not only fitting but inevitable that great things will come out of unkempt circumstances.

I do think the Chalcedonian formula was one such thing. As Bavinck said, the language of Chalcedon is not sacrosanct, but we have yet to do better. Its strength lies in the fact that it does not try to comprehensively explain the person of Christ - but rather that, in succinct language, it puts up some fairly simple parameters within which orthodoxy can be found and outside of which there is departure from the truth.

Regarding your last paragraph - I would say church history is subordinate to scripture, but that church history should be interwoven with exegetical and systematic theology. I don't think you can artificially separate or rank them in this way. Saying church history should be subordinate to exegetical theology is not a "sola scriptura" argument.

I really wrestled with the claims of Oriental Orthodox for a few years (never in danger of "switching," though). Some of their sharper apologists can show parallels between what the Council of Ephesus condemned as Nestorian and what Pope Leo said in his Tome. Moreover, Chalcedon didn't settle as many problems as we would have liked.

OOs can point to passages in Gregory of Nazianzus, Nyssa, and Irenaeus which speak of a "Mixture" of divine and human in Jesus. All three of these theologians are superior to anyone at Chalcedon. In terms of analytic theology, they would say that the divine hypostasis (glossed as "concrete reality") assumes certain human properties, but these properties never create a third term, neither divine nor human.

Two things: there is a label for a person or writing that solves as many problems as we like. It's "rationalist". Chalcedon didn't intend to, and never could, solve as many problems as we would like because they recognized that they were working out a mystery beyond human comprehension.

As for OOs finding implicit miaphysitism in pre-Chalcedonian fathers... that holds as much water with me as subordinationist and universalist appeals to Origen.

Beyond that... I'd like to see some of these YouTubers you mention square up against Rev. Winzer, to whom I am grateful for the illuminating thoughts he shared in this thread.

 

[RamistThomist]

As for OOs finding implicit miaphysitism in pre-Chalcedonian fathers... that holds as much water with me as subordinationist and universalist appeals to Origen.

It's a bit more than implicit. These fathers use the language of "mixture." Moreover, both Athanasius and his immediate followers operated on a Logos-sarx Christology, Word-flesh, not Word-nature. Perhaps the distinction is a bit fine, but I think it cashes out like this. A nature is a genus, a universal. But when Jesus became flesh, so they argue, he didn't assume the universal of humanity (for the simple point that I, being part of that universal, didn't also become incarnate). He assumed flesh. That is why Cyril insisted on using hypostasis, not ousia. The distinctions are cashed out here.

McGuckin on Natures

This ties in with my recent reflections on universals, natures, and metaphysics. This is from John McGuckin’s fine work on St Cyril. I applaud Perry Robinson for doing the legwork in putting…

tentsofshem.wordpress.com

There are still some problems with that.

Beyond that... I'd like to see some of these YouTubers you mention square up against Rev. Winzer, to whom I am grateful for the illuminating thoughts he shared in this thread.

Perhaps, but Rev Winzer probably has the same view of youtube debates as I do. In any case, these guys spend 99% of their time attacking EO bullies.

 

[jwright82]

This is concerning to me because this kind of reasoning can lead to an individualistic biblicism. I don't think you would do that, but it sets the stage.

The political machinations behind so many seminal events in church history should neither be hidden away out of embarrassment nor proclaimed as the only relevant facts. Hagiography is just as damaging as deconstructionism in the end. For one thing, if you try to sift through the politics to find an "innocent" party, you won't. No side of this or other debates comes out looking God. But for another thing, the dirty political realities are how God has chosen to work in his church - sometimes in spite of them, sometimes because of them. If we believe simultaneously in the sinfulness of man and in the credibility of God's promise to build and preserve his church, then it is not only fitting but inevitable that great things will come out of unkempt circumstances.

I do think the Chalcedonian formula was one such thing. As Bavinck said, the language of Chalcedon is not sacrosanct, but we have yet to do better. Its strength lies in the fact that it does not try to comprehensively explain the person of Christ - but rather that, in succinct language, it puts up some fairly simple parameters within which orthodoxy can be found and outside of which there is departure from the truth.

Regarding your last paragraph - I would say church history is subordinate to scripture, but that church history should be interwoven with exegetical and systematic theology. I don't think you can artificially separate or rank them in this way. Saying church history should be subordinate to exegetical theology is not a "sola scriptura" argument.

Two things: there is a label for a person or writing that solves as many problems as we like. It's "rationalist". Chalcedon didn't intend to, and never could, solve as many problems as we would like because they recognized that they were working out a mystery beyond human comprehension.

As for OOs finding implicit miaphysitism in pre-Chalcedonian fathers... that holds as much water with me as subordinationist and universalist appeals to Origen.

Beyond that... I'd like to see some of these YouTubers you mention square up against Rev. Winzer, to whom I am grateful for the illuminating thoughts he shared in this thread.

My pastor is very fond of saying "only God can draw a straight line out of a crooked stick".

 

[MW]

Perhaps, but Rev Winzer probably has the same view of youtube debates as I do. In any case, these guys spend 99% of their time attacking EO bullies.

As someone who clicks on a link and watches a video I wouldn't know how to debate on you tube.

 

[jwright82]

As someone who clicks on a link and watches a video I wouldn't know how to debate on you tube.

Don't be so hard yourself Reverend Winzer. I hear you have many young children. You could always have them show you how.

 

[MW]

Don't be so hard yourself Reverend Winzer. I hear you have many young children. You could always have them show you how.

I think I will leave that for something that matters like having to use a mobile phone.

 

[Knight]

This is concerning to me because this kind of reasoning can lead to an individualistic biblicism. I don't think you would do that, but it sets the stage.

The political machinations behind so many seminal events in church history should neither be hidden away out of embarrassment nor proclaimed as the only relevant facts. Hagiography is just as damaging as deconstructionism in the end. For one thing, if you try to sift through the politics to find an "innocent" party, you won't. No side of this or other debates comes out looking God. But for another thing, the dirty political realities are how God has chosen to work in his church - sometimes in spite of them, sometimes because of them. If we believe simultaneously in the sinfulness of man and in the credibility of God's promise to build and preserve his church, then it is not only fitting but inevitable that great things will come out of unkempt circumstances.

This is true.

However, my point is that there is a clear difference between councils and Scripture. The nuanced contexts we are both speaking about are what cause even OOs and EOs to acknowledge that knowledge of which councils count as "ecumenical" occurs over time (centuries, even) rather than immediately. I would argue this leads to an epistemic distinction one can make between councils and Scripture, for there is quite a difference in how God's people in the Corinthian church may have immediately known the letters of Paul were God-breathed compared to how God's people may come to understand in which councils God worked and in which he did not (e.g. Nicaea II).

I do think the Chalcedonian formula was one such thing. As Bavinck said, the language of Chalcedon is not sacrosanct, but we have yet to do better. Its strength lies in the fact that it does not try to comprehensively explain the person of Christ - but rather that, in succinct language, it puts up some fairly simple parameters within which orthodoxy can be found and outside of which there is departure from the truth.

Regarding your last paragraph - I would say church history is subordinate to scripture, but that church history should be interwoven with exegetical and systematic theology. I don't think you can artificially separate or rank them in this way. Saying church history should be subordinate to exegetical theology is not a "sola scriptura" argument.

I agree with the underlined.

I disagree with the bold. For example, the letter of Ibas was accepted at Chalcedon. That's problematic for EOs and RCs who want to say Chalcedon was infallible. Insofar as we ought to reject the letter of Ibas, we ought to reject that portion of Chalcedon in which it was accepted.

You can even see that 7th century theologians were aware of this problem (link, [Constantinople II] "condemned... that letter which is said to have been written by Ibas." This leads some EO apologists to "reject the scholarly consensus on this point" (link), suggesting an entirely different letter by Ibas was in view at Chalcedon.

You are correct, then, that one cannot and should not try to "artificially separate" church history from sola scriptura. That was not what I was saying. On the contrary! One's view of the data of church history is going to be influenced by his view of the function of church history itself. One must take care, then, not to inflate one's view of church history such that it becomes his rule of faith, and this inflation needs to be called out when others attempt to do so.

Two things: there is a label for a person or writing that solves as many problems as we like. It's "rationalist". Chalcedon didn't intend to, and never could, solve as many problems as we would like because they recognized that they were working out a mystery beyond human comprehension.

That isn't in question (not for me, at least).

If you have a further reply, I will happily read it, but I'll likely not respond - which isn't to say that I haven't enjoyed this, but I only have so much time, and I'd like to refocus on the topic of the thread.

@MW, thanks for the responses. I'll try to get to them as I can.

 

[Knight]

The bold was clarified with "by reason of union." Again, natures are what they are. Properties belong to the nature. There was no change of properties; therefore no change of nature. Divine properties remained divine properties. Human properties belonged to the human nature, and the nature as a whole was united to the person. Personal union is essential to the formula.



A working definition is the basic properties of a thing, or a thing having characteristic properties.


Body and soul are composite parts from a substance dualist perspective. The divine and human are united "personally" in the Son. Two different things. The analogy is sometimes used to illustrate the "possibility" of such an union, not to describe what the union itself is.

Can you clarify if personal union means you accept or reject that the hypostasis of the Son changed?

On the interpretation of Cyril, note Hans van Loon's conclusion after his painstaking study in The Diophysite Christology of Cyril of Alexandria, pp. 578-579:

I read some of van Loon's book a few months ago, including what you cited. I have not seen OOs address it even though I have asked them about it, so it is probably well worth a more thorough read.

 

[MW]

Can you clarify if personal union means you accept or reject that the hypostasis of the Son changed?

No, He did not change. We know the nature did not change. And the person did not change -- He was and remained the Son.

 

[jwright82]

I think I will leave that for something that matters like having to use a mobile phone.

You know I'm old enough to remember pagers and getting a "911" page from my ex girlfriend. Then my mom laughed at me when my 15 year old self threw a fit about her not stopping the car so I could call her, BTW we didn't have cellphone's only payphones. I'm like "you don't get it mom, it's a 911 page that's life or death". It was always something stupid.

 

[Knight]

No, He did not change. We know the nature did not change. And the person did not change -- He was and remained the Son.

How many hypostases would you affirm of the incarnate Son?

Do you also mind defining "hypostasis"?

 

[MW]

How many hypostases would you affirm of the incarnate Son?

Do you also mind defining "hypostasis"?

Isn't it self-evident in light of my first reply? At any rate, hypostasis is a person and the Son is one person.

 

[Knight]

Isn't it self-evident in light of my first reply? At any rate, hypostasis is a person and the Son is one person.

I want to make sure that we aren't talking past each other. I still am not sure whether than is the case, and perhaps it is because I have not been clear in what sense I am using the word "hypostasis."

In what I am asking in the OP, I don't think "person" qua proposon captures the meaning of hypostasis. For one thing, Basil reports that Sabellius enumerated three different persons (prosopa) but not three hypostases (see volume 28 here):

It must be well understood that, as he who does not confess a community of substance falls into polytheism, so he who does not grant the individuality of the Persons is carried away into Judaism. Our mind, supported, as it were, by some underlying principle, must stamp upon itself clear impressions and thus arrive at an understanding of the object of its desire. If we have not grasped the meaning of Paternity, nor considered Him about whom this attribute is defined, how can we receive the concept of God the Father? In fact, it is not sufficient to enumerate the differences in the Persons, but it is necessary to admit that each Person exists in a true hypostasis. Not even Sabellius rejected the illusion of Persons without hypostasis, saying that the same God, though He is one in essence, is transformed on each occasion according to the needs arising and is spoken of now as Father, now as Son, and now as Holy Spirit.

Sabellius affirmed three "persons" but rejected that the Father, Son, and Spirit are individuations of the divine ousia. That's a rejection of three hypostases.

Further, John of Damascus even calls an individual horse a "hypostasis" and "person." You may agree with that, but I just want to make sure we are both speaking of "hypostasis" in terms of an individual rather than prosopon.

If you think all of this is perfectly obvious and implicit in what you've written, then we are on the same page. But in that case, it seems you reject:

1. That the divine hypostasis/individual of the Son changes by Himself becoming composite (Reformed theologians in the OP, Maximus, John of Damascus)
2. That Christ is a single hypostasis resulting from a composition of the divine hypostasis/individual with a human body and soul (miaphysites)
3. Multiple hypostases (Nestorianism)

I'm left wondering, then, on what grounds you predicate a human body and soul of the individual/hypostasis of the Son. Just what is "personal union" if none of the above?

 

[MW]

In what I am asking in the OP, I don't think "person" qua proposon captures the meaning of hypostasis. For one thing, Basil reports that Sabellius enumerated three different persons (prosopa) but not three hypostases (see volume 28 here):

Prosopon is an actor's mask in a play, and could be used to describe the "character" without attributing personhood. This suits modalism. Hypostasis in this earlier stage of thought was more often connected with what came to be known as substance, what stands "under" something as basic to its being. But by Chalcedon the two words have become more concrete and less flexible.

Further, John of Damascus even calls an individual horse a "hypostasis" and "person." You may agree with that, but I just want to make sure we are both speaking of "hypostasis" in terms of an individual rather than prosopon.

By Chalcedon hypostasis and prosopon are used for the person.

If you think all of this is perfectly obvious and implicit in what you've written, then we are on the same page. But in that case, it seems you reject:

1. That the divine hypostasis/individual of the Son changes by Himself becoming composite (Reformed theologians in the OP, Maximus, John of Damascus)
2. That Christ is a single hypostasis resulting from a composition of the divine hypostasis/individual with a human body and soul (miaphysites)
3. Multiple hypostases (Nestorianism)

I'm left wondering, then, on what grounds you predicate a human body and soul of the individual/hypostasis of the Son. Just what is "personal union" if none of the above?

This brings us back to my first reply -- the human nature was personalised by the Son. It had no hypostasis of its own. There was an assumption of human nature by the Son so that it subsists in the Person of the Son. It is something added -- an adjunct. Turretin explains:

"XXII. The communication of the hypostasis of the Logos (Logou) made flesh can be understood in three ways: either effectively (as if it effected in the flesh another hypostasis); or transitively, so that it may be maintained that he formally transferred his own hypostasis into the flesh; or assumptively because he assumed flesh into the same hypostasis and united it to himself. In the former way, the phrase is heterodox and Nestorian. For if he had formed another hypostasis, there would be two hypostases and consequently two persons. The second is no less heretical because thus the flesh would formally subsist in the subsistence of the Logos (Logou) and thus be truly a person. Besides a personal property is simply incommunicable. But in the third sense, it is true and orthodox (viz., the Logos [Logos] may be said to have communicated his own subsistence to the flesh by assuming it into the unity of his own hypostasis so that the flesh is not a hypostasis, but real [enypostatos]; not existing separately, but sustained in the Logos [Logō] [as an instrument and adjunct personally joined to it] in order to accomplish the work of our redemption)."