Can God be Proven to Exist?

[Travis Fentiman]

Hebrews 1:3 says God is “upholding all things by the word of his power.” If this is true then it should be for all created things that their existence and continuance has no sufficient explanation in their own created natures, but is due only to God willing them to exist.

Thus if one investigates natural things by nature's light, this is what one should find. I argue in a new article that this is in fact what one does find, and that necessarily when the nature of things changing and causation is examined.

The general tenor of the proof is old, from Aristotle. It was developed through Thomas Aquinas and more recently by Edward Feser. I have restylized it in a popular way. A very similar argument was given by the Ducth reformed theologian Peter van Mastricht.

See what you think, if God has been proven to exist! I will be glad to hear your thoughts.

A Proof for God’s Existence - ReformedBooksOnline​

 

[MW]

I accept there is a "rational level" where you can prove God exists. The argument from change is as good as any other, and the way you have stated it is coherent.

But in an ultimate sense we cannot "prove" He exists without making Him a perfect version of ourselves. Every logical deduction is a projection of our own rationality. Reason itself bears witness to God's existence; indeed, because He is the "I am," existence itself demands that He exists. We cannot deny it without denying that we exist. But every rational argument needs to be stripped bare of its hubris and made to feel naked and ashamed before One who is altogether Other than ourselves. There must be a via negationis which denies that He is like us. Our glory is to be like Him. His glory is not to be like us. We are made in His image. He is not made in ours. The very idea that He needs to be proven to exist must be refuted and repelled. We, rather, must prove that we exist. And we can only do that by the humble acknowledgment of the eternal God. The eternal God is our refuge and underneath are the everlasting arms. Without them we would fall into nothingness.

Hugh Binning (Works, 38): All our knowledge reacheth no farther than admiration. “Who is like unto thee?” Exod. 15:11; Ps. 89:6, 7; and admiration speaks ignorance. The greatest attainment of knowledge reacheth but to such a question as this, Who is like to thee? to know only that he is not like any other thing that we know, but not to know what he is. And the different degrees of knowledge are but in more admiration or less at his unconceivableness, and in more or less affection expressed in such pathetic interrogations: O, who is like the Lord? How excellent is his name? Here is the greatest degree of saints’ knowledge here-away, to ask with admiration and affection such a question that no answer can be given to, or none that we can conceive or understand so as to satisfy wondering, but such as still more increaseth it.

 

[Travis Fentiman]

I accept there is a "rational level" where you can prove God exists. The argument from change is as good as any other, and the way you have stated it is coherent.

But in an ultimate sense we cannot "prove" He exists without making Him a perfect version of ourselves. Every logical deduction is a projection of our own rationality. Reason itself bears witness to God's existence; indeed, because He is the "I am," existence itself demands that He exists. We cannot deny it without denying that we exist. But every rational argument needs to be stripped bare of its hubris and made to feel naked and ashamed before One who is altogether Other than ourselves. There must be a via negationis which denies that He is like us. Our glory is to be like Him. His glory is not to be like us. We are made in His image. He is not made in ours. The very idea that He needs to be proven to exist must be refuted and repelled. We, rather, must prove that we exist. And we can only do that by the humble acknowledgment of the eternal God. The eternal God is our refuge and underneath are the everlasting arms. Without them we would fall into nothingness.

Hi Matthew,

Thank you for the mildness of your reply, which is helpful in dialoguing, and for showing where you agree. Its probably unlikely that I will persuade you where we differ as you appear to have strong thoughts about such, but for the sake of better understanding:

1. I am not sure what an ultimate sense of proving would entail. But recognizing from reason from the created order that God must exist is fine with me.​

​

2. Every logical deduction I am not persuaded is only a projection of our humanity. If the deduction be necessary, it is necessary, from the God-given nature of things and God-given reason, albeit humans use such, as we were designed to by God.​

​

3. I am not aware where my rational arguments in the proof may bear hubris, but if it is stripped of such, the rational arguments would still hold as far as they hold. I am not sure why, nor even think it good, that God given rational arguments ought to be ashamed for being what they are before Him, as God created all things good in the beginning, and the created order of itself, which reason is a part of, is good.​

​

5. While I affirm the way of negation (as mentioned in the proof), there is also a way of eminence, where things positively good about ourselves, reason and the creation tell us something about what is good about God.​

​

6. When one distinguishes epistemology from ontology, I think that is adequate to show there may be good reasons why God needs to be proved to exist, namely for our own benefit. It doesn't make Him less absolute to use his given-reason to show us that He is, nor does it make epistemology and reason anything other than secondary to Him.​

And I very much agree with you that without God's everlasting arms we would fall into nothingness. Hope these things may be helpful for consideration.

 

[MW]

If the deduction be necessary, it is necessary, from the God-given nature of things and God-given reason, albeit humans use such, as we were designed to by God.

Travis, Therein lies the presumption -- that it is God-given. It confuses the faculty with the content. We weren't designed to reason to God; we were designed to be guided by revelation from Him. The assumption of "God-given" reason to prove God is that reason functions autonomously. And the God who is reasoned to can be nothing other than a projection of that reason. It is not the personal God of revelation in Whom we are to trust at all times.

I am not sure why, nor even think it good, that God given rational arguments ought to be ashamed for being what they are before Him, as God created all things good in the beginning, and the created order of itself, which reason is a part of, is good.

You stated the reason in your own argument. Job 15:15.

 

[Travis Fentiman]

Travis, Therein lies the presumption -- that it is God-given. It confuses the faculty with the content. We weren't designed to reason to God; we were designed to be guided by revelation from Him. The assumption of "God-given" reason to prove God is that reason functions autonomously. And the God who is reasoned to can be nothing other than a projection of that reason. It is not the personal God of revelation in Whom we are to trust at all times.



You stated the reason in your own argument. Job 15:15.

Matthew,

I think our fundamental, possibly seeming, difference is this: "And the God who is reasoned to can be nothing other than a projection of that reason."

I agree that God is beyond our order of rationality and reason, and that our knowledge of Him, and his Being, is analogical to ours. In that respect He cannot be contained or limited by our reason, being the very outside cause of it. And that Job 15:15 implies this, that God is above every natural perfection, including that of our reason.

Yet I don't believe that means we were not designed to reason to our personal God, as reason is a part of general revelation, and the way of eminence has a positive use. Further, reason can be used approximately with respect to God, and it is better (and obliging) to have a closer approximation to truths about God, through reason, than less.

I also think reason and the nature of things can be and must be understood and defined for what they are, as God made them, and this is not to treat them as autonomous in any ultimate metaphysical sense, but only to recognize our creaturely limitedness in not knowing or learning everything at once, and receiving limited information into our minds, fitting with our created nature and discursive reasoning process. I believe the distinction I made in the proof-article a few times, that epistemology need not follow the ultimacy of ontology sufficiently resolves this. If that were not the case, we could not live in our daily lives thinking about food, computers, etc., without being idolaters. But that is absurd.

 

[MW]

Yet I don't believe that means we were not designed to reason to our personal God, as reason is a part of general revelation, and the way of eminence has a positive use. Further, reason can be used approximately with respect to God, and it is better (and obliging) to have a closer approximation to truths about God, through reason, than less.

The way of eminence relates to communicable attributes which we have in some measure. So when you stretch those out to their farthest reach you only have a perfection of your own image. And if this is God it is nothing other than the God reason which Rationalists worship.

The approximation to God is precisely what reason was never designed to do. It is idolatry. As one who has a regard for the Scottish evangelical tradition consider what Thomas Halyburton says, especially under subsection VII:

it is certain that the discoveries of God by nature's light being small, are easily clouded by entangling difficulties arising from the dark occurrences of providence, and the natural weakness and unsteadiness of our minds, which are always to be found in matters sublime, and not attended with strong evidence. And attention in this case will increase the darkness, and force on such an acknowledgment as Simonides made to Hiero, the tyrant of Syracuse, that "the longer he thought about God, the more difficult he found to give any account of him."

VI. They must, whatever be allowed as to their validity in themselves, be owned of no use to the generality, nay, the far greater part of mankind. No man who knows them and knows the world, will pretend that one half of mankind is able to comprehend the force of them. And so they are still in the dark about God; which quite overthrows the whole story about the sufficiency of the natural discoveries of a Deity.

VII. It is plain, that there is no serving God, walking with or worshipping of him, without thoughts, and serious ones too, of him. Now his nature and excellencies are infinite, how then shall we conceive of them? Our darkness and weakness will not allow us to think of him as he is, and conceive those perfections as they are in him. And to conceive otherwise is dangerous. We may mistake in other things without sin; but to frame wrong, and other conceptions of God and his excellencies, than the truth of the thing requires, is dangerous and sinful; for it frames an idol. Now, though this difficulty may be easy to less attentive minds; yet it will quite confound persons who are in earnest, and understand what they are doing, in their approaches to God. Nor can ever the minds of such be satisfied in our present state, "otherwise than by God's telling us, how we are to conceive of him, and authorising us to do it in a way of condescension to our present dark and infirm state."

VIII. I cannot forbear to notice, as what wants not its own weight in this case, though in condescension we did a little wave arguments drawn from the practical influence of truths, that however great the improvements, as to notions of truths, concerning the nature of the Deity, may of late have been; yet the effects of these notices in their highest improvement, have been far from recommending them, as sufficient to the end we have now in view. This natural theology has rather made men more learned than more pious. Where scripture truth has not been received in its love and power, men have seldom been bettered by their improvements in natural theology. But we see in experience, that they who can prove most and best in these matters, evidence least regard to the Deity in their practice.

 

[Alexander Suarez]

Travis, Therein lies the presumption -- that it is God-given. It confuses the faculty with the content. We weren't designed to reason to God; we were designed to be guided by revelation from Him. The assumption of "God-given" reason to prove God is that reason functions autonomously. And the God who is reasoned to can be nothing other than a projection of that reason. It is not the personal God of revelation in Whom we are to trust at all times.

Good evening Rev. Winzer,

Thank you for introducing some distinctions in the use of the term "reason", between the faculty and the content. If I may refer to how some of our forefathers particularized their ideas of "reason" and then follow up with a few questions I have that may help bring clarity to my own thinking.

By “Judging” we mean,

1. Discerning our selves.
2. Proving to others.

By “Reason” We mean,

I. Ex parte objecti [on the part of the object]; such evidence of truth which human reason may discern.

This is three-fold,

1. Evidence of the Thing it self, which is either,
   1. Sensible Evidence, as the very thing is objected to the Senses, and so as Sensate represented to the Intellect.
   2. Evidence immediately intelligible, by which the thing it self is objected to the Intuition of the Mind; so some say, with Ockam, that the Intellect knoweth its own Acts, and Spirits, see Spirits.
2. Evidence of the Medium, from whence, by Reason, we may infer the Verity of the Thing. And this is,
   1. Of an ordinary Natural Medium, (as a Natural Cause is known by the Effects, and the Effects by the Cause: e. g. There is a Sun, ergo there is Motion, Light, and Heat:] or [There is Motion, Light, and Heat; ergo there is Fire.]
   2. Or of a Supernatural Medium, such as is Divine Revelation by Vision, Inspiration, miraculous Attestation.
3. There is Evidence of Consequence, that the Conclusion certainly followeth the Premises.

Of Reason, in these Senses we may have occasion to speak.

II. Ex parte subjecti vel Agentis [on the part of the subject or agent]; And so Reason is taken,

1. For the reasoning Faculty.
2. For the mental Exercise, or Act in the actual Reasoning of the Mind.
3. For a Habit of Facility, and Promptitude in Reasoning.
4. For expressive Reasoning by argumentation, or discourse, by Word, or Writing.

The reasoning Faculty is considered in Man,

1. As in statu informato vel instituto [the state of integrity].
2. In statu deformato seu destituto [the state of lapsed pravity].
3. As in statu reformato seu restituto [the state of sanctification, or recovery].

In your previous comment you mentioned that "we were designed to be guided by revelation from Him."

1. Are you excluding from "revelation," that which we typically refer to as 'natural / general revelation'? If so, why? Is it not "revelation from Him" and does it not have an objective evidence of its own, ex parte objecti?
2. Also, by "guided" I assume you mean, "we were designed to be guided [in our reason ex parte subjecti vel agentis in all four senses mentioned above] by revelation from Him." Would that be correct?

You also said, "The assumption of "God-given" reason to prove God is that reason functions autonomously. And the God who is reasoned to can be nothing other than a projection of that reason. It is not the personal God of revelation in Whom we are to trust at all times."

1. When you say that "reason functions autonomously," what do you mean? What do you mean by "reason function[ing] autonomously" and when exactly does this occur?
2. You argued that "the God" that is "a projection of that reason" is "not the personal God of revelation". May I ask in what sense you are referring to by "a projection of that reason"? Is there an understanding of God that we have that is not in some sense "a projection" of our "reasoning faculties," even as we seek to have them guided or aligned by special revelation? Perhaps this is not what you are referring to and you mean in some other sense.

 

[MW]

Thank you for introducing some distinctions in the use of the term "reason", between the faculty and the content. If I may refer to how some of our forefathers particularized their ideas of "reason" and then follow up with a few questions I have that may help bring clarity to my own thinking.

Hi Alex. I'm not sure I would call Baxter a forefather, but I think we can go with the way he explains things in the portion you have quoted.

Are you excluding from "revelation," that which we typically refer to as 'natural / general revelation'? If so, why? Is it not "revelation from Him" and does it not have an objective evidence of its own, ex parte objecti?

I wouldn't exclude it so far as it is a revelation from God. All His works praise Him. But I do not think man was created to exist in a static, de-eschatological state, without the assistance of special revelation. Including general revelation I would also maintain that what is natural is also innate in man; and if it is innate in man it does not need to be proved to man. He already believes in God in that respect. Then we must add the corrupted state to the discussion, in which man suppresses and corrupts this natural knowledge.

Also, by "guided" I assume you mean, "we were designed to be guided [in our reason ex parte subjecti vel agentis in all four senses mentioned above] by revelation from Him." Would that be correct?

To use the classification adopted by Baxter, I would be speaking especially of point 2, the actual reasoning of the mind.

When you say that "reason functions autonomously," what do you mean? What do you mean by "reason function[ing] autonomously" and when exactly does this occur?

When a man supposes to reason to God's existence rather than from the conviction that God exists.

You argued that "the God" that is "a projection of that reason" is "not the personal God of revelation". May I ask in what sense you are referring to by "a projection of that reason"?

Reason can only proceed from its own principles, otherwise it will be charged with being unreasonable. Any reasoning to God can only be an extension of human reason in order to be accounted reasonable. This mean that reason only ever succeeds in making a perfect image of itself. It can never reason to the One who is infinitely distant from itself.

Is there an understanding of God that we have that is not in some sense "a projection" of our "reasoning faculties," even as we seek to have them guided or aligned by special revelation? Perhaps this is not what you are referring to and you mean in some other sense.

God's revelation is an accommodation to us. We never move outside our own limitations; but He comes within those limitations by use of His "name" that He gives us to understand Him. Within that revelation there is an understanding that God Himself, in His essence, remains hidden from us and will never be comprehended by us. However, there is full confidence and trust in His name because that is the way He has made Himself known to us. By confining ourselves to it we are delivered from the idolatry of the natural man.

 

[jwright82]

Hebrews 1:3 says God is “upholding all things by the word of his power.” If this is true then it should be for all created things that their existence and continuance has no sufficient explanation in their own created natures, but is due only to God willing them to exist.

Thus if one investigates natural things by nature's light, this is what one should find. I argue in a new article that this is in fact what one does find, and that necessarily when the nature of things changing and causation is examined.

The general tenor of the proof is old, from Aristotle. It was developed through Thomas Aquinas and more recently by Edward Feser. I have restylized it in a popular way. A very similar argument was given by the Ducth reformed theologian Peter van Mastricht.

See what you think, if God has been proven to exist! I will be glad to hear your thoughts.

A Proof for God’s Existence - ReformedBooksOnline​

Well great article Travis. I think my major problem with it though is the basic presupposition of Aristotelian metaphysics. As I understand it, not in detail, Aristotelian metaphysics has changed and evolved (you even hinted at this by saying something like "through Aquinas") so which metaphysics is the only appropriate one for us to use? The early or later Aristotle, as I understand current thought scholarship divides him? The Aristotle of the Physics or of the Metaphysics?
My point is you're assuming a nice, neat, and seamless body of thought that doesn't exist. The same may be true for Aquinas. Does Fesser deal with these problems? I don't know.
Now you also seem to flipflop between inductive reasoning and deductive reasoning, statements like "we observe this" and "reason state's such and such". But no mention of Hume's fork or Kant's criticisms, why not? If I shouldn't pay attention to the scholarship in classical metaphysics or the critical interactions with the classical proofs after Aquinas, except apparently Fesser (who I imagine is just another participant in that conversation), than no reason was given for that.
My point is not that you're wrong or that it's an invalid proof only incomplete. Maybe Fesser deals with all this, I don't know. But for someone who is somewhat conversive in metaphysics after Aquinas, I find the presuppositions of classical metaphysics problematic to accept. It's true that within that world your "proof" is valid but only if the classical metaphysics it relies on is also true, that you didn't prove but assumed.
Don't take this criticism as saying that you're absolutely false only friendly suggestions for improvement.
The usual disregard for metaphysics after Aquinas or the acceptance of him by later thinkers until Hume and Kant I guess (although this story is itself problematic) is that it's assumed upfront with no argumentation. Your article is unfortunately a good example of this.
One of the best and worst issues in this whole "recovery of classical metaphysics" has been the overlooking of the messy history of Aristotle/Aquinas thought for a simplified stream less metaphysics for consideration. With no reasons given for it's acceptance within the blogosphere. I'm sure they're scholars dealing with those issues but it's presented often as more simple than it actually is. Just my two cents.
Now in fairness to you, it's just one article not a comprehensive book. But you did provide links to other articles mostly by other participants historically within that conversation. There's nothing wrong with that except quoting someone who only knows about classical metaphysics doesn't prove anything about classical metaphysics, only how it's used in that conversation.
Maybe Fesser deals with all this maybe he doesn't but links to and acknowledgment of the debates around classical metaphysics would be helpful for someone conversant with metaphysics after Aquinas and Kant. Just friendly suggestions for improvement in your article. Overall good though and I love the website BTW.

 

[MW]

Maybe Fesser deals with all this maybe he doesn't

He deals with it, and does it well. He goes into potentiality and actualisation. He shows against Hume that something actual is needed to actualise potentiality. He shows against Kant that this is not based on experience.

Does it prove God exists? It satisfies the criteria of rationality. It gives a good account of our basic beliefs. Inasmuch we depend on rationality to exist and live in the world it gives us a good reason to conclude that God exists. But it cannot ultimately prove God exists because reason is not ultimate. Reason is dependent. And that is where these arguments fall down.

 

[jwright82]

He deals with it, and does it well. He goes into potentiality and actualisation. He shows against Hume that something actual is needed to actualise potentiality. He shows against Kant that this is not based on experience.

Does it prove God exists? It satisfies the criteria of rationality. It gives a good account of our basic beliefs. Inasmuch we depend on rationality to exist and live in the world it gives us a good reason to conclude that God exists. But it cannot ultimately prove God exists because reason is not ultimate. Reason is dependent. And that is where these arguments fall down.

Fair enough, that's why I said it the way that I did. Then I went and read the links. I read several pages of the linked book. But my point was more to the assumption of a metaphysical scheme which we all do. It's been called a conceptual scheme at least since P. F. Strawson I believe. If Aristotelian metaphysics is part of what Strawson would call descriptive metaphysics, I'll have to check that, vs revisionary metaphysics which would be like moving from essence based schemes to like Dooyeweerd's scheme. It's meant to do the same thing only from a different conceptual scheme.
But if it can be shown that Aristotelian metaphysics is descriptive metaphysics than that's one thing, that is basic descriptions of things in reality that are true regardless of one's conceptual scheme. So individual things are true of all possible conceptual schemes according to Strawson.
So if all conceptual schemes will be, by necessity Aristotelian in nature, than every possible conceptual scheme will be Aristotelian through and through but the history of metaphysics disproves that.
Therefore the only other way, it seems to me, is to argue for the necessity of the Aristotelian scheme as the only descriptive metaphysics out there. We must use it because there's nothing else to use. Does that make more sense? Sometimes my brain is three steps ahead of what I'm writing.

 

[Alexander Suarez]

Hi Alex.

Thank you Rev. Winzer for the interaction. Below is my feedback:

I'm not sure I would call Baxter a forefather

I'm assuming you are mentioning Baxter because EEBO lists his name alone as the author. However, the work referenced was subscribed by all of the below persons as representing "all Protestant Parties" or The Judgment of Non-conformists, Of the Interest of Reason, in Matters of Religion:

1. Th[omas] Manton,
2. W[illiam] Bates,
3. [Thomas] Case,
4. Gabriel Sangar,
5. Rich[ard] Baxter,
6. Math[ew] Pemberton,
7. Mat[thew] Silvester,
8. Henry Hurst,
9. Roger Morice,
10. Edw[ward] Lawrence,
11. Benjam[in] Agas,
12. James Bedford,,
13. Sam[uel] Fairclough,
14. John Turner,
15. Joseph Read.

I would also maintain that what is natural is also innate in man; and if it is innate in man it does not need to be proved to man. He already believes in God in that respect. Then we must add the corrupted state to the discussion, in which man suppresses and corrupts this natural knowledge.

When you say, "what is natural is also innate in man," what do you mean by "natural" and in what sense is it "innate" in him?

I don't quite see how the second clause (i.e., what is natural does not need to be proved) follows deductively from the first (i.e., what is natural is innate in man), but that may be due to my lack of understanding.

Additionally, in what "respect" does the unbeliever "already believe[] in God"?

Lastly, as to "man suppress[ing] and corrupt[ing] this natural knowledge," I don't necessarily see how this is an objection against providing demonstrations or arguments, if general revelation has an objective evidence of its own, ex parte objecti.

To use the classification adopted by Baxter, I would be speaking especially of point 2, the actual reasoning of the mind.

When a man supposes to reason to God's existence rather than from the conviction that God exists.

"When a man supposes to" exercise his reasoning faculty (reason # II.2) to form expressive reasonings by argumentation (reason # II.4) towards demonstrating the conclusion that God exists, can he not do this "from the conviction that God exists"? Why does his "conviction that God exists" forbid him from providing "expressive reasonings by argumentation" for God's existence?

Reason can only proceed from its own principles, otherwise it will be charged with being unreasonable. Any reasoning to God can only be an extension of human reason in order to be accounted reasonable. This mean that reason only ever succeeds in making a perfect image of itself. It can never reason to the One who is infinitely distant from itself.

It is unclear to me what you mean by "reason" in relation to the distinctions noted above and what you have in mind by "its own principles".

Similarly, it is not altogether clear what you mean when you say that "reason only ever succeeds in making a perfect image of itself." "Reason" in a certain sense is essential for any kind of our theologizing. Is all of our theology and theologizing merely "a perfect image of [reason]" because "reason" is never ordinarily excluded in relating to revelation and the goal of it? Having asked that, I suspect you mean something very particular by "reason" in the above quotation and welcome you to clarify or correct where I may have misunderstood.

Thanks again for the interaction.

 

[MW]

I'm assuming you are mentioning Baxter because EEBO lists his name alone as the author.

He claimed himself as the author, if I remember correctly. It has been a while so I may be mistaken.

However, the work referenced was subscribed by all of the below persons as representing "all Protestant Parties" or The Judgment of Non-conformists, Of the Interest of Reason, in Matters of Religion:

Thanks for bringing that to my attention. I'm not sure that commits them to every detail; but, as I said, I can work with it as it stands.

When you say, "what is natural is also innate in man," what do you mean by "natural" and in what sense is it "innate" in him?

Within the category of natural revelation there is external and internal light. The internal light is innate to man. He was created with knowledge, righteousness, and holiness.

I don't quite see how the second clause (i.e., what is natural does not need to be proved) follows deductively from the first (i.e., what is natural is innate in man), but that may be due to my lack of understanding.

Rom. 1, what may be known of God is manifested in them and they are accounted as having known God. The end of this knowledge is to render them inexcusable. It cannot be that they must have it logically demonstrated to them in order for them to be without excuse. It must be that they are by nature without excuse whether it is logically demonstrated or not. Otherwise those who don't have it logically demonstrated to them would have an excuse, which is contrary to the point the apostle was making.

Additionally, in what "respect" does the unbeliever "already believe[] in God"?

He holds the truth in unrighteousness.

Lastly, as to "man suppress[ing] and corrupt[ing] this natural knowledge," I don't necessarily see how this is an objection against providing demonstrations or arguments, if general revelation has an objective evidence of its own, ex parte objecti.

I don't have any objection to providing demonstrations or arguments. You may bring your reason as it has been enlightened by special revelation to bear on general revelation. Christianity admits of rational demonstration. But the very fact you are calling it "revelation" shows your dependence on God for this knowledge. There is no knowledge without Him. So the question becomes, How do you prove God exists when you presuppose He exists in order to make the demonstration?

"When a man supposes to" exercise his reasoning faculty (reason # II.2) to form expressive reasonings by argumentation (reason # II.4) towards demonstrating the conclusion that God exists, can he not do this "from the conviction that God exists"? Why does his "conviction that God exists" forbid him from providing "expressive reasonings by argumentation" for God's existence?

It doesn't. Have I said otherwise? See my first post on the thread where I grant the rationality of the argument.

It is unclear to me what you mean by "reason" in relation to the distinctions noted above and what you have in mind by "its own principles".

I am not sure why this is unclear. What is reasonable? That which is in accord with reason. It cannot move beyond itself without subjecting itself to the charge of being unreasonable.

Is God greater than reason? Of course He is. So if a man can reason his way to God it is obvious that the God of reason is merely a projection of itself. And if it isn't it would be unreasonable to accept it. This is why we need revelation. And I presume it is why you began by speaking in terms of general revelation. We receive revelation from God; we do not reason our way to God.

Similarly, it is not altogether clear what you mean when you say that "reason only ever succeeds in making a perfect image of itself." "Reason" in a certain sense is essential for any kind of our theologizing. Is all of our theology and theologizing merely "a perfect image of [reason]" because "reason" is never ordinarily excluded in relating to revelation and the goal of it? Having asked that, I suspect you mean something very particular by "reason" in the above quotation and welcome you to clarify or correct where I may have misunderstood.

Reason is ministerial, not magisterial. We use it in theology to receive the revelation of God. Reason must be trained and corrected. It is like the conscience with respect to morality.

 

[Alexander Suarez]

Good day Rev. Winzer,

Thank you for the response. Below is my feedback.

I would also maintain that what is natural is also innate in man; and if it is innate in man it does not need to be proved to man. He already believes in God in that respect.

Within the category of natural revelation there is external and internal light. The internal light is innate to man. He was created with knowledge, righteousness, and holiness.

I can agree with the distinction of external and internal light, depending on what one means thereby. A slightly different distinction would be between that which is acquired and that which is innate. However, even under this latter distinction, that which is innate is not in reference to "actual knowledge" that one is born with. Rather, as Voetius argues, "they are something distinct from it, having the character of a disposition, or a habit of principles, indeed a general part of the habit of principles."

As to Adam in the state of integrity, yes, he was created along with other things in "ripeness and maturity" with knowledge, righteousness, and holiness. However, I'm not sure what implication you are drawing from this.

Rom. 1, what may be known of God is manifested in them and they are accounted as having known God. The end of this knowledge is to render them inexcusable. It cannot be that they must have it logically demonstrated to them in order for them to be without excuse. It must be that they are by nature without excuse whether it is logically demonstrated or not. Otherwise those who don't have it logically demonstrated to them would have an excuse, which is contrary to the point the apostle was making.

I agree with Romans 1:19 and 1:21: "that which may be known of God is manifest in them" and "when they knew God, they glorified him not as God". I also agree with 1:20 in that it renders them "without excuse". I likewise agree that an unbeliever is rendered "without excuse" apart from having anyone put forward a reasoned argument for the existence of God.

However, what does it mean for this "knowledge" to be "manifest" in them? In what sense is it "knowledge" and how is it "in them"?

Additionally, it appears to me that you are suggesting that because an unbeliever is already "without excuse," one need not bother to utilize logically demonstrated arguments with them for the existence of God, because this gives the impression that they are excused so long as they do not accept your argument(s). However, this does not follow when we argue with them concerning special revelation and their twisting of it. Likewise, I do not see how your conclusion (if I've understood you correctly) follows when we argue with them concerning the evidence of objective general revelation.

He holds the truth in unrighteousness.

Yes, I agree with Rom. 1:18, but simply to recite it does not tell me in what sense or how he holds "the truth in unrighteousness".

But the very fact you are calling it "revelation" shows your dependence on God for this knowledge. There is no knowledge without Him.

Yes, I agree that there is "no knowledge without Him" after the order of being (ordo essendi). However, if by this, you mean with respect to the order-of-knowing (ordo cognoscendi), I disagree. This likely takes us back to Romans 1 and how we are delineating those items mentioned.

I am not sure why this is unclear. What is reasonable? That which is in accord with reason.

What does "reason" here refer to? The faculty (# II.1)?

Is God greater than reason? Of course He is. So if a man can reason his way to God it is obvious that the God of reason is merely a projection of itself. And if it isn't it would be unreasonable to accept it. This is why we need revelation. And I presume it is why you began by speaking in terms of general revelation. We receive revelation from God; we do not reason our way to God.

It appears to me that your continued use of "reason" is equivocal. This is confusing to me. In the question, it is a noun. In the third statement it is a verb and a noun. Following that, it is used as an adjective in the negative (i.e., unreasonable). Is it possible for you to reword the above so that we do not equivocate "reason"?

Reason is ministerial, not magisterial. We use it in theology to receive the revelation of God. Reason must be trained and corrected. It is like the conscience with respect to morality.

I accept the distinction of ministerial vs. magisterial, and affirm "reason['s]" ministerial usage toward revelation, along with the need for our "reason" to be "trained and corrected". However, not only have we not specified in what sense is "reason" "corrected", but even the correction is in relation to both general and special revelation (i.e., the objective evidence of the objects themselves).

Thank you again for the interaction. I pray you have a blessed Lord's Day.

 

[Travis Fentiman]

Well great article Travis. I think my major problem with it though is the basic presupposition of Aristotelian metaphysics. As I understand it, not in detail, Aristotelian metaphysics has changed and evolved (you even hinted at this by saying something like "through Aquinas") so which metaphysics is the only appropriate one for us to use? The early or later Aristotle, as I understand current thought scholarship divides him? The Aristotle of the Physics or of the Metaphysics?
My point is you're assuming a nice, neat, and seamless body of thought that doesn't exist. The same may be true for Aquinas. Does Fesser deal with these problems? I don't know.
Now you also seem to flipflop between inductive reasoning and deductive reasoning, statements like "we observe this" and "reason state's such and such". But no mention of Hume's fork or Kant's criticisms, why not? If I shouldn't pay attention to the scholarship in classical metaphysics or the critical interactions with the classical proofs after Aquinas, except apparently Fesser (who I imagine is just another participant in that conversation), than no reason was given for that.
My point is not that you're wrong or that it's an invalid proof only incomplete. Maybe Fesser deals with all this, I don't know. But for someone who is somewhat conversive in metaphysics after Aquinas, I find the presuppositions of classical metaphysics problematic to accept. It's true that within that world your "proof" is valid but only if the classical metaphysics it relies on is also true, that you didn't prove but assumed.
Don't take this criticism as saying that you're absolutely false only friendly suggestions for improvement.
The usual disregard for metaphysics after Aquinas or the acceptance of him by later thinkers until Hume and Kant I guess (although this story is itself problematic) is that it's assumed upfront with no argumentation. Your article is unfortunately a good example of this.
One of the best and worst issues in this whole "recovery of classical metaphysics" has been the overlooking of the messy history of Aristotle/Aquinas thought for a simplified stream less metaphysics for consideration. With no reasons given for it's acceptance within the blogosphere. I'm sure they're scholars dealing with those issues but it's presented often as more simple than it actually is. Just my two cents.
Now in fairness to you, it's just one article not a comprehensive book. But you did provide links to other articles mostly by other participants historically within that conversation. There's nothing wrong with that except quoting someone who only knows about classical metaphysics doesn't prove anything about classical metaphysics, only how it's used in that conversation.
Maybe Fesser deals with all this maybe he doesn't but links to and acknowledgment of the debates around classical metaphysics would be helpful for someone conversant with metaphysics after Aquinas and Kant. Just friendly suggestions for improvement in your article. Overall good though and I love the website BTW.

Jamey, thanks for your thoughtful dialogue and seeking to further the conversation.

I don't believe the proof in my article commits one to the whole Aristotelian framework, or even assumes it. It only initially uses one principle that Aristotle developed (though later in the article some more principles are brought in with deriving further attributes of God). But that principle, that change involves potential and actuality, can be seen to be true from nature, and must be. So it has nothing to do with Aristotle in that respect. Do you have a better account for change? If so, I would like to use it.

The metaphysics (out of various options) that should be used is the one nature is, or that which derives from nature, or reality all around us. If different philosophies describe reality piecemeal in different and perhaps better ways than others, each participating to some extent in it, very well, but the standard is nature itself, and one can learn things from early Aristotle and late, Aquinas, Hume, Kant, Russell, etc. And is this not what they all thought, that their ideas reflected reality?

As far as the nice neat body of thought in my article, it all derives from nature. If you or others disagree, that is fine, my article isn't the last word on the subject, but please point out which proposition or inference one disagrees with. If change does not occur, please tell us. If it is not potentiality or actuality, please show this. If the law of causality does not hold, or there is some other better alternative, please make it good. If pure actuality is not the only sufficient grounding for change, please tell us why.

My use of alternating at times between some empirical observations and rational deductions was intentional, to build confirmation of all this, but ultimately the proof hangs on the rational deductions. One doesn't have to grant empirically that change occurs, but to deny such contradicts itself, so its true. While the law of causality is observed all around us, as I mention, yet given possibility and actuality, and that possible things by their nature can only be possible, its a pretty strong inference given no third middle that only actual things can actualize actual things, by definition. (And Feser defends the principle further with more careful qualification, as I mention and link.)

The proof is introductory, not a dissertation, and as I note in it and as Matthew has noted, Feser defends these things more at length going into Hume, Kant, etc. As far as evaluating the post Descartes philosophers, while there may be many ways to do that, for me, it is sufficient in my understanding (and that of the Reformed Orthodox) that a form of Christian aristotelianism makes the most sense (and is descriptive) of reality to a higher degree or approximation than any other. If there is another philosophy that does this, please let me know so I may be able to utilize it.

Thanks again for your thoughtful dialogue. I do appreciate the perspective from one who is metaphysically informed. To highlight again, I don't claim to have the last word on every premise or inference. So feel free challenge one or more of them. But I am not seeing alternatives that are better to the ones laid out in the proof.

 

[MW]

I can agree with the distinction of external and internal light, depending on what one means thereby. A slightly different distinction would be between that which is acquired and that which is innate. However, even under this latter distinction, that which is innate is not in reference to "actual knowledge" that one is born with. Rather, as Voetius argues, "they are something distinct from it, having the character of a disposition, or a habit of principles, indeed a general part of the habit of principles."

Hi Alex. Technically, if we are to allow reflection on external revelation, we would say it is intuitive rather than innate. My point was only to show that it is within the person without rational deduction. It is not discursive. I will try to read the Voetius piece later today, but a few sentences after your quotation he makes the point that the man naturally and necessarily comprehends the truth without ratiocination. He likens it to seeing light. This follows Calvin's view that they only have to open their eyes and they see God in His works.

As to Adam in the state of integrity, yes, he was created along with other things in "ripeness and maturity" with knowledge, righteousness, and holiness. However, I'm not sure what implication you are drawing from this.

I am simply saying that he had the knowledge of God. It is part of the image of God in which he was created. There is no implication. I am putting it forth as part of my cumulative response to your post.

I agree with Romans 1:19 and 1:21: "that which may be known of God is manifest in them" and "when they knew God, they glorified him not as God". I also agree with 1:20 in that it renders them "without excuse". I likewise agree that an unbeliever is rendered "without excuse" apart from having anyone put forward a reasoned argument for the existence of God.

However, what does it mean for this "knowledge" to be "manifest" in them? In what sense is it "knowledge" and how is it "in them"?

This is drawn out in many different ways. I don't think it is necessary for our discussion to go into details, but in general I would be content with Paul's expression that it produces a feeling after God. From this comes a natural fear and desire, something like a consent of all mankind, a readiness to receive impressions, a sense of accountability, restraint on wickedness, and a need for religion. All this is operative without any "proof," but is itself a proof that knowledge of God is natural.

Additionally, it appears to me that you are suggesting that because an unbeliever is already "without excuse," one need not bother to utilize logically demonstrated arguments with them for the existence of God, because this gives the impression that they are excused so long as they do not accept your argument(s). However, this does not follow when we argue with them concerning special revelation and their twisting of it. Likewise, I do not see how your conclusion (if I've understood you correctly) follows when we argue with them concerning the evidence of objective general revelation.

What appears to you is contrary to my first sentence in this thread. I affirm the rationality of such proofs. But all you are proving is their rationality; you are not proving God exists. God remains infinitely distant from reason. You could not reason without God. Reason needs to be put in its place as something dependent on God. You cannot reason TO Him when it is evident you reason FROM Him.

Yes, I agree with Rom. 1:18, but simply to recite it does not tell me in what sense or how he holds "the truth in unrighteousness".

Commentators and theologians have a range of ways they expand on it. This is not germane to the discussion. The fact is man holds it without a formal argument. A formal argument cannot be the basis of his belief or his inexcusability. In foundationalist terms it functions as a basic belief.

Yes, I agree that there is "no knowledge without Him" after the order of being (ordo essendi). However, if by this, you mean with respect to the order-of-knowing (ordo cognoscendi), I disagree. This likely takes us back to Romans 1 and how we are delineating those items mentioned.

We are obviously speaking about the order of knowing. You have already granted it as soon as you accepted the "knowledge" is natural to man. How can you now disagree with it?

What does "reason" here refer to? The faculty (# II.1)?

It appears to me that your continued use of "reason" is equivocal. This is confusing to me. In the question, it is a noun. In the third statement it is a verb and a noun. Following that, it is used as an adjective in the negative (i.e., unreasonable). Is it possible for you to reword the above so that we do not equivocate "reason"?

You asked for clarification in your first post. I gave it in my first response to you. "To use the classification adopted by Baxter, I would be speaking especially of point 2, the actual reasoning of the mind." You may take that clarification as my intended meaning.

The idea that I cannot alternate modes of speech without equivocating is news to me. The boy runs. The boy is a runner. He is a running boy. There is no need to suppose the word changes meaning; it only changes the mode. Likewise with the use of reason.

I accept the distinction of ministerial vs. magisterial, and affirm "reason['s]" ministerial usage toward revelation, along with the need for our "reason" to be "trained and corrected". However, not only have we not specified in what sense is "reason" "corrected", but even the correction is in relation to both general and special revelation (i.e., the objective evidence of the objects themselves).

I don't see the relevance of this. You are speaking in terms of "revelation." I presume you mean "divine revelation." The revelation is from God and it is of God. If our reason depends on revelation how can you suppose a formal argument is going to prove God exists. You have to presuppose He exists to make the argument.

The fact is, We do not believe God exists because of a formal argument to that effect. Why would we require others to believe He exists on the basis of a formal argument? That is hubris. The formal argument only presents the rationality of belief in God; it does not prove He exists.

 

[jwright82]

Jamey, thanks for your thoughtful dialogue and seeking to further the conversation.

I don't believe the proof in my article commits one to the whole Aristotelian framework, or even assumes it. It only initially uses one principle that Aristotle developed (though later in the article some more principles are brought in with deriving further attributes of God). But that principle, that change involves potential and actuality, can be seen to be true from nature, and must be. So it has nothing to do with Aristotle in that respect. Do you have a better account for change? If so, I would like to use it.

The metaphysics (out of various options) that should be used is the one nature is, or that which derives from nature, or reality all around us. If different philosophies describe reality piecemeal in different and perhaps better ways than others, each participating to some extent in it, very well, but the standard is nature itself, and one can learn things from early Aristotle and late, Aquinas, Hume, Kant, Russell, etc. And is this not what they all thought, that their ideas reflected reality?

As far as the nice neat body of thought in my article, it all derives from nature. If you or others disagree, that is fine, my article isn't the last word on the subject, but please point out which proposition or inference one disagrees with. If change does not occur, please tell us. If it is not potentiality or actuality, please show this. If the law of causality does not hold, or there is some other better alternative, please make it good. If pure actuality is not the only sufficient grounding for change, please tell us why.

My use of alternating at times between some empirical observations and rational deductions was intentional, to build confirmation of all this, but ultimately the proof hangs on the rational deductions. One doesn't have to grant empirically that change occurs, but to deny such contradicts itself, so its true. While the law of causality is observed all around us, as I mention, yet given possibility and actuality, and that possible things by their nature can only be possible, its a pretty strong inference given no third middle that only actual things can actualize actual things, by definition. (And Feser defends the principle further with more careful qualification, as I mention and link.)

The proof is introductory, not a dissertation, and as I note in it and as Matthew has noted, Feser defends these things more at length going into Hume, Kant, etc. As far as evaluating the post Descartes philosophers, while there may be many ways to do that, for me, it is sufficient in my understanding (and that of the Reformed Orthodox) that a form of Christian aristotelianism makes the most sense (and is descriptive) of reality to a higher degree or approximation than any other. If there is another philosophy that does this, please let me know so I may be able to utilize it.

Thanks again for your thoughtful dialogue. I do appreciate the perspective from one who is metaphysically informed. To highlight again, I don't claim to have the last word on every premise or inference. So feel free challenge one or more of them. But I am not seeing alternatives that are better to the ones laid out in the proof.

Thanks for the amazing and thought provoking response. I didn't get into the "logic" of the argument because I didn't respond with whether or not it's sound in mind. So I wasn't responding to be critical you see, only helpful by pointing out that it may be very persuasive within that conversation. But in a day and age when we no longer think in exactly those terms than you have a preliminary task of arguing for the legitimacy of thinking in those terms.
I tried to point that out, but this is one of the hardest lessons of more contemporary philosophical thinking for most people to wrap their head around. Our language and concepts changed. No one debates the question of "how do we know that substances are there and what can be proven about them?"
So if a more contemporary philosophical thinker were to read it, they very well could ignore it because of the archaic use of language. Which could take a wonderful argument and make it less persuasive. That's more what my point was. To be helpful not critical.
The stuff I said about "which Aristotle" is along the same vien, you and Mathew say he goes over that stuff. But to the same hypothetical person not pointing that out (because sometimes people aren't going to read your links until they are convinced it's worth it) at least in a note of some kind might be equally unpursuasive.
I definitely think you're on to something that, if you didn't you should, you're only using certain principles from Aristotle not his whole metaphysics. In my personal opinion you should work that into it.
As far as the metaphysics and reality question, I'm unsure how to proceed there because I think it would overload the discussion with at least a few more philosophical problems. So let me think about it. But since my responses have been geared towards giving suggestions to improve, an already amazing article, I hope I was helpful there. Let me think it through (I don't like flooding threads with tangents that only philosopher's get OCD about, really bogs down progress).
God bless my friend, I'll respond at a later time. Keep up the good work my friend.

 

[Alexander Suarez]

Good day Rev. Winzer,

Thank you for the thoughtful response. I sense that you may be stressing certain terms, relations, and asserting particular positions that I may be overlooking. Perhaps my limited response below may further bring these out:

in general I would be content with Paul's expression that it produces a feeling after God . . . All this is operative without any "proof," but is itself a proof that knowledge of God is natural.

Are you making a distinction between (a) proof or demonstration for God's existence versus (b) proof or demonstration for knowledge of God being natural? In other words, the demonstration can only show that which is in man and not something objectively external to it?

What appears to you is contrary to my first sentence in this thread. I affirm the rationality of such proofs. But all you are proving is their rationality; you are not proving God exists. God remains infinitely distant from reason.

I apologize if I've misunderstood you.

You said, that you "affirm the rationality of such proofs" but such proofs "are not proving God exists". I suppose I am not understanding how you are relating the rationality of an argument to the reality of the things it purports to speak of. Are you suggesting a hard Kantian line between the phenomenal and noumenal realms? I don’t know if this is what you are attempting to put forward, but if it is, among other things, I find it to run contrary to what I understand from Romans 1:20 (i.e., invisible things of him . . . are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made). If not, I am not sure what you are attempting to convey.

The fact is man holds it without a formal argument. A formal argument cannot be the basis of his belief or his inexcusability.

Yes, I don’t think I disagree. However, would you at least grant that formal arguments can serve the purpose of confirming and/or increasing man’s inexcusability?

We are obviously speaking about the order of knowing. You have already granted it as soon as you accepted the "knowledge" is natural to man. How can you now disagree with it?

Perhaps I could have been clearer in my articulation of what I understood you to be saying and what I was denying. By disagreeing that there is "no knowledge without Him" after the order of knowing, I was suggesting that an unbeliever can have active and actual knowledge that I am talking to him, or that his house is on fire, or even that 2+2 = 4 without actively affirming God's existence in his thoughts. However, as to ultimate things, I agree, he cannot rationally maintain the reality of those things without affirming God's existence.

 

[MW]

Good day Rev. Winzer,

Thank you for the thoughtful response. I sense that you may be stressing certain terms, relations, and asserting particular positions that I may be overlooking. Perhaps my limited response below may further bring these out:



Are you making a distinction between (a) proof or demonstration for God's existence versus (b) proof or demonstration for knowledge of God being natural? In other words, the demonstration can only show that which is in man and not something objectively external to it?



I apologize if I've misunderstood you.

You said, that you "affirm the rationality of such proofs" but such proofs "are not proving God exists". I suppose I am not understanding how you are relating the rationality of an argument to the reality of the things it purports to speak of. Are you suggesting a hard Kantian line between the phenomenal and noumenal realms? I don’t know if this is what you are attempting to put forward, but if it is, among other things, I find it to run contrary to what I understand from Romans 1:20 (i.e., invisible things of him . . . are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made). If not, I am not sure what you are attempting to convey.



Yes, I don’t think I disagree. However, would you at least grant that formal arguments can serve the purpose of confirming and/or increasing man’s inexcusability?



Perhaps I could have been clearer in my articulation of what I understood you to be saying and what I was denying. By disagreeing that there is "no knowledge without Him" after the order of knowing, I was suggesting that an unbeliever can have active and actual knowledge that I am talking to him, or that his house is on fire, or even that 2+2 = 4 without actively affirming God's existence in his thoughts. However, as to ultimate things, I agree, he cannot rationally maintain the reality of those things without affirming God's existence.

Hi Alex. Thanks for your limited response. That might help us to keep track of where we are going. It is easy to lose the flow of arguments when they are broken up by quotes and replies.

Yes, if we hold the knowledge of God is natural, the most we can prove is a knowledge that is rational because it appeals to what is natural in man. I think this is the most solid ground for the theistic proofs. If God could be contained in human thought we could prove His existence the way we prove the existence of other objects. But the old saying is, the finite cannot contain the infinite. Therefore the best approach has been to manifest what appears to be self-evident beliefs.

Kant leaves us with a wall so that we can never reach objectivity or certainty of the phenomenal world. That leads to a transcendental approach. Foundationalists argue more along the lines of Psalm 94. God made man with the capacity to see; therefore He must see. Our perceptions are reliable and there is correspondence between our capacities and the objective world. This forms the basis of an old medieval argument, that as we ascend the order of our capacities we come to the instinct to be religious, which manifests a higher Being. But that higher Being is always beyond us. By searching we cannot find out God.

Romans 1 supposes the reliability of sense perceptions. It is impossible to see the world and not know God exists. Every question that begins with "why" is only answered by Him.

Formal arguments have their place. The theistic proofs are excellent for confirming faith, and may serve to help an unbeliever see the rationality of faith. A good preacher will incorporate them in an informal way in his preaching. But it would be self-defeating to present them in any way that exalted reason to a place it does not have. Reason must be held accountable to revelation at every point.

Yes, the unbeliever can be unconscious of his belief in God because of the power of depravity in holding the truth in unrighteousness. In fact a believer can do the same if he is not taking captive every thought.

James H. Thornwell has a good statement in his discussion on the proofs: "If the conclusion which they yield is an immediate inference guaranteed by the fundamental law of intelligence, the conclusion inevitably follows that we can know nothing aright without knowing of God. He becomes the principium cognoscendi, as well as the principium essendi. He is the fountain to which all the streams of speculation converge. Truth is never reached – the why is never adequately given until you ascend to Him. Intelligence finds its consummation in the knowledge of His name."

 

[Alexander Suarez]

Hi Alex. Thanks for your limited response. That might help us to keep track of where we are going. It is easy to lose the flow of arguments when they are broken up by quotes and replies.

Thank you Rev. Winzer for the exchange. I'll have to give your last reply some extended reflection as I will be traveling in the coming days.

 

[MW]

Thank you Rev. Winzer for the exchange. I'll have to give your last reply some extended reflection as I will be traveling in the coming days.

And thank you for the stimulating discussion. Happy travels! Feel free to resume the discussion if you are so inclined.

 

[Travis Fentiman]

But in a day and age when we no longer think in exactly those terms than you have a preliminary task of arguing for the legitimacy of thinking in those terms.
,

Jamey,

Thanks for the fuller context on your previous comments, and your sympathetic and helpful disposition.

As far as the preilminary task of arguing for the legitimacy of thinking in those (limited Aristotelian) terms, for what is worth, I actually did try to do that in the article by using everyday examples, issues and questions, so the reader is not thinking about the history of interpretation of Aristotle, but daily life and its realities, such as change, train cars, violin music, bunnies, movement, etc. and being forced to get to potential, actuality, natures of things, potentials deriving from natures, parts, the law of causality, etc.

Feser is particularly good at doing such; I was trying emulate him in that, though perhaps my success was limited. As far as my article, I have to be as brief as possible.

 

[jwright82]

Jamey,

Thanks for the fuller context on your previous comments, and your sympathetic and helpful disposition.

As far as the preilminary task of arguing for the legitimacy of thinking in those (limited Aristotelian) terms, for what is worth, I actually did try to do that in the article by using everyday examples, issues and questions, so the reader is not thinking about the history of interpretation of Aristotle, but daily life and its realities, such as change, train cars, violin music, bunnies, movement, etc. and being forced to get to potential, actuality, natures of things, potentials deriving from natures, parts, the law of causality, etc.

Feser is particularly good at doing such; I was trying emulate him in that, though perhaps my success was limited. As far as my article, I have to be as brief as possible.

Oh yeah, you did do that and you did a good job. My suggestion is to reference in a footnote or something to a source that handles all that. It's too much to ask for you to handle all that in a wonderful article. But a footnote is what those things are for.