Berkhof on Creationism

[Barnpreacher]

I know a thread on Traducianism was started a few months back, but I wanted to pursue this a little further.

Berkhof states, "The creationist view is to the effect that each individual soul is an immediate creation of God, which owes its origin to a direct creative act, of which the time cannot be precisely determined. The soul is supposed to be created pure, but to become sinful even before birth by entering into that complex of sin by which humanity as a whole is burdened." Manual of Christian Doctrine, 125.

So, is Berkhof stating that body and soul are joined at conception and because the soul is joined to the body that it becomes sinful?

If our corrupt natures are inherited from Adam then does the depravity and inability of man come through the seed? I'm not talking about original sin here because I understand it is imputed to all men. I'm talking about the corrupt nature of man. Berkhof states, "When he (Adam) sinned in this representative capacity, the guilt of his sin was naturally imputed to all those whom he represented; and as a result of this they are all born in a corrupt state." Manual, 144.

The first part of his statement is referring to original sin, and I take the second statement to imply that the corrupt nature is passed through the seed and when the soul joins with this corrupt body in conception then it too becomes wicked.

Is this how anyone else interprets Creationism or am I missing something?

 

[Barnpreacher]

Nothing??

 

[Barnpreacher]

Berkhof states, "Traducianism is favored by the inheritance of moral depravity or sin, which is a matter of the soul rather than of the body." Manual, 124.

How does Creationism answer to the inheritance of moral depravity? (See above. Is it through the seed?)

 

[Barnpreacher]

Since I'm just talking to myself in this thread I might as well make fun of myself.

 

[BrianLanier]

Berkhof states, "Traducianism is favored by the inheritance of moral depravity or sin, which is a matter of the soul rather than of the body." Manual, 124.

How does Creationism answer to the inheritance of moral depravity? (See above. Is it through the seed?)

I often wonder how much of the Creationism vs. Traducianism problem stems from a presupposed Cartesian mind-body dualism. One could argue that many of the Reformed (and otherwise) dogmatists inherited (perhaps uncritically) some sort of substance mind-body dualism from Plato, Descartes, et al.

There are quite a lot of compelling, yet not conclusive, philosophical arguments against a Cartesian model of substance dualism. I have limited time so I can't fully develop this line of thought --- if I have more time later, I'll try and write more.

 

[shackleton]

I have just been reading about this. The idea that when the soul comes into contact with the body, it becomes evil or fallen is a Gnostic idea, matter is evil and spirit is good. Therefore when good spirit comes in contact with our evil flesh, it becomes corrupt.

There are many passages that speak of the soul coming from God or God giving us life. I think strict traducianism is the old Plato idea. In reality we probably get most of who we are from our parents and God gives us life in there somewhere.

 

[SRoper]

I often wonder how much of the Creationism vs. Traducianism problem stems from a presupposed Cartesian mind-body dualism. One could argue that many of the Reformed (and otherwise) dogmatists inherited (perhaps uncritically) some sort of substance mind-body dualism from Plato, Descartes, et al.

There are quite a lot of compelling, yet not conclusive, philosophical arguments against a Cartesian model of substance dualism. I have limited time so I can't fully develop this line of thought --- if I have more time later, I'll try and write more.

Those are my thoughts exactly, but I didn't know if Ryan wanted to take the thread in that direction.

 

[BrianLanier]

Those are my thoughts exactly, but I didn't know if Ryan wanted to take the thread in that direction.

Yeah, I know. I just think that to the extent that Cartesian dualism breaks down is the same extent that the original problem loses its force.

 

[MW]

Yeah, I know. I just think that to the extent that Cartesian dualism breaks down is the same extent that the original problem loses its force.

How so? It seems to me you still have to face the dilemma of whether individual personality is the result of an immediate act of creation or merely the by-product of human procreation.

 

[SRoper]

I think the dilemma would have to be decided in favor of personality being a byproduct of procreation. I suppose any substantival monist view would have the same vulnerabilities as the form of traducianism that has both parents contributing to the soul of the child.

 

[MW]

I think the dilemma would have to be decided in favor of personality being a byproduct of procreation. I suppose any substantival monist view would have the same vulnerabilities as the form of traducianism that has both parents contributing to the soul of the child.

Yes, I would imagine you still have to answer the creationist objections as to the Scriptural testimony concerning God forming man's spirit within him, etc. I think it also raises its own problems in terms of human personality being tied to genetics and whatever else scientists might be able to discover in the future, which will undermine the biblical ethic that has been founded on what is really only a hypothetical dualism, not a practical one.

 

[Barnpreacher]

I didn't really start this with the intent of support for creationism or traducianism, but that's o.k.

I was simply more interested on thoughts about the corrupt nature in man from a creationism point of view. It was Berkhof's statement below that caused me to start thinking about it again as I read it.

Berkhof states, "When he (Adam) sinned in this representative capacity, the guilt of his sin was naturally imputed to all those whom he represented; and as a result of this they are all born in a corrupt state." Manual, 144.

I believe this statement to be true because the Bible is clear upon it and so I receive it by faith. I do think that although the second part is more readily explained from the traducianism point of view I still hold to creationism.

Ecclesiastes 12:7, "Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was: and the spirit shall return unto God who gave it."

Hebrews 12:9, "Furthermore we have had fathers of our flesh which corrected us, and we gave them reverence: shall we not much rather be in subjection unto the Father of spirits, and live?"

 

[BrianLanier]

How so? It seems to me you still have to face the dilemma of whether individual personality is the result of an immediate act of creation or merely the by-product of human procreation.

I said to the extent *Cartesian* dualism breaks down. The original question had to do with the soul--which I take Berkhof in the traditional dualist sense--and now the emphasis is on personality. I guess the next question is: do you take personality to be identical with soul (in the Cartesian sense)? I am trying to find out if there is some sort of equivocation going on here.

 

[BrianLanier]

Yes, I would imagine you still have to answer the creationist objections as to the Scriptural testimony concerning God forming man's spirit within him, etc. I think it also raises its own problems in terms of human personality being tied to genetics and whatever else scientists might be able to discover in the future, which will undermine the biblical ethic that has been founded on what is really only a hypothetical dualism, not a practical one.

Don't you think there IS some connection between human personality and genetics? How would this be a problem for a biblical ethic, that is, unless one believes there is a strict causal connection between a persons genetics and some *particular* unethical action. But that is tantamount to strict determinism, which not many Christians would want maintain.

 

[MW]

I said to the extent *Cartesian* dualism breaks down. The original question had to do with the soul--which I take Berkhof in the traditional dualist sense--and now the emphasis is on personality. I guess the next question is: do you take personality to be identical with soul (in the Cartesian sense)? I am trying to find out if there is some sort of equivocation going on here.

I took for granted "personality" as being the alternative from a monist perspective. What do you posit instead of a soul if not personality? If I argue an ethical issue with a monist I revert to personality as their own accepted term since "soul" as distinct from the body requires a dualist understanding. On your monist supposition you are still bound to account for the existence of personality, that is, what makes each person unique. And from a Christian monist perspective you are bound to show how this uniqueness is tied to the imago Dei. And from a reformed Christian perspective you are bound to show what becomes of this personality when the "person" dies.

 

[MW]

Don't you think there IS some connection between human personality and genetics? How would this be a problem for a biblical ethic, that is, unless one believes there is a strict causal connection between a persons genetics and some *particular* unethical action. But that is tantamount to strict determinism, which not many Christians would want maintain.

If man's "personality" is generated as a by-product of human pro-creation it is his genetics which determine his "personality. This would establish modern psychology's emphasis on man as a passive being and creature of circumstance; whereas in traditional Christian ethics man is a self-conscious, self-motivating, and therefore accountable creature for all his actions.

 

[BrianLanier]

If man's "personality" is generated as a by-product of human pro-creation it is his genetics which determine his "personality. This would establish modern psychology's emphasis on man as a passive being and creature of circumstance; whereas in traditional Christian ethics man is a self-conscious, self-motivating, and therefore accountable creature for all his actions.

1. This is not an answer to my question.
2. Your first sentence (premise) does not entail your second, unless, as I specified, you assume some form of determinism.

 

[MW]

1. This is not an answer to my question.
2. Your first sentence (premise) does not entail your second, unless, as I specified, you assume some form of determinism.

In order to answer your question as you desire, that is, removing all deterministic elements, I would have to assume an interrelation between body and soul, which rests upon holistic dualism; but you have espoused monism, which has removed the idea of two entities (and the very fact one cannot accomplish this as a Christian shows its contrariety to the Christian view of man) and thinks solely in terms of man as a monad.

 

[MW]

I'm not sure where this thread might lead, but may I suggest before it goes too far in this direction, Robert Reymond's New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith, pp. 418-424, and especially the quotation from Lewis Smedes on pp. 419, 420. Also John Murray, Collected Writings, vol. 2, pp. 14-33, and especially pp. 18-22. Blessings!

 

[BrianLanier]

I took for granted "personality" as being the alternative from a monist perspective. What do you posit instead of a soul if not personality? If I argue an ethical issue with a monist I revert to personality as their own accepted term since "soul" as distinct from the body requires a dualist understanding. On your monist supposition you are still bound to account for the existence of personality, that is, what makes each person unique. And from a Christian monist perspective you are bound to show how this uniqueness is tied to the imago Dei. And from a reformed Christian perspective you are bound to show what becomes of this personality when the "person" dies.

1. My apologies: I didn't realize you were assuming a monist perspective (for the sake of agument) when you used "personality" instead of "soul". That's why I suspected equivocation. I don't want to misunderstand you; thanks for clarifying!

2. Taking (in any robust, meaningful way) account of a persons unique personality would be a long undertaking--one that I am not prepared to do here.

3. Neither side denies that persons have what is necessary to fulfill the criterion of the imago Dei.

4. The person's immaterial aspect (spirit, soul, etc. - note: not bound strictly to the Cartesian view of such) will be with the Lord until he returns and the person is re-united with their body. Now you asked "what" will become of him, not "how" this takes place. (In which case we'll probably both be scratching our heads for a long time!)

5. I don't know if being a monist is the answer (I never claimed to be one). Neither view is without perplexing philosophical problems. I just think that certain forms of *substance* dualism are subject to some very difficult to answer objections. Which is why I think neither option (Creationism or Traducianism as usually explicated) will answer the question that Ryan asked adequately.

 

[BrianLanier]

In order to answer your question as you desire, that is, removing all deterministic elements, I would have to assume an interrelation between body and soul, which rests upon holistic dualism; [ . . . ] .(emphasis added)

This is not the case--not all physicalists are determinists. (I am speaking from a general philosophical pov.)

 

[MW]

My apologies then, because it sounded to me like you were providing the monist's usual critique of traditional dichotomy. I think we have to distinguish between a philosophical and a theological investigation of the subject. The philosophers raise their objections without taking into account the nature of sin and its consequences. As for Berkhof, I think he has provided a very reasonable explanation of the transmission of sin from a creationist perspective. If we understand sin as a relational term rather than a substance of some kind, there will be no difficulty in accepting his view.

 

[MW]

This is not the case--not all physicalists are determinists. (I am speaking from a general philosophical pov.)

My previous post was in response to your five point post. In answer to this one I can only ask, how does a physicalist explain individual choice? It seems to me they are making an empty claim. If the brain/mind is one, the mind does not operate independently from the brain's physical make-up.