RamistThomist
Puritanboard Clerk
This book should be considered a groundbreaking landmark in every sense of the terms. Andrew Radde-Gallwitz has given us careful, non-partisan scholarship on a topic that necessarily (so it would seem) divides the scholarly spectrum between Augustinians and "neo-Palamites." Traditionally, and especially in post-Augustinian cultures, the doctrine of divine simplicity was usually defined to mean that God's essence is synonymous with his attributes (Thomas would carry the argument further to include synonymous with his relations, which are the persons). This construction, though, generated a huge number of problems and didn't survive the hammer blows of analytic philosophy (see Plantinga, Does God Have a Nature?). For example, if God is identical with his attributes, then God is an attribute. Secondly, this robs the attributes of any real meaning, as Charles Hodge clearly pointed out. Radde-Gallwitz, therefore, seeks to construct a notion of divine simplicity that avoids the critiques of Plantinga but also maintains the coherence of theological "speak" about God.
Divine Simplicity at its most basic level seeks to affirm that God is without parts or composition. Until Augustine few really pressed the issue beyond that. In other words, for the pre-Nicene and Nicene Fathers (Origen and the Apologists excepted) simplicity was utilized negatively or with reserve. Radde-Galwitz surveys the historical landscape and notes the ways simplicity was and was not used, all the while anticipating the Identity Thesis of Eunomius.
A brief word on Eunomius: Eunomius held that God is identical with his essence and attributes, the primary attribute being that of Ingeneracy. Pushed to its conclusion that means only the Father is truly God in essence.
Athanasius did hold that our names of God are names for his essence, but he doesn't seem to have developed the thought beyond that of an anti-Arian polemic. Anyway, "Father" can function as a name for the divine essence because Father is a correlative term, which implies a Son, pace Athanasius. Again, though, Athanasios doesn't seem to really develop that idea. St Basil placed simplicity in an epistemological context. We can know the that-ness of God's essence but not the what-ness. This leads into his Trinitarian theology: we know the Trinity by the idiomata or the hypostases, not by the ousia. In contrast to Eunomius, ingeneracy cannot be the operating term for God's essence because it tells how God is, not what. (While superior, this construction is open to epistemological and ontological problems as well)
In dealing with the Identity Thesis, Basil posits the attributes as non-identical substantial predicates. They are "co-extensive" properties that are predicated of the divine substance. Such a property is necessarily connected with other properties. It is not identical with the divine essence, yet neither is it disconnected. In formulating it thus, Basil introduces a new term: propria. A proprium is not identical with the subject, but neither is it an accident.
Gregory of Nyssa takes Basil's insights and sharpens them. Gregory is famous for his discussion of "the Goods," which he takes for the divine names, and places them under the category of "propria." And in a particularly brilliant move, Rallwitz draws upon Michel Barnes' discussion of Gregory's use of power to clinch his argument: the divine "power" (dunamis) is a causal capacity rooted in the divine nature (183).
At the end of this section Rallwitz examines the key passages in Gregory which earlier interpreters took to be indicative of the Identity Thesis: Eun. 1.234 (1.235); Eun. 1.276. Rallwitz shows that to translate this passage is already to interpret, and he contrasts three different translations. The problem seems to be thus: God's goodness is not something God acquires but is true by virtue of God's very nature. How do we interpret auto hoper estin? It does not modify agathon and to be "goodness" it should have the definite article. It should be read, rather, as in "dashes" (206). This, Rallwitz suggests (and I think rightly), is an argument for the divine goods as propria and not as a copula for the divine essence.
Conclusion
This truly is a grand mark of scholarship and it has the potential to rewrite (or at least refocus) past scholarship on the Cappadocians. He ends the book with an attempt to distance Gregory from both Thomists and "neo-Palamites." That Gregory is not a proto-Thomist is clear enough: Gregory even ridicules the Identity Thesis. Rallwitz then argues that Gregory cannot be seen, on the other hand, as a proto-Palamite and he interacts with David Bradshaw's scholarship on this point. I appreciate his interacting with Bradshaw. To often the Academia simply ignore arguments that make them uncomfortable. Rallwitz's contention is that Gregory uses the "Goods" language in a way different than Bradshaw interprets God's "energies" to be, thus Radde-Galwitz distances the cappadocians from Eastern Orthodoxy. If he is correct, then the Orthodox must necessarily own up to the fact that doctrine did develop.
The book's insane price will keep it out of the hands of most. I read it via interlibrary Loan. Still, it is groundbreaking scholarship.
Problems with the book's arguments:
I will assume that Radde-Galwitz identifies (no pun intended) with Gregory and Basil's formulations. He had argued that "A proprium is not identical with the subject, but neither is it an accident." Okay, well what is it? He is not clear. As for Basils claim (Epistle 234) that We can know the that-ness of God's essence but not the what-ness, how does this not introduce a dualism into the godhead?
Divine Simplicity at its most basic level seeks to affirm that God is without parts or composition. Until Augustine few really pressed the issue beyond that. In other words, for the pre-Nicene and Nicene Fathers (Origen and the Apologists excepted) simplicity was utilized negatively or with reserve. Radde-Galwitz surveys the historical landscape and notes the ways simplicity was and was not used, all the while anticipating the Identity Thesis of Eunomius.
A brief word on Eunomius: Eunomius held that God is identical with his essence and attributes, the primary attribute being that of Ingeneracy. Pushed to its conclusion that means only the Father is truly God in essence.
Athanasius did hold that our names of God are names for his essence, but he doesn't seem to have developed the thought beyond that of an anti-Arian polemic. Anyway, "Father" can function as a name for the divine essence because Father is a correlative term, which implies a Son, pace Athanasius. Again, though, Athanasios doesn't seem to really develop that idea. St Basil placed simplicity in an epistemological context. We can know the that-ness of God's essence but not the what-ness. This leads into his Trinitarian theology: we know the Trinity by the idiomata or the hypostases, not by the ousia. In contrast to Eunomius, ingeneracy cannot be the operating term for God's essence because it tells how God is, not what. (While superior, this construction is open to epistemological and ontological problems as well)
In dealing with the Identity Thesis, Basil posits the attributes as non-identical substantial predicates. They are "co-extensive" properties that are predicated of the divine substance. Such a property is necessarily connected with other properties. It is not identical with the divine essence, yet neither is it disconnected. In formulating it thus, Basil introduces a new term: propria. A proprium is not identical with the subject, but neither is it an accident.
Gregory of Nyssa takes Basil's insights and sharpens them. Gregory is famous for his discussion of "the Goods," which he takes for the divine names, and places them under the category of "propria." And in a particularly brilliant move, Rallwitz draws upon Michel Barnes' discussion of Gregory's use of power to clinch his argument: the divine "power" (dunamis) is a causal capacity rooted in the divine nature (183).
At the end of this section Rallwitz examines the key passages in Gregory which earlier interpreters took to be indicative of the Identity Thesis: Eun. 1.234 (1.235); Eun. 1.276. Rallwitz shows that to translate this passage is already to interpret, and he contrasts three different translations. The problem seems to be thus: God's goodness is not something God acquires but is true by virtue of God's very nature. How do we interpret auto hoper estin? It does not modify agathon and to be "goodness" it should have the definite article. It should be read, rather, as in "dashes" (206). This, Rallwitz suggests (and I think rightly), is an argument for the divine goods as propria and not as a copula for the divine essence.
Conclusion
This truly is a grand mark of scholarship and it has the potential to rewrite (or at least refocus) past scholarship on the Cappadocians. He ends the book with an attempt to distance Gregory from both Thomists and "neo-Palamites." That Gregory is not a proto-Thomist is clear enough: Gregory even ridicules the Identity Thesis. Rallwitz then argues that Gregory cannot be seen, on the other hand, as a proto-Palamite and he interacts with David Bradshaw's scholarship on this point. I appreciate his interacting with Bradshaw. To often the Academia simply ignore arguments that make them uncomfortable. Rallwitz's contention is that Gregory uses the "Goods" language in a way different than Bradshaw interprets God's "energies" to be, thus Radde-Galwitz distances the cappadocians from Eastern Orthodoxy. If he is correct, then the Orthodox must necessarily own up to the fact that doctrine did develop.
The book's insane price will keep it out of the hands of most. I read it via interlibrary Loan. Still, it is groundbreaking scholarship.
Problems with the book's arguments:
I will assume that Radde-Galwitz identifies (no pun intended) with Gregory and Basil's formulations. He had argued that "A proprium is not identical with the subject, but neither is it an accident." Okay, well what is it? He is not clear. As for Basils claim (Epistle 234) that We can know the that-ness of God's essence but not the what-ness, how does this not introduce a dualism into the godhead?
