Atheism and ethics.

[jwright82]

I find myself believing A through my conscience just as I find myself believing there is a lamp though my senses.

This is a category mistake howyoui come to believe in a lamp on the desk has no bearing on how you believe something is right or wrong. Since not everyone agrees on what is right or wrong you have no way of knowing if a) your conscience actually exists in the way you view it b) even if it does exist how do you know it is functioning properly?

There is an objective criterion: if you can falsify the believe then I am obligated not to believe. Otherwise it is basic. It is the skeptic who is irrational.

If objective simply means "true for all people in all times" it still does not entail "rationally known or believed by all people at all times." In fact, I would argue that many objective facts are not true for all people at all times. It is objectively true that Barack Obama is president of the United States, but it is not true for all people at all times.

Again, basicality has to do with rational belief formation: ie "How did I come to believe A? Am I rational in believing A despite lack of reasoning?"

Again, is a downs syndrome person rational in believing A? Yes.

All right lets take a different aproech here so I can hopefully demonstrate why a theory of ethics is necessary to prove a beleif of an ethical kind. You meet an atheist who says that it is a basic beleif of his that murder of any kind is morally right to do. How do show this beleif to be false? You rule out my method at the beggining of challenging his theory of ethics so how would you disprove this idea?

Again, warrant has to do with how one came to have a belief: if a person is warranted by a means other than their system of beliefs (ie: externally), then a disconnect is fine. The warrant is external to the system. The system may fall and the belief remain---the only catch is if there is a direct contradiction.

Warrant is fine and dandy in everyday life. But someone can have all the warrant that their finite perception allows and still believe in something that is false. You seem to be blowing warrant out of proportion, no offence intended. It is whether or not the person has coherence with their more important or general beleifs and that any and all their beleifs corespond to reality that is important to me. In your model you cannot get out of the loop of subjectivity. Many empirical beleifs can be challanged on a de facto basis but moral beleifs are not empirical so a de facto argument may be out of the question.

Because they are trying to create a system to explain the phenomena: they want what Christianity has without having a pesky God to judge them. However, if one is content to remain a metaphysical agnostic, I see no reason why an atheist has to create such a system. It's a non-rational motivation

A system to explain phenomonon is a worldview. If the atheist refuses to produce a worldview than that is fine too, that assumes of course that people do not form beleifs about what they experience and that they do not try to reconcile these beleifs toghether, which every average person does. If they refuse to form this worldview by appealing to what they define as atheism not being a worldview than I would critique on two fronts.
1. They are still people and all people produce a system of beleifs to explain the world around them and that is a worldview.
2. Atheism still has logical consequences to it as an idea. Many thinkers have worked out these consequences in history. If we imagine a world without God and this world is how the materialist tells us it is than how do you have ethics in such a universe? That is the logicaL problem withen atheism. Imagining an atheist world and trying to answer these questions.
My computer is going to die give me a couple of hours to respond to the rest.

 

[jwright82]

So what you need is a criterion, not a metaphysical theory. Metaphysical theories are nice, but not strictly necessary.

But even a criterion needs or is affected by metaphysics as well. Materialism as a theory cannot produce or account for ethics if it is true.

Can you come up with an example? I don't think that something has to be analytically true in order to be a given---you are separating the intellect from our other faculties (another Cartesian mistake).

I don't believe there are any. But if you claim that something is given, in the realm of ethics for instance, than it is either analyticaly true or it is not given. Given is given it is like obviously true but although common-sense is very useful for philosophy it still stands that certian beleifs like ethics cannot be given without being analytically true.

Again, which ones? Special pleading is out because properly basic beliefs are indeed challengeable and falsifiable on a de facto level

Well if you rule out a certian kind of of criticism that is or has been applied to theories since the begining of philosophy you either prove why it can't apply or it seems to me that that is special pleading of a certian kind. Also if you claim that a beleif is given enough to need no proof, other than empirical ones, than the most you can come up with is mass appeal which is a fallacy.

Have you studied the ontological argument? Even most atheists admit that it is valid---they escape by attempting to deny premises.

I have studied it but I think criticizing it is beyond this post. I will PM you my criticism if you like.

That is because it is primarily descriptive---the challenges to it are challenges to the things that it claims: ie, the only way to challenge the theory is to challenge the beliefs directly.

The only way it is descriptive is if it describes your metaphysics of epistemology. These modules you keep mentioning I mean how do you even prove that they exist?

That is because it is primarily descriptive---the challenges to it are challenges to the things that it claims: ie, the only way to challenge the theory is to challenge the beliefs directly.

Your right but they only prove that justifying ones beleifs change according to age or mental ability. A child accepts things on authority which is just fine.

Justification B: Doing your epistemic (not necessarily moral) duty as a rational being with regard to your beliefs.

All that is required for justification B is warrant.

It all depends upon what you mean by warrant. If materialism cannot produce an adequite theory of ethics than a materialist has no warrant to believe in any of their ethical beleifs.

Justification A: within your system, being able to account for A on a metaphysical level.

I would make differing levels here.
If an atheist and I are sitting there watching the news and a story about genocide somwhere we could agree that that was wrong no problem and I wouldn't ask for any jutification because we are both warranted according to being made in the image of God and they would be using that innate knowledge of God's law to make this pronouncement.

If they then went into a scathing criticism of Christianity on the grounds that they felt that it was immoral for whatever reason tan one of the possible criticisms that I could level against them would be to askhow in an atheistic universe ethics was even objectivly possible. Again the argument is placed withen imagining what a Godless universe is like logically speaking and then matching that with reality as we experience it, that is the TA in a nutshell.

 

[Philip]

But even a criterion needs or is affected by metaphysics as well. Materialism as a theory cannot produce or account for ethics if it is true.

Again, I don't think your metaphysics has to provide a justification. It's nice if it does, but only necessary if you are a coherentist or internalist in epistemology.

I don't believe there are any. But if you claim that something is given, in the realm of ethics for instance, than it is either analyticaly true or it is not given.

Why? Why must a proposition be analytically true in order to be a given? I would say that "2+2=4" is a given---it's necessarily true, after all.

If there are no givens, then there's nothing to be explained by your theories.

Given is given it is like obviously true but although common-sense is very useful for philosophy it still stands that certian beleifs like ethics cannot be given without being analytically true.

Why not? Why can't we take the dictates of conscience as givens? Every discipline must have givens or else there is no discipline---that, my friend, is relativism.

Well if you rule out a certian kind of of criticism that is or has been applied to theories since the begining of philosophy you either prove why it can't apply or it seems to me that that is special pleading of a certian kind.

And I keep showing why it is that basic beliefs do not amount to special pleading: they are central to our belief system and therefore can be challenged on a de facto basis alone, not on the basis of warrant/justification. The justification for my belief that murder is wrong is qualitatively no different from my belief that there is a lamp--- therefore I am quite rational in believing it regardless of my metaphysical theory regarding it.

What if I can't know why A is true? What if the answer is beyond human comprehension?

The only way it is descriptive is if it describes your metaphysics of epistemology. These modules you keep mentioning I mean how do you even prove that they exist?

We certainly speak of them a lot in philosophy. Skepticism is the doubting of things like sense perception, reason, memory, conscience, etc---even skepticism admits that these are part of our makeup, it just refuses to believe that they are rational because it has a bad definition of rationality. The best epistemologists are educators.

Your right but they only prove that justifying ones beleifs change according to age or mental ability. A child accepts things on authority which is just fine.

And so do adults: how do you know that Barack Obama is the president of the United States? I would hazard a guess that it's on some sort of authority. As credulity develops, it certainly learns to discern between authorities, but that's part of the mechanism.

It all depends upon what you mean by warrant.

Warrant is the property of having been produced by a properly-functioning cognitive faculty within the context for which it was designed.

If they then went into a scathing criticism of Christianity on the grounds that they felt that it was immoral for whatever reason tan one of the possible criticisms that I could level against them would be to askhow in an atheistic universe ethics was even objectivly possible.

But this begs the question. The atheist already assumes that the moral universe we live in is godless. You assume that the atheist has the same top-down approach that you have rather than a bottom-up or composite approach.

Again the argument is placed withen imagining what a Godless universe is like

Except that all that the atheist has to say is, "But the universe we live in is godless and at the same time moral, ergo your question is meaningless."

 

[jwright82]

Again, I don't think your metaphysics has to provide a justification. It's nice if it does, but only necessary if you are a coherentist or internalist in epistemology.

The reason it provides justification is because it has priority over the other areas of philosophy. Take a materialistic universe, this theory describes what can and cannot exist withen this universe, for instance only phyisical material things may exist withen this universe. That sets the rules for any further discussion that the materialist has for the other areas of philosophy. Epistemology, they seek a material explination for reason and other mental phenomonon. Ethics they seek a purely material ethics, which is by nature the naturalistic fallacy. If they claim that some immaterial ethical norms exist outside the universe than their metaphysics and their ethics contradict oneanother. It is like the person who claims that God exists and that He doesn't exist at the same time and in the same realationship, that is no disconnect but a bold faced contradiction. You see my metaphysical views are not disconnected from my ethical views but have logical consequences for them and vice versa.

Why? Why must a proposition be analytically true in order to be a given? I would say that "2+2=4" is a given---it's necessarily true, after all.

If there are no givens, then there's nothing to be explained by your theories.

It is necessarily true if and only if you first assume the laws of mathmatics exist. So your given, your basic beleif, rests on something that must be more given or basic. But since Godel and Turing proved that mathmatics or even logic cannot provide an adequete basis for itself your claim of absolute giveness is on unstable foundations, in an ultimate sense. It is given in a common-sense everyday experience kind of way but once you take common-sense too far than it becomes problamatic.

Why not? Why can't we take the dictates of conscience as givens? Every discipline must have givens or else there is no discipline---that, my friend, is relativism.

It is only relativism in the old foundationalist scheme of the universe, it is all or nothing. For me all authority rests outside the universe in the being of God thus providing a third option to your scheme.
Every discipline does have givens in a limited common-sense view but you cannot take this truth and blow it out of proportion into its own metaphysical foundation upon which all other truths can rest, this is a form of autonomy.

And I keep showing why it is that basic beliefs do not amount to special pleading: they are central to our belief system and therefore can be challenged on a de facto basis alone, not on the basis of warrant/justification. The justification for my belief that murder is wrong is qualitatively no different from my belief that there is a lamp--- therefore I am quite rational in believing it regardless of my metaphysical theory regarding it.

Those two beleifs are qualitativly different because one is developed through the senses and the other one is not. The claim that murder is right can be just as basic as our beleif that murder is wrong.

It is special pleading when you rule out transcendental critiques by asserting that basic beleifs can challenged on a de facto basis alone. Why is this? Well only if your scheme is true, but even if it was how would rule out the beleif that murder is right is a basic beleif. What facts would you go to to disprove this as a basic beleif? That most people disagree with it, fallacy of mass appeal. That it would breed a chaotic world if it were to be adopted by people, this only begs the ethical question of ought and is therefore circiluler reasoning. That it violates some absolute ethical standered, this would only make ethics not as given as you claim and therefore disprove your scheme (also it would again be begging the ethical question of ought). So which other facts are there that would disprove it? The only fact you could come up with would be that you disagree that it is basic but that only proves that you disagree with it not that it isn't basic.

We certainly speak of them a lot in philosophy. Skepticism is the doubting of things like sense perception, reason, memory, conscience, etc---even skepticism admits that these are part of our makeup, it just refuses to believe that they are rational because it has a bad definition of rationality. The best epistemologists are educators.

I don't doubt that there are these modules I just doubt the authority you are claiming they have. I for one love this element of your model, I find it to very insightful and have been thinking about how to incorperate it in my own thinking. Latley I have been melding VanTil/Bahnsen/Frame scheme with a Dooyeweerd/Vollenhaven/Bavink/Smith scheme and what I will call a Pugh/Plantinga/Wolterstorff scheme. One weakness in VanTil's thought is that we are only concerned with the actual beleifs a person has, but he never really explained how those beleifs were aquired, your scheme in my own modified sense can account nicley for the aquisition of beleifs but does not have the ultimate authority you seem to be placing on it.

And so do adults: how do you know that Barack Obama is the president of the United States? I would hazard a guess that it's on some sort of authority. As credulity develops, it certainly learns to discern between authorities, but that's part of the mechanism.

This is another area were we are in agreement, authority has an essential role in both of our schemes. Reason itself rests on the authority of God as creator. So there is no disagreement here.

Warrant is the property of having been produced by a properly-functioning cognitive faculty within the context for which it was designed.

I can certianly agree with this definition but I think proper warrant is a little more complex than you seem to be saying. I have warrant in a limited sense for beleiving that "2+2=4" is given on a practical basis, but I may not have ultimate warrant once the totality of my beleifs about reality come into the conversation, my metaphysics may contradict my beleifs about mathmatics.

The atheist already assumes that the moral universe we live in is godless. You assume that the atheist has the same top-down approach that you have rather than a bottom-up or composite approach

Just because someone assumes something doesn't mean they ultimate warrant for that assumption, the best answer they can come up with it seems for their beleif in morality is that "it just is", which the absolute height of absurdity.

Except that all that the atheist has to say is, "But the universe we live in is godless and at the same time moral, ergo your question is meaningless."

If my question is meaningless than ethics as a discipline is meaningless as well, for you need no theory of ethics which means that philosophy has been wasting its time since its beggining. Also they are pleading that their beleif is special and that it cannot be doubted on a logical basis, why they cannot give. For whatever reason the atheist has found a beleif that logic can't touch, I'm not allowed to logically analyze their beleif and their warrant for such a beleif on practical or ultimate grounds. Because if I was allowed than their beleif would not be as warranted as they thought, so it seems that they must yet again commit logical fallacies just to hold up their various beleifs on different matters.

 

[Philip]

It is only relativism in the old foundationalist scheme of the universe, it is all or nothing. For me all authority rests outside the universe in the being of God thus providing a third option to your scheme.

So is God your given then? Can you show that God's existence is a tautology?

Every discipline does have givens in a limited common-sense view but you cannot take this truth and blow it out of proportion into its own metaphysical foundation upon which all other truths can rest, this is a form of autonomy.

Which definition of autonomy are you using here? I would maintain that my position is how everyone actually gains knowledge, regardless of the metaphysical system they use to try and make sense of it.

If they claim that some immaterial ethical norms exist outside the universe than their metaphysics and their ethics contradict oneanother.

So let's revise the metaphysics to include some non-material entities and we're good.

It is necessarily true if and only if you first assume the laws of mathmatics exist.

Or we could say it the other way round: we know that the laws of mathematics are true because 2+2 does in fact equal 4.

It is given in a common-sense everyday experience kind of way but once you take common-sense too far than it becomes problamatic.

Why can't we assume things? Can you show that I don't know that 2+2=4?

Those two beleifs are qualitativly different because one is developed through the senses and the other one is not.

No, both are developed through the senses: one is developed through physical sense, and the other through moral sense (conscience).

It is special pleading when you rule out transcendental critiques by asserting that basic beleifs can challenged on a de facto basis alone.

This is because of the nature of warrant in the case of a basic belief: a basic belief comes on the basis of a cognitive faculty that is generally assumed to be reliable. Therefore, in order to prove that the sense is not working correctly (warrant, TA) you must prove that the belief is, in fact, false.

So which other facts are there that would disprove it?

The fact that murder is, in fact, wrong. The fact that I cannot prove something to person x's satisfaction doesn't entail that a) I don't know it b) that I am forced to be a relativist. I may not be able to assign epistemic blame, but I can know that his conscience isn't working right.

I don't doubt that there are these modules I just doubt the authority you are claiming they have.

In a Christian system, they can have this kind of authority because, though partly broken by the fall, they are God-given. That's the argument that Reid makes in the first chapter of Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man.

If you know that God exists, the system makes a lot more sense (making sense, though, is not the same thing as being logically coherent: making sense is intuitive, not strictly logical).

but I may not have ultimate warrant once the totality of my beleifs about reality come into the conversation

I think what you are saying is that it may be in contradiction to other beliefs: so what you do is weigh the warrant and decide which you have more warrant for (assuming, of course, that the two are actually in conflict).

If my question is meaningless than ethics as a discipline is meaningless as well, for you need no theory of ethics which means that philosophy has been wasting its time since its beggining.

Here, I think, is the disagreement. You would challenge the atheist to imagine a world without God and see whether it had ethics or not. This question, though, is loaded against the atheist: all he has to do is say:

1) God does not exist
2) We live in a moral universe
3) Ergo there is some explanation, even if I can't provide it right now.

The other problem is that there may well be a way in which an atheist could come up with a consistent way to account for ethics and it just hasn't been thought of yet.

The problem is that you, as a Christian, see the argument run like this:

a) If ethics then God
b) Ethics
c) Therefore God.

Whereas the atheist will dispute the first part. I agree that materialism is untenable, which is why non-materialism is what needs answering---that's the monster we face.

Also they are pleading that their beleif is special and that it cannot be doubted on a logical basis

Can you find a purely logical basis for any belief? All that logic can do is show relations between beliefs: logic alone can yield no truth.

For whatever reason the atheist has found a beleif that logic can't touch

Tu quoque: logic can't touch my belief in God either.

You assume too much: you are (I think) equating "making sense" with logicality. I agree that it makes a lot more sense for us to believe in God than not, but we cannot, with mere logic, destroy the opposite proposition. In many ways, reason is the slave of the passions---it is guided either by a spirit of dependence on God or by a spirit of autonomy. It's not where you start, it's how you start. As someone once said, the heart of the matter is a matter of the heart.

 

[jwright82]

So is God your given then? Can you show that God's existence is a tautology?

He is my most important presupossition. The difference between a given or basic beleif and presupossition is that a presupossition takes on a somewhat religious charector in that it has ultimacy and authority over all other beleifs, it is foundational to my worldview but it takes on a slightly different charector than your basic beleifs do.

Which definition of autonomy are you using here? I would maintain that my position is how everyone actually gains knowledge, regardless of the metaphysical system they use to try and make sense of it.

By autonomy here I mean that the discipline itself needs no outside support from anyother source. Much like Russell and Whiteheads attempt to provide a ground for mathmatics, which Godel disproved later. In fact You could say that Godel disproved the autonomy of mathmatics. I like how your model accounts for the acquisition of beleifs, so yes your right you are looking at how people gain knowledge but knowledge by itself does justify itself in an ultimate sense.

As you point out later in your post all the materialist has to do is to allow for some immaterial things but they are no longer a strict materialist. This new theory has its pros and cons but it only proves that the person cannot hold both set sof beleifs at the same time. But again this isn't as simple as two beleifs contradicting eachother these are two sets of the most important beleifs. I mean what kind of coffee someone likes is not that important in the grand scheme of things but what the nature of reality is well that determines so many other beleifs and sets so many questions that it is of the most important in fact you could eaisily say it is a presupossition.

So let's revise the metaphysics to include some non-material entities and we're good.

Yes this gets them out of the inherent problems of strict materialism. Have you ever studied the atheists of the french revolution? They might fit into this scheme. I have only personally read one atheist who argued this so the vast majority want to stick to a strict materialism. I wouldn't say they were good because I can still question them on their metaphysics of ethics you could say. What are these non-material entities and where do they exist and all that. And I bet I would get 10 different answers for 10 different people because as I said the vast majority of atheist are strict materialsit. There is a more thought out worldview there that is more in line with historical atheism as well.

Or we could say it the other way round: we know that the laws of mathematics are true because 2+2 does in fact equal 4.

This is only circuler reasoning.

Why can't we assume things? Can you show that I don't know that 2+2=4?

You know it to be true in what sense? Do you have warrant to use it in everyday experience, yes.

---------- Post added at 09:18 AM ---------- Previous post was at 09:01 AM ----------

Sorry my computer weirded out on me. You may be warranted in this narrow sense but ultimatly you may not be depending on your view of the foundation of mathmatics.

No, both are developed through the senses: one is developed through physical sense, and the other through moral sense (conscience).

You are equivecating on the word sense here.

This is because of the nature of warrant in the case of a basic belief: a basic belief comes on the basis of a cognitive faculty that is generally assumed to be reliable. Therefore, in order to prove that the sense is not working correctly (warrant, TA) you must prove that the belief is, in fact, false.

Granted this is one way to disprove the beleif but I can also expand the discussion out to include your whole web of beleifs and then the individual faculties play almost no role in warranting a beleif in an ultimate sense. The faculties are good at aquiring beleifs but they cannot provide absolute warrant for a beleif, this is what I mean by justification.

The fact that murder is, in fact, wrong. The fact that I cannot prove something to person x's satisfaction doesn't entail that a) I don't know it b) that I am forced to be a relativist. I may not be able to assign epistemic blame, but I can know that his conscience isn't working right.

You see on your own limited sense of warrant you couldn't factually challenge it at all but I could challange it in an ultimate sense and employ a TA. On the more everyday beleifs sure all that is needed is your method to prove or disprove the beleif but on these more important matters my method might be more useful.

In a Christian system, they can have this kind of authority because, though partly broken by the fall, they are God-given. That's the argument that Reid makes in the first chapter of Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man.

If you know that God exists, the system makes a lot more sense (making sense, though, is not the same thing as being logically coherent: making sense is intuitive, not strictly logical).

Agreed.

I think what you are saying is that it may be in contradiction to other beliefs: so what you do is weigh the warrant and decide which you have more warrant for (assuming, of course, that the two are actually in conflict).

Agreed but they may not have warrant for either beleif as well.

Here, I think, is the disagreement. You would challenge the atheist to imagine a world without God and see whether it had ethics or not. This question, though, is loaded against the atheist: all he has to do is say:

1) God does not exist
2) We live in a moral universe
3) Ergo there is some explanation, even if I can't provide it right now.

The other problem is that there may well be a way in which an atheist could come up with a consistent way to account for ethics and it just hasn't been thought of yet.

The problem is that you, as a Christian, see the argument run like this:

a) If ethics then God
b) Ethics
c) Therefore God.

Whereas the atheist will dispute the first part. I agree that materialism is untenable, which is why non-materialism is what needs answering---that's the monster we face

Strict materialism will commit the naturalsitic fallacy anytime they attempt to provide a objective moral theory it is inescapable. They may provide a practical ethics but that will not prove that you ought to behave the way they want you to.

Can you find a purely logical basis for any belief? All that logic can do is show relations between beliefs: logic alone can yield no truth.

I mean more along the lines of logical analysis and criticism.

Tu quoque: logic can't touch my belief in God either.

You assume too much: you are (I think) equating "making sense" with logicality. I agree that it makes a lot more sense for us to believe in God than not, but we cannot, with mere logic, destroy the opposite proposition. In many ways, reason is the slave of the passions---it is guided either by a spirit of dependence on God or by a spirit of autonomy. It's not where you start, it's how you start. As someone once said, the heart of the matter is a matter of the heart.

I like the last part. I can destroy the the atheist worldview because it contradicts itself and leaves many very important logical problems withen its own system unanswered. Some atheists, like Adam Savage on mythbusters, apparently won't even answer the question of ethics. They just assume good without God and go from there. They commit the fallacy of absurdity by trying to pretend like the question is so stupid that it requires no answer. I can say this without trying to pat myself on the back but this line of argumentation is so weak and irational that even I can embarrass any atheist I have debated who spouted it.