steven-nemes
Puritan Board Sophomore
I am basically struggling with the idea of libertarian free will and the notion that God "predestines" some to be saved, meaning, he brings about the universe in which they are saved, based on knowledge of their having freely responded in faith to the gospel call.
If God creates that universe in which person S is saved, then when the state of affairs in which S is presented with the gospel is instantiated, can S do otherwise? If he has libertarian free will, it seems he would have to be able to do so, and then God would have false knowledge, so this cannot be possible. But then if he does believe; is his choice still free? It seems he necessarily acts in the way he does. But isn't that not possible, if he has libertarian free will? What's the difference in saying that God chose to save some and not others prior to the creation of the universe, and some people are saved and others not, necessarily, given the possible universe that has been instantiated?
But even the notion of God creating the universe in which a person will be saved doesn't seem to comport well with libertarian free will. If God "knew" which people would be saved in a specific possible universe, then is it implied that in other universes they would have not chosen to respond to the call of the gospel in faith? Does that mean that there are factors external to themselves (like their mood, their feelings at that time, how their day went) that determine their choice? But then there is no libertarian free will, if those things do determine choices...
But perhaps God doesn't know who will be saved--maybe he is just taking a chance with sending Christ to die. But that doesn't work at all--Christ said himself that he came to die as a ransom for many, implying that he knew that certain people would be saved. But then the problems associated with God's knowing certain people to be saved arise that seem to entail that libertarian free will does not exist.
Can anyone see into the muddy waters of my writing? Is there an argument in the making here?
If God creates that universe in which person S is saved, then when the state of affairs in which S is presented with the gospel is instantiated, can S do otherwise? If he has libertarian free will, it seems he would have to be able to do so, and then God would have false knowledge, so this cannot be possible. But then if he does believe; is his choice still free? It seems he necessarily acts in the way he does. But isn't that not possible, if he has libertarian free will? What's the difference in saying that God chose to save some and not others prior to the creation of the universe, and some people are saved and others not, necessarily, given the possible universe that has been instantiated?
But even the notion of God creating the universe in which a person will be saved doesn't seem to comport well with libertarian free will. If God "knew" which people would be saved in a specific possible universe, then is it implied that in other universes they would have not chosen to respond to the call of the gospel in faith? Does that mean that there are factors external to themselves (like their mood, their feelings at that time, how their day went) that determine their choice? But then there is no libertarian free will, if those things do determine choices...
But perhaps God doesn't know who will be saved--maybe he is just taking a chance with sending Christ to die. But that doesn't work at all--Christ said himself that he came to die as a ransom for many, implying that he knew that certain people would be saved. But then the problems associated with God's knowing certain people to be saved arise that seem to entail that libertarian free will does not exist.
Can anyone see into the muddy waters of my writing? Is there an argument in the making here?