Apologetic Game Changing Book?

[owenanderson]

Since I'm OA, maybe one way to proceed is to ask me: "when you said ... did you mean ...?" It is in this sense that CT's question has not been answered. Since my book was not about these details of the free will issue, I didn't cover that in any depth in the book. However, I don't think Frankfurt counterexamples or Acts 17 refute ought implies can.

In the Acts 17 example, the person is held responsible for not repenting, which is to say they are getting what they want. They do not want to repent. So there is no excuse available here. In the case of wanting to flap your arms and fly to the moon, this is not within man's natural ability. But knowing God is within that ability. So a problem would only arise if a person wanted to know God but could not.

I wasn't suggesting that Warfield was at odds with earlier Calvinists. As CT pointed out, the common distinction has been between natural and moral ability. And as I said, I believe the WCF navigates these waters very well.

Behind all of these other issues, the question we're asking is: does unbelief have an excuse?

 

[owenanderson]

knowing

Posted on behalf of PM...

On page 1 of that thread OA stated,

"Thus, a person 'knows' if: they believe something, it is true, and they can prove it to be true."

Does he know that? Can he prove it? Does he know his proof? Can he prove it? Does he know his second proof? Prove it. And so on...

He's also assuming internalism with this. Unfortunately, internalism is on the outs. For example, Michael Bergman has dealt externalism some major blows. See his _Justification Without Awareness_. One might also read the arguments of Plantinga, Sudduth, Anderson, Welty, etc.

Another problem is that OA argues that "all men" are "inexcusable" because God's existence is "clear" and they can know it via "right reason." But are we to assume that young children and mentally handicap people are excusable?? If not, then it is not clear that "all men" can know God, nor that "all men" are inexcusable because God's existence is clear and they can know it.

More to the point, can young children not know God? I mean, OA spoke of how hard it was for college students to prove such things as their existence (which seems odd because they'd have to exist to prove it or doubt it). I doubt any child could "prove" that God exists along OA's rigorous lines.

What's also strange is that he claims we should be able to prove God like 2+2=4. Not only is this proof actually a lot harder to do than most people think (for example, the majority of people that would try to prove this would appeal to some empirical argument, say, 2 apples + 2 apples = 4 apples), I'd love to see OA's proof for God that is such that one would be be epistemically certain that he exists. No one has done this in the entire history of apologetics.

He furthermore places a ton of confidence in basic laws of thought, esp. the universality of the LNC. But dialetheists would differ. OA may claim that they refute themselves but that is probably based on a view of logic which is explosive. To assume this with a dialetheist would be question begging by assuming the falsity of paraconsistent logic. OA frequently complains about other apologetic methods that assume the truth of their view according to their worldview. But OA assumes the truth classical logic and Aristotle's proof of the LNC over against a dialetheist worldview (and obviously the comeback to this that if it were true it would be false is based on misunderstanding dialetheism for trivialism, so put that counter on the shelf).

Now, dialetheism may be false, but one just can't assume it. Moreover, OA has the problem of showing how each and every single worldview, and variations within each, are false or contradictory. I refer readers to Sean Choi's critique of the TAG on this exact matter in the book Reasons for Faith (ed. Geisler and Meister).

I was aware of these problems when we began speaking about the definition of "know," which is why I asked if this is what we should work with. But I think the problems you mention can be solved. The same is true for issues about the law of non-contradiction. I mentioned my students having a problem with that exactly to highlight that they would have a problem doing something so simple because they do not think about such things. And I don't think that children or person's with handicaps present a difficulty. It would be great to work through these questions together.

What is your sense of how to defend the inexcusability of unbelief?

 

[Cheshire Cat]

Posted on behalf of PM...

On the ought-implies-can maxim and its problems:

i) "Can the Ethiopian change his skin or the leopard its spots? Neither can you do good who are accustomed to doing evil" (Jer. 13:23).

ii) Suppose that I promised to pick CT's parents up from downtown New York, after the Chinese new years parade. One would say I 'ought' to do so since, after all, I promised that I would do that.

Now, suppose that I purposefully handcuff myself to the bed in my hotel ('cause an awesome movie is on in the hotel). Thus it appears that people can control their moral obligations. If you don't want to be obligated by a moral "ought," render yourself unable to do it. In that case, then obligation disappears.

Once I eliminate my "can," I eliminate the obligation. To respond that I should not posture myself as to not be able to do the obligation seems wrong since up until I render myself unable, I still "can" do it, but the second I incapacitate myself, the obligation leaves that second. And, now there is no more obligation. It "disappears" as soon as I render myself unable to perform it. Further, if we have 2nd level duties to perform 1st level duties, do we have 3rd level duties to perform 2nd level duties, and on and on...

iii) Does O-I-C imply PAP? What is O-I-C? Someone might say: "Necessarily, if S is obligated to perform a at t, then S is able to perform a at t." But this is problematic, suppose Adams promises to meet Brown at 6. But at 5, Adams goes to a movie. The theater is 65 minutes from the meeting place, so if 'ought' entails 'can,' then at 5 (when the movie starts), it is not the case that Adams ought to meet Brown at 6.

How does PAP relate to O-I-C? Here's some definitions of PAP:

Let me give you four definitions of PAP from prominent libertarians who are specialists in this field (quotes taken from Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibility: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities, eds. Widerker & Mckenna, Ashgate, 2006):

"PAP: An agent is morally responsible for performing a given action A only if he could have avoided performing it" (Widerker, p.53).

"PAP: An agent S is morally responsible for its being the case that p only if S could have made it not the case that p." (Ginet, 75).

"Frankfirt-style cases (FSCs) were introduced to undermine 'the principle of alternative possiblities' or PAP. They were designed to show that a person could be morally responsible even though the person had no alternative possibilities (APs) or could not have done otherwise." (Kane, p. 91, see fn. 4 for an elaboration. Kane agrees that in *particular* cases FSCs show that an agent was morally responsible even though he could not have done otherwise just in case he had some libertarian free choices in his past that shaped his character.)

"PAP: A person is (libertarian) free in what he has done (= A) only if there is something he did (= B) which is such that (i) he could have done otherwise than B and (ii) it is (at least in part) in virtue of his doing B that he is (libertarian) free in doing A" (Hunt, p.167).

Notice the use of "could" or "can" in them. Okay...

Since many (most?) people have seen PAP embedded in O-I-C, Baily gives this definition of O-I-C, he calls it "the Tracing Maxim":

Tracing Maxim is as follows: Necessarily, S is obligated to perform act a at t only if S is able to perform act a at t or S was at some time t* able to perform act b such that were S to have performed b at t*, S would have been able to perform a at t and it is not the case that S is obligated to refrain from performing b at t*.

Now, our question is: Does the Maxim (O-I-C) entail some version of PAP?


Putting aside worries over what has been shown by the various Frankfurt cases, for example: Say an omnipotent fiend wants you to kill your wife. He knows you have chosen to do so. He lets you proceed, but just in case you have a change in heart, he makes sure that he will block any choice to do otherwise. It just so happens that you never change your mind. You're resolved. You couldn't have chosen otherwise, though. You hack your wife. Are you not responsible?

As I said, we're by-passing Frankfurt discussions right now. A bigger worry we have is with the person who holds to the above O-I-C, determinism, and denies PAP. I charge that Hermonta and OA are assuming libertarian free will without even realizing it. This accounts for why they can say, "But I affirm the sovereign decree, so how can I assume PAP or any other nasty non-Calvinist assumption!?"

Reformed theology admits to a necessity given the decree of God. For example, Vermigli

"If, as we believe, all things are directed by God and happen by His counsel, where will their contingency be? ... for everything will fall out by necessity. Some think this argument against divine providence so strong that the freedom of our will can hardly be defended."

Or Luther,

"When men hear us say that God works both good and evil in us, and that we are subject to God's working by mere passive necessity..."

Or Turretin:

"The foreknowledge of God implies indeed the infallibility of futurition and of the event and the necessity of the consequence, and yet does not imply coaction or violence, not take away from the will its intristic liberty."

And again,

"Twelfth Question: Do all things fall under the knowledge of God, both singulars and future contingencies? We affirm against Socinus.

[...]

23. The infallibility and certainty of the event does not take away the nature of the contingency of things because things can happen necessarily as to the event and yet contingently as to the mode of production.

24. Although men's actions may be free (because done spontaneously and by a previous judgment of reason), they do not cease to be the necessary with respect to the divine decree and foreknowledge."

I could go on. I assume I've established the reformed view on this matter. This isn't to assert: If God knows S will do x, necessarily S will do x, but it does mean that there is no possible world at which, if God knows S will do x, S will not do x.

Every action one performs, then, given the decree, one could not do otherwise. Now, CT and OA want to hold that for inexcusability and responsibility, that "If S 'ought' to x, then S 'can' S, otherwise, how is S responsible for x-ing?" This seems to lead to PAP.

Note this argument:

1. Suppose some individual, John, does something morally wrong.
2. If John's Xing was wrong, then he ought to have done something else instead.
3. If John ought to have done something else instead, then he could have done something else instead. (The OA and CT premise)
4. So John could have done something else instead. (from 3, PAP)
5. But if causal determinism is true, then John could not have done anything other than he actually did. (Reformed premise)
6. So, if causal determinism is true, it cannot be the case that John's Xing was wrong. (Entailed by CT's and OA's position).

So, it doe seem that O-I-C implies some kind of PAP, and also implies that we deny some key tenant(s) of Calvinism (hence the reason some people are suspect of the claims of CT an OA).

We can close out showing another problem with O-I-C compliments of Fisher:

"Imagine that a person—call him 'Stanley'—deliberately keeps himself very still. He refrains, for some reason, from moving his body at all. … suppose that here is someone with a powerful interest in having Stanley refrain from making any deliberate movements, who arranges things in such a way that Stanley will be stricken with general paralysis if he shows any inclination to move. Nonetheless, Stanley may keep himself still quite on his own altogether independently of this person's schemes. Why should Stanley not be morally responsible for keeping still, in that case, just as much as if there had been nothing to prevent him from moving had he chosen to do so?

I agree with Frankfurt here. And surely Stanley could be considered blameworthy, should something morally important hang on his moving his body rather than keeping still.

Stanley's not moving his body, or refraining from moving, is a "simple omission": the omission is entirely constituted by his failure to move his body. There are many more such omissions, and in these cases it is plausible that the agents are indeed morally responsible—and potentially morally blameworthy—although they could not have refrained from keeping still.

[...]

It is evident where the problems lie. The conclusion that if an agent is morally required to do A but cannot do A, then all of her options are morally ruled out, infelicitously elides the distinction between epistemic and metaphysical options. From the mere fact that an agent lacks a certain metaphysical option it does not follow that she lacks the corresponding epistemic option. So, from the mere fact that an agent in fact cannot do A, it does not follow that she knows that he cannot do A. Thus, all that follows from the moral requirement and the metaphysical fact is that all of the agent's epistemic alternatives are ruled out, except A. But there is nothing problematic about this; and now the moral requirement can have its distinctive role in guiding deliberation and action. Moral requirements insert themselves into the space of epistemic possibilities, not directly into the space of metaphysical possibilities.

I conclude that despite his noteworthy efforts, David Copp has not successfully presented a compelling motivation for the Maxim. If we reject the Maxim, we can reject PAP. And we are thus not pushed toward a compatibilist account of freedom; as I explained above, a compatibilist must say that we are free either to "change" the past or the natural laws. That is, the compatibilist must deny that our freedom is the freedom to extend the given past, holding the laws of nature fixed. But this is quite implausible."

Pax,

 

[Cheshire Cat]

Posted on behalf of PM...

OA wrote:

"In the Acts 17 example, the person is held responsible for not repenting, which is to say they are getting what they want. They do not want to repent. So there is no excuse available here."

No, God commads all men everywhere to repent. But they CANNOT unless the HS regenerates them.

The question is not over them WANTING it's over ABILITY. You are saying that they CAN repent, wich is what allows for responsibility. If you affirm Reformed categories you must hold:

i) These men CANNOT repent.

and,

ii) These men are resposible for what they CANNOT do.


"In the case of wanting to flap your arms and fly to the moon, this is not within man's natural ability. But knowing God is within that ability. So a problem would only arise if a person wanted to know God but could not."

All men do know God, they do not want to know God savingly AND they cannot.

Furthermore:

6The mind of sinful man is death, but the mind controlled by the Spirit is life and peace; 7 the sinful mind is hostile to God. It does not submit to God's law, nor can it do so. 8 Those controlled by the sinful nature cannot please God.

This is problematic with O-I-C. This doesn't say that they do not WANT to, though that is true, it says that they CANNOT sumbit to God's law. Even so, God holds them morally responsible.

 

[Cheshire Cat]

Me: From OA's book Reason and Worldviews: "Problematically, he maintains that the natural man cannot comprehend what he ought to comprehend of God. This is extremely problematic because it means that while humans ought to comprehend God, they cannot. How can they be held responsible?"

Clearly OA just said that if one OUGHT to x, then they CAN do x; otherwise, "how can they be morally responsible." This at least affirms "ought implies can", and probably PAP. Since it affirms "ought implies can" then that's one place where "the above was denied."

This is simply the classic way of stating the problem. Shouldn't you be addressing his answer to the problem?

Posted on behalf of PM...

That's odd Rev. Winzer, OA is claiming that Warfield was saying something PROBLEMATIC because he DENIED O-I-C, yet you claim guys like CT and OA are stating the "classic" position while Warfield was not! Reformed have ALWAYS (traditionally) denied O-I-C over and against the Arminian.

In fact, there is no need to adress his answer because it is beyond me how Edwards is a help to him here. I suggest some may be unaware of the philosophical categories being invoked here. Much of this has to do with contemporary philosophical discussion on moral responsibility and the metaphysics of free will. In all of the literature I have read, I've never seen anyone resort to Edwards or something like that to defend "ought-implies-can." In fact, O-I-C is traditionally defended by the libertarians. Indeed, Kant is famous for invoking it, and Kant was a notorious libertarian action theorist.

 

[Semper Fidelis]

Gentlemen,

Even though PM is my friend, we cannot have a debate by proxy here. The occasional insertion of thoughts from elsewhere is one thing but answering point by point will get distracting.

 

[Jim Johnston]

Dr. Anderson, if/when I write up a review of your book Reasons and Worldviews, I will email you and send you a copy and engage in dialogue with you.

For what it's worth, when you wrote:

Since I'm OA, maybe one way to proceed is to ask me: "when you said ... did you mean ...?"

I'm not sure how much that is needed.

See, you are fairly clear both here, and in your book, that you affirm:

i) Paul's all men in Romans 1 are merely able to know God, they do not know God.

ii) Ought-implies-can. Inability limits responsible.

iii) That if S believes P without being able to prove P, then S is a fideist or dogmatist.

a) Internalism

b) Evidentialism

c) Deontologicalism

(cf. p. 13, Reasons and Worldviews)

iv) Doxastic voluntarism (ibid, p.6, top).

v) And other questionable views on the knowledge of God along with what I take to be some serious misunderstandings of Van Til and a forcing on Plantinga something which his program doesn't pretend to do. (Btw, you also switch back and forth in your Van Til chapter by claiming that Van Til said the presupposition for knowledge was the Ontological Trinity, and other times that he said it was the Scriptures (cf. ibid, 60, 59, 57, 56, 55)).

These are foundational disagreements that have been and can be debated at length. Your position rests on the truth of many of these, along with certain views of reason and what it can do that I do not share. But as I do not post on the PB, I can't spend the time I'd like to interact with you, and I can't keep sending Caleb emails. The bottom line is that on my end I'd have to make some historically Arminian concessions to go along with much of what you've wrote, and if it's not Arminianism, then it is things I take to be philosophically problematic. But if I go through with a review I'll email you.

And, since you asked, my view of inexcusability is that all men do have a knowledge of God (in the Rom. 1 sense), not just that they can. You must be bound to agree that if I, along with the top-notch exegetes on Romans 1 are correct, then I've fully side-stepped your entire program and rendered it fairly irrelevant, despite what other positives might be said of it. That's why you argue against that view. But that view is the historic view on the knowledge of God, esp. in Calvin, the Reformed Scholastics, Turretin, Bavink, Murray, et. al.

Thanks for your time,

PM out...

 

[owenanderson]

There are certainly many things to discuss here and we'll need to do so one by one. I don't agree that I maintain evidentialism or deontology. I do maintain ought/can, but not in a way that leads to or assumes libertrianism or arminianism. I argue specifically against both (aiming at Kant) in "Clarity," and argue that ought/can can be developed in a way that is affirmed by predestination. I also don't agree with how you've characterized my view of ability and responsibility. In other words, there are many nuances that need to be taken into account before we say "so-and-so believes S because so-and-so said P." That is why it is important to ask what the other means, and be careful to avoid telling them what they mean.

The way your explained Acts 17 in your most recent post is what I'd say: they don't want to, and they can't.

I suspect most/all of the apparent disagreements are due to needing to be careful in how we attribute things to others, and in the limitations of this format. I've said a few brief things in a very focused book, and you've wanted to draw from that many more things that will take some time to work over together. Have you had a chance to read my more recent and developed book? It would be great to sit down together and have some time to discuss these things. Then I think we'd see we agree on more than we thought.

More to the point for this thread is the issue concerning Romans 1. There was an earlier discussion on this thread trying to clarifying that. I think we made some progress. It largely depends on what is meant by "know". What would you say this term means?

 

[owenanderson]

I agree with what is expressed by the Reformed thinkers you quotes concerning necessity, and I think there is still an important sense of ought/can that we can rely on.

I appreciate your many references to sources. I think while you and I are aware of these books and thinkers, it may not be familiar to everyone on the thread. Do you think there is a way we could discuss the subject so as to be accessible to everyone and encouraging to others to join in? One way I try to do that in "Clarity" is to discuss levels of freedom. I distinguish between these levels:

practical, psychological, worldview, presuppositional, and reason.

Your examples (and those used by the authors you reference) are limited to the first two levels, and on those levels I completely agree with you. But this is what I mean by recognizing nuances that require time to develop and discuss. I argue that at the most basic level there is a sense in which want and can blend or become indistinct. I can iff I want to, and my want is entirely predetermined by God, and since it is my want I am responsible for it.

Posted on behalf of PM...

On the ought-implies-can maxim and its problems:

i) "Can the Ethiopian change his skin or the leopard its spots? Neither can you do good who are accustomed to doing evil" (Jer. 13:23).

ii) Suppose that I promised to pick CT's parents up from downtown New York, after the Chinese new years parade. One would say I 'ought' to do so since, after all, I promised that I would do that.

Now, suppose that I purposefully handcuff myself to the bed in my hotel ('cause an awesome movie is on in the hotel). Thus it appears that people can control their moral obligations. If you don't want to be obligated by a moral "ought," render yourself unable to do it. In that case, then obligation disappears.

Once I eliminate my "can," I eliminate the obligation. To respond that I should not posture myself as to not be able to do the obligation seems wrong since up until I render myself unable, I still "can" do it, but the second I incapacitate myself, the obligation leaves that second. And, now there is no more obligation. It "disappears" as soon as I render myself unable to perform it. Further, if we have 2nd level duties to perform 1st level duties, do we have 3rd level duties to perform 2nd level duties, and on and on...

iii) Does O-I-C imply PAP? What is O-I-C? Someone might say: "Necessarily, if S is obligated to perform a at t, then S is able to perform a at t." But this is problematic, suppose Adams promises to meet Brown at 6. But at 5, Adams goes to a movie. The theater is 65 minutes from the meeting place, so if 'ought' entails 'can,' then at 5 (when the movie starts), it is not the case that Adams ought to meet Brown at 6.

How does PAP relate to O-I-C? Here's some definitions of PAP:

Let me give you four definitions of PAP from prominent libertarians who are specialists in this field (quotes taken from Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibility: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities, eds. Widerker & Mckenna, Ashgate, 2006):

"PAP: An agent is morally responsible for performing a given action A only if he could have avoided performing it" (Widerker, p.53).

"PAP: An agent S is morally responsible for its being the case that p only if S could have made it not the case that p." (Ginet, 75).

"Frankfirt-style cases (FSCs) were introduced to undermine 'the principle of alternative possiblities' or PAP. They were designed to show that a person could be morally responsible even though the person had no alternative possibilities (APs) or could not have done otherwise." (Kane, p. 91, see fn. 4 for an elaboration. Kane agrees that in *particular* cases FSCs show that an agent was morally responsible even though he could not have done otherwise just in case he had some libertarian free choices in his past that shaped his character.)

"PAP: A person is (libertarian) free in what he has done (= A) only if there is something he did (= B) which is such that (i) he could have done otherwise than B and (ii) it is (at least in part) in virtue of his doing B that he is (libertarian) free in doing A" (Hunt, p.167).

Notice the use of "could" or "can" in them. Okay...

Since many (most?) people have seen PAP embedded in O-I-C, Baily gives this definition of O-I-C, he calls it "the Tracing Maxim":

Tracing Maxim is as follows: Necessarily, S is obligated to perform act a at t only if S is able to perform act a at t or S was at some time t* able to perform act b such that were S to have performed b at t*, S would have been able to perform a at t and it is not the case that S is obligated to refrain from performing b at t*.

Now, our question is: Does the Maxim (O-I-C) entail some version of PAP?


Putting aside worries over what has been shown by the various Frankfurt cases, for example: Say an omnipotent fiend wants you to kill your wife. He knows you have chosen to do so. He lets you proceed, but just in case you have a change in heart, he makes sure that he will block any choice to do otherwise. It just so happens that you never change your mind. You're resolved. You couldn't have chosen otherwise, though. You hack your wife. Are you not responsible?

As I said, we're by-passing Frankfurt discussions right now. A bigger worry we have is with the person who holds to the above O-I-C, determinism, and denies PAP. I charge that Hermonta and OA are assuming libertarian free will without even realizing it. This accounts for why they can say, "But I affirm the sovereign decree, so how can I assume PAP or any other nasty non-Calvinist assumption!?"

Reformed theology admits to a necessity given the decree of God. For example, Vermigli

"If, as we believe, all things are directed by God and happen by His counsel, where will their contingency be? ... for everything will fall out by necessity. Some think this argument against divine providence so strong that the freedom of our will can hardly be defended."

Or Luther,

"When men hear us say that God works both good and evil in us, and that we are subject to God's working by mere passive necessity..."

Or Turretin:

"The foreknowledge of God implies indeed the infallibility of futurition and of the event and the necessity of the consequence, and yet does not imply coaction or violence, not take away from the will its intristic liberty."

And again,

"Twelfth Question: Do all things fall under the knowledge of God, both singulars and future contingencies? We affirm against Socinus.

[...]

23. The infallibility and certainty of the event does not take away the nature of the contingency of things because things can happen necessarily as to the event and yet contingently as to the mode of production.

24. Although men's actions may be free (because done spontaneously and by a previous judgment of reason), they do not cease to be the necessary with respect to the divine decree and foreknowledge."

I could go on. I assume I've established the reformed view on this matter. This isn't to assert: If God knows S will do x, necessarily S will do x, but it does mean that there is no possible world at which, if God knows S will do x, S will not do x.

Every action one performs, then, given the decree, one could not do otherwise. Now, CT and OA want to hold that for inexcusability and responsibility, that "If S 'ought' to x, then S 'can' S, otherwise, how is S responsible for x-ing?" This seems to lead to PAP.

Note this argument:

1. Suppose some individual, John, does something morally wrong.
2. If John's Xing was wrong, then he ought to have done something else instead.
3. If John ought to have done something else instead, then he could have done something else instead. (The OA and CT premise)
4. So John could have done something else instead. (from 3, PAP)
5. But if causal determinism is true, then John could not have done anything other than he actually did. (Reformed premise)
6. So, if causal determinism is true, it cannot be the case that John's Xing was wrong. (Entailed by CT's and OA's position).

So, it doe seem that O-I-C implies some kind of PAP, and also implies that we deny some key tenant(s) of Calvinism (hence the reason some people are suspect of the claims of CT an OA).

We can close out showing another problem with O-I-C compliments of Fisher:

"Imagine that a person—call him 'Stanley'—deliberately keeps himself very still. He refrains, for some reason, from moving his body at all. … suppose that here is someone with a powerful interest in having Stanley refrain from making any deliberate movements, who arranges things in such a way that Stanley will be stricken with general paralysis if he shows any inclination to move. Nonetheless, Stanley may keep himself still quite on his own altogether independently of this person's schemes. Why should Stanley not be morally responsible for keeping still, in that case, just as much as if there had been nothing to prevent him from moving had he chosen to do so?

I agree with Frankfurt here. And surely Stanley could be considered blameworthy, should something morally important hang on his moving his body rather than keeping still.

Stanley's not moving his body, or refraining from moving, is a "simple omission": the omission is entirely constituted by his failure to move his body. There are many more such omissions, and in these cases it is plausible that the agents are indeed morally responsible—and potentially morally blameworthy—although they could not have refrained from keeping still.

[...]

It is evident where the problems lie. The conclusion that if an agent is morally required to do A but cannot do A, then all of her options are morally ruled out, infelicitously elides the distinction between epistemic and metaphysical options. From the mere fact that an agent lacks a certain metaphysical option it does not follow that she lacks the corresponding epistemic option. So, from the mere fact that an agent in fact cannot do A, it does not follow that she knows that he cannot do A. Thus, all that follows from the moral requirement and the metaphysical fact is that all of the agent's epistemic alternatives are ruled out, except A. But there is nothing problematic about this; and now the moral requirement can have its distinctive role in guiding deliberation and action. Moral requirements insert themselves into the space of epistemic possibilities, not directly into the space of metaphysical possibilities.

I conclude that despite his noteworthy efforts, David Copp has not successfully presented a compelling motivation for the Maxim. If we reject the Maxim, we can reject PAP. And we are thus not pushed toward a compatibilist account of freedom; as I explained above, a compatibilist must say that we are free either to "change" the past or the natural laws. That is, the compatibilist must deny that our freedom is the freedom to extend the given past, holding the laws of nature fixed. But this is quite implausible."

Pax,

 

[owenanderson]

And, since you asked, my view of inexcusability is that all men do have a knowledge of God (in the Rom. 1 sense), not just that they can. You must be bound to agree that if I, along with the top-notch exegetes on Romans 1 are correct, then I've fully side-stepped your entire program and rendered it fairly irrelevant, despite what other positives might be said of it. That's why you argue against that view. But that view is the historic view on the knowledge of God, esp. in Calvin, the Reformed Scholastics, Turretin, Bavink, Murray, et. al.

Thanks for your time,

PM out...[/QUOTE]

My sense is that this was cleared up earlier in the thread. I agree with these thinkers depending on what "know" means. The meaning of the term I am focused on includes some form of assent or believing, so that a person does not "know" if they do not agree to the truth of a claim. Thus, Richard Dawkins does not "know" God in this sense. But I believe there are other senses of the term "know" that people use and that can explain the quotes above.

What I'm interested in is the excuses Dawkins (or whoever) gives for not believing. I ask: do you believe the following is true: "God exists." He says: "no." I ask: "why not?" Whatever his answer is, I believe it is inexcusable.

I hope this helps.

 

[JohnV]

Wow! I don't think I can read all this thread. I got to the point where discussion was taking place by proxy, and then I had to leave off reading. It was going in another direction, and my mind was still busy with the previous points.

I think I could write about twenty pages or more of notes just on the first page of this thread. There's so much to consider here. And I haven't read the book yet.

 

[JohnV]

May I take it that this thread is ready for a new direction? I have a few questions I'd like to ask. Please excuse me for not having read your book. This is the first I'd heard of it, and I surelywould like to read it when I get the chance. Right now I'm in the middle of two other studies.

I'd like to know about "knowing". How many ways are there to know something? That's too general; let me be more specific: How many ways are there to know from general revelation that God exists? I'm not referring to proofs here, but rather to the size of the field of knowledge. It's big enough, I know, for someone to confuse the facts sufficiently to scholastically hide his willful unbelief behind a rational explanation. But does that immensity really provide an excuse after all?

Your previous posts seem to suggest that the immensity of the field of knowledge does not matter to the case, that the simple truth is still the simple truth, and that everyone is alike in his indefensible position that he did not know when all his dissembling is set aside.

 

[owenanderson]

general revelation

Thanks for your question. I think that there are many more views out there that need to be addressed than most apologists/Christian philosophers actually do address. Many times it seems that they feel if they've shown there is a beginning to the universe then this means God exists. But on the other hand, I don't think that there are so many views such that we cannot know and should not spend any time sorting them out.

I guess I would begin in general revelation with this question: what has existed from eternity? I think the answers to this question amongst the world's religions can be categorized into only a few possibilities.

Does that help?

 

[JohnV]

Thank you Dr. I'm going to think about that.

In the meantime, I have another question:

Well, it's a series of questions trying to get at one answer. I'm going to try to keep it simple.

Let's say that I was out at night, all by myself, and encountered an alien space ship. It landed right in front of me. The aliens came out and talked to me (asking directions I suppose), and then after we shook hands they left. I was the only one who saw this.

I can't prove any of this to anyone, because I have no solid evidence. There's not even a mark on the grass from their space ship taking off. All I have is my own experience as witness. I would know what I saw, and that it was true, but would have nothing to prove it. To the world I would be a kook.

Is my knowledge of what happened subjective knowledge? Does this change the facts? How does the lack of evidence in this scenario differ with the oft-argued lack of evidence for the existence of God?

 

[owenanderson]

I guess would say "how do you know how to interpret this experience?" Was it really aliens? Could it have been a hoax? Could it have been a dream or due to bad mushrooms in your salad? How can one know which way to interpret it. I think this is the issue for any "religious experience." How do I know how to interpret the experience?

Does that help?

 

[MW]

In fact, there is no need to adress his answer because it is beyond me how Edwards is a help to him here. I suggest some may be unaware of the philosophical categories being invoked here. Much of this has to do with contemporary philosophical discussion on moral responsibility and the metaphysics of free will. In all of the literature I have read, I've never seen anyone resort to Edwards or something like that to defend "ought-implies-can." In fact, O-I-C is traditionally defended by the libertarians. Indeed, Kant is famous for invoking it, and Kant was a notorious libertarian action theorist.

I haven't read the book in question so I cannot argue pro or con concerning the position of the author. I was merely noting that the summary posted here included a statement of the problem, and the criticism of it represented the statement of the problem as if it were the answer to the problem.

It is true that the natural/moral distinction is sometimes criticised for its wording; e.g., the Hodges show the sinner's moral inability is "natural" to him, but this merely comes down to wording. The distinction itself is held by all reformed theologians. (1.) Because man is a free agent even when his will is enslaved to sin. (2.) Because in regeneration the Holy Spirit does not infuse new powers into the soul, but renews the power of will and reason which are constitutional to him.

Further, reformed theology is careful to clarify that the moral inability includes "spiritual good," that is, relative to God. It acknowledges ye being evil "know" how to give "good gifts" to you children, and therefore confesses that man has ability to make good civil choices, that is, relative to his fellow man.

My preference would be to see philosophy and theology confined to their own realms. The words "knowledge" and "ability" have metaphysical connotations in philosophy which they do not possess in theology.

 

[Beth Ellen Nagle]

Mr. Anderson, great to see you posting here. I enjoyed reading_Benjamin B. Warfield and Right Reason: The Clarity of General Revelation and Function of Apologetics. I didn't realize you have two other books out. I look forward to reading them. Thank you for your good work.

 

[Jim Johnston]

I guess would say "how do you know how to interpret this experience?" Was it really aliens? Could it have been a hoax? Could it have been a dream or due to bad mushrooms in your salad? How can one know which way to interpret it. I think this is the issue for any "religious experience." How do I know how to interpret the experience?

Does that help?

I think Alston answered that 'issue" fairly well in his response to Fales in Blackwell's _Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion_

 

[owenanderson]

Mr. Anderson, great to see you posting here. I enjoyed reading_Benjamin B. Warfield and Right Reason: The Clarity of General Revelation and Function of Apologetics. I didn't realize you have two other books out. I look forward to reading them. Thank you for your good work.

Good to hear from you! I should tell you that "Reason and Worldviews" is a revised edition of the Warfield book. There is a new chapter, and the old chapters are revised.

 

[owenanderson]

I guess would say "how do you know how to interpret this experience?" Was it really aliens? Could it have been a hoax? Could it have been a dream or due to bad mushrooms in your salad? How can one know which way to interpret it. I think this is the issue for any "religious experience." How do I know how to interpret the experience?

Does that help?

I think Alston answered that 'issue" fairly well in his response to Fales in Blackwell's _Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion_

Really? I don't think Alston recognizes the range of possible experiences relating to the possible basic beliefs.

 

[owenanderson]

Does anyone else come into these philosophy/apologetic threads and feel like this:

Or is it just me?

No, I don't think its just you

 

[JohnV]

I guess would say "how do you know how to interpret this experience?" Was it really aliens? Could it have been a hoax? Could it have been a dream or due to bad mushrooms in your salad? How can one know which way to interpret it. I think this is the issue for any "religious experience." How do I know how to interpret the experience?

Does that help?

Was it really aliens? You'd have to ask the aliens, not me.

Could it have been a hoax? You'd have to ask the alleged hoaxsters, not me.

Could it have been a dream or due to bad mushrooms in my salad? I can't tell whether it is more presumptuous to assume what I had to eat than that what I ate was more at work than my true senses.

How can one know which way to interpret it. I think this is the issue for any "religious experience." How do I know how to interpret the experience?

I think that this answers my intent of the question. I was trying to get to a point where we could discuss more deeply the distinction between "proving" and "convicting".

In response I'd like to tell you what I think about this question. It'll give more of an idea of the direction I'm going.

Some things, it seems to me, are so much outside of others' personal experience that you cannot "prove" to them what you know to be true. It has nothing to do with gullibility, obstinacy, or will; it's just outside their experience. Though this may be the case with a considerable amount of religious experience, of lived doctrine let us say, it is not the case with the existence of God. No one can deny God's existence without also affirming it; it is just a matter of finding a person's argumentative vulnerability so that you can humbly and caringly show it to him.

The point I wish to ask about is the difference between being able to show what one knows to be true and the various other aspects involved: namely whether another accepts the "proofs", whether the "proofs" are related faithfully, or differentiating between knowing the truth and comprehending all truth, ... and such like distinctions. If one needs to be equal with God in order to "prove" God exists, then only Christ and the Spirit can "prove" God exists. But people don't believe them either; and yet this world has them every bit as much as it has me or you. But does one need to be equal with God in order to "prove" God exists? I don't think so, because the "proof" itself has nothing to do with you or I: proof is proof whether you or I know what it is or not, whether you or I can "prove" or not, whether the one we are trying to "prove" God's existence to accepts the "proof" or not.

And no matter how closely this world studies the creation, they cannot find another's stamp of manufacture on it. It only has God's. So the proof is there; I would say that it cannot be the case that it is not there.

That's why my inclusion of the word "dissembling". I take it from, I believe, Cranmer's last confession, referring to our pretensions of knowledge which are really nothing more than excuses. Are not some of our arguments defending Christianity perhaps (sometimes) not much less a dissembling than the world's refusals of God's displaying His majestic divinity and sovereignty? some Christian philosophers say that you cannot "prove" God's existence. May it be that we sometimes argue in pride every bit as much as the world refuses God in pride, rather than arguing to "proving" God exists?

Do we not, in point of fact, live in such a period, in Christian philosophy particularly, as Dickens describes above?

 

[owenanderson]

I think you're right that we can be guilty of arguing in pride, especially when we start by saying "I'm going to show that Christianity is true." We are taking it for granted that the tradition we are in is true, and we're going to show this to everyone else. I'm wondering about the broader question, "how do I know which tradition to accept?" This puts the burden more on my shoulders as the individual inquirer. What do you think?

 

[JohnV]

I'm wondering about the broader question, "how do I know which tradition to accept?" This puts the burden more on my shoulders as the individual inquirer. What do you think?

That's a question I asked myself 40 years ago when, as a young teenager I witnessed my father's responses to some Jehovah's Witnesses. How could he be so sure, I wondered, seeing that they were defending their tradition and my father his. I knew it was more than tradition, but still I wondered how it could be made more plain to others that we were not defending our tradition, our personal beliefs, our predispositions, but were defending the truth.

I think the burden is on us to a degree. But I think the burden on us is for honesty and integrity, which ought to include first of all our humility in knowing that we are just as guilty in sin as the unbeliever, and perhaps more to blame because of the grace given us to build on the faith granted us.

But I don't see that onus as if the defence of the truth bears the burden of proof. At least I've always approached defending the truth of the Bible from the standpoint of it being the king of the hill, the thing that has to be knocked down if another truth is to succed, to become the new king of the hill. No matter what anyone else says, the truth of the Bible is the king of the hill. There are other ideas that make that claim, but only on the grounds of popularity or from the support of subjective earthly authorities. They have the onus to prove what they claim, I believe.

Where I think we have to carry the weight is in acknowledging that when it comes to believing other things to be true we are more on the side of the unbeliever, needing ourselves to be convicted of truth every bit as much as they. On our own we're no better than they. It is the Spirit's work; and He has chosen to work through His witnesses. Humbly acknowledging our poverty of knowledge in bearing true witness to that truth we know so little of comes first, and that puts us almost on par with the unbeliever. What puts us above them is not our own doing; it is the Spirit's doing. So we shouldn't be trying to trump the Spirit.

So I begin by assuming that the person I am talking to about truth already knows that God exists. I don't have to convince him of that. But if it is the existence of God that we are talking about, and he claims that he can't believe God exists, then it is his rationalizing his refusal to acknowledge God that I have to deal with, not sufficient proofs of the existence of God. Working with his presuppositions is part of it, but there is so much more than that to deal with. And if I lose his heart anywhere along the way, then there's no use talking to his brain. I won't get anywhere showing him the errors of his thinking if I don't at the same time show him that I was received by God in grace, my having no less obstinacy than him.

If I don't show him that I'm an object of grace, then I don't think that true grace is the object of my speaking to him. And if that's not happening, then I'm not really defending the truth, no matter how precise and thorough my arguments for truth may be. I'm just defending my personal beliefs. And if that's the case, then why should he not think that I'm standing only in my upbringing, my tradition? Rather, my personal self should be disappearing in the interchange, and God should be appearing; then I know that true apologetics is working.

That's my thoughts on this. I'll have to reread this thread. I've been thrown off my thoughts by other things happening around me. I had a number of questions I wanted to ask, but I'll have to refresh my thoughts first. I think I mostly wanted to get the conversation going in a different and happier direction. Apologetics is a topic about a far too sacred a thing to get caught up in arguing about methodologies.

 

[tdowns]

Wow....

Not only is this thread, like all the philosophy threads, fun, but it really gets wild and super spy like, when people who don't post on the PB, post on the PB, through someone else....I can't remember or missed the history on that one...but seems... I do miss the days when he did post though, which, I guess, was today?

 

[ChristianTrader]

One other thing: Owen's books seems to have awaken me from my Theonomic slumbers. A key point made in his books concern the relationship between general and special revelation. General revelation has actual content to which people are responsible and are inexcusable for rejecting. It also puts some constraints on what special revelation looks like. Put another way, there is and has to be a natural law.

For me, Theonomy has its true bite only when one rejects natural law. Without natural law, one either has Theonomy or chaos. With natural law, one does not have to push so hard for continuity between the Old Testament and New Testament. One can then accept that some things were special for the jewish administration in the OT and don't need to be explicitly repealed in order to question the validity. If one attempts something like this without a robust natural law, then one is back again looking chaos in the face.

CT

Hermonta,

I am intrigued by your statements, and they prompt a few questions:

1. What do you mean by "natural law"; can you define?

2. What is the means by which one may determine which "natural laws" are to be chosen? For instance, do we choose Hume's version, or the Marquis de Sade's? By what standard do we decide?

3. Does law (whether natural or otherwise) have any place in glorifying God, or in enjoying Him forever? If so, what rule hath God given to direct us in the use of such laws?

4. What is the method that natural man uses to ascertain "natural law"? Does he intuit natural law, empirically judge which laws are natural, democratically decide, or is it subject to a rational process? If so, who's reason is to be used?

5. If law is natural, why is nature so lawless?

6. Can natural man be subject to natural law? Can natural man ascertain natural law?

7. Can you explain an exegetical defense for your responses to the above questions?

8. How do you link Paul's use of general revelation as a means of condemntation with a positive system of law?

Interested in your thoughts.

Cheers,

I am still working some stuff out and should be back later to attempt to flesh out some more of my views but here is an interesting article by Dr. Anderson that started me to thinking.

http://www.owenanderson.net/reviews/AndersonNaturalLaw.pdf