RamistThomist
Puritanboard Clerk
Argument of Book: there exists a religious tribunal distinct from that of the civil magistrate. This tribunal has the power of excommunication. In fact, Gillespie’s overall argument is quite simple, despite the learned discussions in the book. Erastianism isn’t necessarily an outward threat to the church by the state (such as the IRS’s domination of the American church). It’s simply the state’s prerogative to control church discipline.
Church and State, the Civil Magistrate
There is a distinction between magistracy and ministry; as such, there offices are also distinct (80). Magistrates and ministers differ in their causes:
1. The efficient cause: The king of nations hath instituted civil power; the king of saints ecclesial (86).
2. Material: civil magistracy is punitive. The magistrate has the sword, the minister the keys.
3. Formal: the power of magistracy is architectonic and despotic and is immediately subordinate to God. The ecclesial is diakonike and subordinate to Jesus as King of the Church.
4. Final: magistracy is only for the glory of God as king of nations. And while the magistrate ought to be a Christian, he is not participating as Christ’s sub-mediator.
Of the Twofold Kingdom
Jesus has dominion over all things as Son of God, but his special kingdom is the church, of which he is mediator. We are not separating the Person of Christ, but simply making distinctions. Arguments proving it:
1. Does Jesus reign over devils by his mediatorial work or by his divine power? Obviously the latter. Therefore, it is a separate kingdom.
2. His being the ‘heir of all things,’ receiving the heathen, relates to the church (94).
3. In Scripture pagan civil governments are recognized as legitimate, even if they aren’t under Christ.
The Christian Magistrate
He may govern “in the church” but he may not govern the church. He governs not qua the church, but qua the commonwealth. For example, the magistrate must not have the power of church censures, but he ought to punish like sins with like punishments. But he cannot do that if he has church censures, for the heathen must be punished civilly but the believer with church discipline (115).
Sacraments not converting ordinances (Gillespie gives 20 arguments).
In this section Gillespie is responding to Prynne's claim that ministers shouldn't fence the table, for not only is that a civil matter (on Prynne's reading), but that the Lord's Supper is a converting ordinance.
Gillespie on conversion: can be distinguished between habitual conversion and subsequent works of grace. Habitual conversion is the first infusion of life and habits of grace.
(1) That which is an instituted sign is not an operating cause whereby it makes that which is signified present where it is not (236).
(2) That which necessarily supposeth conversion and faith is not that which works conversion of and faith. Smoke presupposes fire but it does not cause fire.
(4) If an ordinance is instituted for believers only (Lord’s Supper), then it isn’t a converting but a sealing ordinance.
(7) Those who come to the Lord’s Wedding Feast must have a wedding garment, but the unconverted do not have this.
(10) The prohibition against eating and drinking unworthily necessarily excludes the unconverted.
Extra: how can it be a pledge of union and communion with Christ when such a one is far off from Christ?
Conclusion
This isn't a difficult read in terms of content, but it does repeat itself and Gillespie often returns to arguments that one thought were long since settled.
Church and State, the Civil Magistrate
There is a distinction between magistracy and ministry; as such, there offices are also distinct (80). Magistrates and ministers differ in their causes:
1. The efficient cause: The king of nations hath instituted civil power; the king of saints ecclesial (86).
2. Material: civil magistracy is punitive. The magistrate has the sword, the minister the keys.
3. Formal: the power of magistracy is architectonic and despotic and is immediately subordinate to God. The ecclesial is diakonike and subordinate to Jesus as King of the Church.
4. Final: magistracy is only for the glory of God as king of nations. And while the magistrate ought to be a Christian, he is not participating as Christ’s sub-mediator.
Of the Twofold Kingdom
Jesus has dominion over all things as Son of God, but his special kingdom is the church, of which he is mediator. We are not separating the Person of Christ, but simply making distinctions. Arguments proving it:
1. Does Jesus reign over devils by his mediatorial work or by his divine power? Obviously the latter. Therefore, it is a separate kingdom.
2. His being the ‘heir of all things,’ receiving the heathen, relates to the church (94).
3. In Scripture pagan civil governments are recognized as legitimate, even if they aren’t under Christ.
The Christian Magistrate
He may govern “in the church” but he may not govern the church. He governs not qua the church, but qua the commonwealth. For example, the magistrate must not have the power of church censures, but he ought to punish like sins with like punishments. But he cannot do that if he has church censures, for the heathen must be punished civilly but the believer with church discipline (115).
Sacraments not converting ordinances (Gillespie gives 20 arguments).
In this section Gillespie is responding to Prynne's claim that ministers shouldn't fence the table, for not only is that a civil matter (on Prynne's reading), but that the Lord's Supper is a converting ordinance.
Gillespie on conversion: can be distinguished between habitual conversion and subsequent works of grace. Habitual conversion is the first infusion of life and habits of grace.
(1) That which is an instituted sign is not an operating cause whereby it makes that which is signified present where it is not (236).
(2) That which necessarily supposeth conversion and faith is not that which works conversion of and faith. Smoke presupposes fire but it does not cause fire.
(4) If an ordinance is instituted for believers only (Lord’s Supper), then it isn’t a converting but a sealing ordinance.
(7) Those who come to the Lord’s Wedding Feast must have a wedding garment, but the unconverted do not have this.
(10) The prohibition against eating and drinking unworthily necessarily excludes the unconverted.
Extra: how can it be a pledge of union and communion with Christ when such a one is far off from Christ?
Conclusion
This isn't a difficult read in terms of content, but it does repeat itself and Gillespie often returns to arguments that one thought were long since settled.
