The Epistemology of Scripturalism

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Civbert

Puritan Board Junior
I want a chance to explain my understanding of Scripturalism, and epistemology in general - and maybe clear up some misunderstandings. I don't present myself as an expert in philosophy or an authority on scripturalism - but I spent some time working out what I think it means and I find it best satisfies my desire for a sound biblical worldview.

So I'd like to start this thread by asking people how they define epistemology, knowledge, scripturalism, and other relevant terms. Then maybe we can look at the strengths and weaknesses of scripturalism and compare it to other epidemiologies.

So, let's gets going.
 
Here are a few questions I have wanted to see Scripturalists take on:

Would you say the scripturalism is a form of classical foundationalism?

How do you regard the old saws such as "You don't know unless you know you know."

Is the method my which you acquire familiarity with the axioms of Scripture relevant to whether they can properly be taken as axioms?
 
Just wondering, do you derogate common sense observations such as your existance as mere "opinions"? For another one, which I know you must get a lot, how do you consider the need for empirical data to receive the Scriptures( eg. sight, hearing )? If I cannot be said to know anything through experience, then I cannot know whether what I'm reading as Scripture should be what I attempt to construct my ideas from, etc.. What do you say?
 
Here are a few questions I have wanted to see Scripturalists take on:

Would you say the scripturalism is a form of classical foundationalism?
I think it is. All I know of foundationalism is a wikipedia article on it I read a few months ago, and it seems that scripturalism is a kind of foundationalism. I believe foundationalism says that knowledge must be founded on something in order to be justified. I consider scripture to be the foundation of knowledge. (BTW, Bahnsen and Van-Til agree.)

How do you regard the old saws such as "You don't know unless you know you know."
I'm not really sure. Do you mean that a person knows what they know? Personally, I think a person is rarely aware of the knowledge their minds posses. I think people possess knowledge they are unaware of. But that is my opinion, I don't think scripturalism addresses that issue directly.

Is the method by which you acquire familiarity with the axioms of Scripture relevant to whether they can properly be taken as axioms?
No, I don't think so. I take scripture itself as the axiom. But how I come to learn or understand true scripture is a different issue. By method do you mean reading or hearing, or induction/deduction?
 
Anthony,

Why aren't you interacting with Paul? It's kind of strange. He defined the terms almost two days ago.
 
Just wondering, do you derogate common sense observations such as your existence as mere "opinions"?
I do, yes. I don't think on can gain any real knowledge from experience. But I do not derogate "mere" opinion. I think most of what we believe is opinion. And a great deal of that opinion are things we are wise in believing. Experience can add great weight to opinions even if it can not justify those beliefs as knowledge.

For another one, which I know you must get a lot, how do you consider the need for empirical data to receive the Scriptures( eg. sight, hearing )? If I cannot be said to know anything through experience, then I cannot know whether what I'm reading as Scripture should be what I attempt to construct my ideas from, etc.. What do you say?
I don't believe "reading and hearing" are really empirical functions in the sense of the epistemology called empiricism. For a proposition to be justified by empiricism, it must be based solely on sensory experience. Reading, and hearing (language) requires one to understand a language before one can take sounds and sights and translate them into words and ideas. If you can take a collection of sound vibrations and turn them into ideas that are also true propositions, without knowing any language - then you have gained knowledge empirically.
 
Anthony,

Why aren't you interacting with Paul? It's kind of strange. He defined the terms almost two days ago.

With the exception of your post here, I was answering them in order. First tewilder, then polemic_turtle. Next will be Paul.

OK?
 
Thanks, Paul. Anyone else?

Epistemology: The study of the nature, scope, and limits of knowledge.

I would have simply said 'a theory of knowledge'. But I agree with your definition as it best defines epistemology in general. The scope of this discussion is a particular epistemology. Rationalism, empiricism, mysticism, etc, can all be considered different theories of knowledge.

Knowledge: Warranted true belief, where warrant is defined as that quantity, enough of which turns true belief into knowledge...
That works for me. I think the rest is more of an epistemology then a definition of knowledge.

I guess before I "interact" with more of Paul's definitions, I should give my own definitions - which I will in my next post.
 
Knowledge - justified true belief.

Epistemology - a theory of knowledge.

Scripturalism - (the epistemology of) - that the Bible alone is God's Word, and therefore all scriptures, and whatever can be deduced therefrom, are justified true beliefs and are therefore knowledge.
 
Now let me look at bit at Paul's definition of scripturalism.

Scripturalism: The worldview which claims that the Bible is the axiom from which to start.
That's about it as far as the epistemology goes.

Empiricism cannot yield knowledge.
I certainly agree with this, but it's not part of the definition of scripturalism.

Knowledge must be certain and, therefore, one must use sound and valid deductive arguments which guarantee the truth of the conclusion and, thus, can be said to be known.
This isn't a part of the definition of scripturalism. And personally, I disagree that knowledge must be certain.


Since one starts with the infallibility of revelation, one has, on that axiom, true propositions.
Certainly.


If one reasons validly from true propositions, one will have a certain conclusion.
Again, "certainty" is not the issue. All scripturalism asserts is that since the propositions of scripture are true, so too are all propositions which can be validly deduced from scripture true. This is simply a consequence of saying the propositions of scripture are true.


Since all truth is in the mind of God, therefore we can only know that which is either expressly set down in revelation, or that which can be deduced from revelation; as the confession says - by good an necessary inference.

I don't know about this "we can only know...". But I don't know of any other propositions one can justify true then those of scripture and those deduced from them. If there is any other way to show a proposition is justified true, I'm open to learning what that is.

(I hope that was fine for a succinct statement But, Anthony, feel free to correct me, or offer your own definition.)

I think you brought up some important issues - and not just for scripturalism. Certainty is an important issue for epistemology in general. I think it's debatable if it is a necessary ingredient for "knowledge". But "certainty" could be one desideratum of an epistemology, and one which scripturalism offers and other's lack.

Also, in common usage of "know", it means those things one is certain of. "I just know she loves me or she wouldn't have bought me that gold chain. It proves her love is true." Here we have "know" and "proves" used colloquially. But is "she loves me" a justified true belief? Does her buying a gold chain for him logically prove her love is true?

Empiricism seems to be an issue that comes up from time to time. Mainly because of the idea that knowledge gained through reading or hearing is the knowledge described by the epistemology called empiricism. While reading and hearing does require the use of our senses, it is not really empirical. Empirical knowledge would be knowledge that is gained only through sensory input.

On the other hand, "empirical data" is generally observational data about an object like color, texture, shape. If you read about the yellow rose that is 1 foot tall, that is not empirical data. If you observe a rose and conclude it is yellow and 1 foot tall, that is technically empirical data (data from observation), but that itself is not "empiricism" because the ideas of "yellow" and "1-foot" are concepts that are a priori to the observation of the rose. Empiricism says that knowledge is based solely on sensory input. That means nothing is a priori to the sensations. You must start with the mind completely blank, then give is sensations like sight and sound, and produce propositions. If you add none-sensory information (like words and ideas passed on from parents), then you've undermined the theory of empiricism. This gets us into theories of language and I'm sure a true empiricist will give an evolutionary theory of language to explain it.
 
How is justification being understood. Deontologically?
I don't think so. I think one could say something is justified if it is accountable. If it can be shown to be the case. I think there are whole areas of philosophy dedicated to "justification" in this sense. But I think simply to say that something is justified if it can be accounted for.

You said you agree with my definition of knowledge (the "rest" was my definition of 'warrant' and, therefore, part of the definition of knowledge), but my definition is externalist. JTB is usually considered as an internalist definition because of the notion of duty that is tied in with the idea of 'justification.'.

Could you explain the ideas of "internalist" and "externalist" . I read something about them on a philosophy site, and the idea the JTB was insufficient due to the Gettier (sp?) problems. Ironically, the Gettier problems presumed empiricism was the valid epistemology. But I might be crossing some wires.


Do you place an infallibilst constraint on knowledge?

Not that I know of. ;)
I do think this is another desideratum of epistemology, but not a deal breaker.


Does the possibility of being wrong about P mean that one can't know P?
No. Not in my opinion. If that were the case, could we know anything. I guess you mean being wrong about P being true - that you think P is justified true, but you could be wrong. Well anyone could be wrong. I could misunderstand scripture, or be mistaken in my deductive reasoning. But I don't think one have to personally deduce something to know it. But, if P is scripture, it is true, and if Q is correctly deduced from scripture, it too is true.


Wasn't God speaking to Adam "God's word?" Wasn't all the things Jesus said that were not written down, God's Word?
Sure. And Adam would have justified true belief. But since it was not written down in scripture, we can't know it. Now, if God reveals something to you directly (enlightens your mind to some truth), that is a justified true belief. But it's not very useful since you can not pass that justification true belief on to me. I guess, if I believe it, I know it in a sense. But (you like this), I don't think I'd know that I knew it. There ought to be some means of knowing what we know, even if it is not essential. We know a lot of things we don't know we know in my opinion. :)


Can you know anything that is not deducible from scriptural propositions?
Yes. But I think my prior comments show the problem. What ever God reveals to us is knowledge. But something revealed to our minds in such a direct fashion could not be shared. Is this related to the internalist/externalist issues?

Anyway, I think there are internal and external perspectives to knowledge. Knowledge is in a sense completely independent of man, since all truth is God's mind. And so, any belief a man has that is also a proposition God knows, would be knowledge. But one a practical level, what good is knowledge we don't know we know? Isn't that a more important part of epistemology? If we can't have some guidance in determining what is justifiable true, then how can we say we know what we think we know. I think these are interesting things one needs to consider.


Your definition (if you deny my question directly above) would allow non-Scripturalists to be Scripturalists. Of course we can know what follows necessarily from true propositions.
I'm not sure what you mean. Do you mean that I think non-Scripturalists can know things, yes I do think non-Scripturalists can know things. Can they justify knowing things, no I don't think they can.
 
I have so much to say Anthony. Mainly because you're not really presenting us with a standard Scripturalist epistemology.
Actually I have. But I think the details may work out differently between different Scripturalists. The standard Scripturalist epistemology is simply: Knowledge is the Scriptures and what can be deduced from Scripture. The only difference between what I wrote and Cheung is I don't make the claim all knowledge is... That is simply because I like to use terms like "all" in the deductive logical sense of "each and every".

But I think Cheung would agree that God has not revealed all his knowledge, and that God has revealed some knowledge to individuals that is not recorded in Scripture. But for a statement of epistemology, using all in a less vigorous fashion is reasonable because the knowledge available outside of scripturalism is nigh impossible to justify. It may be a knowledge that one can never "know" you know. Ya know?

One can be even more general I suppose and say knowledge is only what God reveals. But I think Van Til, Bahnsen, Clark, John Robbins, and Cheung (to name a few presuppositionalists and Scripturalists) would agree with the statement that for the Christian world-view, God's Word is the Foundation of Knowledge. Isn't that a chapter in Bahnsen's book?

...

Previously you have supported Vincent Cheung. You have said that there's not much you disagree with him on. Having said that, how do you reconcile what you've said above with the position Vince calls Scripturalism. Specifically, for now, I'm thinking of what you said in response to my asking:

Can you know anything that is not deducible from scriptural propositions?

You wrote:

"Yes."

Cheung states:
Scripture is the first principle of the Christian worldview, so that true knowledge consists of only what is directly stated in Scripture and what is validly deducible from Scripture; all other propositions amount to unjustified opinion at best. This biblical epistemology necessarily follows from biblical metaphysics. Any other epistemology is indefensible, and unavoidably collapses into self-contradictory skepticism. (p. 43; cf. “Systematic Theology,” p. 18 para. 4, p. 22 para. 5, p. 41 fn. 42)
I think I covered that question in the prior comments. I think the statement is correct as it applied to the knowledge men can share between them. From a Christian worldview perspective, God's Word is the foundation of all knowledge.

I'm not certain about Chueng's scripturalism in all it's details, but it works as a solid system of epistemology - so I have few problems with it. It may not agree with my views in detail, but we are getting beyond the essentials of scripturalism and into the finer details for working it out.

When you say that you don't hold to an infallibilist constraint, how do you take these statements by Cheung:
However, all the “seems like” could be wrong. To paraphrase Clark, it might be that we think we have free will not because we know something (that we have free will), but because we don’t know something (that we really don't have free will). It might be that some people intuitively think certain things are true because they are ignorant. Luther puts it stronger, saying that we think we have free will because we have been deceived by Satan. In any case, the debate cannot be settled by intuition alone. (“Arguing By Intuition,” pp. 3-4)
I'm not sure what this has to do with the so-called "infallibilist constraint". I would think a good epistemology should have less guesswork and better justification than offered by intuition.

Maybe you can explain what an "infallibilist constraint" is in general. Every place I've looked points to papal infallibility. Well the reformers threw out papal infallibility and turned to scriptural infallibility. I agree with the in-errancy and infallibility of scripture. If that makes scripturalism infallible - I'm all for it.

(PS - when I google "infallibilist constraint" all I got were links to this board and aquascum's screed. I thought "infallibilst constraint" was a standard epistemological term of objection. Maybe aquascum made up the term. Or maybe one of his professors did. It does not seem to be a standard category in epistemology.)

(PPS - having better luck with "infallibilist epistemology". But I haven't figured out if "infallibilist" is anything more than a neutral term. If I get time, I'll read some more and see what I can see. )

Clearly Cheung rejects arguing by intuition because it "could be" the case that their intuition is wrong. Whereas in Chueng's epistemology, he clearly thinks that he could not be wrong since he holds to infallibilism. ...
Cheung does consider scripturalism to be infallible in principle - in the same sense that logical deduction is infallible. He doesn't say that people are infallible, and do not need to be to have knowledge. So I don't understand you point. It might be helpful to explain terms such as "infallibilist" and internalist and externalist in regular language. Most people reading this will not understand this technical/philosophical jargon, and if it can't be said in regular speech, then I find it suspect.

... His arguments, says he, are "irrefutable and invincible." One only claims that if one holds an infallibilist constraint on knowledge.
Well so far he has been right. But if the "infallibilist constraint" means one can not know something unless one can know it infallibly, then I don't think Cheung says this. It's one thing to say ones system is irrefutable and invincible, but that does not imply that Scripturalists can never be wrong. We are all sinners and incapable of perfect understanding. What we do know, ultimately, is by God's grace and power. You agree that in order to correctly discern scripture, one is completely dependent on the Holy Spirit. Yes? So whatever truth the Spirit reveals to your mind, will be infallibly true.


Next, what do you mean by a belief B is justified if B can "be shown to be the case?" In other words, are you saying that for S to know that P, P must be true, P must be believed, and S must be able to "show that P is the case?" What is the nature of this 'showing?'
If proposition B is deducible from Scripture, then B is a justified true proposition.

Lastly, above you seemed to question whether you held to internalism. And, you seemed a bit unsure about T.E. Wilder's question about 'knowing that you know.' Well, how do you regard Cheung here, then:
Yes, but unless you can show how you know at any given instance whether that particular sensation is reliable or not, then you can’t show how you could trust any given instance of sensation.

http://www.vincentcheung.com/2005/04...and-empiricism
Sounds correct to me. Tell me, how do you know when you know something? We can go round and round over this internalism/externalism but it doesn't' really effect scripturalism.

Anyway, if you can clarify those, I'll be back sometime later to respond.
Oy! Did I clarify anything?? I hope so, but I'm not sure about some of these issues. I have my opinions on them, some more strongly held then others. But mostly they are just opinions and from speaking with Cheung, I think he would agree they are not necessarily critical issues. They are very interesting and worth study, and could be important too. But I don't know if they are issues we can perfectly settle. As I said before, none seem to be deal breakers. I could be wrong so I'm happy to be further educated.

P.S. I've covered a lot of stuff so please don't feel rushed. I know you wanted to address some other questions I asked in the prior posts and I'd be happy to have to answer those before you address all that was covered in this post.

P.P.S. To tewilder and polemic_turtle,I did answer your questions, I don't want you to miss them since this thread has grown long and it was earlier on that I replied. I'd like others to participate and maybe help us clear up some of the questions I'm a little fuzzy on. Any Scripturalists out there want to add some comments?? Paul and I could easily dominate this thread but others may have more interesting comments and insights than I do.
 
If proposition B is deducible from Scripture, then B is a justified true proposition.
Is the above quote necessary and sufficient?
Sure.

Is the above quote justified?
I think so. :)


If so, is the above quote deducible from Scripture?
Yes. I believe we can deduce the laws of logic and rules of inference from Scripture. It would kind of be like reverse engineering. But the procedure would be in effect to say, if Scripture follows the laws of logic (identity, contradiction, excluded middle) then the laws are validated by scripture. Van Til said all things conform to the law of contradiction (LC), Clark said language and meaning depend on the LC. Since scripture is language, and it is meaningful, then it must be the case that scripture affirms the laws of logic.

Second, if arguments in scripture use the rules of inference, then the rules of inference are valid. And indeed, the rules of inference are found in arguments given by Christ himself. So that's good enough for me.

The above quote is merely a statement that says that if a statement is true, then what ever can be deduced from it by "good and necessary consequences" is also true. This is also confirmed by the WCF.


(P.S. P usually stands for proposition, B for belief.)

B is still a proposition. Since the belief B is also justified true, then B is also knowledge.
 
Here are a few questions I have wanted to see Scripturalists take on:

Would you say the scripturalism is a form of classical foundationalism?

It could be, but I suppose it's all in how you define "classical foundationalism" since I've come across some definitions which would seem compatible with Scripturalism, others not so much. If you mean that in order for any system of thought to start it must start somewhere, then I think, yes, Scripturalism, being a more consistent form of biblical presuppositionalism is concerning with where one starts.

How do you regard the old saws such as "You don't know unless you know you know."

Why would this be an old saw? Or, has it simply been abandoned since non-Christian epistemology has been unable to produce or account for any knowledge at all?

Is the method my which you acquire familiarity with the axioms of Scripture relevant to whether they can properly be taken as axioms?

I think the method of Scripturalism is nicely summed up in WCF 1.5. Technically, I don't think there is any divergence between WCF 1 and Scripturalism. Prior to Dr. Robbins coining the phrase Clark would refer to his position as the "Westminster Principle" (see Clark's response to Mavordes for example) among other names over the years including "Dogmatism."
 
Just wondering, do you derogate common sense observations such as your existance as mere "opinions"? For another one, which I know you must get a lot, how do you consider the need for empirical data to receive the Scriptures( eg. sight, hearing )? If I cannot be said to know anything through experience, then I cannot know whether what I'm reading as Scripture should be what I attempt to construct my ideas from, etc.. What do you say?

I say many confuse arbitrary marks on a page with Scripture, but Scripture consists of propositions and imperatives, none of which can be perceived with the eyes or the ears. To hear or see in Scripture is a metaphor for the enlightening work of the Spirit. It has to do with intellection and not sensation. As Jesus said repeatedly; "He that hath ears to hear, let him hear." The problem, of course, is most to whom the word comes do not hear or see and the reason is because their minds have been darkened (see Eph. 4:17,18 and elsewhere). Ezek 12:2; Son of man, thou dwellest in the midst of a rebellious house, which have eyes to see, and see not; they have ears to hear, and hear not: for they are a rebellious house. Their problem is not that their eyesight is bad or they're in need of hearing aids, rather their minds are alienated from God in Christ who said His very words are spirit and life. Biblically one comes to know the truth and grow in the truth the same way they come to be saved, and that by the grace of God alone.
 
Well, I don't hold to it as a necessary or sufficient condition.

Since when are you the standard bearer of all things epistemological? Actually, you might be a good reason to bring back that old saw. ;)


I suggest Civbert re-title the thread and change it to "Civbert's Version of The Epistemology of Scripturalism"

The "Shotgun" Manata attempt at divide and conquer. Having to deal with what Gordon Clark thought and wrote might be asking too much, since Scripturalism is, after all, a reference to Clark's philosophic distinctives, not Anthony's, mine or anyone else's. I suppose that way you can thump your chest and think you've actually accomplished something.
 
So to "show" that P is the case, one must be able to deduce P from scriptural propositions, or P must be a proposition in Scripture itself? That is, S shows that P iff S can deduce P from scriptural propositions, or S knows that P is a proposition in Scripture.

If one can't "show" (where show is defined above) that P is the case, then one can't know that P? Right?
Not sure if the "if and only if" is warranted. It is sufficient to say that if one can demonstrate the P is scripture or deducible ,then S is justified in claiming to know P. That seems self evident. Do you agree?

My reply earlier was that a belief (proposition) is a justified true belief, if an account for the truth of B can be given. But I did not say if S must actually show B is true in order to know it. Maybe he does, maybe he doesn't. If he doesn't, does that mean he doesn't know B? Maybe it is sufficient for B to be deducible, even if not personally deduced by S. Maybe S need only have a reasonable belief that B is deducible from Scripture. Or maybe he can need only believe B is true and for B to be a JTB. These are all interesting questions, but again, they are not critical to Scripturalist epistemology.


I'm just talking about people in our epistemic situation right now. Not Adam, or the people who heard Jesus, etc. Us now. So, for a subject S in our current epistemic situation E, to know that P, S must believe that P, P must be true, and S must 'show' that P, where 'show' means S must be able to deduce P from scriptural propositions, or P must itself be a Scriptural proposition. ...
I'm not committed to S having to show P is true to know P. I am committed that the truth of P should be at least showable if S is to be reasonable certain and aware that P is justified as knowledge.


... Negatively, if S believes P, and P is true, and S cannot "show" (deduce from scriptural propositions, or P is a proposition in Scripture) that P, then S in E does not know P. ...
That really depends on what on considers sufficient justification for claiming to know P doesn't it?

Scripturalism at face value only says that P is knowledge if it is Scripture or deducible therefrom. It doesn't say S must personally deduce P. It seems fair to ask how S knows P, what are his epistemic presuppositions regarding knowledge. Is he using assumptions about his perceptions (some sort of empiricism), or some sort of rationalism, or is does he presume mysticism. Personally, I think if he believes P and P is deducible from scripture, then S has knowledge - but he can not justify that knowledge personally. Others, maybe Van Til might say this - believe that non-believers know nothing what-so-ever. I've seen people switch around about this.

I tend to lean toward an externalist view of knowledge - in that knowledge has epistemic existence outside of the mind of man, and that many will have knowledge they can not justify simply because they believe truths revealed by God, but they can not give any account of that knowledge. This is true for the knowledge of God's existence which all men are born with and suppress. I don't think one needs to even be aware of the knowledge they hold for them to know it.

But I think the internalist view is valid if one wishes to justify to himselves what he knows. And for the Christen, he should test propositions against scripture. If it contradicts scripture, clearly it is false. If it coherent with scripture, it is at least a reasonable opinion. If it is deducible from scripture, then the Christian personally knows (is aware) that it is true.


.... And so this would be the how the Scripturalist grants the honorific title of "s/he knows that P" to S in E, have I got that about right?
Maybe. Maybe not. :)


Originally Posted by Paul manata
(P.S. P usually stands for proposition, B for belief.)

Originally Posted by civbert
B is still a proposition. Since the belief B is also justified true, then B is also knowledge.

Not quite. A belief B is not a proposition P, rather B is a positive cognitive attitude *toward* a P.
Who's B are we dealing with here? :D True, you introduced the B shorthand for belief, but you were asking me "what do you mean by a belief B is justified if B can "be shown to be the case?". Clearly my B is a proposition believed, not simply a "positive cognitive attitude". It is a proposition one has a "positive cognitive attitude" toward.

A belief is not knowledge, because, as you said, knowledge is JTB.
"A belief" or just "belief".

B may be necessary for knowledge, but not sufficient, as you yourself said.
Here you're addressing a different issue, if it is sufficient to believe a proposition to know it. That is "belief" in the abstract, not a belief that is "shown to be the case". We don't show "belief" to be the case, we show the proposition B is the case (i.e. true).

Anyhow, For a belief to be a JTB, then B must a least be a proposition believed. But "belief" itself can not be knowledge becausea "positive epistemic attitude" is non-propositional, and knowledge itself is propositional. Let's get our B's in order. Huh?

{I know I said I'd respond in full later, but I'm trying to make sure I have *your* version of Scripturalism nailed down first.}
My version is essentially the same as Robbins, Clark, and even Cheung. It even works with Bahnsen and possible Van Til.
 
Well, I don't hold to it as a necessary or sufficient condition.

And so we have Civbert saying he's unsure about an internalist constraint, and Magma explicitly endorsing one.

So, what *is* the "epistemology of Scripturalism" (the title of the thread)? Is an internalist constraint part of the package or not? Is Civbert putting forth Scripturalist epistemology, or is Magma, or Cheung?

I suggest Civbert re-title the thread and change it to "Civbert's Version of The Epistemology of Scripturalism"

It's not an either/or situation. The issue of internalist/externalist is not a necessary element to Scripturalism. The epistemology of Scripturalism is (once again) that knowledge is the propositions of Scripture and that which can be deduced from Scripture by "good and necessary consequences".

That's it. So what's next? I don't mind answer questions about how I think it works, but when it comes to extream details, then it's really my opinion.
 
...I think the method of Scripturalism is nicely summed up in WCF 1.5. Technically, I don't think there is any divergence between WCF 1 and Scripturalism. Prior to Dr. Robbins coining the phrase Clark would refer to his position as the "Westminster Principle" (see Clark's response to Mavordes for example) among other names over the years including "Dogmatism."

Good point.
 
And so we have Civbert saying he's unsure about an internalist constraint, and Magma explicitly endorsing one.

Paul, then what *were* you endorsing in your debate with Dan Barker? As I recall much, if not all, of your debate consisted of your demanding he account for his many truth statements in opposition to Christianity and your demonstrating that his arguments in his defense were insufficient. It seems to me that the externalist have basically relinquished the battlefield -- just when they had the enemy on the run. Rather than an account, reliablists have simply made the Christian faith, or, more properly theism, something respectable at Yale and that's about it. Did your recognition that Van Tilianism has failed to live up to your expectations lead to your defection?
 
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Anthony, I would be interested to know if Scripturalism depends upon the idea that all revelation is propositional and not in any sense personal. From a Westminster tradition perspective, I am surprised when I find any epistemic claim omitting the testimony of the Spirit. Blessings!
 
Anthony, I would be interested to know if Scripturalism depends upon the idea that all revelation is propositional and not in any sense personal. From a Westminster tradition perspective, I am surprised when I find any epistemic claim omitting the testimony of the Spirit. Blessings!

While I don't want to answer for Anthony, please see above concerning WCF 1.5 and the role the Spirit plays, and must play, in the acquisition of knowledge (rightly defined). Beyond that, all revelation IS personal for in Scripture we have "the mind of Christ." It also is complete, coherent and sufficient, contra the Van Tilian, for the perfect has come. However, if you're suggesting that there is a person apart from the propositions he thinks, or that the Spirit speaks or acts apart and independent from the propositions revealed, please feel free to advance your argument here Rev. Winzer. I'm confident that is not your position, but I've been wrong before :(
 
Sean, it's not my intention to offer a critique of scripturalism, only to point out that Anthony's presentation of it omitted reference to the testimony of the Spirit. The testimony of the Spirit is always by and with the Word. That is not at issue.

In theological discourse, "personal" revelation does not refer to the person knowing but to the Person known. Revelation does not begin with propositions or axiomatic principles, but with the Person of Jesus Christ. It is the Person of Christ who gives meaning both to the ink spots on the page (empirical) and the propositions which those ink spots represent (rational). The personal revelation of Christ by the power of the Spirit (faith) is as much needed to account for the objects of sense as the objects of the mind.
 
Anthony, I would be interested to know if Scripturalism depends upon the idea that all revelation is propositional and not in any sense personal. From a Westminster tradition perspective, I am surprised when I find any epistemic claim omitting the testimony of the Spirit. Blessings!

Thanks for the question Rev. Winzer.

I'm not sure I see any dichotomy between the propositional and the personal. But the role of the Spirit in Scripturalism is, in my opinion, vital. The text we find in our Bibles in not Scripture per say, but a means by which the propositional truths of Scripture are conveyed to the believer/regenerate/reader. The exact same propositional truths can be conveyed in many different languages, and through various interpretations and translations. The reason is first that a proposition is the meaning of the statements in a text, and in order to correctly understand the meaning of the Bible texts, one depends on the Spirit.

The Spirit enlightens the mind by making us understand the truths (propositions) of Scripture. Without the Person of the Spirit working in our minds, we would be entirely dependent on our unreliable minds and senses - just a little better off than the rationalist and empiricists.

The Person of the Spirit works within our minds - literally renewing andand transforming our minds to the truths of the Word of God, which is literally Christ Jesus. The Person of Christ Jesus is known personally by knowing the Word (Scripture), and this by the working of the Person of the Spirit. I can't see how it can get any more personal then to know the propositions of the Word.

I hope that answered your question - I'm not sure I understood it. I think Sean's answer also reinforces what I've said here.
 
Sean, it's not my intention to offer a critique of scripturalism, ...

I wouldn't mind. :)


... only to point out that Anthony's presentation of it omitted reference to the testimony of the Spirit. The testimony of the Spirit is always by and with the Word. That is not at issue.

You are correct. I hadn't gotten to that point. The testimony of the Spirit not clearly inferable by my presentation of Scripturalism, but I know of no Scripturalist that would nothing less than the testimony of the Spirit is a vital component to a sound Christian worldview. Of course, one need not be a Scripturalist to agree.


In theological discourse, "personal" revelation does not refer to the person knowing but to the Person known. Revelation does not begin with propositions or axiomatic principles, but with the Person of Jesus Christ. ...

I'm not sure I understand. I agree revelation begins with the Person of Jesus Christ. But I also believe that the Person of Jesus Christ is the Word of God, and the Word of God is propositional. To know the Word is to know Christ.

... It is the Person of Christ who gives meaning both to the ink spots on the page (empirical) and the propositions which those ink spots represent (rational). The personal revelation of Christ by the power of the Spirit (faith) is as much needed to account for the objects of sense as the objects of the mind.

I'm not sure exactly what it means to "give meaning to" something. It sounds good to me. I just have an aversion to embracing any statements I don't really understand. It's one of the reasons I have a strong aversion to the mystical elements most Christians seem so fond of. But I'm not criticizing your words or inferring they are mysticism. I'm just confessing my uncertain comprehension of them. We may be in full agreement.
 
Sean, it's not my intention to offer a critique of scripturalism, only to point out that Anthony's presentation of it omitted reference to the testimony of the Spirit. The testimony of the Spirit is always by and with the Word. That is not at issue.

In theological discourse, "personal" revelation does not refer to the person knowing but to the Person known.

And I would hope you agree that the person known could not be known at all apart from (propositional) self-revelation. How many times have I heard a variant of the pietistic nonsense about knowing a person and not a proposition. I recall a powerful piece by Machen railing against such anti-intellectual religiosity posing as Christian faith. In theological discourse personal revelation means many things to many people, not much of which has anything to do with the God of Scripture. Regardless, in the beginning was the Word.


Revelation does not begin with propositions or axiomatic principles, but with the Person of Jesus Christ. It is the Person of Christ who gives meaning both to the ink spots on the page (empirical) and the propositions which those ink spots represent (rational). The personal revelation of Christ by the power of the Spirit (faith) is as much needed to account for the objects of sense as the objects of the mind.

Not exactly sure what you mean that revelation does not begin with propositions since only propositions can be either true or false and the God of Scripture is the Lord God of Truth. If you mean that the Spirit's intimidate illumination is necessary for a man to know anything at all and that you were concerned that His work was absent from the discussion, no problem.
 
Anthony and Sean, does knowing the proposition mean one ipso facto knows the Person?
 
Anthony and Sean, does knowing the proposition mean one ipso facto knows the Person?

Yes. To know propositions of Scripture, is to know the Word, is to know the Person Christ.

To know me, you would need to know my beliefs, my opinions, what I know. It means to know what I have faith in, how I reason, what I think is important, the sins I struggle with, the things I love. These are all propositions that I hold in my mind.

Knowledge is propositional. So to know a person is to know propositions that person thinks. In the case of Christ, it is the propositions He has revealed to us in Scripture.

P.S. This all fits in with Scripturalism.
 
Yes. To know propositions of Scripture, is to know the Word, is to know the Person Christ.

This is the point at which I believe Scripturalism departs from the reformed faith. WHAT the Bible teaches is only the "form" of knowledge. When one knows WHOM they have believed, then they have true knowledge, with the power thereof. Blessings!
 
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