The "Biola Turn" in Christian Philosophy (Or, a return from relativism)

[RamistThomist]

What exactly is the difference between a subject with properties vs a sub stratum with properties?

The substratum wasn't differentiated, which is why speaking like that fell out of favor.

A subject isn't an object and since objects are what we're talking about lets stick with that language.

I am only saying how the term has always been used. I'll stick with the language in the scholarly literature.

About Jesus are you saying that he has two nature's but no substance's?

That's not what I said. Jesus' case is a bit different since his person enhypostasized a human nature. However, that human nature wasn't a subject (since we aren't Nestorians).

I have no problems with different nature's but how must i subscribe to substance metaphysics to affirm that?

Do you believe in essences, universals, etc.? Are you able to affirm the Westminster Shorter Catechism on the Trinity?

What happens when you strip away all the properties of an object, what are you left with?

Some properties are contingent, some are essential. See Jay Wesley Richards' Untamed God. He explains the logic behind modal logic and God.

Some substances have de re modality in terms of their properties. Those properties can't be abstracted from the subject.

The definition of essence is a set of properties that an entity exemplifies (Richards 64). A property is some fact or truth about an entity in the world. In our usage we want to say that Socrates has necessary/essential properties without saying that Socrates is necessary to every possible world. We would say it like this:

“S has P and there is no W in which S has the complement ~P of P.

Property actualism states that S has no properties in worlds in which he does not exist.

□(x)(P(x) → E(x))

If you say anything about it than your talking about a property.

I have no problem with that. Not every property can be a subject. The color red (or redness) doesn't go around doing stuff.

Subject object distinction, which one are you?

I don't know what you are asking.

 

[jwright82]

The substratum wasn't differentiated, which is why speaking like that fell out of favor.


I am only saying how the term has always been used. I'll stick with the language in the scholarly literature.


That's not what I said. Jesus' case is a bit different since his person enhypostasized a human nature. However, that human nature wasn't a subject (since we aren't Nestorians).


Do you believe in essences, universals, etc.? Are you able to affirm the Westminster Shorter Catechism on the Trinity?


Some properties are contingent, some are essential. See Jay Wesley Richards' Untamed God. He explains the logic behind modal logic and God.

Some substances have de re modality in terms of their properties. Those properties can't be abstracted from the subject.

The definition of essence is a set of properties that an entity exemplifies (Richards 64). A property is some fact or truth about an entity in the world. In our usage we want to say that Socrates has necessary/essential properties without saying that Socrates is necessary to every possible world. We would say it like this:

“S has P and there is no W in which S has the complement ~P of P.

Property actualism states that S has no properties in worlds in which he does not exist.

□(x)(P(x) → E(x))



I have no problem with that. Not every property can be a subject. The color red (or redness) doesn't go around doing stuff.


I don't know what you are asking.

I think we're talking over eachother, a substance is a bear something with properties attached, used to be called accidents. Now you seem to be saying that the sum total of the properties is the substance of a thing, which is merely a linguistic difference.
Why use the word substance in a way different than Aristotle did, and the one Berkley and Hume criticized, and call that traditional substance metaphysics? If your using term differentially than state that. I'm using it the way those guys used it, Locke too and Spinoza.
But that does bring up an interesting critique of traditional substance metaphysics, that of individuality. How does an object, or the subject of a statement (which seems to be the way you're using the term subject, contra Sartre), have a different substance from something of the same species? What makes Fido different from Lassie? If its merely different properties than why even bother with the term substance? Substance is an empty placeholder until you fill it with it properties, if so get rid of the confusing term substance.
You admitted that the sub stratum talk fell out of favor, only proving my point about a difference between a distinction between traditional substance metaphysics and contemporary ones. Make the distinction and let's move on.
As far as essence goes it has linguistic use and that's it. Its not nearly as empty as substance but fine if used in a linguistic setting, the essence of a thing (conversation, different dogs etc). But the "Essence" of a conversation is used differently from an "Essence" of dogs.
I have no qualms about the confessions using the tools of substance language to describe deep mysteries. But they are only tools.

 

[RamistThomist]

a substance is a bear something with properties attached, used to be called accidents. Now you seem to be saying that the sum total of the properties is the substance of a thing, which is merely a linguistic difference.

That is not what I said. You are giving a nominalist version of substance. Simply put, a substance is a continuant that remains through change. If it is simply an aggregate of properties, then it cannot remain the same through change.

A substance has an inner nature that includes its ordered structural unity of ultimate capacities.

Why use the word substance in a way different than Aristotle did, and the one Berkley and Hume criticized, and call that traditional substance metaphysics?

I am in the same ballpark as he is. I am only tweaking it at points.

and Spinoza.

Not really. Spinoza said there is only one substance and an infinity of modes.

You admitted that the sub stratum talk fell out of favor, only proving my point about a difference between a distinction between traditional substance metaphysics and contemporary ones.

Substratum isn't the entire whole of substance metaphysics. It was one way some ancient thinkers spoke about it. I can reject that talk without jettisoning the whole project.

Substance is an empty placeholder until you fill it with it properties, if so get rid of the confusing term substance.

No traditional substance thinker ever thought that. They were realists, not nominalists.

 

[RamistThomist]

As to your other questions:

How does an object, or the subject of a statement (which seems to be the way you're using the term subject, contra Sartre), have a different substance from something of the same species? What makes Fido different from Lassie?

They aren't the same primary substance. They all have the same nature or essence, though. I've said this several times now.

As far as essence goes it has linguistic use and that's it. Its not nearly as empty as substance but fine if used in a linguistic setting, the essence of a thing (conversation, different dogs etc).

This is textbook nominalism. I don't see how you can affirm much of the Westminster standards. You say they are just tools. That's precisely the opposite of what the writers meant. You can't say "I believe what Westminster believes on God" and also "but the concepts they used are just linguistic tools."

I'll summarize: adherence is explained by inherence. This is the Christian view on substance.

 

[jwright82]

That is not what I said. You are giving a nominalist version of substance. Simply put, a substance is a continuant that remains through change. If it is simply an aggregate of properties, then it cannot remain the same through change.

A substance has an inner nature that includes its ordered structural unity of ultimate capacities.


I am in the same ballpark as he is. I am only tweaking it at points.


Not really. Spinoza said there is only one substance and an infinity of modes.


Substratum isn't the entire whole of substance metaphysics. It was one way some ancient thinkers spoke about it. I can reject that talk without jettisoning the whole project.


No traditional substance thinker ever thought that. They were realists, not nominalists.

Cannot remain the same through change without a substance? Of course it it does everyday. To assume that an unknowable substance must exist to account for the "seeming unchable" in things is a transcendental argument. I seem to remember you not liking those.
Your "tweeking it at points" isn't that the same as changing it? But if your changing it how can I be the only unconfessional one here? The contemporary version of substance metaphysics your presenting is not the same as the framers of the creeds and confessions would have known. Accusing me of being unconfessional is below the belt.
Also you throw the words realist and nominalist out there as if those are the only two options but that's not true. Calling the whole game rigged means you aren't on either team. Saying that someone sitting in the sidelines is really on this team or that is prima facie absurd.
By tools I mean conceptual tools for making sense of things. You seem to tie the life or death of Chritianity to an outmoded highly criticized metaphysics. Its like a contemporary evangelical defending the correspondence theory of truth despite all the critiques. Why not throw them both out and be done with it?

 

[RamistThomist]

Cannot remain the same through change without a substance? Of course it it does everyday.

That's because on my account, pace nominalism and linguistic philosophies, an entity derives its unity from an internal, substance account. Nominalism, as you have outlined in many of your posts, sees an entity as an aggregate of properties.

o assume that an unknowable substance must exist to account for the "seeming unchable" in things is a transcendental argument.

Who said it is unknowable? That's poisoning the well. My posts have been quite clear that substance is knowable and I haven't seen any good argments to the contrary. As to transcendental arguments, That's not immediately obvious. If it is, it is in a Husserlian account.

Your "tweeking it at points" isn't that the same as changing it?

There were substance metaphysics besides those of Aristotle. I just don't think his account of primary/secondary substance is all that clear. I also don't believe that the universal is contained in the matter.

The contemporary version of substance metaphysics your presenting is not the same as the framers of the creeds and confessions would have known.

It's close to it. Aristotle knew about modal logic. He just didn't spend a lot of time on it. All of the Reformed divines knew the discussions about counter-factuals, as they had to combat Molinism.

Accusing me of being unconfessional is below the belt.

Do you agree with the divines "same in substance?" I do. My view of substance, like theirs, sees a substance as a continuant that remains the same through change because of an inherent structural unity. The divines agree. I agree.

Also you throw the words realist and nominalist out there as if those are the only two options but that's not true.

There are shades of realism. Plato is purer than Augustine, who is purer than Anselm, who is purer than Aristotle, who is purer than Suarez.

There are shades of nominalism. Scotus is better than Ockham. Okham is better than Hobbes.

outmoded highly criticized metaphysics.

You can't say you agree with the divines on the doctrine of God and make statements like that. You can say that classical metaphysics is outmoded. I've rebutted every argument to the contrary (although there haven't been that many arguments).

 

[RamistThomist]

And Locke didn't reject the idea of substance. He posited, unlike me, a pure substratum existing apart from all properties (Essay 2.23.1ff). I don't hold that view. You are trying to attribute that view to me, and then noting that Locke refuted substance talk. That's actually Locke's own view.

 

[jwright82]

That's because on my account, pace nominalism and linguistic philosophies, an entity derives its unity from an internal, substance account. Nominalism, as you have outlined in many of your posts, sees an entity as an aggregate of properties.


Who said it is unknowable? That's poisoning the well. My posts have been quite clear that substance is knowable and I haven't seen any good argments to the contrary. As to transcendental arguments, That's not immediately obvious. If it is, it is in a Husserlian account.


There were substance metaphysics besides those of Aristotle. I just don't think his account of primary/secondary substance is all that clear. I also don't believe that the universal is contained in the matter.



It's close to it. Aristotle knew about modal logic. He just didn't spend a lot of time on it. All of the Reformed divines knew the discussions about counter-factuals, as they had to combat Molinism.


Do you agree with the divines "same in substance?" I do. My view of substance, like theirs, sees a substance as a continuant that remains the same through change because of an inherent structural unity. The divines agree. I agree.


There are shades of realism. Plato is purer than Augustine, who is purer than Anselm, who is purer than Aristotle, who is purer than Suarez.

There are shades of nominalism. Scotus is better than Ockham. Okham is better than Hobbes.


You can't say you agree with the divines on the doctrine of God and make statements like that. You can say that classical metaphysics is outmoded. I've rebutted every argument to the contrary (although there haven't been that many arguments).

I reject the nominalist/realist distinction so calling me one or the other is pointless. I affirm the use of substance metaphysics in the service of the church in defining the reality of the trinity and the incarnation without buying into the whole thing. Citing two unique examples and applying it to ordinary things is a fallacy of a false analogy.
The only argument I've seen is your TA argument from a necessity to save SM from itself.
You didn't show how a substance can be known outside of that. Also I'm assuming yes to my question, you never answered, about Christians being required to be substance metaphysics believers to be orthodox. So I don't know how that works? I take SM as being one of many, but the most truthful, form of descriptive metaphysics in our creeds and confessions but not one we must tie ourselves to. I don't believe you answered Hume's critique at all, if I'm wrong point to the post and I'll answers it.
Also is it your personal SM that people must believe in to be orthodox or a changing historical tradition that must be believed to be orthodox (changing implying not the same)?

 

[RamistThomist]

I affirm the use of substance metaphysics in the service of the church in defining the reality of the trinity and the incarnation without buying into the whole thing.

Either you affirm God and substance, or you don't.

You didn't show how a substance can be known outside of that.

Yes I did.

Also I'm assuming yes to my question, you never answered, about Christians being required to be substance metaphysics believers to be orthodox.

Sure you can be orthodox. I don't think you can consistently affirm the creedal propositions since they affirm SM.

I don't believe you answered Hume's critique at all, if I'm wrong point to the post and I'll answers it.

I'm fairly certain I did. Hume's metaphysics is a joke. I refuted him and showed how his criticisms didn't hold. I'll look for the post.

Also is it your personal SM that people must believe in to be orthodox or a changing historical tradition that must be believed to be orthodox (changing implying not the same)?

You already asked me that. I answered it. You can be orthodox and not hold to SM. I think it will have negative consequences down the road (e.g., see James KA Smith's career).

 

[RamistThomist]

In post #32 you alluded to Hume, Berkeley, and Locke. You said (but did not demonstrate) that they refuted substance metaphysics. In light of no demonstration, I can only guess what you mean.

I then demonstrated that Locke himself held to the view of substance that you said Locke attacked to refute SM.

 

[jwright82]

And Locke didn't reject the idea of substance. He posited, unlike me, a pure substratum existing apart from all properties (Essay 2.23.1ff). I don't hold that view. You are trying to attribute that view to me, and then noting that Locke refuted substance talk. That's actually Locke's own view.

Never said Locke refuted it. I grouped him and Spinoza together and Berkley and Hume to show that Locke and Spinoza were part of that tradition they criticized.
I can't seem to find any post where you refute Hume outside merely asserting it. The arguments you've presented are TA argument, the you're not orthodox unless you agree with me, and accusing me of holding views I outright reject.
As far Smith goes he seems to be pretty comfortable in his career. I've never accused you of being unconfessional or unorthodox.

 

[TylerRay]

@jwright82, do you believe that you are the same entity today as you were yesterday?

 

[RamistThomist]

I can't seem to find any post where you refute Hume outside merely asserting it.

Since you didn't present Hume's specific challenge, I didn't need to present a specific refutation of Hume. If you want to outline and make a Humean-style argument, go ahead.

I've never accused you of being unconfessional or unorthodox.

Why would I be unorthodox? I'm the one presenting what the Confession (and almost all of church history) taught on substance and God.

As to TA-arguments, they aren't wrong per se. The problem is when Van Tillians misuse them into "bywhatstandard?bywhatstandard?bywhatstandard?bywhatstandard?" instead of dealing with the tough philosophical issues in metaphysics.

 

[jwright82]

Since you didn't present Hume's specific challenge, I didn't need to present a specific refutation of Hume. If you want to outline and make a Humean-style argument, go ahead.


Why would I be unorthodox? I'm the one presenting what the Confession (and almost all of church history) taught on substance and God.

As to TA-arguments, they aren't wrong per se. The problem is when Van Tillians misuse them into "bywhatstandard?bywhatstandard?bywhatstandard?bywhatstandard?" instead of dealing with the tough philosophical issues in metaphysics.

1 Van Til never said that, if you demand I get your POV right don't other people deserve that too?
2 you claimed to have demolished his arguments but now are admitting you didn't actually do that. I will pull out my Hume book to provide the argument. In the future if you claim to have demolished an argument, actually do it.
3 I see nothing wrong with affirming the creeds and questioning the basis of SM. Must i have the bible in one hand and the Philosopher's metaphysics in the other to be orthodox? I know you don't actually believe that but it was worth pointing out, give me a couple of days to find the book and we can continue the conversation. Fair enough?
4 I affirm Christ's two nature's in one person as well as God's three persons but one essence.

 

[jwright82]

@jwright82, do you believe that you are the same entity today as you were yesterday?

Last time I checked. Is a substance the only way to account for that? Or does that problem merely arise because of the choice of concepts? If SM is true than yes substance is the only way to deal with that. If the conceptual scheme is flawed than it's a false question. Also that's more of a memory problem. But nice question!

 

[RamistThomist]

I'll give a simple modus tollens argument to prove I am a substance.

If I am not a substance, then I am not the same "I" as I was a few moments before.

I am the

1 Van Til never said that, if you demand I get your POV right don't other people deserve that too?

Presumably you are referring to my analysis of his TAG. He wasn't as crude as his modern disciples are, but yes, he certainly did advocate that position.

you claimed to have demolished his arguments but now are admitting you didn't actually do that. I will pull out my Hume book to provide the argument. In the future if you claim to have demolished an argument, actually do it

I have on blog posts. I thought I had transferred them here. Anyway, here goes:

Problems with Hume
A)

As Owen Barfield and others have pointed out, if all we can know are sense-impressions, then Hume’s three qualities of association fail the test: “resemblance, contiguity, and causation” are not sense-impressions, or did not originate as such (Barfield 25). Of course, this is the same criticism Hume offered of causality. But why stop at causality? Why not apply it to the other two?


[2] It is here that Hume’s nominalism becomes vicious. How are ideas “in the mind” held together? Hume says they are “bundled” together, but doesn’t bundling imply some sort of unity or association? If Hume’s criticism of causality holds, then it must also hold to any form of association. Thus examining the mental process, Hume is left with an array of facts that cannot relate to each other in any possible way. “All is flux.”


[3] This critique is not so much a refutation of Hume but points toward an ambiguity. During the mental act I perceive an object, we will say the sensory impression of touch, to which it comes back to my mind as the idea of touch. When I reflect upon the ideas “in my mind,” I do so in visual categories. But what does the visual category of “touch” even mean? [sidenote: As Wolterstorff pointed out, this is more a criticism of Locke than Hume].


[4] Hume cannot escape the reality of universals, as Bertrand Russell pointed out (Russell 96ff). If we deny, for example, the universals of “whiteness” and “triangularity,” we will still, in order to form an idea of a triangle, imagine a patch of whiteness and a three-sided figure and say that anything meeting these criteria is white and a triangle--we say that the resemblance must hold. We will also say that the resemblance must hold among many white 3-sided things. We will say that the resemblances must resemble each other. We have made “resemblance” a universal.

As Russell pointed out, Hume failed to note that not only are qualities universals, but so are relations.

[5] Per Thomas Reid and N. Wolterstorff, Hume needs to explain how a physical sensation can cause a mental apprehension (Wolterstorff 2004).

[6.1] Hume’s analysis of perception and reflection seems to privilege visual ideas. Perhaps that can work. Such has been the tendency of philosophy since Plato. Yet when we move to the other senses Hume’s analysis breaks down. How does my idea (weakened sensation) of touch bear any resemblance to the apple I just touched? Even worse, doesn’t the phrase “mental idea” connote visuality? Could this possibly work on ideas like “touch”?

[7] As Thomas Reid pointed out, it seems Hume has lumped all mental reflection (sensation/though) under the label of “perception” in the mind. How does Hume make a distinction between the “idea” of sight and the “idea” of touch (Reid 301ff)?

[8] Hume said I cannot be directly aware of any object unless that object is an impression, But (2) I am not an impression;Therefore (3) I cannot be directly aware of myself. But this is absurd.

I see nothing wrong with affirming the creeds and questioning the basis of SM.

That's no different than saying "I believe Jesus had two of what philosophers have always called natures, but I don't believe in natures the way the guys who wrote the creeds do."

 

[RamistThomist]

Is a substance the only way to account for that?

Hume thought so, which is why he denied both substance and identity (same with Locke). And that's why those who reject the soul today don't really like saying we persist through time. Instead of "persons" or "substances," they use the less-than-euphonic phrase "Phase-sortals." We are only a sortal of what just existed.

 

[TylerRay]

Last time I checked. Is a substance the only way to account for that? Or does that problem merely arise because of the choice of concepts? If SM is true than yes substance is the only way to deal with that. If the conceptual scheme is flawed than it's a false question. Also that's more of a memory problem. But nice question!

Yes, as far as I can tell, it's the only way. If your essence is indistinguishable from what you do, or your properties, then you're constantly changing what you are. What is the constant?

In denying substance metaphysics, you're really denying certain properly basic beliefs.

Do you believe that there is a real universal concept of humanity, or are you and I utterly distinct things? After all, we have different qualities and do different things.

 

[jwright82]

I'll give a simple modus tollens argument to prove I am a substance.

If I am not a substance, then I am not the same "I" as I was a few moments before.

I am the


Presumably you are referring to my analysis of his TAG. He wasn't as crude as his modern disciples are, but yes, he certainly did advocate that position.


I have on blog posts. I thought I had transferred them here. Anyway, here goes:

Problems with Hume
A)

As Owen Barfield and others have pointed out, if all we can know are sense-impressions, then Hume’s three qualities of association fail the test: “resemblance, contiguity, and causation” are not sense-impressions, or did not originate as such (Barfield 25). Of course, this is the same criticism Hume offered of causality. But why stop at causality? Why not apply it to the other two?


[2] It is here that Hume’s nominalism becomes vicious. How are ideas “in the mind” held together? Hume says they are “bundled” together, but doesn’t bundling imply some sort of unity or association? If Hume’s criticism of causality holds, then it must also hold to any form of association. Thus examining the mental process, Hume is left with an array of facts that cannot relate to each other in any possible way. “All is flux.”


[3] This critique is not so much a refutation of Hume but points toward an ambiguity. During the mental act I perceive an object, we will say the sensory impression of touch, to which it comes back to my mind as the idea of touch. When I reflect upon the ideas “in my mind,” I do so in visual categories. But what does the visual category of “touch” even mean? [sidenote: As Wolterstorff pointed out, this is more a criticism of Locke than Hume].


[4] Hume cannot escape the reality of universals, as Bertrand Russell pointed out (Russell 96ff). If we deny, for example, the universals of “whiteness” and “triangularity,” we will still, in order to form an idea of a triangle, imagine a patch of whiteness and a three-sided figure and say that anything meeting these criteria is white and a triangle--we say that the resemblance must hold. We will also say that the resemblance must hold among many white 3-sided things. We will say that the resemblances must resemble each other. We have made “resemblance” a universal.

As Russell pointed out, Hume failed to note that not only are qualities universals, but so are relations.

[5] Per Thomas Reid and N. Wolterstorff, Hume needs to explain how a physical sensation can cause a mental apprehension (Wolterstorff 2004).

[6.1] Hume’s analysis of perception and reflection seems to privilege visual ideas. Perhaps that can work. Such has been the tendency of philosophy since Plato. Yet when we move to the other senses Hume’s analysis breaks down. How does my idea (weakened sensation) of touch bear any resemblance to the apple I just touched? Even worse, doesn’t the phrase “mental idea” connote visuality? Could this possibly work on ideas like “touch”?

[7] As Thomas Reid pointed out, it seems Hume has lumped all mental reflection (sensation/though) under the label of “perception” in the mind. How does Hume make a distinction between the “idea” of sight and the “idea” of touch (Reid 301ff)?

[8] Hume said I cannot be directly aware of any object unless that object is an impression, But (2) I am not an impression;Therefore (3) I cannot be directly aware of myself. But this is absurd.



That's no different than saying "I believe Jesus had two of what philosophers have always called natures, but I don't believe in natures the way the guys who wrote the creeds do."

Wonderful post, I have no problem with natures, which is what the creeds affirm, only substance. But since that was a critique of his epistemology not his ontology it doesn't count, but his epistemology had to do with doubting substance, that quote in no way dealt with his critique of the idea of substance. Only his general position. Leaving Van Til assidde, without a TA you have no argument but a conceptual scheme to make sense out of stuff. But a conceptual scheme is just that.

 

[jwright82]

Yes, as far as I can tell, it's the only way. If your essence is indistinguishable from what you do, or your properties, then you're constantly changing what you are. What is the constant?

In denying substance metaphysics, you're really denying certain properly basic beliefs.

Do you believe that there is a real universal concept of humanity, or are you and I utterly distinct things? After all, we have different qualities and do different things.

Your inventing a problem.

 

[TylerRay]

Your inventing a problem.

No, sir, I'm pointing one out.

 

[RamistThomist]

Wonderful post, I have no problem with natures, which is what the creeds affirm, only substance. But since that was a critique of his epistemology not his ontology it doesn't count, but his epistemology had to do with doubting substance, that quote in no way dealt with his critique of the idea of substance. Only his general position. Leaving Van Til assidde, without a TA you have no argument but a conceptual scheme to make sense out of stuff. But a conceptual scheme is just that.

Then set forth Hume's critique. You are simply saying "Hume doubted substance," but you aren't really telling me anything.

Leaving Van Til assidde, without a TA you have no argument but a conceptual scheme to make sense out of stuff. But a conceptual scheme is just that.

I have no idea what this means.

 

[RamistThomist]

Your inventing a problem.

He is not. He is summarizing the academic discussions and literature surrounding property dualism, identity through time, substance dualism, physicalism, etc. These are very real issues.

 

[RamistThomist]

This free seminary course will explain the problem.
https://archive.org/details/J.P.MorelandMetaphysicsOfSubstance

 

[RamistThomist]

Another note: I am not making any transcendental argument. A TA specifically deals with the preconditions of intelligibility. What must be the case before knowledge is possible? I am not asking that. I am running internal critiques.

 

[jwright82]

No, sir, I'm pointing one out.

Ok, when you place a conceptual scheme on reality and it doesn't fit you run into problems, such as substance metaphysics. That's all I meant.

 

[jwright82]

Then set forth Hume's critique. You are simply saying "Hume doubted substance," but you aren't really telling me anything.


I have no idea what this means.

Hume pointed out that you can't know substance in anyway. It's just assumed. You are positing a thing as a precondition for making sense of reality, a TA.

 

[RamistThomist]

Hume pointed out that you can't know substance in anyway. It's just assumed

Hume asserted it. He didn't offer any non-self refuting constructive cases.

I am a substance. I know myself in a self-presenting way. Chisholm took Hume apart on this point.

You are positing a thing as a precondition for making sense of reality, a TA.

No, I am not. I have given good reasons for why I believe in substances. I have shown that those like Hume who deny substance end up in very bad places, philosophically.

 

[RamistThomist]

Ok, when you place a conceptual scheme on reality and it doesn't fit you run into problems, such as substance metaphysics. That's all I meant.

He is pointing out the problem of identity in time. This is a controversial and well-discussed issue in philosophy and legal theory. He isn't making up things.

 

[jwright82]

He is pointing out the problem of identity in time. This is a controversial and well-discussed issue in philosophy and legal theory. He isn't making up things.

Do you have a problem with recognizing yourself over time? Whether or not a substance exists? I'm thinking not. Why invent a problem that's not there?