Hello Everyone,

The most common definition for 'knowledge' is something along the lines of justified true belief. I think this definition is good; however, it is problematic in that the term 'justified' is not well defined. What is a justified belief?

Sincerely,

Brian

__________________
Brian Bosse
Faith Community Church
Tucson, Arizona
Scientiam Dei

Another question could be: Does the definition of 'knowledge' change as the 'object' of knowledge changes?

__________________
Joshua Philbeck
Boyce Memorial Associate Reformed Presbyterian Church
Shelby, NC

http://philbeck.blogspot.com
http://www.xanga.com/joshuaphilbeck

One of the most basic questions of philosophy.

Does 'justify' modify 'true' or 'belief' or both. Does 'justify' modify 'true' modify 'belief'? Are the three terms a list that defines knowledge, each a predicate of knowledge by itself. Can we say knowledge is justified AND true AND belief?

Can one say he knows something if it is false? That is, is all knowledge true such that a person can not know a falsity (false proposition)? Or is knowledge simply that which we believe is justified true?

And we have to get from 'knowledge' to 'know'. Even if we can demonstrate something is knowledge, how do we then go about knowing it?

This should be an interesting discussion.

P.S. We should also qualify if we are speaking about the epistemological meaning of the word "knowledge" or the word as found in Scripture. For many, the only "true" definition of a word is the meaning found in the Bible. In that case, "to know" takes us to a whole new realm - and you better look out for the local biblicists.

Should we talk about the meaning of "definition"?

where to start?

Let's begin with Webster.

Don't try to answer each question in one post. Hope I'm not scaring anyone off.


So I will start out with: 'justified' is deducible from prior true premises.

__________________
R. Anthony Coletti
Midway Presbyterian Church (PCA)
Jonesborough, TN
[i]et venite et arguite me dicit Dominus[/i]

Isn't that like saying, "It depends on what your definition of 'IS' is!"?

__________________
Sterling Harmon
Coventry, CT
PCA
Deacon
________________

"Whatever is laudable in our works proceeds from the grace of God."
-- John Calvin, Institutes III:xv.3.

"Our Lord God must be a good man, to be fond of worthless fellows. I cannot like them, and yet I, myself, am one."
-- Martin Luther, Table Talk

Hi Brian,

I don't think the definition is good (of course, I guess that all depends on how 'justified' is defined!) since it carries deontological, internalist, and/or evidentialist baggage.

Thus, following Plantinga, I'd opt for 'warrant' as that elusive property that turns a mere true belief into knowledge. (Unless you're using the terms interchangeably.)

Obviously just holding a true belief isn't sufficient for knowledge since we wouldn't be able to rule out coincidence or lucky guesses. And who wants to call a lucky guess, 'knowledge?'

I think Plantinga has demonstrated the deontological, internalist, and evidentialist constraints tied up in the notion of 'justification' (see esp. Warrant: The Current Debate, and Warrant and Proper Function).

So, as in much of the literature, a 'justified belief' is a belief you are entitled to hold. One flouts no epistemic duties in holding it. You are within your 'epistemic rights' in holding it. Or, given the rest of what we believe, they fit within our ken. That is, they submit to the standards of what we may reasonably believe. To this Audi adds, "That, in turn, is roughly what we may believe without being subject to certain kinds of criticisms, say as intellectually lax, sloppy, overhasty, or the like" (Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, p.2). Note the deontologism.

But since this term has been debated vigorously, I don't see any conclusion being reached on the PB.

And, there are some who add 4th conditions. So, justified, true belief isn't enough. The belief must be formed by a reliable cognitive faculty. But this doesn't rule out cognitive malfunction, which seems to be a necessary component for knowledge (ruling out malfunction, not malfunction, that is!).

Furthermore, not only do epistemologists debate what 'justification' means, some say you must also have the right kind of justification, e.g., a belief that is indefeasible (cf. Leher). There are positive and negative defeater conditions too.

Anyway, to answer the basic question, it appears that a survey of the literature tells us that a 'justified belief' is one that has deontological, internalist, and/or evidential requirement associated with it. Since I'm an externalist (with a negative account of defeat, thus intimating an internalist flair), and a proper function epistemologist (with the caveats of a good design plan, a design plan aimed at producing mostly true beliefs, and being in the right environment, i.e., one sufficiently similar to those my cognitive faculties were made to function in), I obviously take issue with how 'justification' is normally understood. I admit people can be justified in many of their beliefs (even someone deceived by an evil demon who nevertheless does his epistemic duty), yet that doesn't mean that they have knowledge (even if the belief is justified and true).

In answer to Civbert's def, I take issue thusly:

Justification = df 'justified' is deducible from prior true premises.

Seems to me this has numerous problems, not the least of which is an invitation to an infinite regress.

If 'justified' = 'deducible from prior true premises' then we must ask if this belief is justified? Either it is, or it isn't. If it isn't, why should we take his definition? If it isn't, then where are the 'true premises' he deduced this definition from. And, say he gives those premises. Are they also justified? If not, then why take them as offering support for an answer to our first question? Do they have any positive epistemic status, at all? If so, then what 'true premises' are these ones deduced from. And on and on...

__________________
Regards,

J.J.
PCA
Suffix

Hello Gentlemen,

I am not sure if these questions where rhetorical or not, but I will answer. For the sake of this discussion, take belief as fundamental. The class of all beliefs can be divided up into four ways: (1) true beliefs that are justified, (2) true beliefs that are not justified, (3) false beliefs that are justified and (4) false beliefs that are not justified. We are speaking about (1). This means that ‘justify’ does not modify ‘true’ nor does ‘true’ modify ‘justify’. The two terms modify the type of belief we are talking about.

Ultimately, our answer needs to be informed by Scripture. There is no agreed on “epistemological meaning of ‘knowledge’”. That is why I started the thread.

Assume premises (1) and (2) are true in both cases.

Premise: Tucson is in Arizona.
Premise: Phoenix is in Arizona.
Conclusion: Tucson is in Phoenix.

The conclusion was deduced from prior true premises. However, I would not say that it is justified.

Premise: Every electron we have seen repels each other.
Premise: ‘x’ and ‘y’ are electrons.
Conclusion: ‘x’ and ‘y’ will repel each other.

Is the conclusion justified? I want to say that it is. However, others may not.

As Tom B points out, is "'justified' deducible from prior true premises" deducible from prior true premises? If so, I would like to know what those premises are. If not, then where are we?

In my opening post I pointed out that ‘justified’ is not well defined. The purpose of this thread is to explore the issue.

We may end up in this thread adopting Plantinga’s view of warrant as our definition for ‘justification’.

This is a good point.

This just pushes us one step back. What do we mean by ‘entitlement,’ or what are the standards of reasonable belief?

I would think ‘justified’ is broad enough to include this, and as such there is no 4th condition. If the equipment we use to justify the conclusions we reach (our cognitive faculties) is not aimed at true belief production, then the conclusions reached cannot be said to be justified. In other words, if the conclusions reached are based on faulty equipment, then they are not justified. What do you think?

Sincerely,

Brian

Isn't it part and parcel to presuppositional apologetics that knowledge is what can be deduced from prior true (in this case "presupposed") premises, and that we don't have to demonstrate the truth of the prior premises because this requires the "testimony of the Holy Spirit in the heart"?

__________________
Davidius
Member: First Reformed Presbyterian Church of Durham (RPCNA) - Durham, NC
Student: University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, German Literature and Classics

And though the really inspired artist may complain that, with the majority, piano-playing is mere strumming, and painting little more than daubing, yet, the exuberant feeling of having a share in the privileges of art is so overwhelming, that the scorn of the artist is preferred to the abandonment of art training in education. To have laid a production of your own, however poor, upon the altar of art becomes more and more the characteristic of an accomplished civilization. - Abraham Kuyper

1) No it's not 'part and parcel.' Indeed, the majority of "presuppositionalists" disagree with your statement.

2) We're specifically talking about justification not knowledge here.

3) The 'demonstration' comment of mine was inherent in the "presuppositionalist" I was responding to. That is, if what you say is correct, then you must reject your fellow Clarkian's definition of justification. He had no qualifier built in. So, if some beliefs can be 'justified' while also not being 'deduced from prior true premises' then his definition that 'justified' = deductions from prior true premises is false.

4) I'd agree that we don't have to 'demonstrate' our basic beliefs, but certainly that's not something unique to 'presuppositionalism.'

5) As a Clarkian, you don't know anything you said since you can't deduce any of it from Scripture.


************************

Hi Brian,

That's fine. I was assuming some familiarity with my comment. Given all the background info, I don't think that tripartite analysis of 'knowledge' to be a good one. Now of course, one can define 'justification' any way one wishes, I was just trying to stand in the mainstream. That is, given the mainstream analysis of the debate epistemologists have had, I don't think it is helpful to use the term.

Don't take offense here, but I have already adopted this perspective (with caveats of my own that don't affect the overall thrust of his project). I wasn't intending on getting involved in a lengthy discussion, I think the relevant literature sufficiently answers the main question of the thread. I merely sketched some of the conclusions of the relevant literature and also pointed others in the general direction where they could verify my conclusions for themselves.

It doesn't really push the question back if the background knowledge of some of my claims are allowed to function in as well as my explicit claims of the deontological (internalist, and/or evidentialist) constraints are read into my statement which you quote. Given the historical survey of the assumptions involved in requiring 'justification' of ones beliefs, then the talk of 'entitlement' makes perfect sense. Given this picture, filled out with notions of epistemic duties and rights, my observations should fit right in. Given the above, 'entitlement' fits right in with my brief sketch. One could say it goes hand in hand with the deontological baggage associated with talk of 'justification.'

i) Then your argument is with those epistemologists who have said this is a 4th condition (cf. Audi's discussion here in his book I cited in my original post).

ii) It wouldn't be "included" with 'justification' as classically conceived of as having deontological and internalist constraints precisely because reliabilism is a form of externalism.

iii) I think talk of 'equipment we use to justify the conclusions' is dripping with internalist assumptions. One externalist lines, we can have a belief produced by a reliable faculty, reliably aimed at producing true beliefs, in a congenial epistemic environment, etc., and still not be 'justified' in the classical sense. I may have 'knowledge' even though I haven't 'done my epistemic duty.'

iv) I think conclusions based on faulty equipment can be 'justified,' though not warranted. Plantinga shows this (as one illustration among many), if you recall, in his discussion of ‘The Case of the Epistemically Inflexible Climber.’ See here (p. 82).

Another example might be: Consider Jim. Halfway through the day Jim's co-worker asks Jim what he had for breakfast. A strong memorial belief presents itself to Jim---he had eggs and bacon. This belief is vivid and imposes himself on Jim. He can almost smell the bacon, as it were. Memorial beliefs, especially of this kind, I take it, are normally justified. Now suppose that at the exact time the friend asked Jim about his breakfast, those nasty aliens bent on raising Cain, the Alpha Centauries, shot a gamma ray down to earth and caused cognitive malfunction to occur in the part Jim's cognitive apparatus that governs memorial beliefs, producing the phenomenologically strong memorial belief that he ingested eggs and bacon while, in actuality, he had mere oatmeal (apologies to fans of the Quaker Oats Man!). So, Jim's belief was due to cognitive malfunction, but nevertheless, for him, he was justified in believing that he had eggs and bacon. Not warranted, though.

Examples can be easily supplied. Take a case of a parent teaching their child about Santa Clause. One is usually justified in basing beliefs off the testimony of another, especially ones parents. Note Thomas Reid's remarks,

"I believed by instinct whatever my parents and tutors told me, long before I had the idea of a lie, or a thought of the possibility of their deceiving me. Afterwards, upon reflection, I found that they had acted like fair and honest people, who wished me well. I found that, if I had not believed what they told me, before I could give a reason for my belief, I had to this day been little better than a changeling."

So the child would be justified, but not warranted in believing in Santa Clause. (Note that this is a case not of cognitive malfunction, but in malfunction of the cognitive environment. That all these parts must be functioning properly, I think lends support to all of Plantinga's qualifications about what it takes for a belief to have warrant.)

Those are some of my thoughts.

Hello Tom B,

The reason I started this thread to explore epistemology without assuming all the intricacies of the current debates in the field. Rather, I was hoping to let the discussion develop these ideas. If someone came up to you and asked you what knowledge is, how would you answer them? My guess is that you would read your audience, and answer accordingly. In this thread I was hoping we would not assume much epistemological sophistication. I was hoping to spark discussion that would develop into more sophisticated ideas. The thread would be kind of like an introduction to epistemology that would start with justified true belief, explore the problems with this, and then explore different solutions. It seems my idea is misplaced and this is not a good thread.

Brian

Brian,

I was just answering. I didn't know that you were intending it to be a mini, intro course on epistemology. Didn't mean to rain on your parade.

I'll bow out from making further comments.

I think it's a good thread, and I'd be more interested in discussing if you would be, too.

Paul says in Colossians 2 that all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge are in Christ. Would that be a starting point for defining knowledge? And just so you don't assume that in asking a simple question I'm trying to espouse Clarkianism, please know that I am not doing so. Even if Scripturalism as defined by Clark is wrong (which I know you believe, and of which I am presently not sure), I know of no other place to start than Scripture.

David,
What do you take Paul to be saying in Colossians 2?

CT

__________________
Hermonta Godwin
Christ The King PCA
Raleigh, NC

I'm not totally sure, which is why I asked the question whether this would be a good place to start. It sounds to me like Paul is saying that knowledge and wisdom, whatever they are, are found in Christ, whatever that means.

Might proto-gnosticism be referred to here? Rather than try to find some hidden, secret gnosis, by means of which one would attain salvation, or special spiritual status, look no futher, it is deposited in Christ!

See v.2 "in order that they may know the mystery of God, namely, Christ."

The "mystery" of God is a frequent reference to the Gospel, by which men are saved. Gnosticism taught men were saved by attaining mysterious or hidden knowledge. Not the case here. There's nothing hidden, Christ came down into history, and made himself known to man. We can see reference to the actual, historical teachings about Hesus, as given by the apostles, and accessible to anyone who chose to search these things to find out if they were true:

" 6 So then, just as you received Christ Jesus as Lord, continue to live in him, 7rooted and built up in him, strengthened in the faith as you were taught, and overflowing with thankfulness."

They were "taught" the things of the faith. The teachings were accessible to all men, salvation is found in the Lord. No need to go searching for salvation elsewhere, it's depositied in Christ.

Reference to the real, corporeal world is made:

9For in Christ all the fullness of the Deity lives in bodily form,

Not secret, mystical, gnostic gestures.

Salvation is in mind here:

"13When you were dead in your sins and in the uncircumcision of your sinful nature, God made you alive with Christ. He forgave us all our sins, 14having canceled the written code, with its regulations, that was against us and that stood opposed to us; he took it away, nailing it to the cross. 15And having disarmed the powers and authorities, he made a public spectacle of them, triumphing over them by the cross.

Paul isn't giving a talk about epistemology here, especially the questions 21st century epistemologists are asking.

Ok, thank you.

Suppose someone says that he will not believe something unless there is a reason for doing so. Is he assuming evidentialism?

__________________
Curt Hayashida
member, Community Bible Church (Non-denominational)
Vallejo, CA

Not the way you stated it. There are some things I won't believe if I don't have a reason (or any evidence) to. Say you get charged with a horrible crime. Say I'm a juror. Say the prosecutor offers absolutely zero reasons to think you committed the crime. I therefore would not believe that you did it since I would require evidence for that belief.

Now, if someone were to say that if one were to believe anything whatever without a reason for doing so, that would be closer to the mark.

And I use 'evidence' in this instance to mean what most epistemologists do: propositional evidence in favor (or against) a belief.

A classic statement of the evidentialist constraint is given to us by W.K. Clifford:

"To sum up: it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence."

Well, given that statement, you can see why he titled his paper The Ethics of Belief (emphasis added).

That's why I asked. I take the phrase to mean knowledge is a belief that is justified true. I think a justified false belief is a contradiction. You can deduce a false proposition, but only if one starts with false premises.


OK



I would say the conclusion was not deduced from the premises. A fallacious conclusion is not a true deduction. When I say, deducible from true premise, I mean the deduction is valid.


The correct conclusion is "it is reasonable to believe (strongly) that ‘x’ and ‘y’ will repel each other.