Josh,

I appreciate what you were aiming at (see blog posts below), and I also agree the thread is an absolute mess. My single "complaint" was that the inferring of the wrong time should not be indexed to faulty senses; in fact, the senses are presupposed as reliable in order to draw the false (yet rational) inference about the time. I'm not quite sure you made the point you were trying to make and I thought that possibly you made a different point than you intended. I'll read it again tomorrow.

Grace and peace,

Ron

p.s. Man it was hot and humid in Houston!

Reformed Apologist: Induction and Knowledge

Reformed Apologist: More on Induction and Knowledge

__________________
Ronald W. DiGiacomo / Ruling Elder
Christ Presbyterian Church (OPC)
Elkton, Maryland

http://reformedapologist.blogspot.com

Those aren't good reasons to distrust the senses, just examples of how inductive logic can be wrong, but more often than not, it isn't. In both of your examples, yes experience says that we can reasonably expect certain results--but it also says that these expectations may not be met exactly because we are not able to account for all the factors that may be involved. It is no count against experience that we may be wrong in our predictions--it's just indicative of our finitude.

It was a good reason--it just happened to be wrong. One can do this in deductive reasoning too--one can have one or two false premises and a true conclusion.

Even in deductive logic, there may be problems with our reasoning that we are not--and possibly cannot--be aware of. Would you call that a count against the validity of deductive logic?

No, we may not be able to call our senses infallible, but nonetheless we are forced by necessity to rely upon them. If you are able to find a way to connect with the external world in some way other than via the senses, then please do so. However, I have a principle: any epistemology that cuts one off epistemologically from the external world is categorically false. Why? Because impractical epistemology is useless epistemology.

I apply this principle presuppositionally--if your worldview cannot be consistently lived out, then it is false (I refer to this as Schaeffer's Anvil).

Setting the bar of knowledge at absolute certainty is unnecessary. My good reason for trusting the senses is this: like it or not, we have to trust them--even to read the Scriptures. Just how do you know, deductively from your axiom, that the book that you may or may not be holding is the word of God?

Just because the Bible is God's word doesn't mean that it is intelligible by finite human beings. Where's the necessary connection between "The Bible is the Word of God" and "Communication must be possible"?

__________________
Philip
Potomac Hills Presbyterian Church (PCA) Leesburg, VA
Attending Reformed Presbyterian Church, Lookout Mountain, GA
Student Covenant College

The Importance of Being Orthodox

Philip,

I know you wrote that to Joshua and I think it is succinct enough for him to deal with, so I’ll let you guys go at it for a while. I think much of what you wrote is fine. I wanted to touch on one thing though because I think that something might be driving your statement below.

"Setting the bar of knowledge at absolute certainty is unnecessary. My good reason for trusting the senses is this: like it or not, we have to trust them--even to read the Scriptures. Just how do you know, deductively from your axiom, that the book that you may or may not be holding is the word of God?"

If knowledge is so broad as to include things believed by inductive inference, then in common parlance we’d have to distinguish between knowing something “for sure” and knowing something that we’re not 100% sure about. Imagine the judge saying: “Do you know that Mr. Smith killed his wife?” “Yes” says Mr. Jones, "I’m nearly 90% certain that it is true!" What is it to “know” something without certainty after all? My question to you would be, at what point does one truly “know” anything through induction? What does it mean to say "I know something, but I can't be certain"?

I don’t say this applies to you, Philip, but I find it remarkable that so many Reformed thinkers are willing to redefine knowledge so as to include inductive inference in order that they can “know” more things, such as that they are saved! If it is true that induction cannot yield absolute certainty and if it, also, true (as some would have us believe) that we come to embrace God’s word through induction, then we must concede that we cannot know with absolute certainty the truth of the gospel! Yet we can know with 100% certainty the truth of the gospel and that we are saved. Induction cannot yield 100% certainty, but it is also false that we ultimately come to know the gospel by way of induction. The knowledge of my existence or that Jesus died for me is not ultimately obtained through induction, which is precisely why one can know with infallible certainty he has eternal life. We don't have to redefine or lower the definition of what qualifies as knowledge. It's the Spirit that confirms God's revelation and that is no mere inference.

Someone on the second blog post that I linked above wrote this to me:

I was just thinking about deduction today and I really don't see how (outside of revelation) it escapes the problem of induction.

For example:

p1: All men are mortal
p2: Socrates is a man
c: Socrates is mortal.

The above argument is true as far as its premises are true but without revelation p1 cannot be justified without faulty appeal to induction as far as I can see.

I might be missing something but this leads me to think that deductive arguments are no 'surer' than induction outside of revelation.

I responded with:

You are correct. Christians know that all men are mortal because we have it on God’s authority. For instance we know by revelation that “it’s appointed for a man once to die and then the judgment.” The unsaved have to justify this general revelation, which they know, by way of inductive inference.

The above argument, however, is an inference for the Christian as well, since p2 is not deducible or revealed by God. However, we can deduce that Alexander the Coppersmith is a mortal since we know it is true that he existed, whereas it is only a most rational inference that Socrates existed.

The person who wrote to me saw no difference between the Socrates syllogism and this one:

p1: God reveals Christianity
p2: What God reveals is true
c: Christianity is true

I responded with:

I know the premises are true through Scripture. They are not arbitrary in the least (as you suggested they were) because they are grounded in God’s word. Such an argument may not be very useful, however, because it doesn’t deal with preconditions of intelligible experience. Nonetheless, the premises are not mere inductive inferences, as is the case with “Socrates existed in the past…” The point, which is clear, is that such an argument is sound, as is TAG; whether they persuade another person or not is not a necessary condition for sound argumentation. Needless to say, the above deductive argument for the truth of Christianity will not be very useful, though TAG can be.

Philip,

I’ll let you get back to Joshua. I simply wanted to put out there that we don’t need to lower the definition of knowledge to include inductive inferences in order to know biblical truth or that we are saved. Induction is very useful but at the end of the day, our assurance of our salvation is due to the internal witness of the Spirit.

Finally, that one can make mistakes while trying to employ deduction does not discredit anything I've said, lest we would have to abandon any criteria for knowledge!

Ron

I agree here. However, belief on testimony is never deductive, no matter how convinced we may be of the witness's authority. If you can construct a valid set of syllogisms, then I'll reconsider. However, in reality what we have is an ongoing miracle in our own lives that bears witness to the truth of the Gospel: that's how I know I am saved and that's why I believe--but it is a belief based on authority, not my fallen deduction.

I couldn't agree more that revelation is not discursive.

I think we agree.

Ron

JTB: You seemed to me to be saying that if one of your beliefs is possibly false, then it cannot count as knowledge. That is an absurd requirement on knowledge that I think you would be hard pressed to find modern epistemologists making.

Your belief that the Bible is the word of God is possibly false: you could be deceived by a malevolent demon into believing it. So it follows by your own standards that you don't know it.

-----Added 10/11/2009 at 04:39:38 EST-----

Well in the first place "prove" means--exactly that, prove. Show that it is true in such a way that is convincing to anyone who is rational and sane. I didn't say anything about providing a sound deductive argument or anything of that sort; in fact I'm not sure why it is you made the observation you did.


To JTB: Is this supposed to be your proof?

1) The Bible is the Word of God.
2) The Bible states that God cannot lie.
3) The Bible states that men know God.
4) To know God is to possess knowledge.

How is that a proof? It isn't even an argument, really.

__________________
Steven Nemes
Phoenix, AZ

Good philosophy must exist, if for no other reason, because bad philosophy must be answered - C.S. Lewis

Steve,

If I were to prove that there is a box of crackers in the pantry, yet someone who was a philosophical skeptic denied that I proved anything, would the proof become invalidated? Of course not! That’s because proof is not a sufficient condition for persuasion and persuasion is not a necessary condition for proof. A sound proof is sound whether anyone is even there to consider it or not, let alone whether an alleged rational or sane man embraces it or not. Accordingly, when you say that I must prove Christianity so that any “rational” or “sane” person will be persuaded, you seem to be suggesting that I must persuade the intelligent so-called atheist that Jesus has been raised from the dead. What you are obviously missing is that the professing atheist who rejects God’s revelation of Christ is in many ways as dysfunctional as the one who would deny the crackers he sees in the pantry.

The former days of ignorance are gone, Steven. God’s clear revelation of Christianity is proof enough. It’s a moral problem, not an intellectual one, that all people are not persuaded by God’s word and the conviction of the Holy Spirit. It’s not an issue of proof. It’s a matter of “Has God said?” You may not find the proof that God offers in His word and is confirmed by the Holy Spirit as indubitable, but that can only be because you are listening to voices other than God.

In the bonds of Christ,

Ron

The fact is, Steven, that the Atheist is right when he says that it will take a miracle for him to believe--it takes regeneration.

Let me back up a step. I don't distrust my senses, but the justification I have for trusting the senses is grounded in the rational nature of God, which I can only know from His revelation (and we can say that revelation is both discursive in His Word, and non-discursive in the sensus divinatatis).

So, my point is that without revelation, we have no justification for trusting our senses apart from Christian presuppositions.

No, I agree with you here, and I hope I've clarified what I think is the difference above. I would also hold that the laws of logic and deductive reasoning can only be justified upon God's revelation.

I'll grant you this point as well, although I'll suggest that you consider the individual whose senses have been cut off (the blind, the deaf, etc.). Can he not still know about the external world apart from these sensations?

Setting the bar of knowledge at anything less than maximal warrant reduces knowledge to belief, and sets up a true dilemma with things that the Bible tells us we can know without a doubt, such as the assurance of our own standing with God in Christ. It is not my sensations that discover the word of God, even when I use my eyes to read ink on a page. It is still the Spirit of God speaking directly to my mind that gives me understanding. The occasion is most often as I read with my eyes, but it isn't the occasion that causes the knowledge.

Perhaps I am assuming more in the proposition than is warranted, since I assume that the Bible is something delivered to men for their understanding.

-----Added 10/12/2009 at 07:43:12 EST-----

No, it follows by your standards that I don't know it. If the Bible is the Word of God, then it is impossible that a malevolent demon has caused me to believe it, for the Bible as the Word of God, says that God does not lie, and that He has revealed Himself to men in His Word, and a host of other propositions that are true upon the axiom that the Bible is God's Word.


How is it not a proof, or an argument? There are four propositions. I've attempted to put them into a logical order. They have a conclusion. What is it that is missing?

__________________
Joshua Butcher
PCA
College Station, TX

I was simply going by JTB's own standard, that of if a belief is possibly false then it cannot be known, and concluding that by his own standard he does not know that the Bible is the word of God.

I don't even understand how some of the replies I've received are germane. JTB seems to me to be saying that if a belief is possibly false, then it cannot be known. Well it's just a fact of the matter that a whole lot of beliefs which are worth believing are all possibly false; they are only contingent truths. It follows by his own standards that any of his beliefs which really count cannot count as knowledge.

1) The Bible is the Word of God.
2) The Bible states that God cannot lie.
3) The Bible states that men know God.
4) To know God is to possess knowledge.

Alright. You gave this as a proof that there is knowledge. Fine. Sure. That's agreeable. But I said that, given your assertions, no one would have knowledge if any thing they know is possibly false. Every single one of those assertions is possibly false. Furthermore, your axiom, whether you want to admit it or not, is possibly false. So it follows you don't know it.

1) The Bible is the Word of God.
2) The Bible states that God cannot lie.
3) The Bible states that men know God.
4) To know God is to possess knowledge.

Every single one of those assertions is possibly false.

1. The first statement is true by definition. Therefore, it cannot possibly be false.
2. The word of God states that God cannot lie. (Titus 1:2)Therefore, it cannot possibly be false that the word of God states that God cannot lie.
3. The Word of God states that men know God. (Romans 1:18-21). Therefore, it cannot possibly be false that the word of God states that men know God.
4. The fourth statement is logically necessary (and somewhat tautological). To know God obviously implies to know something, which presupposes having knowledge. Therefore, the statement cannot possibly be false.

Ron

What you have given is a metaphysical justification. Epistemologically, I maintain that we have to trust them regardless of any other presuppositions. We cannot have a metaphysic without an epistemology.

Here I am going to state a principle: any proposition that is not a priori is dubitable and therefore does not have maximal warrant.

Apart from all external senses, he could not.

Here I would like to make a distinction between reasonable doubt and skeptical doubt. Setting the bar of knowledge at maximal certainty automatically leads to skeptical doubt. I think that when the Bible is talking about doubt, it is mostly talking about reasonable doubt, suggesting that we can know our standing with Christ without a reasonable doubt. That is, the our standing with God stands up to the test of reasonable doubt. Nothing will ever stand up to the test of skeptical doubt.

The real question here is whether we trust our God-given faculties for knowledge (sight, induction, deduction, etc) or whether we trust only our rational intuitions for maximal warrant. The problem here is that only God actually has maximal warrant and in the end, our conclusion (if we're consistent) will be that we know nothing.

On the other hand, while no our senses, intuitions, etc. are not infallible, nonetheless they are God-given and we ought to trust them unless given a good reason not to in a particular situation. What we are trusting, in the end, is that God has given us faculties that lead to knowledge. The question is not whether we can doubt, but whether or not the doubt is reasonable.

Why should I assume this?

Why is this true by definition? Why should I accept it?

It's also circular to prove that the Bible is always right based on the fact that the Bible says that it is always right.

For theology, we can take the Bible as axiomatic, as well as for many kinds of philosophy. For epistemology, I'm not so sure that we can.

Very well, my writing was quick and rushed. The first proposition is possibly false. God can exist and the entire Bible be the product of men's imaginations. That's possible.

What I meant was rather that those things that the Bible states are possibly false. Sure, it's true that the bible says God cannot lie, but that proposition (God cannot lie) is possibly false. Same with Men know God. That is what I meant, but communicated very badly.

“Very well, my writing was quick and rushed. The first proposition is possibly false. God can exist and the entire Bible be the product of men's imaginations. That's possible.”

Dear Steven,

Please assume for argument’s sake that the Bible is the inspired word of God. If that premise is true, then it would be impossible that it be the product of the imaginations of men. Added to the assumption that the Bible is not the product of the imaginations of men but rather the word of God, I would ask you also to assume that the Holy Spirit can grant men full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority of the Bible. I’m here to tell you that the Holy Spirit has persuaded me and I trust many people of what you are not yet 100% persuaded. To put it another way, if God, who cannot lie, has revealed to anyone that the Bible is the word of God, then it is not possible that it is not the word of God. Consequently, the only thing you may assert is that God has not persuaded you to the point of confession that the Bible cannot possibly be the product of the imaginations of men, or that God cannot lie. As I have told you before, the issue is not about proof but persuasion.

“What I meant was rather that those things that the Bible states are possibly false.”

The propositions of the Bible are not possibly false if the Bible is God’s word and God cannot lie. So again, if I know that to be true (along with a myriad of Christians), then it is impossible that it not be true for one cannot know as true that which is false. So once again, the only thing you may assert is that you are not able to confess that God cannot lie or that the Bible is His word, and for that I am truly sorry. In other words, you cannot know that I cannot know that the Bible is God's word and that God cannot lie.

Steven I will try to remember to pray for you. And for what it’s worth, I would encourage you in the Lord to submit your reasoning to the epistemic lordship of Christ and in doing so you will give up on what I trust is at worst an unwitting quest for autonomy, which appears to be taking you captive. I would also encourage you to pray earnestly in the Spirit, asking God to grant you full assurance of the knowledge that He cannot lie and that the Bible is His word. That you would leave such ideas open to possibility is terrifying to me.

In His grace,

Ron

I think that what Steven is trying to say is that, if we are going to take the statement "The Bible is the word of God" as axiomatic, then we need a good reason to think that it is, in fact, axiomatic. One could do this with the TAG iff one could refute every possible worldview that did not accept the axiom. The trouble here is that this project is humanly impossible--the best we could do would be probability, and even then we don't know how many possible alternate axioms there are.

My other concern with this statement as an axiom is that it is a posteriori--that is, it presupposes a knowledge and understanding of Scripture and what it teaches.

I would prefer to deal with what Steven is actually saying. He thinks it is possible that God can lie. I know it's impossible. Steven needs to appreciate that he cannot refute that I know it is impossible for God to lie. The issue is, and has always been, "Has God said?"

Ron

The Triune Personal and Absolute Living and True God is Man's ultimate

(i) Metaphysic

(ii) Epistemology

(iii) Ethic

(iv) Aesthetic

As Van Til said, He is the All-Conditioner. He is the ultimate standard for everything. After Him there is nothing and no standard.

__________________
Richard
communicant member, FCoS
Perth, Scotland UK

His Name forever shall endure;
last like the sun it shall:
Men shall be blessed in Him,
and blessed all nations shall Him call (Ps. 72:17)

Why is it unacceptable to argue, a priori, that "The Bible is the Word of God"?

Also, would you please provide me a succinct statement distinguishing metaphysical and epistemological justification?

How do you then explain how the soul in its intermediate state can possess knowledge of the world?

You'll have to provide more than the assertion that this is the sort of doubt of which the Bible speaks. Also, by having the axiom, "The Bible is the Word of God," we are assured that all its propositions, including those deducible by necessary consequence have maximal warrant. I'd say that is a sufficient amount of knowledge upon which to live life without being a skeptic. Moreover, the usefulness of beliefs not having maximal warrant is recognized by my position, without surrendering the character of knowledge as having maximal warrant.

No, we have maximal warrant because God has testified to us in His Word. We can know it is His Word because He reveals it directly to us, as you yourself have admitted in the regenerative work of the Holy Spirit. I don't prove the axiom, because it has been given to me as a starting point.

But the point is, without revelation, you cannot justify that you know that what you possess is God-given in the first place. We are talking about the justification of knowledge.

I didn't say you should assume it. But I'm saying you cannot justify that the uses of your senses is even the proximate cause of knowledge. I'm saying that my conclusion provides a better explanation for how knowledge occurs.

So you can know theology by the axiom of the Bible, but you cannot know knowledge by the axiom of the Bible. Such a conclusion seems like alternative theories of epistemology to me. How can you retain both and not lead to incoherence? Is knowledge a divided subject matter?

-----Added 10/13/2009 at 02:31:50 EST-----

I think we would all agree that the persuasion that the axiom is good comes directly from the work of the Holy Spirit in regeneration.

As for your second assertion, I'd like to hear you support just how it is that the axiom requires a further presupposition.

Because the Bible is known a posteriori.

Metaphysical justification of knowledge entails an accounting for why we can have knowledge (eg: God imposes knowledge).

Epistemological justification entails an accounting of how that happens a priori. You cannot have a metaphysical justification unless you first have an epistemological one.

Define "intermediate state."

That's a theological axiom, not an epistemological one. Why I say this is that the axiom presupposes the existence of God and of the Christian God. One has to have knowledge of this prior to the axiom.

In addition, I think I've already made it clear that human deduction is fallible and therefore anything that you deduce from Scripture is fallible.

Circular--we have maximal warrant for God's word because God has testified to us in His word?

The regenerative work of the Holy Spirit is demonstrative of the truth of God's word. It constitutes proof in the same way that God sending fire from heaven constituted proof of God's word on Mount Carmel.

Granted, I did give a metaphysical justification there.

Nonetheless, of necessity we are forced to trust them and therefore are unreasonable to doubt them unless given good reason. The burden of proof is on the skeptic to prove that, in a given instance, doubt is reasonable.

The Bible is indeed a source of knowledge about God, provided that we are presupposing the same things that it does.

What I mean to say is that while we can, I think, take the Bible to be a source of knowledge, we are not justified in taking it to be the only source of knowledge.

In order to assume your axiom, one would have to know enough about the Scriptures to understand that such is the case. Further, as I stated, in order to assume this, one has to already have a knowledge of God. There can be no word of God without God.

PFP,

I overlooked some questions asked of me that were burried in a post of yours to Josh. Let me address them now.

Ron Stated: The word of God states that God cannot lie. (Titus 1:2)Therefore, it cannot possibly be false that the word of God states that God cannot lie.

PFP Responded: It's also circular to prove that the Bible is always right based on the fact that the Bible says that it is always right.

The challenge before me was not to demonstrate that the Bible is always right. Rather, the challenge was simply to refute the claim that it is possibly false that a book called the Bible states that God cannot lie. I met that challenge simply by quoting the Bible where it states that God cannot lie. Steven seemed to concede the point, saying he was “rushed” when he made the initial claim. I’m happy to take him at his word. In fact, he was so rushed he later had to retract three of his assertions!

Ron Stated: The first statement [the Bible is God’s word] is true by definition. Therefore, it cannot possibly be false.

PFP Responded: Why is this true by definition? Why should I accept it?

It is a definition held by Christians. For instance, the Westminster Standards calls what we call the books of the Bible, Holy Scripture - the word of God. Secularists define it differently, as historical or ancient writings. Since I was dealing with Christians, I thought I’d use the Christian definition. (How foolish of me!) It’s hard for me to wrap my mind around so-called Christians questioning whether the Bible could be the writings of mere men and God’s truthfulness.

As for why you should accept the Bible as the word of God, I don't think I can improve upon the Confession: "We may be moved and induced by the testimony of the Church to an high and reverent esteem of the Holy Scripture. And the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole (which is, to give all glory to God), the full discovery it makes of the only way of man's salvation, the many other incomparable excellencies, and the entire perfection thereof, are arguments whereby it does abundantly evidence itself to be the Word of God: yet notwithstanding, our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof, is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit bearing witness by and with the Word in our hearts.

I think it's time for me to bow out of this thread. I believe every challenge set at my door has been met and overcome. I could only wish I had the time to try to clear up some of the confusion I believe I see between you and Josh, but I simply do not.

Best wishes,

Ron

Ron,

Given those presuppositions, I agree. I will defend to the death the fact that I know that the Bible is God's Word. What I will not agree to is that the Bible is epistemologically axiomatic because its authority rests on other truths.

No it isn't. What the Bible is truly, is only known when one knows it as the Word of God. That conclusion comes only from the Holy Spirit, and then becomes the axiom by which Christians organize their knowledge of God, man, and the world.

I don't recognize that distinction as valid. Why we have knowledge (God imposes it upon the mind) is the same as how we have it (God imposes it upon the mind).

The soul that is present with Christ and absent from the body.

I don't understand how the axiom is presupposing something other than what it says. Obviously the axiom contains the definition of its terms within itself, otherwise every term is itself presupposed prior to the proposition, which would be the case with every axiom.

Yes, the noetic effects of sin lead to faulty deductions. But that individuals fail does not make deduction faulty. If the premises are true, then the conclusions that necessarily follow are true.

Self-justifying. God's word is the axiom, so it has maximal warrant by definition. You cannot get out more than is put in. We know because God revealed it to us. There is no other conclusion, and the search for something more is, I think, a form of autonomy.

But that goes back to my earlier point that we don't "know" what the word of God is until the Spirit confirms it to us. The pagan understands what the Bible claims to be, but he doesn't believe it is true, so he doesn't know it is God's Word.

I agree that the skeptic bears the burden of proof, but that doesn't mean you escape the requirement to justify why the senses are reliable.

The Bible is the only justification for knowledge. Recall that this is the key issue in our discussion. I agree that the senses are reliable, but not that they can justify the truth of what we experience by them.

Of course, but by containing the term in the axiom, how does it not also contain the definition? We are back to the problem I mentioned above, namely, that if an axiom does not include the definitions of each of its terms, then any axiom must presuppose those definitions and cannot truly be an axiom at all!

I think you are all misunderstanding my point in my posts. My point is that JTB's restrictions on knowledge are absurdly high, so high that even he does not have knowledge by his own standards.

It appeared to me that what JTB said was this: if your belief is possibly false (whether he meant logical possibility or epistemic possibility I don't know--either one isn't any good for him), then you do not know it. That is an absurd restriction on knowledge. Almost all of my beliefs are possibly false, both epistemically and logically, and the same would hold true with JTB. His belief that the Bible is the word of God is possibly false; his belief that the Bible states that God cannot lie is possibly false; it could be that he is being deceived all the time by a malevolent Cartesian demon to believe those things.

So the purpose of my posting is not that the Bible ought not be taken as axiomatic (though I don't think this), but rather that JTB's restrictions on knowledge are unreasonable.

Nonetheless, it is a posteriori. One cannot know that the Bible is the word of God unless one has had contact with the Bible or has heard of the Bible. The Bible cannot be known to be true in an epistemological vacuum.

How do you know that God imposes it upon the mind? Is that a theory or do you have maximal warrant?

Epistemology cannot presuppose a metaphysic--God would be a metaphysical justification for why knowledge is possible because we cannot know that until we have established how we actually come to have knowledge, which is a matter of how we learn things and come to have warrant for beliefs.

And how does He do this? By means of a miracle--by demonstration, not proposition.

I think I've established this: because we have to rely on them.

Why think this? Again, why this "maximal warrant" definition of knowledge?

It assumes a definition. Depending on that definition, the proposition may be true or false. All axioms presuppose the definitions of their terms--unless those terms are commonly understood, there is no content.

As I said, the truth of the proposition "The Bible is the Word of God" rests on two presuppositions: that God is there and that He has spoken. If this were not so, we could say, in good Barthian fashion, "There is no God and the Bible is His word" (incoherent) or "God is silent and the Bible is His word" (also incoherent). The "axiom" can be broken down into further presuppositions and is therefore not axiomatic.

I've enjoyed this thread so far.

Steven,

If it's true, that some demon may be deceiving us, then we certainly can't make positive statements of knowledge about the existence of God or the resurrection of Christ, since the events that lead us to those two beliefs could have just been engineered by a demon, or our perception of those beliefs could be faulty.

So how can I act with certainty, even to the point of risking my life because of certain beliefs, if what I perceive and call 'reality' is justan illusion created by Descartes' demon?

btw, I'm not saying that your argumentation(and Descartes) is wrong simply because your conclusions(and Descartes) seem counter-intuitive and dangerous. I'm just honestly wondering about this.

Thanks

__________________
Andrew C.
IFB
LBCF 1689

The definition is contained within the axiom, as I've said. An elect infant that dies in infancy goes to be with the Lord without ever having heard of or touched a Bible will know that the Bible is God's Word in the intermediate state. Knowledge does not require sensation in order be possessed. God can, and does, deliver knowledge directly to our minds apart from any intermediary sensations. That He desires to use our sensations as occasions for that imposition does not make them necessary for knowledge to be had.

How do you know that God brings about knowledge through the senses and not simply in coincidence with them?

How can epistemology NOT presuppose a metaphysic? Something must exist to be known, therefore some metaphysic is presupposed. The issue is one of logical priority. We need to know how we know what is, before what is can be known truly.

Sure. The proposition doesn't contain persuasion. But persuasion doesn't occur apart from a proposition. Otherwise, what are you persuaded to accept as true?

You haven't demonstrated it at all. I asked about souls in the intermediate state--souls that have no bodies with which to have sensations. Do those souls lose all the ability to know because they can no longer use their bodies' senses? Knowledge cannot be tied to sensation if disembodied souls are to possess it.

Because if you cannot know with maximal warrant that God is not a liar, then you could possibly be wrong that God is not a liar, which, presumably, you would not accept. If you accpt that it is possible that God is a liar, you deny the truth that Scripture affirms.

It doesn't "assume" a definition, it contains the definition within itself. What axiom can you provide that does not require you to define its terms so as to make the full meaning of the axiom known? By asserting "The Bible is the Word of God" you automatically assume the existence of all the terms as they are defined within the axiom. They aren't presupposed, but asserted as true in the axiom.

Example please: sensations include all emotional and rational capacity for understanding, not just physical sensations.

Also, how do you know that physical sensation depends on the physical body? After all, spiritual realities can become visible to physical beings, I see no reason why physical realities would not be visible to incorporeal beings.

Can you provide an example of anything that God has revealed to you without the use of any other means?

But even here you state that epistemology must have priority because we must understand what it is to know before we can know what there is to be known.

Just because I accept that I could possibly be wrong in my persuasion that God cannot lie does not mean that I do not affirm most emphatically that God cannot lie. This is no more logical than that my acceptance of the possibility that you don't exist means that I would not affirm that you actually do exist. It's a non sequitor.

What I'm perceiving here is circularity. If an axiom contains the definitions upon which it depends within itself, then it is circular and therefore fallacious.

Yes that's true.

Well surely it is possible that we are being deceived by demons. But it does not follow that we cannot be certain about some of our beliefs. I am certain that I am typing on a computer at the moment even though I am possibly deceived. I suppose there are two ways of construing "certainty."

There is one sense of certainty, which I would take to be knowing that your belief is true. So if you are certain in the first sense, you not only know that belief, but also you know that your belief is true. I suppose a second sense of certainty would be just holding a belief very strongly and not regarding as plausible alternative explanations.

If certainty in the first sense is a necessary condition of knowledge, then knowledge would be impossible. I suggest that when we use the term "certain," we mean something like the second sense.

Sensation has never, to my knowledge, been defined as all emotional and rational capacity for understanding beyond what arises through physical bodies.

Physical sensation depends upon a physical body by definition. If I don't have a hand, I cannot sense anything by means of a hand. If I am incorporeal, I cannot sense the world corporeally. It doesn't mean I don't know the world, it only means I don't know it through sensation, which is my point.

I'd like a proof for how spiritual beings "see" the world, if by "visible" you mean seeing with eyes. I'd say that spiritual beings understand the world through intellection, apart from any physical stimulus.

I can provide numerous examples. The problem isn't with the examples, but with how those examples are being defined. You won't accept the definition, so you won't recognize them as examples. For example, I believe God is imposing upon my mind this moment the understanding of the words I see on the screen. But I've already given you a valid example: those in the intermediate state possess knowledge that cannot come through sensation.

Presuppose was a mistaken choice on my part. I'd prefer to amend it to "entail." Epistemology entails metaphysics, because to know anything is to know something; therefore something exists.

But believing that you could be wrong about God being a liar implies that you don't really know if God is a liar. Skepticism is the only conclusion for epistemology built upon psychological conviction. The point isn't that you affirm that God is a liar, but that you cannot know whether or not He is, in fact, a liar. And this despite the fact that God has revealed it to you that He is not a liar. Is God's revelation not entirely trustworthy beyond doubt?

You don't seem to recognize the nature of every axiom as begging the question. If it cannot be proven, and must be assumed, then the validity is accepted on the basis of the axiom's assertion (which is circular--I state that it is true, therefore it is true). Your own axiom requires the same condition, whatever that axiom may be (you've said at least two).

So let me summarize what I'm still waiting for you to give an argument for:

1. How does a soul in the intermediate state have knowledge? Or, stated differently, how can an incorporeal being have the corporeal sensations required for knowledge upon your definition? An example would be beneficial, if possible.

2. How can any axiom be stated without presupposition, and without having its terms defined within the statement itself? An example would be beneficial, if possible.

3. If you cannot be sure in your persuasion of the truth of the proposition, "God does not lie," how can you be sure that someone's persuasion of the truth of the proposition, "God does lie," is not valid?

Actually, that's Locke's definition.

Physical sensation, as I am using it, merely means sensation of physical realities.

I'm curious as to how this works. I've never thought without using my brain before or without having emotions engaged. If we can have thought without a physical body, then why not sensation and emotion?

I'm not going to suggest an alternative, because it would be pure speculation on my part.

My question is not whether you believe it--it's whether you know that this is how knowledge works? If so, then how do you know, for example, that 2+2=4 is among the pieces of knowledge that God has imposed on you? In order to have maximal warrant, you must know that you know and also you must know that you know that you know etc etc ad infinitum. At some point you have to admit either a) you don't know anything because your axiom is held non-rationally (not necessarily irrationally) b) the definition of knowledge as maximal warrant is flawed.

But how do you know that you know anything?

That depends on the definition of knowledge, doesn't it? What reason do I have to doubt that God cannot lie?

Beyond reasonable doubt. Nothing, from our finite perspective, is trustworthy beyond skeptical doubt.

Granted. So no axiom ultimately withstands the test of skepticism which the definition of knowledge as maximal warrant naturally produces.

That would be pure speculation, just as your idea of intellection (whatever that means) is.

If the terms are assumed and the axiom is so basic as to be obvious or unreasonable to doubt. Obvious: 2+2=4. Unreasonable to doubt: my senses are generally a reliable source of information.

But I am sure--reasonably sure, that is.

I'd like a reference to the specific passage so that I may read it for myself, if you don't mind.

Does the sensation of physical realities require physical sensory receptors?

Brain is not mind. Body is not soul. When your body dies, your soul goes to be with the Lord. Your brain deteriorates with the rest of your body in the ground. Emotions arise through the changes of state we experience in our physical bodies. Sensations and emotions require a physical body that experience changes of state in order to be experienced. Thoughts do not require a physical body, or else God would require a physical body, and so too would souls who have departed from the body.

2+2=4 is formulated by mathematical theories, but basic addition is demonstrated in Scripture, which provides the necessary maximal warrant upon my axiom. It isn't an ad infinitum, because of the axiom. Again, I am not convinced that you understand what an axiom is, or how it works.

What God has revealed cannot be rationally doubted. That is one reason why the Bible calls the unbeliever a fool.

But if God has given you true propositions, then those propositions aren't subject to your finitude. They come from God, and are not to be doubted--skeptically or otherwise. I maintain that you have yet to produce a sound refutation of the axiom, nor have you provided a better alternative.

Of course it withstands the test of skepticism, because skepticism is self-refuting. A self-refuting position cannot mount a justified counter-claim that axioms cannot be circular. The difference between the circular autonomous arguments of man and the circular argument of Scripture is that Scripture comes from a transcendent and unchanging source of truth, whereas autonomous men do not, and cannot justify the necessity of universal principles necessary for argument itself (i.e. the laws of logic) upon their autonomous presuppositions.

Do you think it pure speculation because you have no direct experience of it? Intellection is thinking, or perceiving with the mind. Unless you think that the mind is a physical body, or that an immaterial being has physical sense receptions that are themselves non-physical (how exactly would that be possible, by the way?) then you have to acknowledge that the mind does not require physical sensations in order to posses knowledge.

You are psychologically convinced, but not epistemologically sound. If assurance boils down to nothing more than your psychological conviction of a reasonable judgment, then you can never offer anything but contingency. Thus, justifying the truth of any universal statement becomes impossible: you cannot justify that God never lies, because it is possible that he does, since you have only your own finite experience by which to judge.

I think you are allowing your autonomous judgment to be the final arbiter or authority of knowledge. If so, then I don't see what makes your view different from the unbeliever in his state of rebellion.

Essay Concerning Human Understanding Book II, 4-5, Locke defines all mental thought as "internal sense" even though he refers to this later as reflection. I am not agreeing with Locke on his general epistemology, just that he has a good definition of what comprises our senses (or what Reidians call cognitive equipment).

Not necessarily--but I couldn't give you a definitive alternative as I have never been disembodied and the Bible is silent on the subject, so any attempt at epistemology here would be speculation.

Why do they require a physical body? I believe that God is compassionate and has emotions--and I certainly think that He can sense things without a physical body.

Are you capable of heresy? If so, then you may not have interpreted Scripture correctly because God might not have imposed the knowledge on your mind.

So what separates you and I from the unbeliever?

It's God accommodating Himself to my language, and I am still capable of misunderstanding.

No--it just ends in "I know nothing or maybe I do and just don't know it."

The axioms of the critic have no bearing on the validity of the criticism. Regardless, skepticism is the only conclusion of the axiom that knowledge is maximal warrant.

I've never seen this actually done. I argue that the Bible assumes these laws just as it assumes the existence of God and other matters of general revelation. The unbeliever cannot be without excuse if he knows nothing.

I think it pure speculation because all that we know is thinking within a physical body.

To think, one must have terms with which to think, and therefore must have a reality backing them up. All that intellection is, then, is a machine for processing--and sometimes the machine doesn't work.

Explain to me how a contingent being can have anything but contingency. I necessarily think contingently.

That depends on how high your standard of justification is. You base things on an axiom, and I base mine on a set of axioms. However, could you be mistaken in your acceptance of that particular axiom? A Muslim could make nearly an identical argument for the Koran and be consistent--in fact, he would probably be more consistent because he can at least account for errors in his system--Allah doesn't necessarily have to be logical. What separates you from the Muslim epistemologically?

It's different for this reason: I have a witness on whose word I base my knowledge. The unbeliever has no witness. The only reason why I know better than the unbeliever is the Grace of God. It's not by reason alone that I know.