To those following this thread, I apologize if some of this is difficult to follow. Brian and I have had a many discussions on logic on the Christian Logic Forum. Brian's taught me a great deal on the subject of logic there to which I am ever grateful. But given that history, we might skip some of the explanations and details knowing that the other will understand the categories and basics of formal logic. So if you don't understand a particular point, feel free to ask for an explanation. And feel free to post question to the Christian Logic Forum. That's what it's there for.

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R. Anthony Coletti
Midway Presbyterian Church (PCA)
Jonesborough, TN
[i]et venite et arguite me dicit Dominus[/i]

Hello Anthony,

Let's look at the argument you originally presented. I think it makes the issue more explicit.

Premise 1: All Scripture is true.
Premise 2: 'Jesus is Messiah' is Scripture.
Conclusion: 'Jesus is Messiah' is true.

Premise 1 is the axiom, and this in itself justifies its use as a premise. The argument is valid. However, the Scripturalist is unable to justify the assertion of premise 2. Where does it come from? (By the way, I have an answer for this, but it seems to contradict the answer you and Sean give to the question "How do we know?") At this point, the axiom by itself has been unable to give us even the simplist of propositional truths derivable from the Bible.

Sincerely,

Brian
P.S. Anthony, you have taught me just as much as I have taught you. I value your friendship very much.

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Brian Bosse
Faith Community Church
Tucson, Arizona
Scientiam Dei

Glad to hear it - because when I virtually kick your logic butt, I'd hate to lose your friendship.

However, I'm writing this in bed with my wireless PDA on a tiny screen. And I've taken a sleeping pill. So your virtual butt kick'n will have to wait until I get a full nights rest.

Later friend.

Hello Anthony,

Everyone needs a good butt-kicking from time to time. I would count it as a means of grace towards me.

As I have thought further on this issue, I find that it is even more accute than I am representing it as above. I also have found some interesting quotes by Clark that may indicate that his view of things was a little different than what has been said by you and Sean. First off, let me illustrate just how accute this problem is. Let's say for the sake of argument that you were able to figure out a way to justify premise 2 above. We are still not there. Why? Because for your argument to follow there is even a more fundamental hidden assumption being made. The form of argumentation we are using is as follows:

All M is P.
All S is M.
Therefore, All S is P.

Why is this considered proper argumentation? To justify this as a valid deduction one must go further. Here is one possible argument:

Premise 1: If (All M is P) and (All S is M), then (All S is P).
Premise 2: (All M is P) and (All S is M).
Conclusion: (All S is P).

In the argument in the previous post you establish (All M is P) on the basis that it is an axiom. In this post, for the sake of the argument we are saying that you can justify (All S is M). At this point you have established premise 2 in the argument immediately above. However, you have not established premise 1. Where does this come from? Also, the argument form above is Modus Ponens. What is the justification for this? My point is simple, all of this must be assumed prior to you and I being able to use the axiom to draw any conclusions from Scripture.

Now, on to Clark quotes. These come from Religion, Reason and Revelation. On page 134 under the heading "Theistic Linguistics" we find the following...

This seems to imply a prior supposition before we can begin to learn anything from Scripture. Regarding this very thing, Clark says on page 135...

Anthony, you may have remembered earlier when I proposed three axioms. Sean was quite critical of my third axiom, and there may be issues with it because it is not an axiom in any proper sense. (More on this later.) However, it essentially does what Clark says above. In order for us to even receive verbal revelation there must already be prior knowledge - the innate ideas and a priori catagories Clark mentions above.

I think Clark was brilliant, and understood these things. I think he has not been properly represented.

Sincerely,

Brian

Clark also pointed out that no knowledge whatsoever of the a_priori in man is possible apart from Scripture. Further, I fail to see how your proposal of three axioms is in any way a proper representation of Clark, since his proposal was one axiomatic starting point and your other two (or at least one and a half) were already subsumed in his one.

I think if anyone has not properly represented Clark here it has been you Brian. I'm just sorry you have taken such apparent umbrage at this being pointed out to you.

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Sean Gerety
Member
Calvary Presbyterian, PCA
Norfolk, VA

“I don't really like disconcerting people. Although often when I try to be normal I disconcert anyway." Robert Wyatt

Brian, If you ever have the opportunity to read Dabney's Sensualistic Philosophy, I would appreciate seeing your evaluation of his chapters on the Validity and Origin of A-Priori Notions. He says, "When we proceed to details, we find that the attempt to construct a system of cognitions, on any plan whatsoever, without a priori notions and judgments, is, in every instance, a self-contradiction." P. 185. It seems Clark and yourself are driving that point home. Dabney proceeds to examine the value of deductive reasoning, and shows how it is of no use without the presupposition of already formed judgments. Hence our cognitive ability should itself be regarded as knowledge -- which brings us to foundationalism.

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Yours sincerely,


"Illum oportet crescere me autem minui."

Hello Sean,

This is vauge. First off, we are not speaking of "knowledge of the a priori" in the sense the we know what is a priori knowledge. We are speaking of knowledge that is a priori whether we know it is a priori or not. The point I am making is that there must be other knowledge prior to Scripture in order for you to be able to deduce any proposition from Scripture using the axiom. In the Clark quote I presented Anthony, Clark acknowledges this type of knowledge as being the means of receiving revelation knowledge. Notice, this knowledge is the means to gain further knowledge from Scripture. It is prior. Secondly, if Clark really said that all a priori knowledge is impossible apart from Scripture, then either (1) he means something different than the kind of priority we are speaking about in this thread, or (2) Clark is being inconsistent. At this point, it would be nice of you to present the reference for the Clark quote where he says that Scripture is a necessary precondition for the a priori. I own most of Clark's books. I would like to read it in context. Lastly, I find it interesting that you have yet to meet my challenge of presenting one deduction of a proposition of Scripture from the axiom using only justified propositions. If my argument is vacuous, it would seem to me that it would easy for you to produce the argument.

I never said it was a representation of Clark. Although I do think it captures Clark's intentions. I do not think he ever intended the axiom to act on its own. His own writings make it clear that he combined the axiom with other things such as the understood nature of God (being omniscient, truthful, etc...) and man's given innate cognitive faculties. He just failed to make those things explicit when proposing the one axiom, but they are there in his writings.

This is certainly possible.

I am curious how you came to the conclusion that I have "taken such apparent umbrage" from my simple observation that "Sean was quite critical of my third axiom." Maybe it is the same kind of reasoning that allows you to go from the axiom alone to a propositional truth in the Bible?

Brian

Hello Matthew,

If our cognitive abilities are not designed to produce true beliefs, then nothing we deduce from Scripture can be called knowledge. I agree with Dabney concerning the necessity of a priori knowledge.

Sincerely,

Brian (the one whose salvation you have been praying for )

See, God answers prayer. Glad to meet up with another Dabneyite.

It seems to me unless you can account for men having anything that can be called an apriori, you're merely begging the question.

Kant had his categories, you can always resurrect those. Others argue that man's mind is a blank slate without any apriori knowledge or anything else for that matter.

I don't see that this follows at all. Again, I think without Scripture, and, say, the biblical doctrine of man, you would have no way to even account for even the forms of logic as being something innate in man. Most unbelievers I've met, at least the thoughtful ones, have a view that logic is an arbitrary and evolutionary tool for survival. Not fixed at all, much anything worthy of being an axiom. So I don't see how you can say anything at all about what this prior knowledge might consist of apart from Scripture? If you'd like to venture a shot at it I'm open to argument?

First, do you mean this quote:

"But it (Theism) must assert that man's endowment with rationality, his innate ideas and a priori categories, his ability to think and speak were given to him by God for the essential purpose of receiving a verbal revelation..."

Would you mind providing a citation? If this is the quote, you might notice no mention of prior knowledge, but rather an endowment of innate ideas and a priori categories. Also, if theism must assert this, it does so on the basis of Scripture alone, at least Clark does, for without it I fail to see how we could possibly know anything about an apriori or even that men possess such a thing?

I'll try and track it down when I get the chance God willing. Maybe it's even in Intro? FWIW I am very confident that is his position however.

Well, I think I did provide not only a valid argument but a sound one as well (especially when I eliminated "alone" from the minor premise since that wasn't an immediate deliverance from the verse I had in mind). I think Anthony did too. I confess I honestly do not know what you're driving at? Maybe Anthony has a better handle on it so I'll see how that plays out.

FWIW I shared your comments in reply to Anthony's little Jesus is Messiah syllogism and he seemed unimpressed. His actually response was "unbelievable." Now maybe he didn't get what profound insight you are bringing to the discussion either (and maybe it really is profound), but it sounded to me that he thought you just didn't get it. Again, I have to wonder if the analytical philosopher in you has simply missed the forest for the trees?

How could it capture his intentions when I provided a rather lengthy quote explaining exactly what his intentions were and they were not yours?

Again, rather than making, say, logic in man, without which all knowledge about God or anything else would be impossible, another axiom, Clark inferred the apriori from his single axiom of Scripture:


I think it was more a matter of you calling me "Bud." It could have also been your tone, but tone is tough to glean especially on internet boards.

No, it wasn't the result of repeating the same thing twice, it was just my opinion.

Hello Sean,

I enjoyed your response - especially the spirit of it. I will not be able to get back to you until tomorrow. Maybe Anthony will get a chance to chime in before then. Have a great evening, bud.

Sincerely,

Brian

Brian,

I refer you back to my earlier post where I asked if I was understanding your objection.

I will repeat it here:

You agree the following is a valid argument:
let S = Scripture
let T = True
let P = a Proposition of Scripture

P1: All(ST)
P2: All(PS)
.: C: All(PT)
Your objection is I can not deduce P2 from P1.

Is that it?

I could say that your objection is that P2 (the proposition) is not justified by P1 (the Axiom). Do I understand your objection at that point?

Hello Anthony,

My objection is that you cannot justify any proposition that necessarily must be assumed in order to draw doctrinal conclusions from the axiom. The example you are asking me to clarify my objection with is not a good example. Your premise 2 strictly speaking from what you gave is...

Premise 2: All 'a proposition of Scripture' is Scripture.

This is sloppy. If what you are trying to say is "All propositions of Scripture are Scripture," then that that is what you should say. If this is what you meant to say, then this is not representative of the objection I am raising. In order to draw a conclusion regarding the truth of a particular proposition in Scripture from the one axiom you need to be able to justify a premise in the form of "X is Scripture" where 'X' represents some proposition of Scripture. If this what you meant to say, then your premise 2 is patently false. You are saying that "A proposition of Scriptrue" is Scripture. In this case the 'X' is instantiated as "A proposition of Scripture" much like it looks in your premise above. However, "A proposition of Scripture" is not a proposition of Scripture. In fact, it is not even a proposition. In the example I provided, the 'X' is instantiated with a proposition. Here it is again...

Premise 1: All Scripture is true.
Premise 2: 'Jesus is Messiah' is Scripture.
Conclusion: 'Jesus is Messiah' is true.

How do you justify premise 2?

Brian

Looks like you answered my question with this post. Just ignore my post.

OK. So the objection is the Scripturalist is "unable to justify the assertion of premise 2". I think this is the one of the problems we are running in to.

I mentioned the inference from A to I propositions. I think this is critical to my contention that P2 is justified by P1.

Let all S(ripture) = (p1, p2, p3,...pn-1, pn), where p1 through pn are all the propositions of Scripture.

If px is a member of S, then px is some S.



A (Scripture is True) -> I (Scripture is True)

and

px = I (Scripture)

:. A (Scripture is True) -> px is True

P2 is justified by direct implication from the Axiom because the Axiom is defined by p1 through pn.

Clark define Scripture as the WCF does using a denotative definition: WCF 1:2 - the 66 books of the Bible. So when Clark uses Scripture as his Axiom, you can substitute each and every proposition of Scripture. And so what is predicated of Scripture, is predicated to each and every member of Scripture.

Again, I have not said how we learn what P2 is, but that P2 is logically justified true by the Axiom since P2 is a member of the Axiom by definition. And therefore the Axiom is logically sufficient for justifying epistemically. And it is logically (not temporally) prior to all knowledge.

You mention innate forms and man's ability to reason as a precondition of knowledge. This is true temporally. We can not think unless we have the equipment in place - but this does not disqualify the Axiom since we are no longer talking about logical priority, but temporal. Much of the reasons you gave that show we must have a prior knowledge before we can use Scripture as our axiom is true only in the temporal sense. Logically, we can only justify knowledge if we can deduce it from our Axiom, and nothing can be deduced from the empty forms of mans "innate abilities". I think this is an import point, that there is a clear difference between temporal and logical priority. And when we mix them, we confuse the issues involved. You can't invalidate a logical priority with a temporal priority because they follow or belong to different categories and paradigms. (not sure if that's the best word.) Logical priority deals with order by necessary implication and the "states of things". A justified proposition is true regardless of time and place and person. Temporal order deals with "cause and effect". God causes knowledge, or innate ability to think allows us to know, the "light of nature" is our innate capacity for reasoning and abstract thinking. Certain elements are conditions for knowing, but they do not provide the logical priorities for knowledge. A logical priority for knowledge provides the prior true propositions that logically produce knowledge by logical necessity.

(That last paragraph could have been broken into steps and a bit more organized, so if you want to focus on the first, that's fine. We can get to the second part as it logically results from the first part.)

Cross posting. My prior post may answer your questions.
That's the definition of Scripture in Clark's axiom. I don't consider that "sloppy", rather is is precise thinking.


....
Logically, it ('Jesus is Messiah') is justified by being a member of the subject in P1 (Scripture).

So I think the issue we are really moving towards is, how do we determine that 'Jesus is Messiah' is a member of "Scripture". And Scripturalism follows the WCF chapter 1 on that issue too.

'Jesus is Messiah' is Scripture

can be rewritten:

Scripture -> "Jesus is Messiah"

it is a direct implication.

Maybe I should have put it that way instead of making it into a syllogism.

For the Clarkian Axiom, to assume Scripture is to assume 'Jesus is Messiah' among other things.

But Clark used the same rules of hermeneutics that the WCF used for learning that "Jesus is Messiah" is a member of "Scripture". And he insisted on the role of the Holy Sprite in making us understand and believe it.

Hello Anthony,

The inference from universal affirmative statements to particular affirmative statements is very precise. “All S is P” implies “Some S is P”. I am not trying to be pedantic, but you are playing with your logic fast and loose. Is the following a valid argument?

Premise 1: All men are mortal.
Conclusion: Socrates is mortal.

I hope you of all people say that the argument is invalid. (If you don’t, I may need to revoke your membership to the Christian Logic Board. ) One rule of multiple rules broken is that the middle term is not distributed. Let’s make this invalid argument more general…

Premise 1: All M is P.
Conclusion: All S is P.

The required proposition to make the conclusion follow is “All S is M”. However, this proposition is not an immediate inference from “All M is P”. In fact, if we use your argument of “inferences from A to I propositions,” then given “All S is M” we can only validly conclude “Some S is M.” Yet, my wildest mightmare is coming true in that my good friend is actually arguing that “All M is P” is a valid conclusion from "All S is M." Please say it ain't so. Repent my friend and return from the dark side.

Brian

Can you give a denotative (extensional) definition of 'men'?

Anthony,

This is a formal matter. This is not a material matter. You are asking me to accept the implication that "All M is P" implies "All S is M." In a strictly formal sense, it does not matter what the referents are for these terms. If this is what Scripturalism leads to, then it is irrational.

Brian