Molinism - Middle Knowledge and Divine Providence

Brian Bosse · #1 (**permalink**) 05-26-2007, 05:12 PM

This thread will be a critique of Thomas Rauchenstein’s article “A ‘Middle’ Knowledge Perspective on the Doctrine of Divine Providence”. Middle Knowledge (MK) lends itself to be understood within the framework of Possible World Semantics, and as such I will begin with a very brief introduction to the logic of possible world semantics.

Possible World Semantics

The idea of a possible world is simply a world made up of a set of possible events. Our actual world is one such world in the set of all possible worlds. The only events that are precluded are events that are logically incoherent – whether this incoherence is relative to the event itself (a square circle), or incoherent relative to the events around it (a possible world with no oxygen cannot have water). Here are some possible worlds:

Possible World 1 (our actual world): All events as they have happened up to this point.
Possible World 2: All events as they have happened up to this point with the exception of me wearing a red shirt instead of a blue shirt.
Possible World 3: A world where Cesar did not cross the Rubicon.
Possible World 4: A world where Germany won World War II.

A logic was developed in an attempt to capture the ideas of ‘possibility’ and ‘necessity’ within possible world semantics. This logic is called ‘Modal Logic’. In propositional logic, there are functions that assign truth-values to atomic sentences, and functions that assign truth-values to more complex sentences built up from these atomic sentences using the sentential connectives: ¬, →, ↔, Λ, V. In modal semantics, a set W of possible worlds is introduced where these truth-value functions assign a truth-value to each sentence for each of the possible worlds in W. It is possible for particular sentences to be assigned different truth-values in different possible worlds. For instance, in some possible world it is true that Germany won World War II; whereas, in another possible world, it false that Germany won World War II. This makes truth-value relative to a particular possible world. We can now introduce the modal operators of ‘necessity’ and ‘possibility’ that make up modal logic.

Modal Operators

□p = ‘p’ is necessarily true. For ‘p’ to be necessary (□p), then ‘p’ is true in all possible worlds.
◊p = ‘p’ is possibly true. For ‘p’ to possible (◊p), then ‘p’ is true in at least one possible world.
p = ‘p’ is actually true. For ‘p’ to be actual (p), then ‘p’ is true in the real world.

It should be noted that we can define both □ and ◊ in terms of each other as follows:

Rule N: □p ↔ ¬◊¬p. That is to say, ‘p’ is necessarily true if and only if it is not the case that ‘p’ is false in at least one possible world.
Rule P: ◊p ↔ ¬□¬p. That is to say, ‘p’ is possibly true if and only if it is not the case that ‘p’ is false in all possible worlds.

Modal logic is essentially propositional logic combined with the modal operators □ and ◊ as defined above. At this point we have laid the foundation necessary to understand Middle Knowledge (MK) within the framework of possible world semantics. My next post will begin my analysis.

Sincerely,

Brian

shackleton · #2 (**permalink**) 05-26-2007, 09:20 PM

This might be a stupid question...but is this similiar to the multiple, now infinite, parallel universes that scientists have come up with under the development of string theory or rather membrane theory?
As a joke I remember telling some people that now free will is possible, it just happens in an alternate universe. Like you said a world were Hitler won WWII. Imagine the number of infinite universes there would have to be for every persons free decision to play out in its own alternate universe, everyone would have to have their own universe. On the other hand, it would be logically impossible because everyone could not have libertarian free will because it does not take into account everyone elses libertarian free will. My free decision is going to conflict with your free decision. We both can't be free because we most likely want different things. No matter how you frame it, it always seems to come back to some sort of determinism.

But again this may be completely differetn from what you are talking about.

Brian Bosse · #3 (**permalink**) 05-26-2007, 11:05 PM

Hello Erik,

The multiple universe thingy is different than possible world sematics. This analysis certainly will deal with determinism and free will.

Sincerely,

Brian

turmeric · #4 (**permalink**) 05-27-2007, 12:07 AM

My head hurts!

cih1355 · #5 (**permalink**) 05-27-2007, 01:13 AM

Does the middle knowledge perspective define free will as the power of contrary choice?

Doesn't God ordain all of the events in every possible world?

Cheshire Cat · #6 (**permalink**) 05-27-2007, 02:49 AM

Looking forward to the critique.

Quote:

Originally Posted by cih1355

Does the middle knowledge perspective define free will as the power of contrary choice?

Yes. I have yet to study the topic, but from what little I have read its purpose is to reconcile God's foreknowledge with a libertarian view of free will.

shackleton · #7 (**permalink**) 05-27-2007, 11:29 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by cih1355

Doesn't God ordain all of the events in every possible world?

Instead of this doesn't God in His wisdom know the outcome that He desires and works the world according to the way He wants so that it will fall out as He has planned?

In Reymonds theology I read, that God started out with a plan. The eventual end of time so to speak, the way life will be after the Great White Throne judgement and we all have our resurection bodies. Incidentally, this includes who He wants to spend eternity with. (but that is a different thread) He then set out to plan all the events of everyones life and everything that happens in history all the way back to the creation of the universe and Adam and Eve. Everything is falling out according to His plan.

No matter how much we worry back and forth about a decision, it has alrteady been settled. Because everything falls out according to Gods plan.

Brian Bosse · #8 (**permalink**) 05-27-2007, 10:09 PM

With the preliminaries out of the way, I am going to begin interacting with the article. Someone has already mentioned this, and it is important to keep in mind – the purpose of the article is to explain how someone can affirm God’s omniscience and sovereignty and at the same time affirm libertarian freewill (LFW). ‘Molinism’ is the answer the author gives, and I will argue that Molinism fails. This means this critique is not so much a critique of LFW, a concept that I think is incoherent and unbiblical, but rather is a critique of Molinism failing to provide the answer. The author begins with several definitions:

Quote:

That God has foreknowledge of all future contingent events simply means that "there is no event still to occur of which God is ignorant or uncertain. God never has to ‘wait and see’ how things will develop."

Quote:

God exercises sovereignty over his world…in the sense that every event, no matter how large or small, is under God’s control and is incorporated into his overall plan for the world.

The author points out that God's knowledge of what will occur (foreknowledge) depends upon God predetermining what future events will come to pass. Divine foreknowledge is therefore a consequence of His sovereignty.

Quote:

That is, His knowing the future is dependent on his sovereign decision to make the world a certain way.

It should be noted that Reformed Baptist James White has made the same point concerning how God knows the future. He says God knows the future because He ordains what the future is. Now, James White’s conception of how this happens and the Molinist’s conception of how this happens are different. But, alas, I get ahead of myself. Suffice it say that the author provides Biblical support for the idea that “foreknowledge and sovereignty describe (in part) God’s relationship to the actual world.” The author desires to be faithful to this Biblical witness.

At this point, the author raises the issue how the above view seems to militate against the concept of human freedom, i.e., LFW. I will deal with this in detail.

Libertarian Freewill

Quote:

Consider the fact that a human action is genuinely free only if the entire context of prior and contemporaneous events is not causally sufficient to determine what one will do. In other words, if my actions are entirely the product of internal or external factors that constitute my circumstance, then what I do is causally "fixed," and therefore it is impossible for me to do otherwise. The only way an action can involve genuine alternatives is if it is undetermined. See below,

Circumstance [C] + Free Will [FW] = Undetermined Action [A]

According to those libertarians who espouse agent causation (i.e. the view that I actually cause my free actions), it is true that some aspects of C are necessary for my freely doing A, but nothing in C is sufficient to bring it about that A. Only the conjunction of FW and C causally implies that A is an undetermined action.

Libertarian Freewill: Human action ‘A’ is free if and only if all internal and external contemporaneous events do not determine human action ‘A’.

If we let ‘C’ stand for all internal and external contemporaneous events as is in the above quote, then LFW can be expressed this way…

Libertarian Freewill: Human action ‘A’ is free if and only if ¬□(C → A).

In possible world semantics, ¬□(C → A) says that it is not the case that in all worlds if you have C, then the agent will do A. That means there exists at least one possible world where you have C and the agent does ¬A. Today at church we sang “How Great Thou Art.” For this action to be free, then there exists some possible world were everything remained the same, but we sang something else instead. This is what is meant by the above definition. However, we already have a real problem Biblically. Consider the denial of Christ by Peter. If Peter’s action is free, then there must be a possible world where everything was exactly the same up until the time of Peter’s denial of Christ, yet the outcome was that Peter did not deny Christ. The problem with this is that Jesus said that Peter would deny Christ. Did Jesus make a mistake in this possible world? Now, the Libertarian will object by saying that all possible worlds are only those worlds where events logically cohere. Once Jesus prophesied that Peter would deny Him, then future events where Peter does not deny Jesus are not allowed since this would not logically cohere being that Jesus cannot make a mistake. I agree with the Libertarian on this point. However, this means that once Jesus prophesies Peter’s denial, then Peter’s future action no longer is free according to the definition above. In other words, there exists some C such that A is necessarily the case. It is not clear to me how the Libertarian can overcome this objection. It seems that at the very least the libertarian must acknowledge that there are some situations where human freedom is suspended. The open theist Greg Boyd has bitten this bullet in some of his writings.

The author then takes the last paragraph in section A to argue philosophically for LFW. This is done in two ways: (1) Moral responsibility presupposes LFW; and (2) Rationality presupposes LFW. I deny both points, but will not argue the point here being that this is not the purpose of the critique. Suffice it to say, we will next turn to Molinism, explain what it is, and how it reconciles God’s foreknowledge and sovereignty with LFW. Actually, the idea is quite ingenious.

Brian

shackleton · #9 (**permalink**) 05-27-2007, 10:28 PM

I think Open Theism is the logical conclusion to how man could be truly free. This would only be possible if God did not even know the future but even if God only knew the future passively and not actively, the fact that He is perfect and cannot be wrong always takes it back to determination of some sort. The fact that God knows something will happen, necessitates its happening.

The other thing I find interesting is that even though Jesus predicted Peter's denial only a few minutes or hours prior to its actually happening, Peter I am sure, still mulled over in his brain back and forth what was happening, what he should do and so forth before finally giving into what he was predicted to do. My point is that our "free" choices must be determined. That is a deeper issue, how God can use our "free" choices to fulfill His eternal purpose. This just proves how sovereign He really is.

Great discussion!

tdowns007 · #10 (**permalink**) 05-28-2007, 12:24 AM

This very topic came up today in my Sunday School class, as we work through T.U.L.I.P. A guy who I have discussed this topic with before, was there, and I said that without proper understanding of these principles, we find ourselves, with Middle Knowledge, and possibly, Open theism....we had a good discussion, and will continue later, so I came on the internet to do a search, and of course, stopped by the Board for a quick read, and I see this High on the Today's Posts!!!!!....Awesome...I will read, copy and send via email when done...thanks.

cih1355 · #11 (**permalink**) 05-28-2007, 01:41 AM

According to LFW, a person can act contrary to his desires. The cause of a person's actions is the person himself. Our desires are the final cause, not the efficient cause. LFW teaches that people are self-caused or self-determined. People are not determined by anything, except for themselves.

shackleton · #12 (**permalink**) 05-28-2007, 09:27 AM

This is like saying that man is in a perpetual state of being a "tabula rasa." He makes a decision and it dissapears into a vacuum so that it will not effect our future decisions. Every decision we make effects events that effect every other decision we make and so on ad infinitum.

In reality, everything from our genetics to our upbringing to everything that has happened to us throughout our entire lives effects every decision we make. What is amazing is how all this works right into the plan of what God wants for us. God does not make the best of what we have done with our lives. He has ordered our lives exactly the way he wanted them to be. This includes our "free" decisions which lead to our "free" actions. Don't get me wrong this does not make us robots or puppets. God designed us in such a way that we would be free to make decisions and perform free actions. Being in God's image we are free like He is free. (Not as free as He is, just free to make choices and decisions like He is) He is however so completely sovereign that our free decisions and actions work to accomplish what He wants from us and ultimately the world.

To me this is very comforting because I can rest in the fact that whatever I do even though it seems like I made the wrong choice, it is what God wanted and is a part of His plan. The "All things work together for good" does not mean that God takes our mistakes and turns them unto something good like some Chtistians try to say. It means that everything that happens to us works together for good, God is in control, it is what He wanted to happen so it will not lead to your demise. Even if God only knew things passively, He still choose not to intervene which makes it what He wanted to happen.

I don't know if I hi-jacked this thread, if I did it was not my intention.

Brian Bosse · #13 (**permalink**) 05-28-2007, 06:44 PM

In our last post I brought up an objection against the definition of LFW. I stated that I did not see how this objection could be overcome. In the next section titled “Theological Fatalism,” the author introduces certain concepts in an attempt to overcome this objection. These concepts will lead us directly into a “full-blown Molinist account.”

The objection I raised in the earlier post concerned Jesus’ prediction of Peter denying Christ. In section B, the author deals with the issue regarding God foreknowing Peter denying Christ. There is a difference here between the two situations that has significant ramifications, but these ramifications will only be made specific latter on. Here is the situation…

If God believed at time t1 that Peter would deny Christ at time t2, then if Peter really could have not denied Christ, then at least one of three consequences results:

(1) It was within Peter’s power at time t2 to do something that would bring about God having a false belief.
(2) It was within Peter’s power at time t2 to change God’s belief at t1.
(3) It was within Peter’s power at time t2 to make it such that any person who believed that Peter would deny Christ at time t1 held a false belief.

All three of these possible consequences are very problematic, and as such libertarian freedom is a farce – at least as far as this argument goes. In response to this argument, the author appeals to arguments given by Alvin Plantinga and William Lane Craig.

Quote:

In response to…(this) argument for theological fatalism, Alvin Plantinga has argued quite persuasively that we possess a type of "power over the past" that does not entail the ability to change past events by retro-causation. That is, we have counterfactual power over the past.

Consider the proposition: “God believes at time t1 that Peter will deny Christ at time t2.” If LFW is true, then at time t2 Peter must be able to not deny Christ. According to Plantinga, Peter can refrain from denying Christ, and if he were to do so, then God would have always foreknown that Peter would not deny Christ. It is de facto true that Peter will deny Christ, but had he done otherwise, God’s past knowledge would always have been different.

Quote:

Thus, even if God’s foreknowledge is a function of the past, it does not follow that one is not free with regard to any action. On the contrary, Plantinga would assert that that I have the power to act such that, were I to do so, God would have always known differently. It is this notion of counterfactual power over God’s knowledge that proves fatal to …fatalism. Hence, at least one aspect of God’s providence – i.e. divine foreknowledge – is not incompatible with human free will.

Essentially, what is being stated is the following:

P1: If Peter does A at t2, then God’s knowledge at t1 is K.

and

P2: If Peter does ¬A at t2, then God’s knowledge at t1 is ¬K.

As a fatalistic determinist, I can affirm P1 and P2. It is like saying whatever happens God knew it would happen. However, asserting both of these propositions does not assert that Peter can do either A or ¬A. Clearly, he must be able to do one or the other. The libertarian wants to assert that he can do both, but this does not follow. So, in what sense is this fatal to my fatalism? What is the argument really being put forward by Plantinga and others? The key has to do with little phrase “counterfactual power over God’s knowledge.” This is Plantiga’s “power over the past” that does not entail retro-causation. The author tells us…

Quote:

…there are counterfactual truths governing the relationship between foreknowledge and one’s free actions. The affirmation of counterfactual truths, as we shall see, is crucial to the reconciliation of God’s sovereign will with human freedom. It is within this context that a full-blown Molinist account of providence can be elucidated.

In the next post we will make clear how this “counterfactual power over God’s knowledge” works. This answer is what is called Molinism. I would like to point out one thing here, though. The author, Plantinga, Craig and others feel the pressure that God’s foreknowledge places on the concept of LFW. The reason they are going through such machinations is because they realize that God’s foreknowledge seems to militate against LFW. They say in the end it does not. Can they really pull this off? We will find that in spite of their heroic and ingenious efforts, the answer is a resounding ‘No’!

tdowns007 · #14 (**permalink**) 05-28-2007, 08:39 PM

When you are finished, will you link it as a complete document?

Brian Bosse · #15 (**permalink**) 05-28-2007, 08:48 PM

Hello Trevor,

I will do better than this. When this is done, I will turn it into a single paper that I will make available as a PDF document.

Sincerely,

Brian

tdowns007 · #16 (**permalink**) 05-29-2007, 12:21 PM

Thanks, I'm going to send him the link to the thread, so he can view this way as well....if you made it this far Tony, Welcome! and Hi!

Brian Bosse · #17 (**permalink**) 05-31-2007, 12:14 AM

Hello Everyone,

I am going to take a short excursion that I hope will lay a foundation. It is a little abstract, but is important. So, please ask questions. If someone is unsure about a concept here, then there are probably others who are unsure as well, and will benefit from the questions. Even though I will try to be clear, I am not always successful. Questions will help clarify points.

We are going to create our own system of possible worlds. This system will be very simple and hopefully will allow us to grasp the much more complicated system making up real possible world semantics. In fact, the construction of our system will parallel the system of real possible world semantics.

Our system begins with only two possible initial stages, which we will call IS(1) and ¬IS(1). What is interesting, this is a logically necessary situation. Think of it as: you either start with IS(1) or you don’t. It is just an application of the law of non-contradiction. So, what is ¬IS(1)? Well, for our purposes, we will say that there is only one other possible initial state, which we will call IS(2). (Note: there is a reason as to why I started with IS(1) and ¬IS(1) rather than starting with IS(1) and IS(2). This reason will be made clear in the next post.)

IS(1) and IS(2) each make up a complete set of events that we are calling the initial stage of a possible world. In real possible world semantics we have the same situation with one major exception. We have IS(1) and ¬IS(1), but ¬IS(1) is made up of a huge number of possible worlds, rather than just one. Think of all the possible starting points there could have been for creation. This would be our initial set. Of course, this is much too large for us to work with, and as such we just pretend that there are only two initial states: IS(1) and IS(2).

Now, there are a number of possible consequences to these initial stages. Think of them as the next stage as time moves forward. In other words, they are what happens next. For IS(1) the possible consequences are MS(1) and ¬MS(1). IS(2) has the possible consequences of MS(2) and ¬MS(2). (‘MS’ stands for middle stage, which is not to be confused with Middle Knowledge. They have nothing to do with each other.) In real possible world semantics the parallel is exact with the exception that there is a huge number of initial stages for which there are two possible consequences, namely MS(n) and ¬MS(n). In our system, we will define ¬MS(1) to be MS(2) and ¬MS(2) to be MS(1) for the sake of simplicity. Of course, this is not the same for real possible world semantics. ¬MS(n) stands for an even larger set of possible consequences than the huge set of possible initial stages. Two stages into real possible world semantics leaves us with a mind boggling number of possibilities.

We will end our possible world system with the final stage FS(1) and FS(2) with all of the corresponding possibilities. In the real possible world semantics, we would not stop here. In fact, there would be numerous stopping points, some right after the initial stage, some after the second stage, and some after the billionth stage. The number of possible combinations is truly staggering. However, it is not too staggering for God to comprehend. In our possible world system, the number of possible worlds is only eight. In real possible world semantics, then number of possible worlds is gargantuan. Here are our eight possible worlds in our little bitty system:

P(1) IS(1) → MS(1) → FS(1)
P(2) IS(1) → MS(1) → FS(2)
P(3) IS(1) → MS(2) → FS(2)
P(4) IS(1) → MS(2) → FS(1)
P(5) IS(2) → MS(2) → FS(2)
P(6) IS(2) → MS(2) → FS(1)
P(7) IS(2) → MS(1) → FS(1)
P(8) IS(2) → MS(1) → FS(2)

Here is the math behind this: 2 (initial stage possibilities) x 2 (middle stage possibilities) x 2 (final stage possibilities) = 8 possible worlds. For illustration purposes, if you want to think for a minute what the math would look like to calculate the number of possible worlds in real possible world semantics you might start this way:

Number of Possible Initial Stages: 3.98x10^245
Number of Possible Second Stages: 9.78x10^245
.
.
.
Number of Possible Twelve Millionth Stages: 5.57x10^459

Total Possible Worlds = (3.98x10^245)x(9.78x10^245)x…x(5.57x10^459). Like I said, this number is gargantuan.

Back to our much simpler system of only eight possible worlds. Each of these possible worlds has an event path that is unique. For instance our P(6) is made up of the following path: <2,2,1>. There is no other possible world that has this path. <1,2,1> is P(4), <2,2,2> is P(5), and <1,1,1> is P(1), etc…The parallel in possible world theory is exactly the same. Each possible world has its own unique event path. Different possible worlds may share many events in common, but each event path will all be unique - just like P(1) and P(2) share the first two stages the same, but end differently. In Molinism, God considers the humongous set of event paths that make up the humongous set of possible worlds in possible world semantics, and He chooses to actuate one of these possible worlds. It is in this sense that God ordains everything that comes to pass. He actuates one possible world and this in turn actuates the event path of this possible world. All events can then be spoken of as being ordained by God on the basis of Him choosing this particular possible world. So, if God were to actuate P(4), then it would be said that God ordained all events that make up the event path <1,2,1>.

Ok, as mentioned earlier, the above discussion was rather abstract. Please ask questions.

Sincerely,

Brian

shackleton · #18 (**permalink**) 06-01-2007, 11:02 AM

Brian, are you implying that you believe this stuff? or are you just giving a critique of what someone else believes?

tdowns007 · #19 (**permalink**) 06-01-2007, 01:06 PM

"This thread will be a critique of Thomas Rauchenstein’s article “A ‘Middle’ Knowledge Perspective on the Doctrine of Divine Providence”. Middle Knowledge (MK) lends itself to be understood within the framework of Possible World Semantics, and as such I will begin with a very brief introduction to the logic of possible world semantics."

He's arguing against it.....

I've been reading through William Lane Craig's site, and listening to his lectures. His lecture on the Doctrine of God, part 1, is spot on...he's a very good teacher, I just think he's so hung up on wanting libertarian free will, that he's using his great intellect to find a way to make it work.....it is interesting though, and so I'm enjoying Brian's work on it. Still seems it's simple in that it's simply wrong, because Craig puts man's decision, as the basis for salvation. Very complicated, as far as what Brian's dealing with though......

shackleton · #20 (**permalink**) 06-01-2007, 01:41 PM

Sorry for the interlude.

So are you saying that God thinks out many possible world paths along with their consequences and then picks the best one based on His wisdom? Then proceeds to do what it takes to make that world a reality.