Thread: modal argument against free will

Let FW = men have libertarian free will, and by libertarian free will, I mean, in any set of circumstances, for some act, you are able to either commit an act or to refrain from committing an act; both of them are possibilities for you
GP = God makes a promise which requires for its fulfillment the cooperation of libertarian free creatures
GU = God's promise goes unfulfilled
GL = God is a liar
Fx = x is free
COx = x freely cooperates with God (and thus God's promise is fulfilled)


(P1) (FW ∧ GP) → (∃x)((Fx → (¬◻COx ∧ ¬◻¬COx)) ∧ Fx)
(P2) (∃x)((Fx → (¬◻COx ∧ ¬◻¬COx)) ∧ Fx) → ◊¬COx
(P3) ◊¬COx → ◊GU
(P4) ◊GU → ◊GL
(P5) ¬◊GL
(C1) ∴ ¬◊GU
(C2) ∴ ¬◊¬COx
(C3) ∴ ¬(∃x)((Fx → (¬◻COx ∧ ¬◻¬COx)) ∧ Fx)
(C4) ∴ ¬(FW ∧ GP)
(P6) ¬(FW ∧ GP) ≡ (¬FW ∨ ¬GP)
(P7) ¬¬GP
(C5) ∴ ¬FW

I am no logician so probably my form is wrong or it is sloppily organized but this is it.

ummmmm..........

I am also thinking this:

(P1) (FW ∧ GP) → ◊GL
(P2) ¬◊ GL
(P3) ¬◊GL ≡ ◻¬GL
(C1) ∴ ◻¬(FW ∧ GP)
(P4) ◻¬(FW ∧ GP) ≡ ((FW ∧ ¬GP)∨(¬FW ∧ GP)∨(¬FW ∧ ¬GP))
(P5) GP
(C2) ∴ (¬FW ∧ GP)
(C3) ∴ ¬FW

Just be sure that if you are attempting to use such arguments, you are using them in a secondary, "and the light of nature also declares this" way.

lol, what do you mean Prufrock?

Steven, it would be helpful if you list how you go from premise to conclusion (e.g. "modus tollens on #3 and #4"), and also what the various symbols mean.

I need to learn more about modal logic.

Yes some clarification on the symbols would be greatly appreciated.

Originally Posted by ewenlin

Good work Steven, now can I see the algorithm for the people who believe in Open Theism.

Actually, I've got this one. I shouldn't have even asked, as it's only the two modal symbols that I'm uncertain about.

∧ = and
V = or
→ = implies (e.g. P→Q is "P implies Q" or "If P, then Q")
¬ = not
∃x = for some x (e.g. ∃x(Dx) could be, "For some x, x is a dog," i.e., "A dog exists.")
◻ = it is necessary that
◊ = it is possible that
≡ = biconditional; each side implies the other (e.g. "P≡Q" = "If P, then Q; and if Q, then P")

The symbol for "or" is not used, but I figured I'd throw it in there anyway.

-----Added 9/23/2009 at 12:02:18 EST-----

First, Steven, I think it'd be best to avoid using the predicate-logic quantifiers. You used only one, ∃, and you didn't use it elsewhere. However, predicate logic, if I am not mistaken, necessitates that every phrase have some quantifier; therefore you erred when you had "stand-alone" propositions. Predicates, using either ∃ or ∀ quantifiers, must be present in all propositions or none. However, this is off the top of my head and I could be totally wrong about it.

Second, your argument is basically that if people can possibly reject cooperating with God, then God's promise possibly goes unfulfilled and God possibly is a liar. God cannot possibly be a liar; ergo etc. However, I think a free-willist would react to this by declaring that God promises to do all He can to save people; He doesn't promise to actually save anyone, and consequently your premise is false. After all, He wants people to really love Him; He doesn't want robots! Therefore, God's promise would be entirely fulfilled just by His giving people prevenient grace, and God would not have any unbroken promises just because some people mishandled His grace.

Of course, if you show from the Bible that God promises actual salvation for His people, rather than potential salvation for everybody, then free-willism is again disproved. But in that case there's no elaborate syllogism you get to flaunt.

Yeah, I started to write a post, but what Ben said. As it stands, P1 (particularly GP) seems inadequate. Good job, though. I read modal logic so rarely that it was like trying to read Hebrew after a long break.

Originally Posted by Confessor

Second, your argument is basically that if people can possibly reject cooperating with God, then God's promise possibly goes unfulfilled and God possibly is a liar. God cannot possibly be a liar; ergo etc. However, I think a free-willist would react to this by declaring that God promises to do all He can to save people; He doesn't promise to actually save anyone, and consequently your premise is false. After all, He wants people to really love Him; He doesn't want robots! Therefore, God's promise would be entirely fulfilled just by His giving people prevenient grace, and God would not have any unbroken promises just because some people mishandled His grace.

God does make a promise that (the Arminians would say) requires free cooperation to be fulfilled. God promises Abraham that in him the nations are going to be blessed; I understand Paul in Galatians 3 as saying that this promise is fulfilled in the possibility of men being justified by faith rather than through the works of the law. They are blessed if they have faith. Clearly God would not make necessary that any one person is saved, so this is a promise which requires cooperation (so the Arminians will say).

Originally Posted by steven-nemes

God does make a promise that (the Arminians would say) requires free cooperation to be fulfilled. God promises Abraham that in him the nations are going to be blessed; I understand Paul in Galatians 3 as saying that this promise is fulfilled in the possibility of men being justified by faith rather than through the works of the law. They are blessed if they have faith. Clearly God would not make necessary that any one person is saved, so this is a promise which requires cooperation (so the Arminians will say).

Arminians would view this as two parts, God's offer and man's acceptance, and they would say that God promised only to make the offer. In other words, God's promise is of conditional salvation: "You put faith in Me, and I'll save you." Grossly unbiblical, sure. The fact that all who have faith in Christ are saved therefore shows that, according to Arminianism, God is in fact keeping His promise.

However, if you go back to God's promise to Abraham and conceive of it in terms of physical descent, then we have something. For instance, when Abraham was about to sacrifice Isaac, if free will is true, he could have killed him. It might be argued that in that case God would have provided him another son, but Abraham could free-willedly refuse to sleep with his wife, or kill any children she bears, etc. As each of these scenarios show, it's always possible for the promise not to be fulfilled, and then your argument holds.

An Arminian might respond that God foreknew that everything would work out just fine, and then promised on the basis of that foreknowledge, but in such a case your polemic reduces to the fact that omniscience destroys the notion of free will.

If God foreknows X, it still has to be possible that not-X in order for S to be free.

Another example would be the promise to save the world through the Messiah which required to cooperation of the Jews and Romans who killed Jesus. If they did so but not freely, but were still morally responsible, then you don't need LFW to be morally responsible. If they did so freely, then they must have had the possibility of doing otherwise, which they didn't.

“Of course, if you show from the Bible that God promises actual salvation for His people, rather than potential salvation for everybody, then free-willism is again disproved.”

Confessor,

A refutation of free will is a bit more complex than what is being implied. I trust you were simply cutting to the chase... What needs to be argued, which I'm not suggesting you aren't keenly aware of, is that the truth of a morally relevant choice requires that it fall out necessarily and not contingently. In other words, that God’s promises are fulfilled through human agency does not prove that morally relevant choices are not purely contingent.

Arminians agree:

1. Necessarily, if God foreknows x, then x will happen
2. God foreknows x
3. Therefore, x will happen

The following argument they would argue is fallacious:

1. Necessarily, if God foreknows x, then x will happen
2. God foreknows x
3. Therefore, x will necessarily happen

Philosophically astute Calvinists appreciate the fallacious nature of the second argument. The fallacy in view is that of transferring the necessity of the inference to the conclusion. The question is whether the fallacy can be made to disappear. One way to do so is by establishing that a necessary condition for God’s foreknowledge of x is the necessity of x. Remember, Molinists assert that x will occur, not necessarily but contingently. Of course a contingent x, by definition, truly might not occur. Accordingly, Molinists are left with God knowing that x might not occur while knowing it will occur – but these are contradictory truths and, therefore, impossible for God to know. Accordingly, God’s foreknowledge of x presupposes the necessity of x for the simple reason that might and will are semantically antithetical and it is true (by the Molinists own admission) that x will occur. Consequently, if x will occur, then it is false that it merely might (or might not) occur.

Another way of making the fallacy disappear is to argue successfully that necessarily, God foreknows x, something most Calvinists are afraid to do. Molinists agree with the validity but not the soundness of the following argument (in other words, they agree with the form of argument but not with all the premises):

1. Necessarily, if God foreknows x, then x will happen
2. Necessarily, God foreknows x
3. Therefore, x will necessarily happen

Molinists deny that necessarily God foreknows x. In fact, pop-Molinist William Lane Craig states “Christian theology always maintained that God’s creation of the world is a free act, that God could have created a different world – in which x does not occur – or even no world at all. To say that God necessarily foreknows any event x implies that this is the only world God could have created and thus denies divine freedom.”

Sadly, Frame (and I believe we can say the same of Helm) agree with Craig. What they fail to grasp is that YES, God could have created a different world - but only had he wanted! But that is not the same thing as saying that God could have created a different world given the same state of affairs, which included his eternal intention! Frame waffles on this point and Helm never picks up on it but tacitly agrees I must infer. By doing so they attribute an attribute to God no different than that of LFW, which if he has then why not we?

In passing we might note that Molinsts are not typically well read in the areas of Reformed systematics and historical, Reformation Protestantism. In part IV, Section VII of Jonathan Edwards’s classic, The Freedom of the Will Edwards has much to say on this matter under the heading “Concerning the Necessity of the Divine Will.” Edwards so eloquently states that “It no more argues any dependence of God’s will, that his supremely wise volition is necessary, that it argues a dependence of his being, that his existence is necessary. If it be something too low for the Supreme Being to have his will determined by moral necessity, so as necessarily, in every case, to will in the highest degree holily and happily; then why is it not also something too low for him to have his existence, and the infinite perfection of his nature, and his infinite happiness, determined by necessity. It is not more to God’s dishonor to be necessarily wise, than to be necessarily holy… and, in every case, to act most wisely, or do the thing which is the wisest of all; for wisdom is also in itself excellent and honorable… One thing more I would observe, before I conclude this section; and that is, that if it derogates nothing from the glory of God to necessarily determined by superior fitness in some things; then neither does it to be thus determined in all things…”

LFW is not needed but rather "liberty" in order to establish moral accountability:

Molinists do not draw any distinction whatsoever between liberty (i.e. the ability to choose as one wants), and the power of contrary choice, which is the alleged ability to act contrary to how one will (libertarian free will). The two are the same for the Molinist; yet the former idea pertains to moral accountability, whereas the latter is metaphysical notion that in the end would destroy moral accountability. It’s sad to consider but has anyone ever read a Molinist where he has interacted with the notion of liberty, which is the very seat of moral accountability? Why isn’t the ability to choose as we want a sufficient condition for moral accountability? Do Molinists tell us why liberty is insufficient? No, they simply ignore the matter of liberty and make the bald assertion that we must be able to choose contrary to what we will in order to be morally responsible agents. What is it after all to be able to choose x, when we intend to choose ~x? If that’s a caricature of libertarian freedom, then will a Molinist explain this metaphysical notion in light of the infinite regress problem that is inherent to the notion?

Pressing on, we should see that the minor premise that “necessarily, God foreknows x” is indeed true. If God’s foreknowledge of x was not necessary, then it was contingent. Forget for a moment that future contingencies - being truly contingent - defy eternal truth values with respect to their outcome, (which Open Theists have demonstrated). How about the simple truth that everything eternal (God and his thoughts) must be necessary? After all, did God deliberate? Did God move from not knowing to knowing? Moreover, where is “x will happen” grounded if not in the eternal, determination of God? And if there, what does it mean to determine x without determining a cause of x? Did contingent causes determine God’s eternal decree, which would include the Arminian notion of "contingent certainties"?!

A third way to get rid of the fallacy is to utilize facts that are grammatically in the past tense yet contemplate acts still future. The progression below takes no shortcuts so it might seem a bit tedious, but each step is appropriate.

Establish the necessity of God’s belief about Tom’s choice:
1. 100 years ago God believed that Tom will do x tomorrow
2. If x is believed in the past, it is now necessary that x was believed then
3. It is now necessary that 100 years ago God believed that Tom will do x tomorrow

Establish the necessity of Tom’s choice, given the necessity of God’s belief:
4. Necessarily, if 100 years ago God believed Tom will do x tomorrow, then Tom will do x tomorrow
5. If p {i.e. God's historical belief about Tom's choice} is now necessary (3), and necessarily if p, then q; then q {i.e. Tom's choice of x tomorrow: (consequent from 4)} is now necessary [transfer of necessity principle]
6. Therefore, it is now necessary that Tom will do x tomorrow [3, 4 and 5]

Establish that Tom does not act freely, given the necessity of Tom’s choice:
7. If it is now necessary that Tom will do x tomorrow, then Tom cannot do otherwise
8. Therefore, Tom cannot do otherwise than x tomorrow
9. If one cannot do otherwise, then one does not act freely
10. Therefore, when Tom does x tomorrow, he will not do it freely

Molinists will again find the argument valid but take issue with some of the premises, namely 5 if not also 2. With respect to 2, a Molinist might wish to assert that the necessity of the past does not apply to the entire past, but that’s an arbitrary stricture. A Molinist might also object to premise 5, where a change of modality occurs whereby accidental necessities (necessities about the past) are intermixed with metaphysical necessities having to do with actions of choice. This, however, represents a classic case of drawing a distinction without a relevant difference. The Molinist objection is to the transfer of necessity principle, yet they permit the very same principle of logic when dealing with the validity of argument 3! Accordingly, their objection should only be with premise 2 of argument 4, but are they prepared to argue that the past is contingent and not necessary?!

Given an objection to the transfer of necessity principle, the Molinist position reduces to: Tom's choice of x will necessarily occur but contingently. What is it though for x necessarily to occur by contingent means? In other words, what does it mean for a necessary occurrence to fall out contingently?! (Again, "will = might" for the Molinist.)

In summation, Craig’s lament with argument 3 is that one cannot prove the necessity of God’s foreknowledge. If one can prove that necessity, then I am led to believe by his say-so that he would accept the conclusion of argument 3 above, which asserts the non-contingent nature of choice. Consequently, the issue with Craig and his disciples over the 10-step proof should not be over any change in modaltity in step-5, since the same sort of modality change occurs in argument 3 without objection! Craig’s objection to argument 3 is not a change of modality objection but rather strictly a metaphysical objection pertaining God’s free will. Having no modality objection there, Craigites should find none in argument 4 either. Consequently, Craig and his disciples should at least begin by conceding that in time God’s foreknowledge became necessary (step 3 – argument 4), which should lead him to embrace all the valid arguments on the page as being sound given no modality objection for argument 3. Now why won’t they? Because the matter is ethical, not intellectual, that’s why. God has blinded the Arminian to the glorious doctrines of grace, which is why they say things like: “How can God find fault, for who can resist his will?” I’m afraid that Arminians don’t recognize that Romans nine is speaking to them.

Ron

Ronald,

I just re-read your post, and I agree with all of it. It was a supreme pleasure to read. I do have a few questions and comments, though:

(1) You said the following:

Sadly, Frame (and I believe we can say the same of Helm) agree with Craig. What they fail to grasp is that YES, God could have created a different world - but only had he wanted! But that is not the same thing as saying that God could have created a different world given the same state of affairs, which included his eternal intention!

Doesn't it follow, then, that this universe is the only possible world? If this is not the only possible world, then by what possibility could God's nature be otherwise, so that He would desire to create a different world? If this is the only possible world, then why can I conceive of different worlds; wouldn't my conception of them ipso facto establish their possibility?

(2) You said the following:

It’s sad to consider but has anyone ever read a Molinist where he has interacted with the notion of liberty, which is the very seat of moral accountability? Why isn’t the ability to choose as we want a sufficient condition for moral accountability?

This is true. No one is ever willing to consider that power of contrary choice is not essential to moral responsibility. They figure that since we do not choose our inclinations (which would require an infinite regress), it would be false to base freedom as being the outworking of our inclinations. Unfortunately, this goes contrary to experience, as I can recall many times when a disposition of anger or licentiousness or vanity arose in me; I never chose for their arising, but I knew I was responsible for them.

(3) Usually, when I'm debating with a free-willist, I abandon arguing from God's foreknowledge (usually because they invoke God's timelessness and it just gets weird) and argue rather from bivalence, i.e., that propositions must be either true or false. Let C be the proposition that a free choice is made: If it is true at T1 that C occurs at T2, then C cannot possibly be false at any moment up to T2, in which case it occurs necessarily and not contingently. (Propositions that are already "established" as true cannot be changed into falsities, not even possibly.) They may argue that such a proposition is not yet established until the actual time (T2) when the choice occurs, but this amounts to a denial of bivalence, in which a proposition is not only unknown to be true or false, but undetermined.

Hence, bivalence necessitates determinism.

I'm going to have to read the rest of your post, starting with "pressing on," tomorrow. (That part looks good! )

Confessor,

Thanks for your kind and encouraging words. Let me tell you, I thoroughly enjoyed your response especially in light of what I'm experiencing over on the Galatians thread!

“Doesn't it follow, then [from what you wrote], that this universe is the only possible world?”

If we consider possible worlds as those that God could have created had he wanted, then there are of course other possible worlds. If we consider possible worlds as those worlds that God could have created given his greatest inclination, then of course the one he created is the only possible world. I’m fine with either tagging of the term as long as there’s clear communication.

“If this is not the only possible world, then by what possibility could God's nature be otherwise, so that He would desire to create a different world?”

God’s nature cannot be different. What I think you mean by “nature” is his inclination. One chooses according to his strongest inclination at the moment of choice and that inclination is always consistent with the nature; yet it is not the nature but rather the inclination that determines the choice. Because one has a human nature, he will want food from time to time. That he chooses ice cream over spinach is due to the inclination at the moment of choice. The choice is consistent with the nature but it is inclination that determines the choice of ice cream. Having said all that, I think you are asking whether God could have had a different inclination to create a different world. We can approach that question a couple of ways. Edwards, in the quote I supplied, approached it by suggesting that God’s choice of this world was perfectly wise; hence any other choice would have been less than that, which would have been impossible for God. I agree. The impossibility would have been for the other inclination. Another way we could approach it is by asking whether God’s choice of this world was according to his strongest inclination. If it was, then how could he have had another inclination? If one were to say he could have chosen another inclination, then of course that choice would have needed to been according to an inclination too. In which case I’d ask whether that inclination was chosen and if so according to what, still another inclination? You see the problem I trust.

“If this is the only possible world, then why can I conceive of different worlds; wouldn't my conception of them ipso facto establish their possibility?”

If we presuppose that you can only conceive of things that are logically consistent, then yes, you would have conceived of a world that God could have created had he wanted. We’d be using the possible world definition of the first kind.

“This is true. No one is ever willing to consider that power of contrary choice is not essential to moral responsibility. They figure that since we do not choose our inclinations (which would require an infinite regress), it would be false to base freedom as being the outworking of our inclinations. Unfortunately, this goes contrary to experience, as I can recall many times when a disposition of anger or licentiousness or vanity arose in me; I never chose for their arising, but I knew I was responsible for them.”

Indeed – and what you know by experience spawns you on by grace to willfully guard against those tendencies, which begets even greater strength and victory – praise be to God! It’s too wonderful for words.

“(3) Usually, when I'm debating with a free-willist, I abandon arguing from God's foreknowledge (usually because they invoke God's timelessness and it just gets weird) and argue rather from bivalence, i.e., that propositions must be either true or false.”

Absolutely! God’s prescience is utterly irrelevant. The question is whether the proposition in view is true and not whether it is known. If we bring knowledge into the picture, we could just as well use man’s knowledge because if x is known by anyone, then it’s true.

“Let C be the proposition that a free choice is made: If it is true at T1 that C occurs at T2, then C cannot possibly be false at any moment up to T2, in which case it occurs necessarily and not contingently.”

I agree with the conclusion but it assumes a premise that has not yet been established in what you wrote. Pure contingency must be refuted, which is why I addressed the antithetical nature of “might” and “will” occurrences. I think you begin to touch upon that missing premise below.

“(Propositions that are already "established" as true cannot be changed into falsities, not even possibly.)”

YES - which is to say that something that might occur does not comport with the truth that it will occur. When we really get down to it, how can there be anything that “might” occur in the mind of God? From God’s perspective, which is the perspective of truth, things either will or will not occur. There is no “might” with God. Probability of occurrence deals with our inability to capture and analyze the causal nexus, whether physical or metaphysical.

“They may argue that such a proposition is not yet established until the actual time (T2) when the choice occurs, but this amounts to a denial of bivalence, in which a proposition is not only unknown to be true or false, but undetermined.”

That would be how the Open Theist deals with the issue. The Molinist wants his cake and eats it too. He wants the eternal truth of the proposition so he doesn’t become a total heretic by having to deny God’s exhaustive omniscience, but he also wants pure contingency too, in order to protect his view of moral accountability (or else to seek autonomy from God!).

Best wishes,

Ron

If God foreknows X, it still has to be possible that not-X in order for S to be free.

Says who?

Certainly not the bible.

Originally Posted by rpavich

If God foreknows X, it still has to be possible that not-X in order for S to be free.

Says who?

Certainly not the bible.

Steve wrote that but only as an example of what those who embrace libertarian free will find necessary for moral accountability with respect to creaturely choices.

Ron

thanks for clarifying that for me

no prob

Ron,

First, thank you for correcting me on the distinction between nature and inclination.

Originally Posted by Ron

Originally Posted by Ben

“If this is the only possible world, then why can I conceive of different worlds; wouldn't my conception of them ipso facto establish their possibility?”

If we presuppose that you can only conceive of things that are logically consistent, then yes, you would have conceived of a world that God could have created had he wanted. We’d be using the possible world definition of the first kind.

If God cannot but choose that which is perfectly wise, then it is not possible for God to have different inclinations, correct? And if God cannot possibly have different inclinations, then He could not have made a world different from this one. I don't think this is somehow impinging on divine freedom (lest I want to revert to the libertarian stance that power of contrary choice is essential to freedom), but I am curious how this meshes with the fact that I can imagine worlds different from this one. Usually, something is considered possible so long as it's not contradictory or nonsensical.

In other words, here's the problem: it's contradictory to say that God could create a world less perfect than this one, making all different worlds to be impossible. However, I can clearly conceive of a different world that is not contradictory or nonsensical (e.g. one in which I am not in my dorm room at the moment), meaning that some different worlds are in fact possible.

Confessor,

I would suggest you’re using possible in two different ways, which leads to the ambiguity. We can leave God out of the picture and just talk of the actions of men. Something can be logically feasible for me to choose and in that sense possible, while at the same time metaphysically uncaused, and in that sense impossible. I could have in a logical sense refrained from writing this post but not in a decreetal / metaphysical sense since my strongest inclination was to write. So, you can readily imagine a world where I just blew you off and didn’t respond. The world that contains that choice (of my not responding) is no less logically consistent than this one which contains my choice to write. As you are most comfortable with, my choice to write was indeed necessary and not purely contingent. Accordingly, that world in which I blew you off given the same state of affairs (up to the inclination determined by God) was although logically possible - it was impossible in a causal sense.

Best wishes,

Ron

Originally Posted by steven-nemes

let fw = men have libertarian free will, and by libertarian free will, i mean, in any set of circumstances, for some act, you are able to either commit an act or to refrain from committing an act; both of them are possibilities for you
gp = god makes a promise which requires for its fulfillment the cooperation of libertarian free creatures
gu = god's promise goes unfulfilled
gl = god is a liar
fx = x is free
cox = x freely cooperates with god (and thus god's promise is fulfilled)


(p1) (fw ∧ gp) → (∃x)((fx → (¬◻cox ∧ ¬◻¬cox)) ∧ fx)
(p2) (∃x)((fx → (¬◻cox ∧ ¬◻¬cox)) ∧ fx) → ◊¬cox
(p3) ◊¬cox → ◊gu
(p4) ◊gu → ◊gl
(p5) ¬◊gl
(c1) ∴ ¬◊gu
(c2) ∴ ¬◊¬cox
(c3) ∴ ¬(∃x)((fx → (¬◻cox ∧ ¬◻¬cox)) ∧ fx)
(c4) ∴ ¬(fw ∧ gp)
(p6) ¬(fw ∧ gp) ≡ (¬fw ∨ ¬gp)
(p7) ¬¬gp
(c5) ∴ ¬fw

i am no logician so probably my form is wrong or it is sloppily organized but this is it.

what in the world?

Ron,

Thanks for clarifying.

And for not blowing me off.

I don't know what it is about your argument, Ron, but I don't like it--maybe the fact that a consequence of it is that every fact about the world is a necessary truth.

There is something else I also don't understand.

If God could have made a different world had he wanted to, then it is not necessary that he wants to make a world with X, and if it is not necessary that he wants to make a world with X, then it is not necessary that he foreknows X.

gWX = God wants to make a world with X
gKX = God knows X

[](gWX -> gKX)
gWX
∴ []gKX

Clearly that's not right.

Originally Posted by steven-nemes

If God could have made a different world had he wanted to, then it is not necessary that he wants to make a world with X, and if it is not necessary that he wants to make a world with X, then it is not necessary that he foreknows X.

It is impossible that God would not want to make this world, for His choice of this world was perfectly wise, and He is necessarily perfectly wise.

That is absurd. Then every fact about the universe is a necessary truth, which no one would accept.

Besides it is conceivable that there is a better world than this, one where, say, instead of only typing this message, I am typing this message while eating a delicious slice of pizza at the same time. That universe is better than this one.

Originally Posted by steven-nemes

That is absurd. Then every fact about the universe is a necessary truth, which no one would accept.

There are some distinctions that need to be made regarding necessity and contingency, and I simply am unprepared to make them right now. In any case, you can see what we wrote above regarding those distinctions (where I asked what the implications for the fact that I can conceive of a different universe were).

Besides it is conceivable that there is a better world than this, one where, say, instead of only typing this message, I am typing this message while eating a delicious slice of pizza at the same time. That universe is better than this one.

As far as your saying that some separate universe is better than this one, that's simply not true. God works for the display of His glory, and He is omnipotent and omniscient; therefore this universe will display His glory better than any other universe.

I'll check it out tomorrow. I can't now.

Originally Posted by steven-nemes

I don't know what it is about your argument, Ron, but I don't like it--maybe the fact that a consequence of it is that every fact about the world is a necessary truth.

There is something else I also don't understand.

If God could have made a different world had he wanted to, then it is not necessary that he wants to make a world with X, and if it is not necessary that he wants to make a world with X, then it is not necessary that he foreknows X.

gWX = God wants to make a world with X
gKX = God knows X

[](gWX -> gKX)
gWX
∴ []gKX

Clearly that's not right.

Steve, it does not follow that if God could have made a different world had he wanted to, that therefore it was not necessary that we wanted this world. That would be like saying that if I wanted I could have chosen x, therefore, my inclination of y wasn't necessary. The antecedent speaks to liberty and the consequent speaks to metaphysical ability. Moreover, the "if" of the antecedent doesen't imply pure contingency and not necessity. At best it implies logical possibility and liberty.

Also, God had liberty to choose contrary to this world, yet given that he chose this world, it does not follow that he would not necessarily know x.

Finally, rather than lament over what I wrote, you might wish to offer a construct that does not involve LFW. If you can't, then you must allow LFW for all creatures, which if you do will of course destroy God's omniscience.


Ron

P.S. I'm away this weekend starting last night so any posting will be on the fly, if at all.

It doesn't follow from the fact that I believe God has libertarian free will that I therefore believe that humans have free will, or even can have free will. And I'm not convinced that if humans have LFW, then God's omniscience is destroyed. I'd like to see that argument.

Steve, it does not follow that if God could have made a different world had he wanted to, that therefore it was not necessary that we wanted this world. That would be like saying that if I wanted I could have chosen x, therefore, my inclination of y wasn't necessary.The antecedent speaks to liberty and the consequent speaks to metaphysical ability. Moreover, the "if" of the antecedent doesn't imply pure contingency and not necessity. At best it implies logical possibility and liberty.

If God has compatibilist free will, then necessarily, if he chooses to do X, then X was his strongest inclination at that moment. If those factors which determine his inclinations, like his goodness and wisdom and so on, are necessary, which they are, then his inclination also is necessary. If his inclination is necessary, then his creating this world is necessary. If his creating this world is necessary, then his knowing every fact about this world is necessary, and every fact about the world therefore is necessary also.

I am saying if God has compatibilist free will, it is not even logically possible that he want to do other than he did.

Also, God had liberty to choose contrary to this world, yet given that he chose this world, it does not follow that he would not necessarily know x.

If God necessarily chose this world, then he did not have liberty, because he was not capable of wanting anything other than this world.

Originally Posted by steven-nemes

It doesn't follow from the fact that I believe God has libertarian free will that I therefore believe that humans have free will, or even can have free will. And I'm not convinced that if humans have LFW, then God's omniscience is destroyed. I'd like to see that argument.

Steve, it does not follow that if God could have made a different world had he wanted to, that therefore it was not necessary that we wanted this world. That would be like saying that if I wanted I could have chosen x, therefore, my inclination of y wasn't necessary.The antecedent speaks to liberty and the consequent speaks to metaphysical ability. Moreover, the "if" of the antecedent doesn't imply pure contingency and not necessity. At best it implies logical possibility and liberty.

If God has compatibilist free will, then necessarily, if he chooses to do X, then X was his strongest inclination at that moment. If those factors which determine his inclinations, like his goodness and wisdom and so on, are necessary, which they are, then his inclination also is necessary. If his inclination is necessary, then his creating this world is necessary. If his creating this world is necessary, then his knowing every fact about this world is necessary, and every fact about the world therefore is necessary also.

I am saying if God has compatibilist free will, it is not even logically possible that he want to do other than he did.

Also, God had liberty to choose contrary to this world, yet given that he chose this world, it does not follow that he would not necessarily know x.

If God necessarily chose this world, then he did not have liberty, because he was not capable of wanting anything other than this world.

Steve,

I pointed out several errors in your post that preceded your last post. Rather than deal with those errors you simply moved on to make new assertions. (It's tedious to try to interact with moving targets.) Those other assertions make several new blunders, like not appreciating what a logical possibility is, which is not to appreciate what a possible world is (let alone a feasible world); nor do you understand how liberty differs from metaphysical ability, a monstrosity indeed in such a discourse as this one you want to involve yourself with. Moreover, to speak of God having "compatibilist free will" is not to appreciate what compatibilist free will means. The term strictly pertains to creaturely choices and its relationship to God's decree, and may not be philosophically applied to God's choices! Finally, if LFW is a philosophical surd due to the notion of pure contingency, then not even God can have it. You said that God having LFW doesn't imply that we do. Well, if God's will can be purely contingent (allowing for the philosphical surd), then there would be no reason to believe that such an alleged attribute is not a communicable attribute! After all, its either an essential property for morally relevant choices (for all persons with a will) or it is not.

As for your assertion that creaturely LFW might be compatible with God's omniscience, I destroy that idea in a previous post (above) that I'll link you to below. The short answer is that might and would counterfactuals are contradictory and proponents of LFW who want to mantain divine omniscience demand both - that something that truly might not occur (due to LFW) truly will occur (a precondition for omniscience). If something is free in the LFW sense (i.e. purely contingent), then it defies a truth value, yet foreknowledge of such choices presuppoes the truth of the outcome, hence the contradiction! That is the achilles heal of Arminianism. Consistent Arminianism leads to Open Theism, which means that if man has LFW God is not omniscient.

Young man, your posture conveys that you are no longer seeking; so I see no point in arguing against your position any longer. I already know what I believe.

modal argument against free will

Blessings,

Ron

Originally Posted by steven-nemes

And I'm not convinced that if humans have LFW, then God's omniscience is destroyed. I'd like to see that argument.

LFW mandates that the essence of freedom is the power of contrary choice, i.e., the power to choose contrary to how one actually does, all other things being equal. This means that one would have the power not to do what God has foreknown from all eternity, which is an absurdity. If all other things, including God's foreknowledge, are equal, then there is only one course of action; other courses, given God's foreknowledge, are impossible. Therefore, LFW and divine omniscience are contradictory.

Originally Posted by Steven

Originally Posted by Ron

Steve, it does not follow that if God could have made a different world had he wanted to, that therefore it was not necessary that we wanted this world. That would be like saying that if I wanted I could have chosen x, therefore, my inclination of y wasn't necessary.The antecedent speaks to liberty and the consequent speaks to metaphysical ability. Moreover, the "if" of the antecedent doesn't imply pure contingency and not necessity. At best it implies logical possibility and liberty.

If God has compatibilist free will, then necessarily, if he chooses to do X, then X was his strongest inclination at that moment. If those factors which determine his inclinations, like his goodness and wisdom and so on, are necessary, which they are, then his inclination also is necessary. If his inclination is necessary, then his creating this world is necessary. If his creating this world is necessary, then his knowing every fact about this world is necessary, and every fact about the world therefore is necessary also.

I am saying if God has compatibilist free will, it is not even logically possible that he want to do other than he did.

Steven, you did not note the distinction Ron made between possibilities. Sometimes we discuss possibilities in terms of what is logically conceivable, and sometimes we discuss possibilities also taking into account the metaphysical and causal antecedents. For instance, we might talk about God predestining the entire human race to hell. We conceive of this, and we can discuss it intelligibly -- it is possible in the sense that is logically consistent. However, if we take God's nature into the equation, we realize that an instantiation of such a possible world is not possible -- in the sense that God would never want to make such a world. God's mercy would not be demonstrated in such a world.

Therefore, our present world is the only possible world when we understand that it is metaphysically interconnected with God's being, but it is not the only possible world when we discuss it as detached from its requisite metaphysical antecedent.

We often talk about possibilities as detached from requisite metaphysical antecedents anyway, e.g. when we talk about how we might have ordered something different from a restaurant, or answered differently on a test, or said something different to another person. But in each of those situations we are clearly talking about what is possible not taking metaphysical antecedents into consideration; we are discussing what we would have freely chosen if we had so desired...which leads to the next point:

Originally Posted by Steven

Originally Posted by Ron

Also, God had liberty to choose contrary to this world, yet given that he chose this world, it does not follow that he would not necessarily know x.

If God necessarily chose this world, then he did not have liberty, because he was not capable of wanting anything other than this world.

Make sure not to beg the question in favor of LFW. To say that God necessarily chose a certain option is not to say that God had no liberty. To (paraphrasingly) borrow from the Jonathan Edwards quote above, if it is no impingement on God's goodness to say that He cannot possibly sin, then it is no impingement on His wisdom to say that He cannot possibly choose a world that is less than perfect.

Liberty has to do with acting in accord with one's inclinations, not the power of contrary choice. God therefore had liberty to choose contrary to this world in the sense that if He wanted He could have chosen a different world.

I don't understand how the "had he wanted" clause even helps. It would not be possible for God to want other than he did. It is like saying, "God could have done otherwise, you know, had he not been God..."

That is fine, I don't mind not discussing God's free choice and so on. If it is so clear that I don't understand what is going on, that's fine, I'll trust your judgment on it. The fact of the matter is that if God necessarily foreknows X, where X is any fact at all about this world, then X is a necessary fact which is beyond absurd.