Thread: Defining Free Will

Free will can mean, "to act according to one's desires." One can be a Calvinist and believe that we have free will in the sense of acting according to one's desires.

Anselm defined free will as "the power of preserving rectitude of will for its own sake." What did he mean by this?

Everyone's free will plays in a playpen.

Confessor,

I think you might be getting a bit ahead of yourself.

"If one has the capability of performing an action when he wants, then he has a natural ability to carry out that action." (I placed your entire quote in italics so I decided to place what you had in italics in bold print.)

Although the capability of performing an action when one wants is a sufficient condition for natural ability, it is not the only the sufficient condition; in fact, it might be misleading to say what you said given where you put the accent. One’s liberty can be restricted due to external physical constraints (such as imprisonment) yet such constraints would not eliminate natural ability, yet your statement above seems to place the accent upon the ability to act upon one's intentions, as if the ability to act upon one's intention is a necessary condition for natural ability. I find the accent a bit misleading, that's all. “When one wants” does not speak to natural ability but to liberty. The man in jail, for instance, has the innate capability of walking in the park, which is to say he has the natural ability to carry out the action. However, his being lock-up precludes such action, but does not take away his natural ability; so it is false that being capable of acting when one wants is the only sufficient condition for natural ability. "When one wants" either muddies the water or implies something false.

"Would you say that this proposition is true? If God desired to sin, [then] He would be powerful enough to carry it out."

If God desired to sin, then he would have sinned already. He would have sinned prior to acting upon the intention, whether he was or wasn’t “powerful enough to carry it out.” Accordingly, the power to carry out the sin is not necessary for sin to occur. It only clouds the issue.

Moreover, the If-then proposition proceeds upon a false premise, that being God having a desire to sin, which is what I believe Joshua and Matthew are driving at. It’s like saying “if a square was round, then the square x”. The antecedent that contemplates God desiring sin, or a square being round, are logically impossible since for God to desire sin would equate to God not being God, which is indeed a contradiction since by definition God cannot become not God - just like a square cannot be round.

Consider the argument:

If God could desire sin, then God could stop being God
It is false that God could stop being God
Therefore, it is false that God could desire sin

Doesn't that give us pause to argue under the premise of "If God desired to sin", then...?

Yours,

Ron

Matthew and Ron are correct in their posts. Take the time to re-read them.
Free-will does not exist, but is a false philosophical idea,as if man is somehow neutral and outside of the creation of God.
All facts are created facts.God gives meaning to all things. The under-pinning of this supposed ability in fallen mankind is unbelief and a denial of the biblical revelation as set forth in scripture.
We do not have to give in to the false philosphers of the age try and re-define the world. Read carefully 1Cor 1,and 2.

Originally Posted by JTB

The definition of sin contains an aspect that would make it impossible for God to desire it as a metaphysical consideration. Sin is the transgression of what God has Himself established as the standard of conduct. Therefore, for God to desire Himself to sin, would be to desire against His desire to craft a standard for Himself. It basically asserts a contradictory willing in God's nature, which is not respecting of moral character, but of metaphysical or epistemological possibility.

I would agree that it is a metaphysical impossibility, for it is not possible, given God's nature, for Him to possess any inclinations to sin. The outworking of God's will, including all His choices from His inclinations, is metaphysical. This is simply to say that the antecedent of the proposition, "If God could desire sin, then He would be powerful enough to carry it out," is impossible, not necessarily that it is unintelligible.

But this raises the question of whether a proposition which is objectively impossible can be intelligible. If we take a proposition the entirety of which is nonsensical, e.g. "Pyrques kib gyjurles," and if we take a proposition with two unresolvable aspects, e.g. "A square circle exists," then we can see a key difference between the two. In the former, not a single thing makes sense; in the latter, the individual concepts make sense, and because they make sense, we can realize that the whole proposition is unintelligible. It would be foolish to say "If a square circle exists, then X," as the entire proposition would be unintelligible due to the antecedent's unintelligibility. Therefore, if the proposition contains two absolutely unresolvable aspects (e.g., a morally perfect Being who can sin), then such a proposition cannot be the antecedent of an intelligible conditional proposition.

So, Joshua, you are absolutely correct that it is simply meaningless to talk about God's desiring to sin -- and if it's meaningless to posit it as an antecedent, then it's meaningless to attempt to deduce things from it, which I was attempting.

This shows that I should have used a glorified saint to make my point. I will presently change the aforesaid question to, "If a glorified saint could sin, then would he be powerful enough to carry it out?" If so, then he has the natural ability to sin; if not, then he does not. (Certainly it is not unintelligible to speak of someone glorified to have the desire to sin, as it is not inconceivable that God could decree such a thing for His glory. Satan fell from heaven.)

-----Added 10/9/2009 at 11:44:58 EST-----

Originally Posted by armourbearer

This still doesn't grasp what is meant by the distinction. "Natural ability" is an ability to make choices. "Moral ability" is an ability to "choose good," i.e., choices which God judges as good, spiritually and absolutely.

So moral ability refers to a proper use of one's natural ability?

Intelligibility is simply the ability to be understood. Only intelligible things can be possible or impossible. I can't say whether a slithey tove is possible because I don't understand the term and it is therefore unintelligible to me. I can tell you whether a spherical cube exists because I understand what that entails--it's intelligible and I therefore can understand it to be impossible.

Given a malicious omnipotent being, yes he could sin. God is not malicious and therefore cannot sin.

Originally Posted by Ron

Although the capability of performing an action when one wants is a sufficient condition for natural ability, it is not the only the sufficient condition; in fact, it might be misleading to say what you said given where you put the accent. One’s liberty can be restricted due to external physical constraints (such as imprisonment) yet such constraints would not eliminate natural ability, yet your statement above seems to place the accent upon the ability to act upon one's intentions, as if the ability to act upon one's intention is a necessary condition for natural ability.

I would say the ability to act upon one's intention is a necessary condition for natural ability. If I intend to arise from my bed in the morning, but I am actually chained down, then I don't have the natural ability to arise; I am constrained from without.

Originally Posted by Ron

I find the accent a bit misleading, that's all. “When one wants” does not speak to natural ability but to liberty. The man in jail, for instance, has the innate capability of walking in the park, which is to say he has the natural ability to carry out the action. However, his being lock-up precludes such action, but does not take away his natural ability; so it is false that being capable of acting when one wants is the only sufficient condition for natural ability. "When one wants" either muddies the water or implies something false.

How does a man in jail have the natural ability of walking in the park? Does that mean that, if he were in the park and desired to walk, he could? If so, what if I said that a man with no legs had the natural ability to walk in the park, provided he had legs and desired to walk? It seems the only distinction between the two is that one of them is belonging directly to the man's body while one isn't, but that seems an arbitrary divide. And if the divide is arbitrary, then your definition of natural ability as so distinct from liberty is, in my estimation, nonsense, for it would basically say that just about anything has the natural ability to do just about anything, e.g. "My dog has the natural ability to fly, because if she had hollow bones and wings (etc.), and if she wanted, then she could fly."

I would contend that natural ability and liberty are not so different. They are pieces of the same puzzle. If one is capable of doing X when one desires to do X, then one has the natural ability to do X. And if one is performing X when he desires to perform X, then he is performing X with liberty. Therefore, to have natural ability to perform an action is requisite to perform an action; and to perform an action when desiring to perform the action is liberty.

Originally Posted by Ron

If God desired to sin, then he would have sinned already.

I actually would dispute this. Seeing as this is a separate topic, I'll keep it brief. First, keep in mind that there is a distinction between internal sins (lust, covetousness, etc.) and desires to sin; one can desire to do a sin, internal or external, without effecting that desire. Second, and more importantly, desires to sin are necessary in order to undergo temptation; Jesus underwent temptation; ergo etc.

Originally Posted by Ron

Moreover, the If-then proposition proceeds upon a false premise, that being God having a desire to sin, which is what I believe Joshua and Matthew are driving at. It’s like saying “if a square was round, then the square x”. The antecedent that contemplates God desiring sin, or a square being round, are logically impossible since for God to desire sin would equate to God not being God, which is indeed a contradiction since by definition God cannot become not God - just like a square cannot be round.

Consider the argument:

If God could desire sin, then God could stop being God
It is false that God could stop being God
Therefore, it is false that God could desire sin

Doesn't that give us pause to argue under the premise of "If God desired to sin", then...?

Well, the mere fact that the antecedent is false does not imply that the antecedent cannot be used to convey intelligible (and therefore, possibly truthful) propositions -- as your syllogism itself proves. For how could you show such a syllogism if the first premise were wholly unintelligible? I conceded to Joshua above that it would be foolish to proceed from such an unintelligible antecedent, but, even after writing my reply to Joshua so soon, I am questioning this. If the antecedent, "If God could desire sin," is unintelligible, then why is the proposition, "If God could desire sin, then God could stop being God" intelligible? If that proposition, containing the supposedly unintelligible antecedent, is true, then why cannot other propositions containing the same antecedent be true?

I would say this goes back to the two propositions I mentioned earlier, "Pyrques kib gyjurles," and, "A square circle exists." Squares and circles are intelligible concepts, yet they are contradictory; therefore attempting to merge them leads to unintelligibility. For now, I realize that it has something to do with the fact that parts of the proposition are intelligible, and these parts have to be distributed in the syllogism in such a way in order to retain the intelligibility of the propositions as whole, but at the moment I have worked my brain in grinding out all the details of this thread, so I'm gonna take a pass right now.

-----Added 10/10/2009 at 12:10:06 EST-----

Originally Posted by P. F. Pugh

Intelligibility is simply the ability to be understood. Only intelligible things can be possible or impossible.

These short sentences are immensely helpful.

While responsibility presupposes accountability, accountability does not presuppose ability or freedom. Indeed, free will has absolutely nothing to do with responsibility. Instead, accountability simply presupposes one who is in a position to demand accountability, ergo the One who is not responsible to anyone, God.

AMR

Confessor,

I'm going to pass on trying to work through all that you wrote. I find it somewhat confused.

Cheers,

Ron

OK, at least before all the arguments about God and such, Ben was simply stating the view of mainstream Reformed philosophy (of which I'm aware) since Edwards. The natural vs. moral distinction is useful in distinguishing between the Reformed concept of free will vs. libertarian free will. (It can be confusing because the unregenerate's sinful "nature" does not at all pertain to "natural ability" but rather to "moral ability.")

For anyone interested, the seeds of this idea (though not the clear technical language) are visible in Calvin, and perhaps in a few before him. I recommend reading "Free Will" in Paul Helm's John Calvin's Ideas. He is very good at addressing Calvin in his own context, yet also assessing Calvin's ideas from the categories of modern analytic philosophy.

Originally Posted by P. F. Pugh

. . . Pre-enlightenment: Freedom is the ability to do what is good in the sight of God.

Post-enlightenment: Freedom is the natural ability to do what one pleases, whether that be good or evil. . . .

Enlightenment is a funny word. Being an instructor of a Chinese alternative medicines, their philosophies had taken me to many la la lands until I sensed the animated force that keeps man alive and living . One of my schools are called the "School of Sudden Enlightenment" and was trained by well known so-called-masters in China. Man has this animated energy that makes them a living being or alive as compared to dead things. One school teaches a sort of "surrender" to the natural forces barely known to man. A type of free will plays a lot into this. Many claims it's cultic and from the demons but I rather explore all explanation of human slaved free will as much as possible. So far, I've learned that God is in control of all things including every will of men. I, also, learned that God doesn't control of all things including every will of men. As some state here on this site, "it's a mystery!, we may never learn why both "God controls and God doesn't control" until we become enlightened or go "Ah ha! I see now"
As the cult-like Taoist said," We can't talk about the Tao (an impersonal god) cause we don't have the language to understand it. They say if you describe the Tao, you don't understand what it is.
There is a form, (movements) that I teach, that allows man to surrender to the forces or an invisible natural magnetic fields of earth and I believe God uses our environments to cause us to do things according to His Own Will. This surrender allows us to observe the forces that controls us. In other Words, free will is a man-made philosophy that doesn't really exist.
What I wrote here may sound from la la land but it's from my deep search to explain the works of Charismatic Pentecostal movements and many other healing arts. Theres a lot of historical explanations of "freewill" in many countries that are unfamiliar to us. As many Christians calls a Taoist, demonic, one Taoist said this:

" The perfect Tao is without difficulty, save that it avoids picking and choosing. Only when you stop liking and disliking will all be clearly understood. A split hair's difference, and heaven and earth are set apart! If you want to get the plain truth, be not concerned with right and wrong. The conflict between right and wrong is the sickness of the mind."

Perhaps we might want to stop liking or disliking whether we have free will or not and allow God to say, "I'm in control"

Charlie, the libertarian incompatibilist definition says that free will is not choosing in accordance with desires, but choosing in a wholly unconditioned manner--which is absurd (I think the concept of Burridan's Ass is a good reality check).

Edwards is distinguishing between the philosophical concept of freedom, apart from moral categories, and the theological concept, which is all about the moral distinctions. One is a philosophy of mind that actually helps to clarify God can foreordain and humans still be held morally responsible.

Enlightenment refers to the philosophical movement of the 18th century that I have been known to term "Endarkenment."

Originally Posted by P. F. Pugh

Charlie, the libertarian incompatibilist definition says that free will is not choosing in accordance with desires, but choosing in a wholly unconditioned manner--which is absurd (I think the concept of Burridan's Ass is a good reality check).

Edwards is distinguishing between the philosophical concept of freedom, apart from moral categories, and the theological concept, which is all about the moral distinctions. One is a philosophy of mind that actually helps to clarify God can foreordain and humans still be held morally responsible.

Enlightenment refers to the philosophical movement of the 18th century that I have been known to term "Endarkenment."

Yes, I agree with all you wrote. Did I say something wrong?

I thought you said that the second definition is libertarian, but now that I reread, I see I was mistaken. As it is, I think we've just clarified each other.

I think that Paul makes it very clear that all are either in bondage to sin or to righteousness and therefore the will is not free for either one outside these two contexts. I guess you have to define what you mean by "free"? I kind of liken this to a computer being able to generate a random number; a computer can never truly generate a random number without providing a seed to make even more random. So I think with the natural depraved man his enslavement to sin will never let him choose otherwise unless God intervenes.