I'm currently reading W. Gary Crampton's By Scripture Alone, which is a treatment of the WCF doctrine of Scripture contrasted throughout with Roman and Pentecostal views. I'm familiar with Van Til, Bahnsen, Frame and Schaeffer with regards to theories of knowledge and epistemology, but I'm fairly new to Gordon Clark's stuff and intend to read more (Crampton is, of course, a student of Clark's).

Anyway, if anyone is familiar with Clark's (or Crampton's) theory of knowledge and epistemology and can help me out with a question I have, it would be much appreciated. In the book, on pg. 28, Crampton states, "A Christian epistemology is not founded upon rationalism or empiricism. Neither is the knowledge that man has of God and His creation in any sense mediated knowledge. Rather, all knowledge is immediate, revelational, and propositional." He then puts forth a God-centered coherence theory of truth.

I can understand in what ways all knowledge might be revelational and propositional, but the idea that all knowledge is immediate raises questions in my mind. As I understand it, Clark (and Crampton) might say that we can only refer to "knowledge" properly as in relation to Scripture. We only "know" what has been revealed in Scripture. All else is relegated to the realm of "opinion," since it cannot be based upon the properly sure foundation of special revelation, and rests upon mere human reason or sensation. But isn't the reading of Scripture "mediated" through the sense experience of sight and the "reasoning" process of the mind? I don't understand the role of reason and sensation in this framework. Can anyone throw me a bone?

__________________
B.C. Askins
Evangelical Church of Fairport, Member (Fairport, NY)
"If you eat a live frog in the morning, nothing worse will happen to either of you for the rest of the day."
-W.G.T. Shedd

I think what you need to consider is what empiricism means. It speaks of knowledge developed through sensory stimuli alone. Basically, everything is objects to be "observed", and based on a history of "experiences" one develops knowledge of the object. Now how that works, or how those remembered sensations become propositional knowledge, or knowledge anything beyond knowledge of objects, I don't know. But that's the idea.

Now contrast that with the idea of gaining knowledge through language. With reading, you have the propositional knowledge right there before you. You don't' depend on a history of experiences and some processes to covert them into knowledge, instead you depend on language.

I can draw you a thousand pictures of people with crowns and robes and landscapes of Israel and more to try to tell you David was King of Israel. I'm not sure how many I would need to draw, or if it's even possible for you to come to that knowledge just though images without any prior knowledge for interpreting them. But if I simply write "David was King of Israel", then you'd have the propositional knowledge immediately. The first is mediated through sensory experiences, the second is immediately conveyed to you through propositional language.

So the difference is between somehow translating sensory experiences of objects into propositional knowledge, and gaining direct propositional knowledge through language.

Does that help?

__________________
R. Anthony Coletti
Midway Presbyterian Church (PCA)
Jonesborough, TN
[i]et venite et arguite me dicit Dominus[/i]

Thanks for the response and the help. Some things are still a bit unclear to me, maybe you can un-clutter things a bit.

You said:
[quote=Civbert;305597
I can draw you a thousand pictures of people with crowns and robes and landscapes of Israel and more to try to tell you David was King of Israel. I'm not sure how many I would need to draw, or if it's even possible for you to come to that knowledge just though images without any prior knowledge for interpreting them. But if I simply write "David was King of Israel", then you'd have the propositional knowledge immediately. [B]The first is mediated through sensory experiences, the second is immediately conveyed to you through propositional language.[/b]

So the difference is between somehow translating sensory experiences of objects into propositional knowledge, and gaining direct propositional knowledge through language.QUOTE]

I still don't grasp, in this example or any other, how the information "is immediately conveyed through propositional language." If you write down, then I read "David was the King of Israel," light bounces off of paper, encoding that data as electromagnetic information, it strikes my eye, where it is re-encoded as electrochemical information carried to my brain where it interprets the cryptogram of information received into the idea of "David was the King of Israel." How is this process unmediated? If I hear the information, or feel it as sign language as sign language in my hand, isn't it still mediated through those senses, in some way?

Even if we say, as Clark does, that Christ is the "epistemological Logos," and according to John 1:9 he is the "light which enlightens everyone," doesn't that enlightening still use basic human sensation and reasoning as a medium through which the light passes?

What am I missing?

Boy, that quote came through pretty literally... Guess I've got a lot to learn, about theories of knowledge and message board posting...

I'm not going to go into Clarkian details, but perhaps a simple answer to your dilemna is one that I ran across first in Dabney. Basically it's this:

God made us in such a way that we understand propositions (we are made in God's image). How do we know this? Because of a proposition (found in the Bible).

God also made us to have senses. Through those senses we are made to receive propositions. (For example, the decree to eat fruit of every tree one in the Garden).

To me it's really no big deal. It doesn't matter if the propositional content is transmitted through photons or sound waves. We are made by God to receive the propositional information either way.

That is completely different from empiricism: in that approach people attempt to determine a truth about creation without reference to our preordained and designed ability to understand propositions.

In another context, Bob V. mentioned the image of a sea slug trying understand an integrated circuit. The empiricists have us in the same position: trying to understand the created world while pretending to ignore the proposition that God made us in such a way to desire to understand.

__________________
R.Vic Bottomly
Providence Reformed Baptist Church, Tacoma, WA

Click to get: Board Rules -- Signature Requirements -- Suggestions?

Vic,
Thanks for the response. Your point, from Dabney, regarding man being created to receive propositions (regardless of the form or medium) makes good sense to me. As you said, "It doesn't matter if the propositional content is transmitted through photons or sound waves. We are made by God to receive the propositional information either way." This is the direction I would lean in this regard, but I want to properly understand Clark and Crampton's position as well. I can't accept, reject or modify what I don't first understand.

(I would reject empiricism as unbiblical, illogical and largely unhelpful.)

So this brings me back to my original question: In what sense can it be said that "all knowledge is immediate" (as quoted from Crampton, see original post)?

Well, I think my point is that sound waves or photons in no way mediate the information. In other words, the proposition before transmission is the same as after transmission, absent sin and faulty equipment.

Can you give me a definition for the term "mediate" as you're using it here? I may be misunderstanding you (and maybe Crampton too) in this regard.

I would take "mediate" to be synonymous with "transmit," as you use it above. The fact that the proposition is the same before and after the transmission is true, but it doesn't negate the medium of the transmission.

Am I misunderstanding you?

Maybe so. I think of mediate here in terms of information being somehow modified by a mediator. In other words: interpreted. The idea is that the original proposition is somehow unavailable to the recipient without some kind of modification. That would be what I call the mediator.

The idea "lost in translation" is sort of analogous.

Please note that I am not saying that we don't need interpreters. I'm keeping my idea narrow. We certainly need interpretation now because propositional knowledge gets lost or distorted.

Well, if that's all that you (and possibly Crampton) intend by the term "immediate" (meaning un-interpreted or un-modified) then I don't think I have any problem with it.

Would I be correct, then, in saying that true knowledge is based upon Christ's immediate revealing of the propositions of Scripture to our minds, despite the failings of sin-effaced reason and sensation?

And, on a related but different note, is there no basis whatsoever in general revelation for something properly called "knowledge"?

I think Vic is hitting on an important point.

With empiricism, I think the medium and the message are conflated. Knowledge becomes a product of sensations. Knowledge is within the sensations. But if knowledge is based on revelation, then the knowledge is the propositions revealed and the "medium" that conveys the knowledge is complete separate and does not effect it.

This can be seen when you consider that the same knowledge can be conveyed in any number of languages. The same propositional knowledge can be said in English or Chinese, and while the literal sounds are very different, the knowledge is the same.

The medium itself does not hold knowledge or produce knowledge. So knowledge totally independent of the "medium". Further, I think we can say that God can convey knowledge to us with out any medium. Spoken and written language is the "normal" means of conveying knowledge, but they are not necessary.

In the sense that Clark uses the term "knowledge", as I understand it, you are right that you cannot have knowledge from observing the universe.

But there is something here that often gets missed. Let’s say I’m a completely secular, atheist, budding scientist of age 4 who observes one limited aspect of the universe: an uncovered outlet. I stick my finger in. BUZZ. Curious, I go looking for another uncovered outlet. I stick my finger in. BUZZ. Being a rather strange sort, instead of crying, I’m laughing with delight! I have discovered a repeatable effect.

(This really happened to me, BTW).

Ignoring the interlude with the screaming mother, I left the experience with this conclusion: uncovered outlets BUZZ. I think to myself, "this is knowledge."

Now Gordon Clark comes along and says, “Wait a minute, you only made two observations. You cannot say, based upon those two observations, that you have knowledge.”

And then I’d have to run off and cry.

What I don’t contemplate (and neither do the empiricists) is the reason why I leaped to the conclusion that uncovered outlets buzz. I presupposed uniformity in the universe. This is what scientists do all the time. They have to if they want to come up with “universal laws.”

But they can never empirically prove uniformity in nature, any more than I could prove the general law of live uncovered outlets. The only way their assumption can be proven logically is by reference to something outside of their observations. That would be the Creator who created all things well. The use of uniformity principle is innate in humans, put there by God, but we can’t say that until it is revealed to us.

But I remain fairly simple minded on all this.

It does seem that Clark's definition of "knowledge" (assuming I've understood it properly) is a bit narrow (hence my question regarding general revelation).

It seems that a hard distinction between "knowledge" (based on special revelation) and "opinions" (based on anything else) is a bit of an over-statement or could at least use a bit of mitigation. Why not "absolute knowledge" (based on special revelation) and "empirical knowledge" or "probabilistic knowledge" (or something along those lines), based on something a bit more well-founded than mere "opinions"?

I wonder how Clark (or Crampton) would reconcile this definition of "knowledge" with extrapolations based on the uniformity of nature...

I think people get unnecessarily hung up on Clark's hard line. Clark certainly acknowledged (at least in one of his lectures I listened to) the usefulness of such extrapolations, giving the example of engineering.

But he was adamant about distinguishing that from knowledge. It never bothered me in the least because he was consistent and made his definitions from the start.

Oh, I recognize that Clark was consistent and clear in his treatment of the subject. I'm just thinking through (for my own purposes in constantly seeking a "theology-of-everything") some of the implications of his position. I guess I'd like to do more than just "acknowledge the usefulness" of engineering, medicine, etc., since I see them as immensely valuable outworkings of a biblical worldview, within a creation-fall-redemption-restoration framework.

It seems that, as Calvin might have put it, general revelation viewed through the "spectacles" of special revelation teach us some things about the uniformity of nature (i.e. that the uniformity of nature is founded in and revelatory of God's "eternal power and divine nature," such as his immutability, and so on). In studying this uniformity, by the nature of the case we may not have the same absolute certainty we have available in Scripture, but by applying rigorous logical principles ("God is Logic," in Clark's words) to the natural world can we not have real, bona fide knowledge of how the world works?

I would say we can. And I might also be inclined to say that such knowledge is propositional and revelational, though mediated through fallible processes.

What do you think?

I've kind of run out of time to go in depth. But I think that whatever real, bona fide knowledge we have of how the world works absolutely has to have, as a starting point, an understanding of the proposition: "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. . . . And he saw that it was good." So to the extent you are saying the same thing, so far so good.

I'm not going to defend some of Clark's more radical statements, I gather from listening to him that he sometimes said things for effect. That's not my cup of tea. But the plain thing I think we need to remember is that we can't have any knowledge without acknowledging the Creator. We may have a collection of tricks that work, but it isn't knowledge because it lacks understanding.

A doctor may say that an antibiotic kills a certain bacteria because he sees the cell walls dissolve under a microscope, but he can't say why he thinks it will happen again the next time unless he acknowledges an ordered universe. And as Dabney pointed out in his "Sensualistic Philosophy", nobody can do that without acknowledging God.

[quote=LockTheDeadbolt;305721]Several problems occur with "empirical" knowledge.

• knowledge tends to be "personal" and equivocal
• one person's "knowledge" can contradict another person's
• knowledge is no longer true for "all people, places, and times".

With Clark's system, propositions do not lose value just because they are technically "opinions". Engineering "knowledge" is just as useful and carries just as much weight. However, his system is not open to the internal contradictions or equivocations of empiricism. It can not be contradicted by "science" because scientific propositions never achieve the standard for knowledge.

[quote=Civbert;305753]Hey Anthony, I didn't post that!

Just pointing out the quote feature isn't always accurate.

Maybe the question could be adjusted just a bit: is knowledge only psycho-semanatic?

__________________
JohnV

John Vandervliet
Ontario, Canada
member of: Canadian Reformed Church
"In coming to understand anything we are rejecting the facts as they are for us in favour of the facts as they are" C.S Lewis, An Experiment in Criticism

Again, I'm not advocating empiricism as a school of thought, simply looking for a biblically coherent epistemological foundation for science, engineering, math, medicine, agriculture, etc. (and questioning, critically, Clark's view in order to understand it better).

Questions/observations about your list, in reverse:
3.) I think I said that knowledge in this empirical sense wouldn't be absolute, unless given conditions are the same (I know, even then they would only be more or less "similar", but like I said it would be "probabilistic knowledge" rather than absolutely certain).
2.) Are you saying that in this case both persons can have accurate "knowledge" and be in genuine contradiction?
1.) In what sense do you mean it is equivocal? Do you mean the knowledge would be "uncertain" or that it would be "open to multiple interpretations"? Or both? (Which would be effectively equivocating on the definition of equivocal )

Your last paragraph makes good sense. Thanks for that.


John V.,
Did you mean "psycho-semantic"? How do you mean that? (I slept through Psych 101 back in my unregenerate, er I mean, undergraduate days...)