Thread: Cheung and His view.

Originally Posted by JKLeoPCA

I don’t usually see a particular translation of choice when talking to those in cult circles. What you will find every time is a, “It’s just me and my Bible,” mentality in the leaders (especially) and the members. To me they all seem to hold that God will show them what He wants them to learn, directly through His Spirit.

I know this deals with translations, but it made me think of Vincent Cheung. Doesn't Cheung hold to the view that God can hinder His children from learning about Him? I heard about induction and scripturalists. I honestly, don't know much about these views. Could someone give insight?

I'm not certain but I think Paul Manata has heard of Vincent Cheung before.

Do a search on Cheung. You'll find some interested threads.

This thread:
http://puritanboard.com/showthread.p...ghlight=cheung

Has links from Paul.

The only thing is that when I read a thread from another thread(lol) I felt like I was either became stupid, or just didn't see why this argument is such a big deal. Maybe I'm just not seeing it, I dont know. Anyone want to chime in?

Thanks Rich for the suggestion by the way.

Originally Posted by Andrew P.C.

I heard about induction and scripturalists. I honestly, don't know much about these views. Could someone give insight?

Scripturalists, and to the extent Cheung is a Scripturalist, merely agree with scientists and philosophers of science that induction is a fallacy. This clearly bothers many Christians who believe sensation and induction are valuable tools of cognition, even though they never seem to take the time to actually defend their assertions (which is why my debate with Manata got bogged down). Some Christians have even taken the path long ago ventured by scientific thinkers like Popper in merely redefining knowledge not in the traditional Aristotelian sense where knowledge is said to arrive at final and immutable truths, but rather probabilistically where knowledge is always tentative, never final, and is considered knowledge to the extent it comports with "working models." IMO Plantinga falls into this category where knowledge is said to result from the combination of warrant and true belief. As one favorable reviewer of Warranted Christian Belief wrote; "A belief is warranted when it is the product of a belief-producing mechanism that is (a)functioning properly (b) truth-aimed, and (c) functioning in the epistemic environment for which it was designed to acquire truth." Regardless of Plantinga's merits or lack thereof, I think you'll agree this is hardly a return to a defense of knowledge qua knowledge in the traditional sense.

Unfortunately, all inductive arguments, with the rare exception of a closed induction, are fallacious. They can never yield the truth of any given proposition. Therefore, all evidentialist claims to knowledge, even knowledge of God, are necessarily false. The foundation does not hold and the building has collapsed even if some still refuse to vacate the rubble. Or, to put it another way, it's impossible to arrive at any universals starting with particulars. FWIW this is Schaeffer 101 and not something exclusive to Scripturalism. Admittedly, Clark drew out this insight to its logical conclusion whereas Schaeffer doggedly held to the cognitive nature of science and held to the common view that all truth is God's truth. OTOH, Clark, unwilling to simply beg the question, held God's truth is all truth and even many Christians find this position untenable.

Here are a few quotes randomly culled from the Trinity Review archives dealing with induction:

Dr. Gary Crampton

Science commits the fallacy of induction. Induction is the attempt to derive a general law from particular instances. Science is necessarily inductive. For example, if a scientist is studying crows, he might observe 999 crows and find that they all are black. But is he ever able to assert that all crows are black? No; the next crow he observes might be an albino. One can never observe all crows: past, present, and future. Universal propositions can never be validly obtained by observation. Hence, science can never give us true statements.

Dr. John Robbins

Science is based on observation and experiment. But induction, Russell admitted a little reluctantly, “remains an unsolved problem of logic.” Put more bluntly, induction is a logical fallacy. Just because one observes a thousand white swans, one cannot conclude that all swans are white. Number 1001 may be black. Just because the Sun has come up every morning for the past one hundred years does not imply that it will come up tomorrow. Or, to give you a more theological example, non-Christian archaeologists used to claim that there was no evidence whatsoever for the existence of the Hittite nation, and therefore the Bible must be mistaken. Today there are more Hittite documents in our museums than the archaeologists have had time to translate. Induction is always fallacious, yet science is based on induction.

[Gordon Clark] wrote a book about science entitled The Philosophy of Science and Belief in God. In that book, Dr. Gordon Clark said of physics, which is the most advanced of the sciences: “All the laws of physics are false.” Moreover, he gives ninety-five pages of arguments demonstrating why this must be so. I have already mentioned two of those reasons, the fallacies of induction and asserting the consequent, and there are many more. But Clark, and logic, show far more than that all the laws of physics are false; they show that all the laws of physics must be false. Clark wrote: “Instead of being the sole gateway to all knowledge, science is not a way to any knowledge.”

One of the insoluble problems of the scientific method is the fallacy of induction; induction, in fact, is a problem for all forms of empiricism (learning by experience). The problem is simply this: Induction, arguing from the particular to the general, is always a logical fallacy. No matter how many crows, for example, you observe to be black, the conclusion that all crows are black is never warranted. The reason is quite simple: Even assuming you have good eyesight, are not colorblind, and are actually looking at crows, you have not, and cannot, see all crows. Millions have already died. Millions more are on the opposite side of the planet. Millions more will hatch after you die. Induction is always a fallacy.

. . . one cannot establish universals by induction; that requires revelation . . .

Clark’s consistently Christian rejection of sense experience as the way to knowledge has many consequences, one of which is that the traditional proofs for the existence of God are all logical fallacies. David Hume and Immanuel Kant were right: Sensation cannot prove God, not merely because God cannot be sensed or validly inferred from sensation, but because no knowledge at all can be validly inferred from sensation. The arguments for the existence of God fail because both the axiom and method are wrong - the axiom of sensation and the method of induction - not because God is a fairy tale. The correct Christian axiom is not sensation, but revelation. The correct Christian method is deduction, not induction.

The main objections to the above is that it is hard for some to believe, or even entertain, any theory of knowledge that doesn't allow for at least some role for sensation and induction. After all, they'll claim, even to read your bible requires the belief in the "reliability of sensation." Similarly, it's assumed science too must yield knowledge, after all look at all the useful things it's discovered. If nothing else science "works" and these pragmatic considerations are but testaments to its value in the acquisition of knowledge. I think many people are scandalized by statements like "all science is false" and prefer to argue from the reliability of sensation already mentioned and the validity of probabilistic arguments since such arguments are the core of their apologetic. The King, whoever he might be on any given day (Van Til one day, Alvin Plantigna the next), doesn't like to be told he doesn't have any clothes.

Clark built a Christian philosophy on the axiom of revelation alone and refused to build the Christian system on a fallacy. Others seem quite happy to do just that. Hence the fuss.

Anyway, if you want to understand Scripturalism you need to read Clark. Trinity Foundation put out a one volume set covering his major works on philosophy (see http://www.trinitylectures.org/produ...cacb04a391f4f).

What is meant by the statement, “science can never give us true statements”. I don’t see why one should make the jump from saying that science cannot give us certainty, to then saying that science can never “give us true statements”.

Induction is only “fallacious” if one wishes for it to provide certainty.

Originally Posted by caleb_woodrow

What is meant by the statement, “science can never give us true statements”. I don’t see why one should make the jump from saying that science cannot give us certainty, to then saying that science can never “give us true statements”.

Induction is only “fallacious” if one wishes for it to provide certainty.

Hi Caleb. Certainty is a psychological state of mind and has nothing to do with whether or not the form of an argument is valid or not or whether any set of premises or any conclusions drawn from them are either true or false. Many people are certain about things that are false all the time. If you're like me I'm sure you too have repented of ideas you were certain were true at one time but found out by God's grace they were not. God willing He will continue to expose any false notions I might at present be certain of by the light of His Word so I might repent. A desire for certainty has nothing to do with the problems of science.

Also, I should point out the fallacy of induction is but one of many informal and formal fallacies science commits. Clark has nearly a hundred pages of arguments in his "Philosophy of Science and Belief of God" exposing many of these fallacies.

Induction is a fallacy because the form of the conclusion is not the same as the form of the premise. One dictionary of philosophy defines induction as; "Probable reasoning whose conclusion goes beyond what is formally contained in its premises." To put it simply, the conclusions of inductive arguments are not supported by its premises. Consequently, the statement “science can never give us true statements” has nothing to do with wishing for certainty since recognizing an argument as being fallacious has nothing to do with certainty.

So the problem is not, as some dismissively claim, induction isn't deduction, but rather induction as a means for acquiring truth is a complete and logical failure -- and that's not even the least of science's problems in this regard. The Emperor, especially the one in a lab coat, has no clothes. Science, while extremely useful in helping man subdue the earth, or even annihilate it, is not a cognitive enterprise. Men who view science as a means to knowledge are those who are ever learning and are never able to come to a knowledge of the truth. One would think Christians -- in particular those interested in philosophy and apologetics -- would immediately see the benefit of a Scripturalist critique of science. Unfortunately, few do.

Well, I am speaking of ‘certainty’ in the logical sense. In this sense, a deductive argument can yield certainty, but an inductive argument cannot. When talking about logical fallacies, I think it is more appropriate to speak of certainty in this sense.

Now the problem seems to be that “Universal propositions can never be validly obtained by observation. Hence, science can never give us true statements.”

This should be qualified. It would be better to say that “universal propositions can never be obtained by observation *with certainty*. Now, the universal thus discovered by induction may perhaps be false (or true), but just because induction does not yield certainty, it does not follow that universals cannot be *discovered* through induction.

I don’t see why one should make the jump from saying that universal propositions cannot be discovered with certainty by induction, to then saying that science can never yield true statements. And I do think that certainty plays a significant role about what we are talking about.

What do you mean by “the form of the conclusion is not the same as the form of the premise”?

You also say, “the conclusions of inductive arguments are not supported by its premises”. What exactly is meant by this? It would be more correct to say that the conclusions of inductive arguments are not supported by its premises with certainty. Well if that is the case, who cares, because induction is a different form of logic than deduction. The premises of an inductive argument can support the conclusion of an argument by giving good evidence (high probability) that the conclusion is true.

I still don’t see how this proves that inductive reasoning is logically fallacious.

Originally Posted by caleb_woodrow

Well, I am speaking of ‘‘certainty’’ in the logical sense. In this sense, a deductive argument can yield certainty, but an inductive argument cannot. When talking about logical fallacies, I think it is more appropriate to speak of certainty in this sense.

First, I apologize for the length of this reply, but much of it consists of citations from other sources so I can't be blamed for all of it. Second, I confess I fail to see how certainty has any bearing on how to make a fallacious argument valid or a false proposition true? Certainty is the state of being without doubt and that is irrelevant to whether inductive reasoning is fallacious. I would prefer to avoid psychological states of mind and rather stick with logical terms like validity and soundness. Would it make you feel better if I were to say that even the strongest inductive arguments are only probably true and are just as probably false?

I got this from Wikipedia piece on Hume which might be helpful and even appeals to certitude at least as far as mathematics:

In Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (EHU), §§4.1.20-27, §§4.2.28-33,[17] Hume articulated his view that all human reasoning is of two kinds, Relation of Ideas and Matters of Fact. While the former involves abstract concepts like mathematics where deductive certitude presides, the latter involves empirical experience about which all thought is inductive. Now, since according to Hume, we can know nothing about nature prior to its experience, even a rational man with no experience "could not have inferred from the fluidity and transparency of water that it would suffocate him, or from the light and warmth of fire that it would consume him." (EHU, 4.1.6) Thus, all we can say, think, or predict about nature must come from prior experience, which lays the foundation for the necessity of induction.

Inductive inference says that the past acts as a reliable guide to the future. For example, if in the past the sun has risen in the east and set in the west, then, inductive inference suggests that it will probably rise in the east and set in the west in the future. But how can we justify such an inference, known as the principle of induction? Hume suggested two possible justifications, but rejected both:

1. The first justification states that, as a matter of logical necessity, the future must resemble the past. But, Hume pointed out, we can conceive of a chaotic, erratic world where the future has nothing to do with the past –– or, more tamely, a world just like ours right up until the present, at which point things change completely. So nothing makes the principle of induction logically necessary.

2. The second justification, more modestly, appeals to the past success of induction –– it has worked most often in the past, so it will probably continue to work most often in the future. But, as Hume notes, this justification uses circular reasoning in attempting to justify induction by merely reiterating it, bringing us back where we started.

The noted 20th century theoretician and philosopher Bertrand Russell attempted to reinstate induction as a rational procedure and to restore the credibility of the scientific method. However, all he could say was that induction is an independent logical principle, incapable of being inferred either from experience or from other logical principles, and that without this principle, science is impossible."

Sometimes atheists are of real value to the church, as in the case of Hume and Russell even if Clark and only a handful of others seemed to have noticed.

Now the problem seems to be that ““Universal propositions can never be validly obtained by observation. Hence, science can never give us true statements.””

This should be qualified. It would be better to say that ““universal propositions can never be obtained by observation *with certainty*. Now, the universal thus discovered by induction may perhaps be false (or true), but just because induction does not yield certainty, it does not follow that universals cannot be *discovered* through induction.

No, it is fine the way it is. I don't for a minute even grant that any proposition can be obtained by observation, much less a true one. I've already explained that the question has nothing to do with "yielding certainty," however that might occur or to what benefit. What about yielding true conclusions? The problem lies with the form of the argument. For example:

P1. Most Puritan Board members drink beer.
P2. Caleb is a PB member.
C. Caleb drinks beer.

The conclusion may be true, but there is nothing in either of the premises that support the conclusion. Now you may say, hey, I drink beer therefore the conclusion is true, but I didn't arrive at the truth of the conclusion from the argument itself. You had to reveal it to me that you are a beer drinker.

If you think that universal true propositions CAN be discovered through induction you ought to show how this might occur? Even if a particular conclusion to any inductive argument were true you would have no way of knowing it. Induction is not only a fallacy it is epistemologically impotent in discovering the truth of anything.

As far as I can tell you're basically saying nothing since every proposition is either truth or false. If that’s your point, it’s trivial. So, yes, the conclusions of science are either true or false, but the methods by which the conclusions are arrived at, at least as far as the scientific method is concerned, can *NEVER* tell you which is which. The best science can hope to do is to disprove any given theory or model, it can never prove the truth of anything. Science, as Popper observed long ago, is nothing more than conjectures and their refutations. He also said that the probability of any scientific theory being correct can be demonstrated to be precisely zero. As I've said, science is not a cognitive enterprise. Frankly, scientists I've spoken to on atheist boards and apologetic lists, as well as in person, all agree that science is non cognitive; i.e., it can never nor will it ever arrive at the truth of anything. Christians seem to be the only ones under this delusion.

I can only guess the apologetic import is lost on you, but I think it is an incredible advantage to realize that structurally all attacks on Christianity from science have no force. The converse is also true and that Christianity cannot use science to demonstrate the truth of its position either. Science just doesn't do what most people evidently assume. If science is non cognitive it doesn't magically become a cognitive enterprise for the Christian. One of the errors in Van Tilian apologetics is that it assumes the validity of science within a Christian framework.

The “solution” to the problem of induction seems to be to just redefine the word knowledge. Knowledge is no longer concerned with truth, but instead is tied to utilitarian assumptions.

I don’’t see why one should make the jump from saying that universal propositions cannot be discovered with certainty by induction, to then saying that science can never yield true statements. And I do think that certainty plays a significant role about what we are talking about.

If you grant that all inductive arguments are probabilistic, and why wouldn’t you, then it's not a jump at all to say that science can never yield true statements. You simply cannot get any universal propositions starting with particulars. Since this thread is in part in reference to V. Cheung, he wrote: " . . . it is impossible to use induction . . . to validly reason from premises X and Y to conclusion Q regarding any subject P." He's exactly right, but why is this a shock to you or anyone?

It cannot yield true statements, or conclusion, because its methods are flawed, they are logically fallacious.

What do you mean by ““the form of the conclusion is not the same as the form of the premise””?

You also say, ““the conclusions of inductive arguments are not supported by its premises””. What exactly is meant by this? It would be more correct to say that the conclusions of inductive arguments are not supported by its premises with certainty. Well if that is the case, who cares, because induction is a different form of logic than deduction. The premises of an inductive argument can support the conclusion of an argument by giving good evidence (high probability) that the conclusion is true.

What I mean is simply that for an argument to be valid anything found in the conclusion must be already present in the premises. As one logic primer states; “An inductive argument is one in which the conclusion is probable based on the premises. In an inductive argument the conclusion goes beyond the premises.” If a conclusion goes beyond the premises the argument from which the conclusion is drawn is fallacious. I would think nothing could be plainer. A valid argument is one in which the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion.

I still don’’t see how this proves that inductive reasoning is logically fallacious.

Perhaps Karl Popper will be of some assistance. This is from a piece, “The Problem of Induction”:

I hold with Hume that there simply is no such logical entity as an inductive inference; or, that all so-called inductive inferences are logically invalid - and even inductively invalid, to put it more sharply; We have many examples of deductively valid inferences, and even some partial criteria of deductive validity; but no example of an inductively valid inference exists. And I hold, incidentally, that this result can be found in Hume, even though Hume, at the same time, and in sharp contrast to myself, believed in the psychological power of induction; not as a valid procedure, but as a procedure which animals and men successfully make use of, as a matter of fact and of biological necessity.

I take it as an important task to make clear, even at the cost of some repetition, where I agree and where I disagree with Hume.

I agree with Hume's opinion that induction is invalid and in no sense justified. Consequently neither Hume nor I can accept the traditional formulations which uncritically ask for the justification of induction; such a request is uncritical because it is blind to the possibility that induction is invalid in every sense, and therefore unjustifiable.

I disagree with Hume's opinion (the opinion incidentally of almost all philosophers) that induction is a fact and in any case needed. I hold that neither animals nor men use any procedure like induction, or any argument based on the repetition of instances. The belief that we use induction is simply a mistake. It is a kind of optical illusion.

And to think Popper was an atheist.

I won't be able to respond until later tonight or even tomorrow. Thanks for the reply.

I am not talking about psychological states of mind. Its not that “certainty has bearing on how to make a fallacious argument valid or a false proposition true”. Perhaps I will better show later in this post how certainty plays a role in this discussion.

Let’s take the statement again: “Universal propositions can never be validly obtained by observation. Hence, science can never give us true statements”.
Again I ask, what exactly is being said here? By “validly obtained”, is this meant in a deductive manner that produces certainty? It seems this is what you say, when you said

Originally Posted by Magma2

What I mean is simply that for an argument to be valid anything found in the conclusion must be already present in the premises. As one logic primer states; “An inductive argument is one in which the conclusion is probable based on the premises. In an inductive argument the conclusion goes beyond the premises.” If a conclusion goes beyond the premises the argument from which the conclusion is drawn is fallacious. I would think nothing could be plainer. A valid argument is one in which the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion.

If so (and it seems clear that this is the case from the above statement), this simply begs the question against induction.

Also, what is meant by “true statements”. Is this supposed to mean universals? It would seem hard to show how science cannot produce true statements with respect to particulars at least.

For an inductive argument, you gave the example of beer and I. I will use a different example.

P1. In all past experience Ducks have been mortal creatures.
P2. Bill is a Duck
C: Therefore, Bill is a mortal creature.

Notice that the premises depend on induction. With respect to such an argument, you say “there is nothing in either of the premises that support the conclusion”. What is meant by *support* here? If you mean support in a *certain* (certain as in 100%) manner, then this merely begs the question against induction. The premises give good evidence, that is, give a high probability that the conclusion is true. So yes, I would say that I arrived at the truth of the conclusion from the argument itself. Albeit I cannot be logically certain of the conclusion, but if the conclusion is true, I arrived at it by the premises.

You also said that “Frankly, scientists I've spoken to on atheist boards and apologetic lists, as well as in person, all agree that science is non cognitive; i.e., it can never nor will it ever arrive at the truth of anything. Christians seem to be the only ones under this delusion.”

Usually people think of non-cognitive as meaning ‘non-rational’. Of course they don’t think that science will lead to Truth in the way we think of it if they are nominalists.

Going back to the original topic, it seems like you are trying to appeal to the problem of induction in order to argue against the ‘form’ of inductive arguments. Here is the thing though, the problem of induction doesn’t apply to Christian epistemology, but it does to secular epistemologies. I believe in an all sovereign God who upholds all of nature, and revelation is where I go to back up the idea of the uniformity of nature [See Genesis 8 (specifically verse 22 if I remember correctly) on the topic of Uniformity of Nature]. The point is that there isn’t a problem with science per se, but with the secularist epistemological justification of science.

Pretty much when it comes down to it you are going to deny that we can arrive at any knowledge by sense experience, and I will not. It seems we then arrive at an impasse, and that argument can be saved for another thread at another time when I am not busy with a big paper and getting ready for finals. Hopefully at least you now understand my position better, and I think I now better understand yours. Thanks for the replies, but for now I will bow out of this thread. ~Caleb

Originally Posted by caleb_woodrow

I...Let’s take the statement again: “Universal propositions can never be validly obtained by observation. Hence, science can never give us true statements”.
Again I ask, what exactly is being said here? By “validly obtained”, is this meant in a deductive manner that produces certainty? ....

To be clear what is being spoken if is the "scientific method" which is inductive by design. And since inductive conclusions do not follow logically from the premises, then they are not "true" statements. Even if they might be happen to be true, one can not know they are true by science. Conclusions by induction are invalid and fallacious. The problem of induction is inductive conclusions are always fallacious - never true. You can't even say they are false.

Originally Posted by caleb_woodrow

Also, what is meant by “true statements”. Is this supposed to mean universals? It would seem hard to show how science cannot produce true statements with respect to particulars at least.

A true statement is simply one that follow necessarily from true premises. Particulars follow easily from true statements. The typical example is:

P1: All men are mortal. (universal)
P2: Socrates is a man.
C1: Therefore Socrates is a mortal. (particular)

Originally Posted by caleb_woodrow

I...
For an inductive argument, you gave the example of beer and I. I will use a different example.

P1. In all past experience Ducks have been mortal creatures.
P2. Bill is a Duck
C: Therefore, Bill is a mortal creature.

Notice that the premises depend on induction. With respect to such an argument, you say “there is nothing in either of the premises that support the conclusion”. What is meant by *support* here?

Not support. The term is "necessary". The conclusion must follow necessarily. A conclusion is not valid unless it must be true with when premises are true.

In your example, the argument type is almost deductive. This in a way shows Karl Popper's point that no one thinks inductively, that it is an "optical illusion". The conclusion almost seems to follow necessarily. However, since there is no premises that makes Bill the Duck a necessary member of "Ducks of past experience", the the conclusion is fallacious. It does not follow necessarily. It assumes the hidden sub-conclusion that all future ducks are mortal which does not follow.

The issue of universals is relevant because that is what the scientific method does, draw universals from particulars. "All crows are black" or all men evolved from apes". Or, "all ducks are mortal" based on the particulars of all past experienced ducks.

Originally Posted by caleb_woodrow

If you mean support in a *certain* (certain as in 100%) manner, then this merely begs the question against induction. The premises give good evidence, that is, give a high probability that the conclusion is true. So yes, I would say that I arrived at the truth of the conclusion from the argument itself. Albeit I cannot be logically certain of the conclusion, but if the conclusion is true, I arrived at it by the premises.

It is not a matter of percentage. In deduction (which is the only way to know a true statement is true), either if follows necessarily (can not be otherwise), or it doesn't.

2+2 = 4
2+2 /= 5

No one says certainly or 100%. It simply either is, or is not the case.

So the reason "science" can never produce truth is that the "scientific method" can never logically justify the truth of any of it's conclusions. The "scientific method" will only produce answers that will always be possible, and the epistemology of empiricism can not explain how it can produce a single proposition, much less a single true proposition.

When a "scientist" happens to say something that is true, it isn't true because of the "scientific method" or empiricism. The only way a scientist says something true by God's grace. And the only way a Christian can know it is through God's revelation. And the "Bible Alone" is the Word of God.

Sola Scriptura.

Originally Posted by Andrew P.C.

I know this deals with translations, but it made me think of Vincent Cheung. Doesn't Cheung hold to the view that God can hinder His children from learning about Him? I heard about induction and scripturalists. I honestly, don't know much about these views. Could someone give insight?

In a nutshell:

P1: Inductive conclusions are logically fallacious. (Logic 101)

P2: The only way to know a true statement is through deduction from a priori true statements. (Logic 101)

P3: The Bible alone is God's Word.

P4: The inerrancy of Scripture.

C: Ergo Scripturalism.

This will be my last post in this thread. Civbert: Your using the definition of ‘logically’ as requiring certainty, which is under discussion. When you say, “do not follow logically”, you really mean “do not follow necessarily”.

In my example, I could have just said P1: All ducks are mortal. The point is that I only know of ducks being mortal because of my past experience of ducks being mortal. Again, this is perfectly fine because the problem of induction doesn’t apply to *my* epistemology. The secularist still has the problem. The question is how did you get the universal in the first place. Like I said, we disagree on whether sense experience can produce any knowledge. I think it can. You guy’s don’t think it can. As well, I don't think that all of knowledge can be deduced from scripture. You don't have to go into it either, when I have the time I'll read all of the different views.

Also, one doesn’t have to be an empiricist to think that people can gain knowledge by sense experience.

"Scripturalists, and to the extent Cheung is a Scripturalist, merely agree with scientists and philosophers of science that induction is a fallacy."

So would this mean that induction is neutral and gathering info to come to a conclusion and deduction is a conclusion from your assertion of what truth is?

I'm a simple folk, please bear with me.

Originally Posted by caleb_woodrow

I am not talking about psychological states of mind. Its not that “certainty has bearing on how to make a fallacious argument valid or a false proposition true”. Perhaps I will better show later in this post how certainty plays a role in this discussion.

If by certainty you mean necessity, as in the conclusion of a valid argument necessarily follows from its premises, then we're just discussing semantics.

If so (and it seems clear that this is the case from the above statement), this simply begs the question against induction.

How ironic is that! As Anthony made clear in his excellent reply all that one can hope for in any induction is to beg the question. It's a clever disguise. What Popper calls an optical illusion. It gives the appearance of a valid inference, but it's just an educated guess, or, better, a dressed up conjecture. Regardless, I think Anthony already answered this objection and a couple of others along the way, so I'll try not to add anything to what he has already written.

Also, what is meant by “true statements”. Is this supposed to mean universals? It would seem hard to show how science cannot produce true statements with respect to particulars at least.

It can mean universals such as all have sinned or all men evolved from apes or all men are ducks. Truth also applies to statements of history, geography, and anything else for that matter. For example; "two of them were going that very day to a village named Emmaus, which was about seven miles from Jerusalem." It is a true statment that two followers of Christ were going to Emmaus and that this village was about seven miles from Jerusalem. How do we know this? Not from any empirical or inductive method, but by revelation alone. The question for you is; how can you arrive at the truth of any proposition from empirical means? You've asserted as much, but you haven't shown how this might work? You've provided no theory whatsoever. Again, ironically, empiricism has historically ended in skepticism not knowledge. Admittedly, Kant tried to rescue empiricism form the trash bin, but I'm hard pressed to see where or how he succeeded?

Usually people think of non-cognitive as meaning ‘non-rational’.

That is one meaning, not the one I had in mind. Cognitive 1. concerned with acquisition of knowledge: relating to the process of acquiring knowledge by the use of reasoning, intuition, or perception.

Going back to the original topic, it seems like you are trying to appeal to the problem of induction in order to argue against the ‘form’ of inductive arguments.

Yes, I thought I was crystal clear. I guess I wasn't since it only seemed that way to you. Hopefully Anthony's reply made it clearer.

Here is the thing though, the problem of induction doesn’t apply to Christian epistemology, but it does to secular epistemologies. I believe in an all sovereign God who upholds all of nature, and revelation is where I go to back up the idea of the uniformity of nature [See Genesis 8 (specifically verse 22 if I remember correctly) on the topic of Uniformity of Nature]. The point is that there isn’t a problem with science per se, but with the secularist epistemological justification of science.

Well, this is where you're wrong and why I said it appears only Christians are under this particular delusion and not secularists. If the problem is a formal one than your belief in the uniformity of nature per the Scriptures, while admirable, does not magically change a fallacious argument into a valid one. The counter claim to a Christian epistemological justification for science is merely begging the question.

Again, this is not to say that science is not useful. It is supremely useful. The problem is that you did not go far back enough in Genesis. You need to go back to 1:26 & 28. Science is a great tool for subduing the earth, but as a means to knowledge it is a complete and utter failure. Jumping ahead, man does not live by bread alone, "but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God." In this regard, I would also recommend a piece by John Robbins, [i]Scientist as Evangelist[i], at http://www.trinityfoundation.org/journal.php?id=35. Maybe after you're done with your finals.

Pretty much when it comes down to it you are going to deny that we can arrive at any knowledge by sense experience, and I will not.

Yep, that's pretty much what it comes down to. I'm not willing to merely beg the question and you are.

It seems we then arrive at an impasse, and that argument can be saved for another thread at another time when I am not busy with a big paper and getting ready for finals.

Another day then.

Originally Posted by caleb_woodrow

Also, one doesn’t have to be an empiricist to think that people can gain knowledge by sense experience.

To the extent one thinks knowledge can be gained by sense experience, then to that extent you are an empiricist.

Originally Posted by Andrew P.C.

"Scripturalists, and to the extent Cheung is a Scripturalist, merely agree with scientists and philosophers of science that induction is a fallacy."

So would this mean that induction is neutral and gathering info to come to a conclusion and deduction is a conclusion from your assertion of what truth is?

I'm a simple folk, please bear with me.

Not sure I'm following? But to take a stab anyway . . . . Valid deduction from true premises results in a true conclusions and necessarily so. This is why the WCF states that Scripture is not limited to just those propositions explicitly set down in Scripture, but also they're necessary inferences as well. The problem is not just a matter of recognizing that induction is a fallacy, but can the truthfulness of any premise be established and on what basis? Empiricism? I don't see how? The history of philosophy has shown how and why empiricism has failed in this regard (Christian claims to the contrary notwithstanding). Yet, it seems to me Christians are the last ones to have actually learned this lesson simply because so few have. Frankly, I'm quite sure I'm not clever enough to have ever seen this either without the help of a teacher. That is why I think reading the work of Gordon Clark is required for any thinking Christian.

Originally Posted by Andrew P.C.

"Scripturalists, and to the extent Cheung is a Scripturalist, merely agree with scientists and philosophers of science that induction is a fallacy."

So would this mean that induction is neutral and gathering info to come to a conclusion ....

To be precise, when I am using the term "induction" I am taking about making universal truth claims ("all crows are black") based on particular experiences ("observation that 10,000 crows are black"). This is a fallacy of induction.

Ironically, many scientist avoid making universal claims. Some avoid actually saying theorem X is proven true. Scientists know that for many of their theorems, one contradictory observation might falsify the theorem. In fact, the best (most scientific) theorems are specifically formed to be falsifiable - formed so that it is clear what would need to be observed in order to prove the theorem is false.) (BTW, this is why the Theory of Evolution if bad science, it is not falsifiable).

So when Scientist do no claim to provide truth, but rather strong possibilities, then they do their job correctly.

Originally Posted by Andrew P.C.

... and deduction is a conclusion from your assertion of what truth is?

Induction and deduction are not like sides of a coin. We use the terms as if they are optional choices or merely methods of logic. But really, strict induction (making universal claims from particulars) is logically fallacious. So in that sense - induction is not logical.

Now if one says induction is a means from producing possibilities from particular observations - then there is not a problem anymore. And as Karl Popper noted, we are not longer really taking about induction anymore. A universal truth claim is not being made, and so this is no longer a fallacy. A claim that observations y1, y2, ..., yn lead to the conclusion the x is possible the case. All the observations of crows gives strong support that crows are black. So we do not conclude that all crows are black, but that probably all crows are black. And this is really deductive thought.

So deductive though is logical thinking. When you are thinking correctly and clearly, you think deductively. Even when using "so-called" induction, your thinking is deductive in form. And when you use clear correct deductive (logical) thinking, you can prove what is true ("by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture" (WCF 1.6)).

The only valid logical thinking is deductive. Anything else a a variation on the theme of deduction or is fallacious.

Another Popper quote to chew on:

. . . in science there is no 'knowledge', in the sense in which Plato and Aristotle understood the word, in the sense which implies finality; in science, we never have sufficient reason for the belief that we have attained the truth. What we usually call 'scientific knowledge' is, as a rule, not knowledge in this sense, but rather information regarding the various competing hypotheses and the way in which they have stood up to various tests; it is, using the language of Plato and Aristotle, information concerning the latest, and the best tested, scientific 'opinion'. This view means, furthermore, that we have no proofs in science (excepting, of course, pure mathematics and logic). In the empirical sciences, which alone can furnish us with information about the world we live in, proofs do not occur, if we mean by 'proof' an argument which establishes once and for ever the truth of a theory. (What may occur, however, are refutations of scientific theories.)

Originally Posted by Civbert

To be precise, when I am using the term "induction" I am taking about making universal truth claims ("all crows are black") based on particular experiences ("observation that 10,000 crows are black"). This is a fallacy of induction.

Ironically, many scientist avoid making universal claims. Some avoid actually saying theorem X is proven true. Scientists know that for many of their theorems, one contradictory observation might falsify the theorem. In fact, the best (most scientific) theorems are specifically formed to be falsifiable - formed so that it is clear what would need to be observed in order to prove the theorem is false.) (BTW, this is why the Theory of Evolution if bad science, it is not falsifiable).

So when Scientist do no claim to provide truth, but rather strong possibilities, then they do their job correctly.





Induction and deduction are not like sides of a coin. We use the terms as if they are optional choices or merely methods of logic. But really, strict induction (making universal claims from particulars) is logically fallacious. So in that sense - induction is not logical.

Now if one says induction is a means from producing possibilities from particular observations - then there is not a problem anymore. And as Karl Popper noted, we are not longer really taking about induction anymore. A universal truth claim is not being made, and so this is no longer a fallacy. A claim that observations y1, y2, ..., yn lead to the conclusion the x is possible the case. All the observations of crows gives strong support that crows are black. So we do not conclude that all crows are black, but that probably all crows are black. And this is really deductive thought.

So deductive though is logical thinking. When you are thinking correctly and clearly, you think deductively. Even when using "so-called" induction, your thinking is deductive in form. And when you use clear correct deductive (logical) thinking, you can prove what is true ("by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture" (WCF 1.6)).

The only valid logical thinking is deductive. Anything else a a variation on the theme of deduction or is fallacious.

Wouldn't a universal truth be correct in the christian sense? (Now, correct me if I'm totally missing it) For example, Christ is the way, the truth, and the life; or you are justified by faith alone. Aren't those universal truth claims?(Which it is the truth whether one believes so or not.)

Originally Posted by Andrew P.C.

Wouldn't a universal truth be correct in the Christian sense? (Now, correct me if I'm totally missing it) For example, Christ is the way, the truth, and the life; or you are justified by faith alone. Aren't those universal truth claims?(Which it is the truth whether one believes so or not.)

A "universal" truth is a statement that is true for all members of a class. All men are mortal. All men have sinned and fallen short of the glory of God. All cats have four legs.

"Particulars" are claims made about a subset of things. Some crows (all those we have observed) are black. Some Europeans are Italian.


If a proposition is "universal" or "particular" is know as it's quantity.

http://www.logic-classroom.tvcobx.net/study1.htm

Originally Posted by Civbert

A "universal" truth is a statement that is true for all members of a class. All men are mortal. All men have sinned and fallen short of the glory of God. All cats have four legs.

"Particulars" are claims made about a subset of things. Some crows (all those we have observed) are black. Some Europeans are Italian.


If a proposition is "universal" or "particular" is know as it's quantity.

http://www.logic-classroom.tvcobx.net/study1.htm

Ah, I see. Thanks Brother.

So the punch lies within "some" or "all".