Quote:
Originally Posted by Spear Dane 
First, you begin your disagreement with On the Contrary. You cite an authority who disagrees with the objector. Context: St Thomas would respond to a series of Objections 1, 2, 3...y. These objections would usually cite some prominent figure from philosophy or church history. St Thomas would often respond to this authority with this authority. However, the ancients usually considered appeals to authority to be the weakest form of argument (Reformed folk take heed!). More importantly this appeal to authority helpfully and succinctly states your position
Secondly, respond in the form of I answer that...; here you build your case for your position.
Thirdly, you will directly reply to the objections in the previous post--or, given the nature of discussion boards, state your objections to the previous post.
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Douglas Walton, in
Informal Logic: A Handobook for Critical Thinking, discusses the
argumentum ad verecundiam and concludes that it is not always fallacious or weak (p. 179 - 197). Its merit should be judged from within the "context of dialogue" and can be seen as a valuable way to put the burden back on to your opponent. Walton is recognized as one of the most respected authorities, a breaker of new ground (he even argues that not all circular argumentation is fallacious!) in informal logic. I henceforth ask that Walton be included in any refutation of the
argumentum ad verecundiam - which, of course, we know was given that name by John Locke and means "the argument from modesty." But even Locke did not claim all such appeals to be fallacious (see Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 159-160).
I answer that the argument is fallacious when you try to silence the opposition. In the context of dialogue - especially a persuasion dialogue, there are rules of procedure expected of both sides. If you are in a dialogue, and try to silence the opposition, then you show you are not in a dialogue. That you're not trying to come to an understanding, or even persuade your disputer. A dialogue is not a monologue. Hence in the
context of a
dialogue, when authority is appealed to to shut down your opponent, that is an instance of the fallacious use of the argument because once the dialogue is begun,
both parties are expected to finish it.
But obviously such appeals are not always fallacious. it would seem foolhardy and irrational to tell your doctor that you refuse to heed his advice because to do so would engage in taking his conclusions on his authority. Or, when we investigate something we cannot very well investigate everything required, hence we will appeal to some authority. If our cognitive authority is regarded as a means of supplementing experimental investigation, when such investigation is impractical, it may not be wrong to appeal to said authority.
Also, in court cases juries are expected to listen to authorities. They have no time to investigate what was said. Are all such court proceedings shams? Travesties of justice based on fallacious decisions handed down by jurors?
No doubt the above can be question. The opposing side in a court case will no doubt invoke his own authority.
The question that concerns us is are arguments from authority weak arguments, or fallacies? The answer we have sought to prove is; no, not always. We must look at the context of dialogue and ask critical questions about how the appeal was invoked. In some cases we may say that the appeal validly threw the burden of proof back on to the other party(ies). If every single Greek scholar in the world translated some word in a certain way, and someone, especially one unfamiliar with the Greek language - or only partly so - dissented, I think our mere appeal to authority (given that we don't understand Greek too) would be appropriate here and would force our interlocutor to have the burden of proof. Our appeal, though, obviously doesn't *necessitate* his being wrong about the translation. it just throws the burden on him.
I see no objections, but in case they say, "but such an appeal does not guarantee that you are correct," I agree. But I never intended to convey that it did. That would try to squeeze too much juice out of the authoritative fruit. But certainly even our objector does not dilly dally after the doctor has prescribed some course of action. To do so would be foolish. Surely our objector would not hang every jury he was a part of because he didn't have the time, means, or education to personally investigate the issues discussed by the authority.
So, we shouldn’t go too far on either end of the spectrum. We should try to find some mean. I submit that Aquinas, being the good Aristotelian that he was, would appreciate the nod towards moderation, towards means. Excess in either direction is potentially foolhardy.
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