Thread: Brief note on Cyril of Alexandria

Originally Posted by timmopussycat

The attitude that once a theological judgement once made by the church is not capable of being revisited when prima facie views of evidence that is either not known or not presented in the original court turns up, is simply inconsistent with the stances Reformed Theology has taken elsewhere. We do not, for example, presume that we may not reexamine the Roman doctrine of the Mass because the doctrine is already established. Nor can we assume that Councils get it always right. I think it was the Bainton bio of Luther that noted that it was when Martin Luther discovered two solidly "evangelical" (his word) propositions of Hus that were condemned by the council of Constance that he showed that councils could not hae final authority in the church.

Moreover on biblical standards, it is an injustice to condemn a man for a doctrine he does not hold.

If N's own writings show Chalcedonian orthodoxy wrt to the nature of Christ, his reservations concerning how to name Mary must be shown by GNC to be heresy before he can be condemned for it. It would help if someone could set forth a place where such demonstration is attempted.

On paragraph one, you are speaking to the wrong issue. I am not denying the responsibility of the modern church to evaluate the history. I am denying the ability to revise the history. Modern evangelicals continually confound those two things, so I suppose I have to show some indulgence to your zeal for the fallibility of human councils.

On paragraph two, that is a truism, and it applies as equally to condemning a council for acting in the interests of Christian truth.

On paragraph three, good and necessary consequence only applies in a closed world of facts. It applies to the Bible because the fulness of the Bible as a revelation fom God specifically implies truths which are not expressly stated. Good and necessary consequence would be dangerous to apply to fallible and limited human statements. What we must determine is whether Nestorius' rejection of the theotokos was a rejection of an important part of Christological orthodoxy of that time. Given the incarnational model of salvation, the answer to that question is affirmative.

Originally Posted by DTK

Moreover, although he was permitted initially to return to the vicinity of Antioch for 4 or 5 years, he was sent on order of the emperor into exile at the Oasis, in the Thebaid, i.e., to a monastery in the Great Oasis of Hibis (al-Khargah). This was in the middle of the Libyan desert of Egypt, at the most southern oasis, so I disagree with your suggested "probability."

Oops--regardless, Egypt was also a major center of Christianity, plus it was the breadbasket of the Empire. News would still have traveled fast there.

Originally Posted by armourbearer

Regrettably modern scholars come to the facts of the case as if it were still open, which results in the evaluation of evidence which was not part of the original case and the omission of evidence which was essential to the original case.

The church of the time was divided on the validity of the proceedings. Hence the immediate counter-council called by John of Antioch, which exonerated Nestorius and defrocked Cyril. The emperor banished both Cyril and Nestorius but was later persuaded to reinstate Cyril and banish Nestorius to Egypt--under Cyril's watchful eye.

He denied the orthodox language of the time at the precise point where it comes to bear on orthodox Christology. "Theotokos" simply cannot be cast aside as the language of Mariolatry; it was the orthodox way of representing soteriological truth in an incarnation model of salvation; much in the same way the reformed speak of the infinite value of the atonement.

He didn't deny its validity as a technical theological term any more than we reject the validity of the term "real presence." The trouble was that he saw it as being a bit ambiguous and leading to error (in which he was justified), preferring a term that emphasized both humanity and divinity.

His overall theological concerns cannot be reconciled with the strong emphasis on union which later came to be identified with Christological orthodoxy.

I think the quote which I presented in post 27 answers this.

The son brought forth by the Virgin is "God with us." The catholic tradition (including the reformed catholic tradition) takes seriously the nativity revelation of Matthew and Luke. Nestorius' failure to affirm this key element of the incarnation is bound to become a problem for anyone who undertakes to defend him.

Again, he didn't deny the title theotokos, he just disliked it for some of its possible implications--and I don't think any Protestant can deny that his fear was ultimately justified. He preferred the title Christotokos partly because it emphasized both divine and human.

I might myself say that the term theanthropotokos (God-man-bearer) might be even more accurate.

Originally Posted by P. F. Pugh

Oops--regardless, Egypt was also a major center of Christianity, plus it was the breadbasket of the Empire. News would still have traveled fast there.

I think I'm done with this discussion.

DTK

Originally Posted by P. F. Pugh

The church of the time was divided on the validity of the proceedings. Hence the immediate counter-council called by John of Antioch, which exonerated Nestorius and defrocked Cyril. The emperor banished both Cyril and Nestorius but was later persuaded to reinstate Cyril and banish Nestorius to Egypt--under Cyril's watchful eye.

I am referring to the Christological verdict, not events. Nestorius is left on the outside and Cyril within the circle of orthodoxy.

Originally Posted by P. F. Pugh

He didn't deny its validity as a technical theological term any more than we reject the validity of the term "real presence." The trouble was that he saw it as being a bit ambiguous and leading to error (in which he was justified), preferring a term that emphasized both humanity and divinity.

Can't you see that you are substantiating the point, that his negation of a term which emphasised unity and his preference for duality is the very problem.

Originally Posted by P. F. Pugh

His overall theological concerns cannot be reconciled with the strong emphasis on union which later came to be identified with Christological orthodoxy.

I think the quote which I presented in post 27 answers this.

Regrettably it doesn't. His concerns were metaphysical; he could not find a rational way to bring divinity and humanity together in personal union. Even the Bazaar (which is really irrelevant to the case as it was post factum) continues to voice these concerns.

Originally Posted by P. F. Pugh

Again, he didn't deny the title theotokos, he just disliked it for some of its possible implications--and I don't think any Protestant can deny that his fear was ultimately justified. He preferred the title Christotokos partly because it emphasized both divine and human.

As suspected, the problem does not lie in the verdict of history, but in the dislike of an orthodoxy which Protestantism has always confessed. If a modern rejects the theotokos it is no wonder he will fight for Nestorius because he is really fighting for himself.

I am referring to the Christological verdict, not events. Nestorius is left on the outside and Cyril within the circle of orthodoxy.

Depends--do you accept Cyril's council or John's version of Ephesus?

Can't you see that you are substantiating the point, that his negation of a term which emphasised unity and his preference for duality is the very problem.

I think you miss the problem that theotokos emphasizes Christ's divinity at the expense of His humanity. I don't see how using the term Christotokos is any less unified than theotokos.

Regrettably it doesn't. His concerns were metaphysical; he could not find a rational way to bring divinity and humanity together in personal union. Even the Bazaar (which is really irrelevant to the case as it was post factum) continues to voice these concerns.

And they were legitimate concerns, as Chalcedon and later history proved.

As suspected, the problem does not lie in the verdict of history, but in the dislike of an orthodoxy which Protestantism has always confessed.

Half the church didn't accept it at the time! The only parts that accepted it were the ones under imperial jurisdiction. Outside the Roman Empire, it was rejected entirely and within, the debate would rage until Chalcedon.

If a modern rejects the theotokos it is no wonder he will fight for Nestorius because he is really fighting for himself.

I don't reject the theotokos--I just think the term has been so misused as to not be useful. Again, think "real presence." I can affirm the original intent--I just reject its current use in Catholicism as a reference to transubstantiation.

Originally Posted by P. F. Pugh

Depends--do you accept Cyril's council or John's version of Ephesus?

The orthodox Christological tradition accepts Cyril's council.

Originally Posted by P. F. Pugh

I think you miss the problem that theotokos emphasizes Christ's divinity at the expense of His humanity. I don't see how using the term Christotokos is any less unified than theotokos.

Yes, Christ is a divine person who assumed a human nature; that is the point of the term. "Christotokos" made no substantive claim.

Originally Posted by P. F. Pugh

And they were legitimate concerns, as Chalcedon and later history proved.

Chalcedon answered these metaphysical concerns with theological certainty: "Mary, the Mother of God."

Originally Posted by P. F. Pugh

Half the church didn't accept it at the time! The only parts that accepted it were the ones under imperial jurisdiction. Outside the Roman Empire, it was rejected entirely and within, the debate would rage until Chalcedon.

Chalcedon accepts it; catholicism (including reformed catholicism) accepts Chalcedon.

Originally Posted by P. F. Pugh

I don't reject the theotokos--I just think the term has been so misused as to not be useful. Again, think "real presence." I can affirm the original intent--I just reject its current use in Catholicism as a reference to transubstantiation.

By all means one is required to free terms from misconceptions which attach to them; but one is not at liberty to disregard the substantive truth signified by a term. Corporeal presence, not real presence, undergirds transubstantiation. Anyone with common sense will understand that. But this is beside the point, as Nestorius' polemic was aimed at the Christological truth signified by theotokos, not at mariolatrical abuse of the term.

Therefore has he said 'the likeness' and 'the name' which it has taken, which indicates a prosôpon as of one; and this same name and prosôpon make the two of them to be understood; and the distinction of nature, one hypostasis and one prosôpon,50 is theirs

Two natures in a hypostatic/prosoponic union. I really can't see how Nestorius' understanding contradicts.

But this is beside the point, as Nestorius' polemic was aimed at the Christological truth signified by theotokos, not at mariolatrical abuse of the term.

Actually, if anything, that was his error--in his objection to the term theotokos (which is where the controversy started), he made too great a distinction between the two natures. The subtle christological differences between the actual Nestorian (ie: Nestorius--not the Ephesian definition), orthodox, and miaphysite positions are so slight, in my humble opinion, as to render them moot. In fact, in modern times, adherents of all three have come together in affirming Chalcedon.

The other question I would ask here is, how much does it matter? Does Nestorius' position teach another Gospel/worship another Christ than the one that we do?

I would suggest that it does not. Nestorians in Persia and beyond were the greatest missionaries since the apostolic age. By 1000 AD there were Christians of this Church of the East from Mesopotamia to Japan and the Philippines and from Mongolia to India. Are we going to seriously suggest that they were all preaching a false Gospel as they were fulfilling the Great Commission? Somehow the thought is incredible to me.

Originally Posted by P. F. Pugh

Therefore has he said 'the likeness' and 'the name' which it has taken, which indicates a prosôpon as of one; and this same name and prosôpon make the two of them to be understood; and the distinction of nature, one hypostasis and one prosôpon,50 is theirs

Two natures in a hypostatic/prosoponic union. I really can't see how Nestorius' understanding contradicts.

This is from a work which is only relevant to the case insofar as it seeks to present the perspective of the condemned. This work was not in evidence during the controversy.

Even here, however, there is no genuine presentation of Christological orthodoxy. In the very section you cite, we read, "But since he became flesh in taking the flesh, he was named after both of them in both of them, but as though he were one in both of them, not [in both] in nature, but in the one indeed in nature but in the other in prosôpon by adoption as well as by revelation."

Again, "He who was seen speaks from him who was conceived as from his own prosôpon, as though he were one and possessed the same prosôpon."

Again, "For they are not far removed either in operation or in word or in ousia; nor are the things which are to be distinguished the one from the other in the prosôpon distinct in love, for they are conceived of his prosôpon in the love and the will of God in that he took the flesh."

The "union" recognised by this bizarre Bazaar is one of love and will. The flesh is spoken of as a prosopon by adoption and revelation. The language of two persons is not utilised, but it uses very impertinent language if it intends to teach a unio personalis.

Originally Posted by P. F. Pugh

Actually, if anything, that was his error--in his objection to the term theotokos (which is where the controversy started), he made too great a distinction between the two natures.

It is good that you are starting to see what the controversy was actually concerned with.

Originally Posted by P. F. Pugh

The subtle christological differences between the actual Nestorian (ie: Nestorius--not the Ephesian definition), orthodox, and miaphysite positions are so slight, in my humble opinion, as to render them moot. In fact, in modern times, adherents of all three have come together in affirming Chalcedon.

All three have not come together in affirming Chalcedon if Nestorius' advocates continue to reject Chalcedon's affirmation of theotokos.

To show the importance of the controversy in modern terms -- do you believe "Christ" satisfied "infinite" justice? How?

This is from a work which is only relevant to the case insofar as it seeks to present the perspective of the condemned. This work was not in evidence during the controversy.

And neither were the eastern bishops. You have a synod of half the church essentially condemning the other half for heresies they don't hold. Again, I'm not convinced that Nestorius actually held the heresy condemned at Ephesus. This isn't like Nicaea where the case was clear--in this case there were so many irregularities as to throw the whole into doubt.

All three have not come together in affirming Chalcedon if Nestorius' advocates continue to reject Chalcedon's affirmation of theotokos.

I'll check into that. Given the subsequent history of the term theotokos, I would prefer to find a different term that doesn't put quite so much emphasis on Mary.

To show the importance of the controversy in modern terms -- do you believe "Christ" satisfied "infinite" justice? How?

By being God incarnate. I don't think Nestorius would disagree here.

We do not, for example, presume that we may not reexamine the Roman doctrine of the Mass because the doctrine is already established.

He said

Regrettably modern scholars come to the facts of the case as if it were still open, which results in the evaluation of evidence which was not part of the original case and the omission of evidence which was essential to the original case.

How can the RC doctrine of the Mass be compared to the teachings of Nestorius when it comes to clear forensic evidence?

Originally Posted by timmopussycat

Originally Posted by PCFLANAGAN

"Actually, the Bazaar, which I quoted, refers to events that happened at Chalcedon."

Would you please provide an example? If you did earlier, I missed it.

One may find the introduction to the Bazaar online at
Nestorius, The Bazaar of Heracleides (1925) pp.iii-xxxv.* Introduction

The introduction contains the following paragraph.

"The book must have been written by Nestorius in the year 451 or 452, seeing that there are references to the death of Theodosius II in 450, and to the flight of Dioscorus of Alexandria. Dioscorus was at the Council of Chalcedon in 451, but though formally deposed by the Council in October of that year was not condemned to banishment until the following July. On the other hand, Nestorius, though speaking of the triumph of the orthodox faith of Flavian and Leo, does not seem to be aware of the formal decisions of the Council of Chalcedon. It appears, therefore, that Dioscorus must have fled when the Council decided against him, and that when Nestorius wrote he must have heard of his flight, but not of the formal decision of the Council or of the imperial decree by which sentence of exile was pronounced upon him."

If this is correct it dates N's last emendation of the Bazzar to sometime betwen mid November 451 and early 452.

The flight of Dioscorus is not an event that happened at Chalcedon.

Furthermore, you may be interested to note that the quotation you provided is essentially a block quotation taken from "Nestorius and his Teaching" by James Franklin Bethune-Baker. Bethune-Baker provides the following justification for his dating:

There is no direct mention of the Council of Chalcedon, but the orthodox faith—the faith of Flavian and of Leo which Nestorius regards as his own faith—has already triumphed, and Dioscorus has betaken himself to flight 'as a means of avoiding deposition and being driven into exile'. But Dioscorus was at the Council of Chalcedon, still endeavouring to brave out all that he had done, and if he took to flight it can only have been after the Council had already condemned him and before their sentence had been ratified by the Emperor, in the hope that his friends might secure more favourable treatment for him. The Council sat from the 8th of October to the 1st of November, and the formal deposition of Dioscorus was pronounced at the third session on the 13th of October. On the 7th of February of the following year the Emperor published an edict confirming the doctrinal decisions of the Council, but the decree condemning Eutyches and Dioscorus to banishment was not issued till the 6th of July. Nestorius therefore wrote the concluding portion of his book after the Council (apparently before the Acts of the Council had reached him) and before the news of the imperial edict which sent Dioscorus into exile had travelled so far up the Nile. The earlier parts were probably written at a much earlier time:—they breathe more of the spirit of battle and give no indication of the denouement; it seems to be only to a distant future that the writer looks for the vindication of his doctrine.

The emphasis is mine.

I'm not sure that will change your (or Pugh's - who has not deemed my inquiry worthy of a response) firmly entrenched views either as to the speed of the post in those days or to the fact that the Bazaar does not refer to events that happened at Chalcedon.

Originally Posted by PCFLANAGAN

Originally Posted by timmopussycat

Originally Posted by PCFLANAGAN

"Actually, the Bazaar, which I quoted, refers to events that happened at Chalcedon."

Would you please provide an example? If you did earlier, I missed it.

One may find the introduction to the Bazaar online at
Nestorius, The Bazaar of Heracleides (1925) pp.iii-xxxv.* Introduction

The introduction contains the following paragraph.

"The book must have been written by Nestorius in the year 451 or 452, seeing that there are references to the death of Theodosius II in 450, and to the flight of Dioscorus of Alexandria. Dioscorus was at the Council of Chalcedon in 451, but though formally deposed by the Council in October of that year was not condemned to banishment until the following July. On the other hand, Nestorius, though speaking of the triumph of the orthodox faith of Flavian and Leo, does not seem to be aware of the formal decisions of the Council of Chalcedon. It appears, therefore, that Dioscorus must have fled when the Council decided against him, and that when Nestorius wrote he must have heard of his flight, but not of the formal decision of the Council or of the imperial decree by which sentence of exile was pronounced upon him."

If this is correct it dates N's last emendation of the Bazzar to sometime betwen mid November 451 and early 452.

The flight of Dioscorus is not an event that happened at Chalcedon.

Furthermore, you may be interested to note that the quotation you provided is essentially a block quotation taken from "Nestorius and his Teaching" by James Franklin Bethune-Baker. Bethune-Baker provides the following justification for his dating:

There is no direct mention of the Council of Chalcedon, but the orthodox faith—the faith of Flavian and of Leo which Nestorius regards as his own faith—has already triumphed, and Dioscorus has betaken himself to flight 'as a means of avoiding deposition and being driven into exile'. But Dioscorus was at the Council of Chalcedon, still endeavouring to brave out all that he had done, and if he took to flight it can only have been after the Council had already condemned him and before their sentence had been ratified by the Emperor, in the hope that his friends might secure more favourable treatment for him. The Council sat from the 8th of October to the 1st of November, and the formal deposition of Dioscorus was pronounced at the third session on the 13th of October. On the 7th of February of the following year the Emperor published an edict confirming the doctrinal decisions of the Council, but the decree condemning Eutyches and Dioscorus to banishment was not issued till the 6th of July. Nestorius therefore wrote the concluding portion of his book after the Council (apparently before the Acts of the Council had reached him) and before the news of the imperial edict which sent Dioscorus into exile had travelled so far up the Nile. The earlier parts were probably written at a much earlier time:—they breathe more of the spirit of battle and give no indication of the denouement; it seems to be only to a distant future that the writer looks for the vindication of his doctrine.

The emphasis is mine.

I'm not sure that will change your (or Pugh's - who has not deemed my inquiry worthy of a response) firmly entrenched views either as to the speed of the post in those days or to the fact that the Bazaar does not refer to events that happened at Chalcedon.

Unless you know that D was present for his deposition or remained in Chalcedon for the rest of the council and travelled to his see immediately afterwords, N may have been better informed than you are. Do we know D's travel diary? The land speed of the postal system throughout the Roman empire is known to have been 50 miles/day and it is not at all unreasonable to posit that such news could have reached N in Lower Egypt within 50 days as the distance from Istanbul (Chalcedon) to Alexandria is about 1061 miles. From Alexandria to the present Aswan is about another 700 miles. The Thebaid area was a twenty mile wide strip along the Nile running from Abydos south to Aswan. So the maximum distance from Chalcedon to Nestorius in exile was 1800 miles or 36 days average travel time.

The entire reason I have cited the matter was to point out that since the Bazaar specifically mentions an event that could only have occured after the council began, (since we know that D participated in the council until deposed), we have good reason to believe N's death took place after the Council commenced rather than before it began as was earlier presumed.

Tim wrote:

Please note that the Bazaar specifically mentions that Discordius has taken flight so it could only been written after his banishment on 13 October. The land speed of the postal system throughout the Roman empire is known to have been 50 miles/day and it is not at all unreasonable to posit that such news could have reached N in Lower Egypt within 50 days.

Note, however, that Nestorius was not in Lower Egypt (well - of course, that depends where one sets off the limits). He was banished to a remote (far from the Nile) oasis in the Western Desert, as Pastor King already pointed out. (The place known today as al-Kharga, Egypt)

As to the remainder...

Pastor King had written:

Moreover, Nestorius was either dead (or at any rate, near death...some suggest he died in 436 AD, some suggest 451 AD when Chalcedon convened) at the time of this Council, and certainly could not have expressed familiarity with its proceedings in any of his writings.

Mr. Pugh had retorted:

As for the Church history, I'm relying on the scholarly introduction to the text which suggests that he most probably died around 451 and knew at least of the banishment of Dioscorus I, Pope of Alexandria (student of Cyril). The text also refers to the death of Theodosius II in 450.

You, Mr. Cunningham, chimed in by quoting from the paragraph to which Mr. Pugh was referring. However, that source (the source from which that paragraph originally comes) supports what Pastor King said.
Recall that Mr. Pugh had stated:

As I recall, the followers of Cyril were condemned at Chalcedon. In reading Nestorius' writings, it seems he was aware of the Council of Chalcedon and applauded it.

And again:

Actually, the Bazaar, which I quoted, refers to events that happened at Chalcedon.

I think what Pastor King wrote still stands:

You're going to have to do more than refer me to the above work by Nestorius when you suggest that "the followers of Cyril were condemned at Chalcedon" and that Nestorius was aware of the proceedings of Chalcedon, which is why I suggested the needed lesson(s) in Church history.

And I'm rather puzzled both as to why Mr. Pugh hasn't apologized to Pastor King and as to why you are seemingly trying to support Mr. Pugh. Your explanation doesn't really clarify things for me:

The entire reason I have cited the matter was to point out that since the Bazaar specifically mentions an event that could only have occured after the council began, (since we know that D participated in the council until deposed), we have good reason to believe N's death took place after the Council commenced rather than before it began as was earlier presumed.

Given that Pastor King said dead or dying and given that the issue is whether Nestorius was familiar with Chalcedon's acts, I hardly see what purpose your comments serve, or how they are really relevant to the topic. Perhaps focus has been lost in the flurry of comments.

Originally Posted by TimV

We do not, for example, presume that we may not reexamine the Roman doctrine of the Mass because the doctrine is already established.

He said

Regrettably modern scholars come to the facts of the case as if it were still open, which results in the evaluation of evidence which was not part of the original case and the omission of evidence which was essential to the original case.

How can the RC doctrine of the Mass be compared to the teachings of Nestorius when it comes to clear forensic evidence?

It can't. We have clear statements accepted by the Roman magisterium as to what they teach on the subject. But much of N's own teachings are not accessible to us and N. consistently denied that that he taught what his accusers were accusing him of both at Ephesus and thereafter.

But my main point in referring to the Hus condemnation was to provide supporting evidence for my comment that

=timmopussycat
The attitude that once a theological judgement once made by the church is not capable of being revisited when prima facie views of evidence that is either not known or not presented in the original court turns up, is simply inconsistent with the stances Reformed Theology has taken elsewhere.

in contrast to the claim that

Originally Posted by armourbearer

Our method of examining the evidence must reflect a case that has already been tried.

-----Added 10/15/2009 at 04:02:30 EST-----

Originally Posted by PCFLANAGAN

Tim wrote:

Please note that the Bazaar specifically mentions that Discordius has taken flight so it could only been written after his banishment on 13 October. The land speed of the postal system throughout the Roman empire is known to have been 50 miles/day and it is not at all unreasonable to posit that such news could have reached N in Lower Egypt within 50 days.

Note, however, that Nestorius was not in Lower Egypt. He was banished to a remote (far from the Nile) oasis in Upper Egypt, as Pastor King already pointed out. (The place known today as al-Kharga, Egypt)

Sorry my typo: Upper Egypt is correct. But Upper Egypt lies within the milage radius I gave as that radius includes the distance from Alexandria to Aswan which is south of the Thebaid. Any oasis in the Thebaid would have been visited by the mail route to Aswan.

Originally Posted by PCFLANAGAN

As to the remainder...

Pastor King had written:

Moreover, Nestorius was either dead (or at any rate, near death...some suggest he died in 436 AD, some suggest 451 AD when Chalcedon convened) at the time of this Council, and certainly could not have expressed familiarity with its proceedings in any of his writings.

Mr. Pugh had retorted:
You, Mr. Cunningham, chimed in by quoting from the paragraph to which Mr. Pugh was referring. However, that source (the source from which that paragraph originally comes) supports what Pastor King said.

Not quite. I stated the source from which I was quoting. That source was not Mr. Pugh's source, although mine drew from his.

Originally Posted by PCFLANAGAN

And I'm rather puzzled ...as to why you are seemingly trying to support Mr. Pugh. Your explanation doesn't really clarify things for me:

The entire reason I have cited the matter was to point out that since the Bazaar specifically mentions an event that could only have occured after the council began, (since we know that D participated in the council until deposed), we have good reason to believe N's death took place after the Council commenced rather than before it began as was earlier presumed.

Given that Pastor King said dead or dying and given that the issue is whether Nestorius was familiar with Chalcedon's acts, I hardly see what purpose your comments serve, or how they are really relevant to the topic. Perhaps focus has been lost in the flurry of comments.

The Bazaar provides evidence that N may have been familliar with some of the events at the council, if not its decrees. That possibility must be taken into account in any discussions of timelines, something Pastor King appeared unwilling to do.

The Bazaar provides evidence that N may have been familliar with some of the events at the council, if not its decrees. That possibility must be taken into account in any discussions of timelines, something Pastor King appeared unwilling to do.

There is no positive evidence that Nestorius knew what the council said about Christ. None. Even the source you quoted states:

On the other hand, Nestorius, though speaking of the triumph of the orthodox faith of Flavian and Leo, does not seem to be aware of the formal decisions of the Council of Chalcedon.

So, again, it seems apparent that there is no interaction between Nestorius and the council of Chalcedon, and that the weight of the evidence suggests he did not know what the council said.

-----Added 10/15/2009 at 04:40:23 EST-----

Friedrich Loofs: Now the Treatise of Heraclides teaches us that Nestorius lived roughly speaking till the time of that council. Accurately speaking there is no trace of the Chalcedonian synod in the Treatise of Heraclides, and the passages which seem to point to the time following it must in my opinion be explained otherwise. Hence I believe that the monophysitic stories asserting that Nestorius had been invited to the council of Chalcedon, but died a dreadful death on the journey thither are right in so far that Nestorius did not live to see the opening of the council in October 451. But he saw the beginning of the reaction which followed the so-called robber-synod of Ephesus in 449. He even read the famous letter of Pope Leo to Flavian of Constantinople, which was of such decisive importance for the determination of Chalcedon and was acknowledged as a norm of doctrine by this council. See Nestorius and his place in the history of Christian doctrine, Friedrich Loofs, Cambridge: 1914, pp. 21-22

Originally Posted by P. F. Pugh

To show the importance of the controversy in modern terms -- do you believe "Christ" satisfied "infinite" justice? How?

By being God incarnate. I don't think Nestorius would disagree here.

Then we will have to agree to disagree over what Nestorius would agree or disagree with.

Pastor Winzer:

I don't disagree with you, and yet your comment makes me wonder whether you've considered this remark from Nestorius:

Nestorius. As a king, who takes the clothes of soldierhood and is [so seen], has not become a double king, and as the king exists not apart from him, in that he is in him, and as, further, he is not revered apart from him in whom he is known and whereby men also have known him and have been rescued; so also God used his own prosôpon to condescend in poverty and shame even unto the death on the Cross for our salvation; and by it he was raised up also to honour and glory and adoration. Nestorius, Bazaar of Heracleides, Book I, Part I, Section 29

I'm not sure we can construct a complete view of the atonement from Nestorius' works, but it appears he recognized the significance of the passive obedience of Christ in our salvation. Now, whether he would use the "Christ" where he used "God" there, is a more difficult issue (we have so little of his own writings to go on). Given that he called Mary, Christokos, I suspect he'd prefer not to refer the atoning work simply to the name of Christ, but to the person of God the Word.

I understand from Pastor King that you've studied this issue more than I have. I would welcome your correction if you think I'm mistaken in my conclusions.

I'd like to add one more quotation from a portion where he appears to be opposing a monophysite error:

Nestorius: But to those who thought that the body of the Son of God was polluted the Apostle says that they are trampling underfoot the Son of God in rejecting him and denying him, against those who confess that the body is of our own nature and who regard it as polluted, although [they admit] that it was given for the salvation of us all because it was pure and unstained and saved from sins, and that for all our sins he accepted death and became as it were an offering unto God. Nestorius, Bazaar of Heracleides, Book I, Part I, Section 41

Originally Posted by armourbearer

Originally Posted by timmopussycat

The attitude that once a theological judgement once made by the church is not capable of being revisited when prima facie views of evidence that is either not known or not presented in the original court turns up, is simply inconsistent with the stances Reformed Theology has taken elsewhere. We do not, for example, presume that we may not reexamine the Roman doctrine of the Mass because the doctrine is already established. Nor can we assume that Councils get it always right. I think it was the Bainton bio of Luther that noted that it was when Martin Luther discovered two solidly "evangelical" (his word) propositions of Hus that were condemned by the council of Constance that he showed that councils could not hae final authority in the church.

Moreover on biblical standards, it is an injustice to condemn a man for a doctrine he does not hold.

If N's own writings show Chalcedonian orthodoxy wrt to the nature of Christ, his reservations concerning how to name Mary must be shown by GNC to be heresy before he can be condemned for it. It would help if someone could set forth a place where such demonstration is attempted.

On paragraph one, you are speaking to the wrong issue. I am not denying the responsibility of the modern church to evaluate the history. I am denying the ability to revise the history. Modern evangelicals continually confound those two things, so I suppose I have to show some indulgence to your zeal for the fallibility of human councils.

I am not attempting to revise the history. I have no dog in the fight and I am not an expert on the controversy. But I agree with John Bugay who in post 6 yearned for "a very thorough history ... written by someone other than an eastern orthodox theologian." And I don't see the seven ecumenical councils given equal ranking to Scripture by the WCF.

Originally Posted by armourbearer

[On paragraph two, that is a truism, and it applies as equally to condemning a council for acting in the interests of Christian truth.

On paragraph three, good and necessary consequence only applies in a closed world of facts. It applies to the Bible because the fulness of the Bible as a revelation fom God specifically implies truths which are not expressly stated. Good and necessary consequence would be dangerous to apply to fallible and limited human statements. What we must determine is whether Nestorius' rejection of the theotokos was a rejection of an important part of Christological orthodoxy of that time. Given the incarnational model of salvation, the answer to that question is affirmative.

No but we can compare the statements of men with the Scripture and that is how all theological controversy ought to be settled. Which means that we ought not to ultimately judge N's statements by the judgements of other men or councils but by comparing them to Scripture, particularly in cases where he is on record as denying the specific teachings imputed to him.

Now on theotokos: It is simply unjust to presume N to be guilty of an error in the nature of his Christology because of his statement concerning the propriety of a title for Mary. It is only if one can show that a Christological error is a good and necessary consequence of his anti-theotokes statements that we will be justified in condemning him for those statements.

Nobody will doubt that there may be differences between Mary's actual relationship to the Second Person of the Trinity, and the particular terms used to describe that relationship. The words may or may not not fully match the reality.

To determine whether or not N's rejection of the title theotokos is itself an error, we must, in the final analysis, consider whether or not his concept of that relationship accurately conveyed the Scriptural reality, despite his rejection of the technical term. One can for example describe the reality of Christ's incarnation quite accurately without using the term. (This is not to say that the council may have no justification for condemning him on other grounds. This is why I'd like to see a non-Orthodox writer do a full analysis of the era.)

I am grateful for the serious discussion on all sides of this issue.

For a long time, my knowledge of "The Church of the East" consisted of Acts 16:6: "and they went through the region of Phyygia and Galatia, having been forbidden by the Holy Spirit to speak the word in Asia."

My interest began, as I may have mentioned, with Samuel Hugh Moffett's very serious "A History of Christianity in Asia." Moffett traces the growth of Christianity eastward from that point, as "The Old Silk Road," a major trade route, extended northeast from Antioch into Edessa, east toward Nisibis (where one of the great early schools of Christianity was located), southward along the Tigris River through Mosul, Tekrit, Baghdad, Seleucia-Ctesiphon, (the border between Roman and Persian empires; we know this area as Iraq), before heading straight east through Persia, modern Afghanistan, and onward to China.

This eastward expansion of Christianity led to the development of a thriving church outside of the Roman Empire which grew in spite of a truly "Great Persecution" in the 4th century. As Moffett says, the conversion of the Roman Empire "was enough to make any Persian ruler conditioned by three hundred years of war with Rome suspicious of the emergence of a potential fifth column."

Persia's (Zoroastrian) priests and rulers cemented their alliance of state and religion in a series of periods of terror that have been called the most massive persecution of Christians in history, \"unequalled for its duration, its ferocity and the number of martyrs.\" (Moffett 138)

By the time this persecution ended, in around 401 ad, Moffet says, "one estimate is that as many as 190,000 Persian Christians died in the terror. It was worse than anything suffered in the West under Rome, and yet the number of apostasies seemed to be fewer in Persia than in the West, which is a remarkable tribute to the steady courage of Asia's early Christians." (145)

This "Church of the East" emerged from that period of persecution and adopted the the canons of the Council of Nicaea and the Nicene Creed unanimously in about 410 ad. It was a church which knew next to nothing of Rome and Constantinople and Alexandria, nothing of their feuds, nothing of their supposed "authority." It was this church which looked to Theodore of Mopsuestia as one of its greatest theologians. It was this church which took the "ill-fitting name for the church in non-Roman Asia, 'Nestorian.'"

Later, this church lived through the invasions of Islam, and largely died at its hand after the 12th century invasions of these lands under Ghengis Khan.


This history is one reason why I believe it is important to really understand how this branch of Christianity, which held some beliefs that we would not hold today. Their quite orthodox faith in Christ (those early centuries), their endurance, their rejection after the utterly reprehensible council of Ephesus, make the arguments of "who was greatest" among the "great" centers of Christianity -- Rome, Alexandria, Constantinople -- seem quite small and petty by comparison.

Originally Posted by timmopussycat

I am not attempting to revise the history. I have no dog in the fight and I am not an expert on the controversy. But I agree with John Bugay who in post 6 yearned for "a very thorough history ... written by someone other than an eastern orthodox theologian." And I don't see the seven ecumenical councils given equal ranking to Scripture by the WCF.

Again you trumpet the fallibility of human councils. I always find this an unbalanced zeal when it refuses to recognise the work of the Spirit of truth in the church. It really maintains solo Scriptura rather than sola Scriptura. There is a whole garbage truck of inconsistency here.

Originally Posted by timmopussycat

No but we can compare the statements of men with the Scripture and that is how all theological controversy ought to be settled. Which means that we ought not to ultimately judge N's statements by the judgements of other men or councils but by comparing them to Scripture, particularly in cases where he is on record as denying the specific teachings imputed to him.

As noted previously, this is a-historical and fails to take into account the development of dogma. Nestorius must be judged in the appropriate court of jursidiction, which is his own times, not ours.

Originally Posted by timmopussycat

Now on theotokos: It is simply unjust to presume N to be guilty of an error in the nature of his Christology because of his statement concerning the propriety of a title for Mary. It is only if one can show that a Christological error is a good and necessary consequence of his anti-theotokes statements that we will be justified in condemning him for those statements.

When judging between parties in an earlier controversy, men can't be held to good and necessary consequence because it is only in the light of controversy that logical outcomes are brought forth. It is illegitimate to judge on the basis of knowledge which has come as a result of that controversy. It equates to standing on a man's shoulders and kicking him in the head at the same time.

It is an error to make theotokos a mere "title for Mary." It is a Christological statement, as the structure and emphasis of both Ephesus and Chalcedon reveal. It does not aim to show us something about Mary per se, but about Jesus Christ. As with the nativity revelation of Matthew and Luke, Mary's dignity is conceived solely in terms of the nature of her offspring.

Originally Posted by PCFLANAGAN

I'm not sure we can construct a complete view of the atonement from Nestorius' works, but it appears he recognized the significance of the passive obedience of Christ in our salvation. Now, whether he would use the "Christ" where he used "God" there, is a more difficult issue (we have so little of his own writings to go on). Given that he called Mary, Christokos, I suspect he'd prefer not to refer the atoning work simply to the name of Christ, but to the person of God the Word.

Please keep in mind that I only used the atonement of Christ as a modern day concern which this controversy influences. I would not import it into those times and make it a criterion of judgement. I don't expect the fathers to speak of atonement in Anselmian categories. By and large they were more concerned with the issue of humiliation-exaltation than with satisfaction.

I am sorry, but I just cannot see anywhere that Nestorius affirmed orthodox Christology. I agree we cannot pin "two persons" on him because we have no statement to that effect; but his language is always in terms of speaking of the Word as a prosopon and the flesh as a prosopon while the "unity" is apparent and moral rather than real and personal. My own opinion is that he was a rationalist who simply could not accept the "mystical union," and therefore struggled to rationally come to terms with how the finite could contain the infinite. We have seen a similar example in Gordon Clark in our own times. I am open to any evidence which suggests otherwise.

Originally Posted by armourbearer

Again you trumpet the fallibility of human councils. I always find this an unbalanced zeal when it refuses to recognise the work of the Spirit of truth in the church. It really maintains solo Scriptura rather than sola Scriptura. There is a whole garbage truck of inconsistency here.

Why do the Reformed then seem to stop counting "ecumenical councils" after Chalcedon? How much (if any) of the councils of Constantinople II (553), Constantinople III (681) and Nicea II (787) do you accept? By what criterion, and by whose authority, do you reject what you reject of these? Are there other subsequent councils that have addressed these three?

As noted previously, this is a-historical and fails to take into account the development of dogma. Nestorius must be judged in the appropriate court of jursidiction, which is his own times, not ours.

What then is our responsibility, given that we have information about him that "his own times" did not have? Or that "the appropriate court of jurisdiction" in "his own times" was very much a corrupt one?

First, apologies. Lack of sleep and an excessive zeal caused me to misread/skip over some things. Pastor King is right that it is improbable that Nestorius was aware of the doctrinal statements produced at Chalcedon.

However, the Bazaar does suggest that he was a) aware that it was happening b) aware of the flight of Dioscorus c) aware of the tone it was taking.

Originally Posted by armourbearer

Originally Posted by P. F. Pugh

To show the importance of the controversy in modern terms -- do you believe "Christ" satisfied "infinite" justice? How?

By being God incarnate. I don't think Nestorius would disagree here.

Then we will have to agree to disagree over what Nestorius would agree or disagree with.

What I stated was simple Nicene Orthodoxy--both sides at Ephesus were orthodox by Nicene standards.

Personally, I have been persuaded, in my reading of the history, that in Heaven, we will meet Nestorius, Cyril, John of Antioch, and maybe even the odd Arian Goth. If there's not room in Heaven for a few heretics, then we're all damned. I'm just not convinced that Nestorius' error was enough to warrant a church split. The whole question of theotokos seems to be a question of which terminology to use rather than the actual theological content.

My own opinion is that he was a rationalist who simply could not accept the "mystical union," and therefore struggled to rationally come to terms with how the finite could contain the infinite.

Were there "rationalists" in the 5th century?

It is true, Nestorius began with the phrase, "And the Word became flesh". Nestorius's characterization of this did not become the orthodox way of characterizing it. But Chalcedon did not rely on the verbiage of any one party in coming up with the definition. Cyril's terminology was not used -- in fact, some of his theology was definitely rejected, and yet he became a great doctor of the Church, as later councils (rejected by the Reformed) incorporated some of his theologies (to my understanding).

Reymond says "It is interesting to note that the council did not declare Leo's Tome a doma of the church as he had wished, doubtless lest it give too much authority to the Roman bishopric. It then wrote a new creed ..."

Nestorius became a "heretic" because of a mischaracterization of his teachings that simply happened to have been voted on by "a council". That was his "court of jurisdiction" -- it was dishonest with him.

Originally Posted by johnbugay

My own opinion is that he was a rationalist who simply could not accept the "mystical union," and therefore struggled to rationally come to terms with how the finite could contain the infinite.

Were there "rationalists" in the 5th century?

Yes; there were rationalists in the 1st century. Read 1st Corinthians and its refutation of the exaltation of reason and an over-realised eschatology.

Originally Posted by johnbugay

It is true, Nestorius began with the phrase, "And the Word became flesh". Nestorius's characterization of this did not become the orthodox way of characterizing it. But Chalcedon did not rely on the verbiage of any one party in coming up with the definition. Cyril's terminology was not used -- in fact, some of his theology was definitely rejected, and yet he became a great doctor of the Church, as later councils (rejected by the Reformed) incorporated some of his theologies (to my understanding).

Yes, well the difference between Cyril and Nestorius is that the former was catholic. Cyril's emphases were rejected while his orthodoxy was respected, even as we would reject the Lutheran tenet of communicatio idiomatum from nature to nature while receiving them as generally orthodox.

Originally Posted by armourbearer

Originally Posted by timmopussycat

I am not attempting to revise the history. I have no dog in the fight and I am not an expert on the controversy. But I agree with John Bugay who in post 6 yearned for "a very thorough history ... written by someone other than an eastern orthodox theologian." And I don't see the seven ecumenical councils given equal ranking to Scripture by the WCF.

Again you trumpet the fallibility of human councils. I always find this an unbalanced zeal when it refuses to recognise the work of the Spirit of truth in the church. It really maintains solo Scriptura rather than sola Scriptura. There is a whole garbage truck of inconsistency here.

I "trumpet" nothing. I am a trombone player. ;-)

Your last two sentences are the guilt by associaton fallacy and you ought to know better. It would be like someone claiming that you hold to concilliar equivalency with Scripture in view of your high view of the early councils.

As for me, for over 30 years I have recognized the importance of tracing out the work of the Holy Spirit in Church history and not reinventing the wheel when early fathers, Reformers, Puritans, and Calvinistic Methodists can be shown to have understood issues Scripturally. I just don't place councils on the level of Scripture unless their findings can be shown to be consistent with Scripture.

Either Councils have the authority of Scripture or they do not. The WCF does not give councils ulitmate authority to determine controversies of religion. Rather it specifically makes the point that " The Supreme Judge by which ....councils...are to be examined can be no other but the Holy Spirit speaking in Scripture." WCF 1:ix

Originally Posted by armourbearer

Originally Posted by timmopussycat

No but we can compare the statements of men with the Scripture and that is how all theological controversy ought to be settled. Which means that we ought not to ultimately judge N's statements by the judgements of other men or councils but by comparing them to Scripture, particularly in cases where he is on record as denying the specific teachings imputed to him.

As noted previously, this is a-historical and fails to take into account the development of dogma. Nestorius must be judged in the appropriate court of jursidiction, which is his own times, not ours.

Shall we not appeal Luther's condemnation by the diet of Worms? Or challenge the decrees of the Council of Trent? Certainly Cardinal Newman thanks you for taking up the principle on which he justifies Roman accretions. See his work on the development of doctrine here. Newman Reader - Development of Christian Doctrine

Originally Posted by timmopussycat

Now on theotokos: It is simply unjust to presume N to be guilty of an error in the nature of his Christology because of his statement concerning the propriety of a title for Mary. It is only if one can show that a Christological error is a good and necessary consequence of his anti-theotokes statements that we will be justified in condemning him for those statements.

Originally Posted by armourbearer

When judging between parties in an earlier controversy, men can't be held to good and necessary consequence because it is only in the light of controversy that logical outcomes are brought forth. It is illegitimate to judge on the basis of knowledge which has come as a result of that controversy. It equates to standing on a man's shoulders and kicking him in the head at the same time.

You are missing the point. You made the link not me. Your claimed that N was guilty of heresy at point B because he "erred" at point A. For that claim to be true, denying the title to Mary must necessarily force one into asserting an error about Christ's nature. Such a demonstration could have been provided, and N or anybody prior to him who (ex hypothesi made the denial before he did) truly shown to be guilty of heresy at point B at any time before the Council began, at the council or even today, on the the basis of logic alone once the prooof of necessity is known. Such a demonstration does not necessarily involve relying on knowledge that came about as a result of the controversy, as what is at issue is the logical demonstration that one "error" necessitates the other.

Originally Posted by armourbearer

It is an error to make theotokos a mere "title for Mary." It is a Christological statement, as the structure and emphasis of both Ephesus and Chalcedon reveal. It does not aim to show us something about Mary per se, but about Jesus Christ. As with the nativity revelation of Matthew and Luke, Mary's dignity is conceived solely in terms of the nature of her offspring.

The question is can the Scripturally assigned dignity of Mary and the Scripturally described nature of the incarnate Second Person be correctly expressed in terms other than "theotokos" without violating that dignity and misrepresenting that nature? If the answers to these questions are yes, then there may not be a real problem when someone wished to avoid the term, provided that the term or terms one uses instead of theotokos correctly express the Scriptural realities to which they point.

Originally Posted by timmopussycat

I "trumpet" nothing. I am a trombone player. ;-)

Originally Posted by timmopussycat

Your last two sentences are the guilt by associaton fallacy and you ought to know better. It would be like someone claiming that you hold to concilliar equivalency with Scripture in view of your high view of the early councils.

There was no guilt by association; I identified your unbalanced statement with the position of solo scriptura. If in reality you heartily recognise the work of the Spirit in the church then I am very happy to withdraw the identification; but if that is the case, I would also ask you to present that balance when looking at the decrees of councils. By your own admission, the fact that councils may err does not mean that they have erred; so it is not helpful to appeal to the fallibility of councils simpliciter.

Originally Posted by timmopussycat

Either Councils have the authority of Scripture or they do not. The WCF does not give councils ulitmate authority to determine controversies of religion. Rather it specifically makes the point that " The Supreme Judge by which ....councils...are to be examined can be no other but the Holy Spirit speaking in Scripture." WCF 1:ix

Unless you can find in this thread where I have ascribed "the authority of Scripture" to Councils your remarks are irrelevant. As already noted, you are speaking to the wrong issue. You quote WCF as an authority. Should I assume thereby that you place the WCF on the same level as Scripture? No. Then neither should that be read into my remarks. It should also be borne in mind that the WCF validates the orthodox Christological tradition in its presentation of Christ the Mediator.

Originally Posted by timmopussycat

Shall we not appeal Luther's condemnation by the diet of Worms? Or challenge the decrees of the Council of Trent? Certainly Cardinal Newman thanks you for taking up the principle on which he justifies Roman accretions. See his work on the development of doctrine here. Newman Reader - Development of Christian Doctrine

Again, I haven't denied the responsibility of the modern church to evaluate past councils. I am only requiring that such an analysis does not import later developments and concerns into the proceedings being evaluated. In this case, I would insist that neither the Council nor Luther be judged by a principle of scriptural authority which did not come to the fore until the debates of the Puritans with the Elizabethan settlement. This puts the onus on the historian to ascertain precisely what Luther meant by being captive to the Word, and not simply to assume a Puritan view of it.

The fact that you would confound any idea of the development of dogma with Newman's specific idea of it does not indicate you understand the subject very well. At no point in this discussion have I suggested that non-scriptural developments are permissible.

Originally Posted by timmopussycat

You are missing the point. You made the link not me. Your claimed that N was guilty of heresy at point B because he "erred" at point A. For that claim to be true, denying the title to Mary must necessarily force one into asserting an error about Christ's nature. Such a demonstration could have been provided, and N or anybody prior to him who (ex hypothesi made the denial before he did) truly shown to be guilty of heresy at point B at any time before the Council began, at the council or even today, on the the basis of logic alone once the prooof of necessity is known. Such a demonstration does not necessarily involve relying on knowledge that came about as a result of the controversy, as what is at issue is the logical demonstration that one "error" necessitates the other.

I have stated that the theotokos was orthodox Christology at the time. Nestorius denied it. There is no moving from point A to point B in my criticism of him.

Again you fail to understand the historical method at issue. I am not saying that Nestorius can't be found guilty or exonerated today. I am saying that the case is not to be examined as if it were a new case. He has already been tried and condemned in his own times. Modern concerns cannot be read into the proceedings which found him guilty and used as a basis for his exoneration. E.g., the fact that Mariolatry came to be condemned by Protestants does not justify Nestorius' rejection of the theotokos as a common Christological affirmation of the time.

Originally Posted by timmopussycat

The question is can the Scripturally assigned dignity of Mary and the Scripturally described nature of the incarnate Second Person be correctly expressed in terms other than "theotokos" without violating that dignity and misrepresenting that nature? If the answers to these questions are yes, then there may not be a real problem when someone wished to avoid the term, provided that the term or terms one uses instead of theotokos correctly express the Scriptural realities to which they point.

No, that is not the question because "theotokos" meant something significant at that time just as "sola scriptura" means something significant at this time. To understand the significance of it we simply need to look at Peter's confession: thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God. What would that confession mean if it only consisted of "the Christ," and there was a rejection of "the Christ" being "the Son of God?" That is what Nestorius' denial of theotokos and affirmation of Christotokos looks like. Either Mary is the mother of our Lord or she is not. By denying the theotokos Nestorius claimed she was not.

No, that is not the question because "theotokos" meant something significant at that time just as "sola scriptura" means something significant at this time. To understand the significance of it we simply need to look at Peter's confession: thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God. What would that confession mean if it only consisted of "the Christ," and there was a rejection of "the Christ" being "the Son of God?" That is what Nestorius' denial of theotokos and affirmation of Christotokos looks like. Either Mary is the mother of our Lord or she is not. By denying the theotokos Nestorius claimed she was not.

For goodness sake, Nestorius was making an assertion about Mary--he wasn't denying the divinity of Christ at all--he was orthodox by Nicene standards. The question was not whether Christ was God and Man, but exactly how that relationship works.

Again you fail to understand the historical method at issue. I am not saying that Nestorius can't be found guilty or exonerated today. I am saying that the case is not to be examined as if it were a new case. He has already been tried and condemned in his own times.

And we are saying that the case needed a retrial due to procedural irregularities and a biased jury. To me, there's a reasonable doubt about Nestorius' guilt, especially given his actual teaching. The fact that he claimed not to teach what the council accused him of teaching is enough to warrant our saying this. His real teaching is what needed to be examined, not the misrepresentation of it.

I have stated that the theotokos was orthodox Christology at the time. Nestorius denied it. There is no moving from point A to point B in my criticism of him.

But the question is whether the term was crucial to orthodox Christology (and again, Nestorius did not reject the term outright--he just found it confusing). Does the alternate term compromise Christ's divinity? No. The alternate term was imprecise, but not inaccurate. Nestorius knew and taught that Christ was God--that part was not at issue at Ephesus, having been decided by Nicaea. No one ever accused Nestorius of being Arian.

Just because a term is orthodox does not mean that alternate terms are heretical. I personally would have suggested theanthropotokos.

Originally Posted by P. F. Pugh

For goodness sake, Nestorius was making an assertion about Mary--he wasn't denying the divinity of Christ at all--he was orthodox by Nicene standards. The question was not whether Christ was God and Man, but exactly how that relationship works.

The reason why Ephesus and Chalcedon settles "how that relationship works" is because the manner of subsistence was seen to be critical to the affirmation that Christ is God and man. When Nestorius emerges on the other side of the orthodox fence he is clearly seen as affirming something different to orthodoxy. He does not teach two natures in one person, as has already been shown from the Bazaar. If you agree with the Bazaar you disagree with orthodoxy; hence it is little wonder if you defend Nestorius because you are really only defending yourself.

Originally Posted by P. F. Pugh

And we are saying that the case needed a retrial due to procedural irregularities and a biased jury. To me, there's a reasonable doubt about Nestorius' guilt, especially given his actual teaching. The fact that he claimed not to teach what the council accused him of teaching is enough to warrant our saying this. His real teaching is what needed to be examined, not the misrepresentation of it.

The only point in question is whether he taught "two persons." But whether he taught it or was imputed with it is really beside the point because his teaching does not and cannot affirm the two natures in one person formula of orthodox Christology.

Originally Posted by P. F. Pugh

The alternate term was imprecise, but not inaccurate.

It is not only imprecise but inaccurate as a substitute for theotokos. The substitution diminishes a point of Christology for which Ephesus and Chalcedon contended. If you agree with Nestorius then you also diminish that Christological assertion.

The reason why Ephesus and Chalcedon settles "how that relationship works" is because the manner of subsistence was seen to be critical to the affirmation that Christ is God and man. When Nestorius emerges on the other side of the orthodox fence he is clearly seen as affirming something different to orthodoxy. He does not teach two natures in one person, as has already been shown from the Bazaar. If you agree with the Bazaar you disagree with orthodoxy; hence it is little wonder if you defend Nestorius because you are really only defending yourself.

If I agree with the Bazaar, it's because it teaches two natures in one person. He's speaking the language of prosoponic union--which is the language of Cyril himself. If Cyril's understanding was orthodox, the so was Nestorius'.

If you want to show me exactly how the Bazaar teaches two persons, please do so. My concern is that we not convict a possibly innocent man just because a church council did.

And I must say that accusing me of Christological heresy does little to convince me.

But whether he taught it or was imputed with it is really beside the point because his teaching does not and cannot affirm the two natures in one person formula of orthodox Christology.

But it's exactly the point. If his teaching does affirm the two natures in one person formula (which I think it does), then he was falsely accused and we need to re-evaluate. Cyril of Alexandria, by all accounts was a man who sometimes let his zeal blind him to the facts. If this is so, then it is very much the point.

Remember also that Nestorius and his teacher Theodore were esteemed as Church fathers outside the Roman Empire post-Ephesus. What we have to say, then, is that if real Nestorian teaching (as opposed to Ephesian-Nestorian) is heretical, then we hold the whole of the Eastern Missionary enterprise of the next five centuries (the largest missionary effort in church history) to be unorthodox. Are you prepared to say that half of the church of Nestorius' day was heretical?

It is not only imprecise but inaccurate as a substitute for theotokos. The substitution diminishes a point of Christology for which Ephesus and Chalcedon contended. If you agree with Nestorius then you also diminish that Christological assertion.

Why? Does Christotokos as a title for Mary somehow diminish the identity of Christ? I agree that the term is imprecise (see my alternate title), but I don't take the title "Mother of God" to be a doctrinal statement. Again, all my sources indicate that Nestorius didn't reject the title persay--he just didn't like it.

Originally Posted by P. F. Pugh

If I agree with the Bazaar, it's because it teaches two natures in one person. He's speaking the language of prosoponic union--which is the language of Cyril himself. If Cyril's understanding was orthodox, the so was Nestorius'.

If you want to show me exactly how the Bazaar teaches two persons, please do so. My concern is that we not convict a possibly innocent man just because a church council did.

Please pay attention. I have repeatedly said that we have no evidence that Nestorius taught two persons. What we have in the Bazaar is a reference to the Word as a person and the flesh as a person and a mere moral union between the two. Please see my above response to your quotation of the Bazaar and especially the emboldened portions. This language cannot be reconciled with Christological orthodoxy.

Originally Posted by P. F. Pugh

And I must say that accusing me of Christological heresy does little to convince me.

You weren't accused of heresy, as you will see if you give some attention to the conditional form of the statement to which you are repying.

Originally Posted by P. F. Pugh

But it's exactly the point. If his teaching does affirm the two natures in one person formula (which I think it does), then he was falsely accused and we need to re-evaluate. Cyril of Alexandria, by all accounts was a man who sometimes let his zeal blind him to the facts. If this is so, then it is very much the point.

Where does he make such an affirmation? How many times are you going to make the same claim without actually presenting evidence to support it?

Originally Posted by P. F. Pugh

Are you prepared to say that half of the church of Nestorius' day was heretical?

I'm prepared to say what the catholic church teaches -- Nestorius and Nestorianism is unorthodox. Enough with the emotional pleas, please. Try and present some facts.

Originally Posted by P. F. Pugh

but I don't take the title "Mother of God" to be a doctrinal statement.

It is a doctrinal statement in Ephesus and Chalcedon, so you are only asserting your disagreement with the councils.

Friend, If you can't be bothered interacting on a factual level I'm not going to waste time responding to your posts.

Please pay attention. I have repeatedly said that we have no evidence that Nestorius taught two persons. What we have in the Bazaar is a reference to the Word as a person and the flesh as a person and a mere moral union between the two.

The understanding that I took away was that Christ has two natures (ousia) in one person (prosopon). Prosopon here is the exact word from which "Person" is derived.

Therefore has he said 'the likeness' and 'the name' which it has taken, which indicates a prosôpon as of one; and this same name and prosôpon make the two of them to be understood; and the distinction of nature, one hypostasis and one prosôpon,50 is theirs, the one being known by the other and the other by the one, so that the one is by adoption what the other is by nature and the other is with the one in the body.

Again, my reading here is that he is saying two ousia in one prosopon.

Again, part of my whole issue is the fact that Church history seems to have vindicated Nestorius. Not only did Chalcedon overturn the Alexandrian Christology, but the Church of the East produced the most missionary-minded--and the most persecuted--branch of the church in history. I'm quite sure that Nestorius was mistaken--but no more mistaken than Cyril was. If Cyril is orthodox, then so was Nestorius. Orthodox by Chalcedonian standards? Probably not--but neither was Cyril.

I would almost compare this to the Clark-Van Til controversy except that Ephesus produced the largest church split in history.

I'm prepared to say what the catholic church teaches -- Nestorius and Nestorianism is unorthodox.

So only western Christianity is catholic, then?

At any rate, we have two parallel threads going, of which the other is the more senior, so maybe we should move the discussion there.

Originally Posted by P. F. Pugh

Again, my reading here is that he is saying two ousia in one prosopon.

And this "reading" is an overt indication that you neither understand Nestorius, nor the orthodox understanding of Christ, which has been my point all along. But since you have been continually presenting a "moving target," I expect this to be revised as well.

DTK

I'm going to get a bit out of my historical comfort zone here so bear with me as I ask some questions for my own clarification. Please don't derail the thread becaue of my ignorance.

Today, can't the word prosopon properly be interpreted as "person" but also as "face", which is to say manifestation (modalistically)? Accordingly, if the understanding during the controversy was "face", then to apply it to the incarnation - couldn’t that suggest a form of modalism (a manifestation of a one person God), or else two manifestations within Christ, which might suggest two persons within one Christ?

With respect to ousia, can't it rightly be interpreted as substance and therefore, more readily applied to the persons Trinity (all being divine), but not so readily (cumbersome in fact) to apply it to the Christ (without a view to the Trinity) since he was not two persons, same in substance? In other words, how can we have two substances (or beings) within one person (i.e. "two ousia in one prosopon")?

David, I'll probably phone you on this one!

Thanks,

Ron

As I consider this more, if we take ousia to mean "nature" (without any further qualification), then I suppose Jesus could be referred to having two ousia. I recoil at such phraseology because I have taken ousia always to refer more to the divine being or substance that all three persons possess. In my own thinking, contrary to the term "nature", I have always attributed being and substance to the type person (either divine or human, never both ) that is being considered. SO, if the person is divine, like Jesus, then his being or substance I would have considered divine only. (“Essence” I might have possibly been more inclined to allow to be synonymous with nature (but not without further elaboration about one-person), but never would I have used being or substance that way.) In the end, I would have never equated being or substance with nature, but rather to what the person is (as a person), either divine or human. Accordingly, I have always thought of the incarnate Christ although having two natures yet in one person, as having one being or substance only, that being divine. Again, I’m out of my element here, but I question whether there has been some unusual tagging of terms going on.

Cheers,

Ron

Ousia can mean "reality", "substance", or "Essence". Hypostasis means "That which stands beneath" or "Substantive reality" and (in the Antiochene tradition) was used almost interchangeably with prosopon. The prosopic union and the hypostatic union are thus extremely similar, but not quite. On further review, no Nestorius was not orthodox by a Chalcedonian standard--but he was by the Nicene and Ephesian standards.

We confess in the creed that the the Son is homoousious with the Father, so I don't think that two substances is so far off-track, as Christ's divine nature is pre-existent, where His human nature is not. Hypostasis is then an accurate way to describe the union of Divine and human substance. I think the prosopic union needs clarification (and I noted that Nestorius does actually use hypostasis to describe the union at one point), but it is not inaccurate.

Maybe a good term for Nestorius and Theodore would be "semi-orthodox", but I wouldn't go so far as to call his view heretical in his time. The line between heresy and orthodoxy was so blurry sometimes, and the irregularities at Ephesus were so glaring (Nestorius himself refused to give an account of his teaching until the Antioch delegation arrived, which meant that the council rendered a verdict without hearing what he actually taught).

And this "reading" is an overt indication that you neither understand Nestorius, nor the orthodox understanding of Christ, which has been my point all along. But since you have been continually presenting a "moving target," I expect this to be revised as well.

I would be much obliged if you would actually show where exactly I have denied the hypostatic union. I really don't see where the idea of prosopic union contradicts that of hypostatic union--I would say that our Christology should recognize both.

“On further review, no Nestorius was not orthodox by a Chalcedonian standard--but he was by the Nicene and Ephesian standards.”

Mr. Pugh,

You seem to grant with one hand what you take away with another, which I believe in part is DTK's lament. Assuming the councils do not oppose each other, I regret to say that I feel led to believe that you might be opposing yourself, which if true would explain this attempt to affirm both orthodox and non-orthodox in one person:

“Maybe a good term for Nestorius and Theodore would be ‘semi-orthodox’?”

I’ll leave the semantics and historical account to the historians on this site. Theologically, I do know that Jesus was a divine person with two natures. That is why I am not comfortable referring to his two natures with a term (ousia) that seems best reserved to describe the single being or substance of divinity that all three persons possess as it pertains to their respective persons. Two beings in one person is wrong, so let's stay away from anything that might suggest it is not.

Warmly,

Ron

Originally Posted by P. F. Pugh

We confess in the creed that the the Son is homoousious with the Father, so I don't think that two substances is so far off-track, as Christ's divine nature is pre-existent, where His human nature is not. Hypostasis is then an accurate way to describe the union of Divine and human substance.

Young man, you are making this up as you go along, and it's evident to me at this point that you have no understanding of basic Christology.

Listen carefully, now, and try reading closely for a change, because it might help you, though at this point I am confessedly beginning to have my doubts. There is one, yes, you read me correctly, there is but one οὐσία, and that is the one true and living God - "Hear, O Israel: The LORD our God, the LORD is one!" (Deuteronomy*6:4). There is but one divine essence, substance, yes one. The Trinity is One being (οὐσία) and three persons. We never speak of Christ as two essences (substances) in one person. The fact is that you are confused and clueless, and yet still winging it as you go along!

Maybe a good term for Nestorius and Theodore would be "semi-orthodox", but I wouldn't go so far as to call his view heretical in his time. The line between heresy and orthodoxy was so blurry sometimes, and the irregularities at Ephesus were so glaring (Nestorius himself refused to give an account of his teaching until the Antioch delegation arrived, which meant that the council rendered a verdict without hearing what he actually taught).

Try this on for size, no maybe about it, you have no idea of that which you're trying to define.

I would be much obliged if you would actually show where exactly I have denied the hypostatic union. I really don't see where the idea of prosopic union contradicts that of hypostatic union--I would say that our Christology should recognize both.

I am not obliged to show something I never claimed. I am not responsible for your inability to read correctly. But I don't think you even understand what the hypostatic union of Christ is. Surely to deny it is to presuppose that you know it, which obviously you don't. And you would have an excuse if it were not for the fact that I've already cited Chalcedon's language for the hypostatic union earlier in this thread. But, in your misguided zeal, you have demonstrated repeatedly that you either gloss-over what is being said, or you are unable to read carefully what others have said. I am going to try this again...

Christ "was begotten by the Father before all ages according to His divinity and, in these latter days, He was born for us and for our salvation of Mary the Virgin, the Θεοτόκος according to His humanity; one single and same Christ, Son, Lord, only begotten, known in two natures [my note - not two substances], without confusion, without change, without division, without separation (ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν Χριστόν, Υἱόν, Κύριον, μονογενῆ, ἐν δύο φύσεσιν ἀσυγχύτως ἀτρέπτως, ἀδιαιρέτως, ἀχωρίστως γνωριζομένον); the difference of natures is in no way suppressed by their union, but rather the properties of each are retained and united in one single person (πρόσωπον) and single hypostasis; He is neither separated nor divided in two persons, but He is a single and same only-begotten Son, God the Word, the Lord Jesus Christ, such as He was announced formerly by the prophets, such as He Himself, the Lord Jesus Christ, taught us about Himself and such as the symbol of the fathers has transmitted to us. See Peter L'Huillier, The Church of the Ancient Councils, p. 194.

It is frustrating trying to deal with a novice, especially when he pontificates about something concerning which he has demonstrated himself repeatedly to be clueless.

DTK

Forgive me Gentlemen, I do want to emphasize that I am very willing to grant, as Moffett says, that "This doctrine of the unity of the person (prosopon) of Christ in two natures may have rested on the use of a word too weak to support the weight it was required to bear, but it was in no sense heresy." (177)

As well, I am working with English works, and I do not see where the word "ousia" appears in some of these writings.

In his "examination" of Nestorius and "Nestorianism," Moffett says:

Nestorius's theological writing is difficult and often obscure. But some points are clear. He took his stand firmly on the historical Christ as revealed in the Gospels. He was not at ease with technical and semantic theological distinctions. He was absolutely convinced that he was biblically orthodox. At no time did he deny the deity of Christ, as was charged against him. He merely insisted that it be clearly distinguished from Christ's humanity. Nor did he deny the unity of Christ’s person, which was the most enduring of the charges against him. It was on this point that he was officially condemned. His opponents, the Alexandrians, maintained that by separating Christ into two “natures” (keyane or keiane in Syriac, physis in Greek) – “true God by nature and true man by nature” was how Nestorius put it – he destroyed the real personality of the Savior, deforming Christ into a creature with two heads. Nestorius answered, “The person (parsopa in Syriac, prosopon in Greek) is one…,” and “There are not two Gods the Words, or two Sons, or two only-begottens, but one.”

The problem lay partly in his choice of words. Nestorius used the Greek word prosopon to refer to Christ’s person as the basis of Christ’s unity. But prosopon is a weak word, used only once in the New Testament to refer to people as “persons” and more often meaning “presence” or even mere “appearance.” His opponents insisted on the use of the stronger word hypostasis (“substance,” or “real being,” as in Heb 1:3) for Christ’s person as one being, incarnate. That, said Nestorius, is too strong – for hypostasis, like ousia, if used of Christ’s unified, essential being confuses the fact that there is still a distinction between his humanity and his deity.”

There is a subtle distinction between “two natures” (Dyophysitism, which is what Nestorius and the school of Antioch taught) and “two persons,” which is how Alexandria interpreted the phrase, as if Nestorius were teaching “dyhypostatism.” By insisting that one person (hypostasis) can have but one nature (physis), Alexandria sought to make the teaching of Nestorius heretical. But what Alexandria said he taught was not what Nestorius actually taught, even in his earlier works, and clearly not in the Book of Heracleides, his last work. As early as Ephesus he struggled to find a way to express the essential unity of the person of the incarnate Christ without denying the essential reality of both the humanity and deity of the Savior and without surrendering the all-important truth that there is an ultimate, basic distinction between deity and humanity.

The divine Logos was not one, and another the man in whom he came to be. Rather, one was the prosopon of both in dignity and honour, worshipped by all creation, and in no way and no time divided by otherness of purpose and will.

(From Moffett, “A History of Christianity in Asia,” pgs 175-177).

And again, he describes this as "too weak to support the theological weight it was required to bear, but it was in no sense heresy."

I would trust that Moffett's presentation and explanation from "Heracliedes" is a better place to begin than some of the other snippets from that work have presented.

The reason that I keep bringing this up is because of context: (a) Nestorius did not get a fair examination in a council (which itself was held in a questionable way), and (b) the result was a horrific schism that, for all practical purposes, cut off half the church from itself.

The defense that "God, in the Holy Spirit, produced the correct doctrine in spite of sinful men," simply doesn't seem to hold water, in that (a) the Christological doctrine that came out of Ephesus was not upheld at Chalcedon, and (b) what DID get reaffirmed at Chalcedon, "Theotokos," was not needed in any of the Reformed confessions to write their Christological definitions (except as the definition of Chalcedon is used in them in passing), and it in fact equivocation of that term has caused a great harm of another kind, the Marian cult.

While Calvin seems to have lumped Ephesus in with the first four councils "which were concerned with refuting errors" and that "they contain nothing but the pure and genuine exposition of Scripture," he allowed (concerning "councils against councils!) that "we shall determine from Scripture which one's decree is not orthodox."

"Theotokos" is not found in Scripture; moreover, Nestorius was vitally careful to accurately characterize Mary's role from the Scriptures. Here, from the text of the Council, is what the Council rejected:

Again I should like to expand on this but am restrained by the memory of my promise. I must speak therefore but with brevity. Holy scripture, wherever it recalls the Lord's economy, speaks of the birth and suffering not of the godhead but of the humanity of Christ, so that the holy virgin is more accurately termed mother of Christ than mother of God. Hear these words that the gospels proclaim: "The book of the generation of Jesus Christ, son of David, son of Abraham." It is clear that God the Word was not the son of David. Listen to another witness if you will: "Jacob begat Joseph, the husband of Mary, of whom was born Jesus, who is called the Christ. " Consider a further piece of evidence: "Now the birth of Jesus Christ took place in this way. When his mother Mary had been betrothed to Joseph, she was found to be with child of the holy Spirit." But who would ever consider that the godhead of the only begotten was a creature of the Spirit? Why do we need to mention: "the mother of Jesus was there"? And again what of: "with Mary the mother of Jesus"; or "that which is conceived in her is of the holy Spirit"; and "Take the child and his mother and flee to Egypt"; and "concerning his Son, who was born of the seed of David according to the flesh"? Again, scripture says when speaking of his passion: "God sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and for sin, he condemned sin in the flesh"; and again "Christ died for our sins" and "Christ having suffered in the flesh"; and "This is", not "my godhead", but "my body, broken for you".

-----Added 10/17/2009 at 06:07:02 EST-----

Concerning my statement above that Chalcedon did not keep the Christological definition provided by Ephesus, I'll cite Pelikan:

The genealogy of this decree (the Definition of Chalcedon) makes clear that "the formula is not an original and new creation, but like a mosaic, was assembled almost entirely from stones that were already available. Specifically, its sources were the so-called Second Letter of Cyril to Nestorius, the Letter of Cyril to the Antiochesnes together with the the union formula of 433 (which according to Kelly, "dropped" the anathemas, "the language of "hypostatic union" and "one nature" had disappeared, in favor of Antiochene language of "one prosopon" and "union of two natures"); and the Tome of Leo; the phrase "not divided or separated into two persons appears to have come from Theodoret." Even though it may be statistically accurate to say that "the majority of thw quotations come from the letters of Cyril," the contributions of Leo's tome were the decisive ones, in the polemic against what were understood to be the extreme forms of the alternative theologies of the incarnation..."

Listen carefully, now, and try reading closely for a change, because it might help you, though at this point I am confessedly beginning to have my doubts. There is one, yes, you read me correctly, there is but one οὐσία, and that is the one true and living God - "Hear, O Israel: The LORD our God, the LORD is one!" (Deuteronomy*6:4). There is but one divine essence, substance, yes one. The Trinity is One being (οὐσία) and three persons. We never speak of Christ as two essences (substances) in one person. The fact is that you are confused and clueless, and yet still winging it as you go along!

Is Christ of one substance with the father? Yes. Is Christ of our substance? Yes. Is Christ essentially God? Yes. Is Christ essentially man? Yes. Are the two natures united in a hypostatic/prosopic union? Yes. To Nestorius, nature, essence, and substance are the same or at least extremely closely linked.

The dividing line between heresy and orthodoxy is this: is Christ fully God and fully human in one person (prosopon/hypostasis)? If that is what you hold, I maintain that you are, at least, not in serious error about the incarnation or its ramifications for the atonement. We can argue about the details of how that works, exactly, but it's an in-family dispute.

Christ "was begotten by the Father before all ages according to His divinity and, in these latter days, He was born for us and for our salvation of Mary the Virgin, the Θεοτόκος according to His humanity; one single and same Christ, Son, Lord, only begotten, known in two natures [my note - not two substances], without confusion, without change, without division, without separation

Do we agree that Christ was homoousious with the Father, as Nicaea stated? If He is fully God and fully Man, he must have both substances. Nature and substance are very closely linked.

In theology, ousia means "being" or "substance" in a metaphysical sense. God is three prosopa or hypostases in one ousia. We speak of ousia to denote a mode of existence. To say that the Son is homoosios with the Father is to say that He exists in the same manner as the Father--pre-existent, co-eternal, co-equal. Can we also say that He is fully human in substance? Yes--He has a physical body and all the attributes that define humanity. Can we say that these are distinct? Yes, or else we are monophysites. The hypostatic/prosopic union unites these two natures/ousia into one hypostasis/prosopon.

I'm not trying to equivocate the terms here--but I do think that these terms are closely linked.