Thread: "That's just the way things are"

Often unbelievers might use this answer when questioned by a presuppositionalist on why nature is uniform, or why universal, immaterial laws of logic exist, etc. (They might transform "that's just the way things are" into "it's inherent in nature"; the two are the same.)

Let me give an example I saw in Van Til's Apologetic (p. 322, n. 116):

Originally Posted by Greg Bahnsen

That is, even if one granted Plato's point that the Ideas (forms) would have needed to organize or form the material realm in order to make the world of sense knowable, and then granted that it is knowable to human souls which, innately aware of the forms, are imprisoned in bodies, he has still given no rationale or explanation for why the Ideas (forms) or human souls ever became "incarnated" in the lower realm of time and space at all. Thus Plato's epistemology is ultimately arbitrary and rests on unwarranted assumption.

Plato believed in a metaphysical continuum with unchanging Ideas (being) at the top and changing matter (non-being) at the bottom. The top was unity; the bottom was particularity. The top was generally "good"; the bottom was evil. Anyway, he thought that human life was somewhere between the two on the continuum, and that the mind of man was created by some "demiurge" in which the Ideas "moved down" the continuum.

But according to Bahnsen, since Plato has not rationally warranted why this demiurge occurred, his epistemology is at root arbitrary and therefore null. And apparently Plato realized that this was an error of his (he didn't use the excuse "that's just the way things are"); he therefore thought that maybe there was something to the gods all along.

Anyway, after I read this footnote, I immediately thought of a question someone could ask if a Christian were to object to Platonic philosophy as Bahnsen did: "Why does God exist?" (I actually have been asked this before, and I didn't know how to answer it.) If we answer, "He just does," then why can't an unbeliever say, "the demiurge just happened"? How much can the unbeliever say "just is"? How much can anybody get away with in saying "that's just the way things are"?

This question is crucially important in the context of presuppositionalism.

But for the atheistic unbeliever (if I may generalize), he gives a "that's just the way it is" defense for the reality of rationality built on a foundation of ultimate irrationality. This is a recipe for nonsense and meaninglessness.

The Christian in contrast predicates ultimate Rationality, the very opposite of the atheist. Therefore, our claim to real meaning in the present rests on a correlative foundation, i.e. ultimate Meaning--the pre-determined will of God--One who isn't confined to our self-contained universe. Our stance says there is correlation between the meaning we believe in here and now, and foundational meaning.

Read Bertrand Russell's "Why I Am Not a Christian", and his unflinching stare into the abyss of despair and nihilism. Consistent atheism is hopeless.

Originally Posted by Contra_Mundum

But for the atheistic unbeliever (if I may generalize), he gives a "that's just the way it is" defense for the reality of rationality built on a foundation of ultimate irrationality. This is a recipe for nonsense and meaninglessness.

So, saying "that's just the way it is" is a problem only if a contradiction arises? What if they can give an answer without positing a contradiction?

And what would you say if someone asked you why God exists?

Originally Posted by Confessor

Originally Posted by Contra_Mundum

But for the atheistic unbeliever (if I may generalize), he gives a "that's just the way it is" defense for the reality of rationality built on a foundation of ultimate irrationality. This is a recipe for nonsense and meaninglessness.

So, saying "that's just the way it is" is a problem only if a contradiction arises? What if they can give an answer without positing a contradiction?

And what would you say if someone asked you why God exists?

I would say that something has had to exist for eternity for their to exist anything now. God is that eternal being.

CT

What He said Himself: "I am that I am." He is because He is.

Originally Posted by Brad

What He said Himself: "I am that I am." He is because He is.

Thanks for bringing up that verse.

But now the question arises: if we can say that God exists because He does, why could not Plato say that the demiurge happened because it did? Why was Plato (seemingly) allowed not to give a reason for the existence of the world of Ideal forms, yet disallowed from not giving a reason for the demiurge?

Originally Posted by Confessor

Originally Posted by Brad

What He said Himself: "I am that I am." He is because He is.

Thanks for bringing up that verse.

But now the question arises: if we can say that God exists because He does, why could not Plato say that the demiurge happened because it did? Why was Plato (seemingly) allowed not to give a reason for the existence of the world of Ideal forms, yet disallowed from not giving a reason for the demiurge?

Over my head, Ben. I was just calling out from the shallow end my answer to this question:

And what would you say if someone asked you why God exists?

I'll leave the deeper insights for the deeper minds, which means I probably don't have much to add to this discussion and should stay out of it.

Originally Posted by Confessor

Originally Posted by Brad

What He said Himself: "I am that I am." He is because He is.

Thanks for bringing up that verse.

But now the question arises: if we can say that God exists because He does, why could not Plato say that the demiurge happened because it did? Why was Plato (seemingly) allowed not to give a reason for the existence of the world of Ideal forms, yet disallowed from not giving a reason for the demiurge?

Because it is not eternal, it would have to be dependent or explained by something else.

CT

I'm not sure this answers your question. I'm not entirely sure I understand your question. However, I would point out that in the one instance, the demiurge is argued for 'just because'. In the other instance, God's existence is 'just because'. To bring parity to this situation, shouldn't we be comparing the existence of forms 'just because' with the existence of God 'just because'. Or, we should compare the particulars (demiurge) 'just because' with the creation 'just because'.

For the Christian, the existence of God, who is perfect unity and particularity, with all the wonderful attributes he has, does provide a reason, in a sense. Of course, God did not have to create the world (aseity). But he did so to share the benefits of his incomparable goodness (in turn for his own glory -- after all, we don't add glory, we merely reflect and proclaim it). He created a perfect world. On the other hand, Plato cannot give a reason for the rise of the demiurge, particularly since, in its very nature, it was a corruption of the forms.

I think Rev. Buchanan got it right. How would you have an atheist produce a non-contradictory answer? How would you have an atheist give a reason at all? Isn't his foundation for predication refuted by his own atheism?

Originally Posted by Brad

Originally Posted by Confessor

Originally Posted by Brad

What He said Himself: "I am that I am." He is because He is.

Thanks for bringing up that verse.

But now the question arises: if we can say that God exists because He does, why could not Plato say that the demiurge happened because it did? Why was Plato (seemingly) allowed not to give a reason for the existence of the world of Ideal forms, yet disallowed from not giving a reason for the demiurge?

Over my head, Ben. I was just calling out from the shallow end my answer to this question:

And what would you say if someone asked you why God exists?

I'll leave the deeper insights for the deeper minds, which means I probably don't have much to add to this discussion and should stay out of it.

I apologize if I made it sound as if I was singling you out with the question. I was trying to build off your point and ask everyone else generally.

-----Added 6/7/2009 at 01:08:37 EST-----

Originally Posted by ChristianTrader

Originally Posted by Confessor

Originally Posted by Brad

What He said Himself: "I am that I am." He is because He is.

Thanks for bringing up that verse.

But now the question arises: if we can say that God exists because He does, why could not Plato say that the demiurge happened because it did? Why was Plato (seemingly) allowed not to give a reason for the existence of the world of Ideal forms, yet disallowed from not giving a reason for the demiurge?

Because it is not eternal, it would have to be dependent or explained by something else.

CT

Yeah, I'll take that. That almost makes too much sense -- perfect answer! "The problem when solved will be simple." Thanks!

-----Added 6/7/2009 at 01:22:58 EST-----

Originally Posted by chbrooking

I'm not sure this answers your question. I'm not entirely sure I understand your question. However, I would point out that in the one instance, the demiurge is argued for 'just because'. In the other instance, God's existence is 'just because'. To bring parity to this situation, shouldn't we be comparing the existence of forms 'just because' with the existence of God 'just because'. Or, we should compare the particulars (demiurge) 'just because' with the creation 'just because'.

You're right on this; Hermonta above made the important (and brief) clarification that basically answered any problems I was having. I was thinking, too, that the demiurge would have to be juxtaposed with creation ex nihilo, but for whatever reason I couldn't understand why. The answer was right in front of me but I didn't see it! Thankfully Hermonta straightened me out.

Originally Posted by chbrooking

I think Rev. Buchanan got it right. How would you have an atheist produce a non-contradictory answer? How would you have an atheist give a reason at all? Isn't his foundation for predication refuted by his own atheism?

This is one point that I did not learn until recently that is a slight weakness in Bahnsen's apologetic. (Perhaps it's off topic, but I don't really mind as this topic's OP was answered quite fully already.)

Bahnsen often points out how the unbeliever cannot account for uniformity in nature, and he likes to do this with Hume's problem of induction (i.e., to argue for uniformity inductively begs the question since induction presupposes uniformity -- although I'm pretty sure you already knew this). According to Bahnsen, then, since the unbeliever believes in uniformity but does not have a rational undergirding for it, then he is not justified in his belief in uniformity.

But there's a problem with this that I encountered in a strange form when I was discussing this on Facebook. The unbeliever will often respond "I'll presuppose uniformity." And they do make a good point: the unbeliever is already rationally justified in believing in uniformity. If you go to a faraway land, a savage will also be justified in believing it without believing in a providential God. The vast majority of Christians who do not understand that Providence is the basis of uniformity are still rationally justified in believing in uniformity. Therefore Bahnsen's saying that they are unjustified is wrong.

What he should do (and he does this, though a bit inconsistently) is to say that an unbeliever's belief in uniformity not only is unsupported by his other beliefs, but contradicts his other beliefs -- it is not coherent to say that one believes in a world of Chance and also that events are rationally linked as if by a providential Mind. That is how you deal with "I'll presuppose uniformity."

I'm sorry if this is presup-common knowledge, but when I found this out I was quite happy.

I apologize if I made it sound as if I was singling you out with the question. I was trying to build off your point and ask everyone else generally.

Oh no, Ben - no need to apologize. I was serious, and in no way offended. This stuff is 'above my paygrade', I just like to step in and try to say something that sounds profound and run away once in a while.

What scares me is that I actually grasped the discussion on some level. Good points to consider.

Originally Posted by Confessor

Anyway, after I read this footnote, I immediately thought of a question someone could ask if a Christian were to object to Platonic philosophy as Bahnsen did: "Why does God exist?" (I actually have been asked this before, and I didn't know how to answer it.) If we answer, "He just does," then why can't an unbeliever say, "the demiurge just happened"? How much can the unbeliever say "just is"? How much can anybody get away with in saying "that's just the way things are"?

This question is crucially important in the context of presuppositionalism.

The atheist is not exactly wrong when he says "that's just the way things are" referring to nature and logic, because that is the way things are. The crucial problem is that they can't account for how it got that way nor that it will stay that way. And whenever they make a moral judgment, they can't account for why they are making the judgment in the first place, nor why it is even necessary. There is a huge disconnect between their professed faith and reality, between how they actually live and what they claim to believe, hence they are irrational. There explanation of reality doesn't fit with "the way things are." And it does come down to authority, either God reveals what happened and why things are the way they are, or man has to make something up.

Plato new he had a missing link between the world of forms and the world of reality, so he made one up called the demurge, just like evolutionists make up missing links to explain the gaps between their belief in naturalism and the realities of present experience. It's ultimately arbitrary and irrational.

Originally Posted by Puritan Sailor

The atheist is not exactly wrong when he says "that's just the way things are" referring to nature and logic, because that is the way things are. The crucial problem is that they can't account for how it got that way nor that it will stay that way.

Oh yes, I understand that. My problem was when atheists think they are accounting for something when they say "that's the way things are." But that problem's been solved, so we're good with that.

Originally Posted by Puritan Sailor

Plato new he had a missing link between the world of forms and the world of reality, so he made one up called the demurge, just like evolutionists make up missing links to explain the gaps between their belief in naturalism and the realities of present experience. It's ultimately arbitrary and irrational.

Excellent connection between Platonism and evolutionism. I'm going to start using that now if you've not copyrighted it.

"The evolutionists have not yet found their demiurge..."

Originally Posted by ChristianTrader

I would say that something has had to exist for eternity for their to exist anything now. God is that eternal being.CT

The atheistic materialist would say that matter has always existed. So, a tree exists today in the backyard because the matter that composes the tree has always been.

Originally Posted by Whitefield

Originally Posted by ChristianTrader

I would say that something has had to exist for eternity for their to exist anything now. God is that eternal being.CT

The atheistic materialist would say that matter has always existed. So, a tree exists today in the backyard because the matter that composes the tree has always been.

Yeah, but for the purposes of this thread, that's permissible. The point is that if we ask the atheist, "Why does matter exist?" then they can simply respond, "Um, it's eternally existed." That is the same answer we give for God.

Of course, a plethora of problems arises from materialism, but none that are plainly addressed in this thread.