Why do you NOT believe in the two wills of God?

jpfrench81 · #1 (**permalink**) 04-24-2009, 10:58 PM

Until reading this thread about high and low calvinism I thought pretty much all calvinists believed in the two wills of God: i.e., the decretive and preceptive wills, the secret and revealed wills, the sovereign and moral wills, etc.

Obviously I was wrong. I do believe this doctrine currently because it seems to me the best way to reconcile passages like Romans 9:19, "For who resists his will"? and passages like 1 Thess 4:3, "It is God's will that you should be sanctified: that you should avoid sexual immorality" where it seems like there is one will of God that cannot be resisted and one that can. (I am not trying to argue this viewpoint; I just want to give you an idea of where I am coming from.)

For those who DO NOT believe in the two wills of God, why do you not believe it? How do you reconcile these types of passages? What do you think is a better explanation?

Thanks for your answers in advance!

Jimmy the Greek · #2 (**permalink**) 04-29-2009, 10:19 AM

There is indeed a legitimate sense in which Reformed theology acknowledges the decretive will vs the preceptive will of God. Or, as you reminded us, the secret and revealed will. But this is not to suggest that God is double-minded about things or has two wills taken in the same sense. E.g. He doesn't will all to be saved in the same sense He wills only the elect to be saved. Low Calvinism, however, suggests this very thing.

Jonathan Edwards explained it this way:

“When a distinction is made between God’s revealed will and his secret will, or his will of command and decree, will is certainly in that distinction taken in two senses. His will of decree, is not his will in the same sense as his will of command is. Therefore, it is no difficulty at all to suppose, that the one may be otherwise than the other: his will in both senses is his inclination. But when we say he wills virtue, or loves virtue, or the happiness of his creature; thereby is intended, that virtue, or the creature’s happiness, absolutely and simply considered, is agreeable to the inclination of his nature. His will of decree is, his inclination to a thing, not as to that thing absolutely and simply, but with respect to the universality of things, that have been, are, or shall be. So God, though he hates a thing as it is simply, may incline to it with reference to the universality of things. Though he hates sin in itself, yet he may will to permit it, for the greater promotion of holiness in this universality, including all things, and at all times. So, though he has no inclination to a creature’s misery, considered absolutely, yet he may will it, for the greater promotion of happiness in this universality. God inclines to excellency, which is harmony, but yet he may incline to suffer that which is unharmonious in itself, for the promotion of universal harmony, or for the promoting of the harmony that there is in the universality, and making it shine the brighter” (Misc., 527-28).

“There is no inconsistency or contrariety between the decretive and preceptive will of God. It is very consistent to suppose that God may hate the thing itself, and yet will that it should come to pass. Yea, I do not fear to assert that the thing itself may be contrary to God’s will, and yet that it may be agreeable to his will that it should come to pass, because his will, in the one case, has not the same object with his will in the other case. To suppose God to have contrary wills towards the same object, is a contradiction; but it is not so, to suppose him to have contrary wills about different objects. The thing itself, and that the thing should come to pass, are different, as is evident; because it is possible that the one may be good and the other may be evil. The thing itself may be evil, and yet it may be a good thing that it should come to pass. It may be a good thing that an evil thing should come to pass; and oftentimes it most certainly and undeniably is so, and proves so” (Misc., 542-43).