(1) Some dialetheists use that example, not all. The are a lot of different ways dialetheists argue. Assuming youve shown a problem with one example doesn't disprove dialetheism. In fact, I don't recall that one being used in the OUP book I referenced. The strongest have usually been considered the semantic ones, though Priest goes further. Indeed, your example is one of the weakest for them as it is classified by Beall as "borderline cases" where "not a lot of work has been done" yet is a "potential area where contradictions might arise." So it's not clear you've chosen the best challenge.

Anyway

(in/out room) Transition states: when I exit the room, I am inside the room at one time, and outside of it at another. Given the continuity of motion, there must be a precise instant in time, call it t, at which I leave the room. Am I inside the room or outside at time t? Four answers are available: (a) I am inside; (b) I am outside; (c) I am both; and (d) I am neither. (a) and (b) are ruled out by symmetry: choosing either would be completely arbitrary. As for (d): if I am neither inside not outside the room, then I am not inside and not-not inside; therefore, I am either inside and not inside (option (c)), or not inside and not-not inside (which follows from option (d)); in both cases, a dialetheic situation.

(2) That obviously can't be the way you'd respond to all of their examples/arguments, as the "relationship" factor doesn't factor into all of them.

(3) Even your conception of contradiction as: "true and not true at the same time and relationship" isn't the only definition, and is disputed even by some adherents of the LNC. See Grim's ch. in _The LNC: New Philosophical Essay's_. He recognizes 20 some permutations of the law.

(4) Some might deny your "same respect" constraint, showing there's even debate among supporters of the LNC.

(5) Of course this gets into the messy debate about how we should understand 'meaning'. For example, one view of meaning is that a proposition must rule something out. But consider:

(*) Everything is true.

So, (*) entails everything and thus rules nothing out. Yet it seems clearly meaningful.

Or, perhaps meaning is considered as 'use.' But, as Vallicella has pointed out, "take the logical operation of conjunction. If p, q, ... z ... are each of them meaningful, then (p & q & ... & z & ...) is meaningful. Imagine a thousand-membered conjunction each conjunct of which has both a clear meaning and an established ordinary use. This monstrosity will have a clear sense, but no use. So meaning cannot be identified with use. As Jerrold J. Katz puts it, "Use is under biological constraints, meaning is not." (Cogitations, Oxford 1986, p. 122.)"

Or, perhaps you take the LNC as the determiner of what is meaningful (as you intimate in your book), but then you've clearly begged the question. Anyone can just define their way to the top.

As Bergmann points out, this gets you into a dilemma. He puts the skeleton this way:

(I). An essential feature of internalism is that it makes a subject’s actual or potential awareness of something a necessary condition for the justification of any belief held by that subject.

(II). This required awareness is either conceptual awareness (of a particular kind to be described later) or it is not.

(III). If it is conceptual awareness (of the relevant kind), then internalism falls victim to regress problems.

(IV). If it is not, then internalism is subject to a prominent objection to externalism.

(V). If internalism is subject either to the regress problems mentioned in (III) or to the prominent objection to externalism mentioned in (IV), then we should not endorse internalism.

(VI). Therefore, we should not endorse internalism.

His conclusion: "Why don’t internalists recognize that by avoiding regress problems they make their positions vulnerable to the Subject’s Perspective objection?"

Furthemore, I'm unsure you can resurrect foundationalism.

Let me look at it, perhaps it was a typo.

i) I basically complied the worries I've already expressed to you. I also told you if I did any major review I would email you. Since I already told you my major worries, I thought it would be okay. Make use of the time I spent here.

ii) If a critical reviewer always waited until the reviewed was satisfied with the critical review, I don't think many reviews would get done. :-)

I'm unsure what you refer to. I did mention your exegesis of Romans 1, but you did this in your conclusion and not in conversation with other thinkers (p. 100-101).

I'm unclear how what you say here is an "issue" you should have with my review.

I did critique your claims about the fall, but I was responding to what youm specifically said.

Your view of the knowledge(s) of God is a whole other issue I ave, but I didn't spell out my worries in that review. I did mention that you didn't focus on what Paul says we should know when he speaks of the redeemed knowing. Your book focused on us showing what is "clear" of God, but Romans 1 isn't saying that Christ, him crucified, our justification, etc., is "clear." So you placed were right generally but wrong specifically. To detail all of this would take more time, that's why I avoided it for now.

Of course, and the reader can read both sides. I am glad you want to get Christians more involved in apologetics, for that you should be commended.

One of my purposes is to show that it's harder than you make it seem.

I'm not even a dialetheist.

But it looks like you're having a harder time even getting your method off the ground (nevermind your actual apologetic arguments) than you would in proving 2+2=2.

I have other Christians in mind too. I want to avoid another over confident group of young apologists who find out it's not as easy as the teacher made it sound.

__________________
Regards,

P.M.
PCA
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