Originally Posted by packabacka

1. Does God have two wills? I thought this must be necessary, because I don't know how else to explain that God could desire that we not murder but simultaneously allow a murder to occur. I thought the "two-wills" explanation was perfect, but then I seemed to infer from other writings on this forum that it was a dismissed notion, and an obvious one at that.

2. Is saving faith a duty? I don't see why not, for I view the skeletal method of salvation as following an earthly analogy: if I were to wrong someone by, say, stealing something from him, and if I were sincerely sorry and expressed my apologies to him, and if he were forgiving, then I would be forgiven of my action. Similarly, if I wrong God by willfully rebelling, or sinning, against Him, then it can be forgiven if I "apologize" to Him and Him alone. (I know there's tons more to salvation than my analogy implies, but I believe it still follows such a structure.) Thus, if we are all obliged to apologize to a person we wrong, then we are all obliged to "apologize" to our Creator whom we have wronged. We have a duty to have faith in Him. The objection to this that I have encountered is that, since the totally depraved cannot have saving faith, then they should not be obliged to have saving faith. I think this fails, however, just as we are obliged to be perfect (Matthew 5:48), yet none of us are (Romans 3:23). The inability to commit an action does not imply the lack of an obligation to do it.

3. Does not God have universal love for mankind? I have not done much study on this, but it seems necessary. Although God may love the reprobate less than the elect, He may still possess the love which would be expected from an omnibenevolent deity for His creation. The objection I have seen against this is that God loved Jacob but hated Esau (Romans 9:13), and therefore He hates people. However, my rebuttal to this is that "hate" only implies a lesser love, just as when Jesus said that we must hate our families and our own lives (Luke 14:26).

4. I see big problems with each form of lapsarianism. In infra, the Fall precedes election, which would seem to make God decree the Fall without a purpose in mind. If God have no reason to logically decree the Fall (because election had not yet been decreed), then it would not have logically preceded election. In supra, election precedes the Fall, which seems just as impossible: in order to elect some, God would first have to at least conceive of a state from which to be elected. The whole concept of electing some without a Fall is just nonsense. I have concluded from this that, since neither the Fall or election can logically precede each other, they must have been simultaneous. This seems to be a doctrine in error, so I request some help on this.