1) No it's not 'part and parcel.' Indeed, the majority of "presuppositionalists" disagree with your statement.

2) We're specifically talking about justification not knowledge here.

3) The 'demonstration' comment of mine was inherent in the "presuppositionalist" I was responding to. That is, if what you say is correct, then you must reject your fellow Clarkian's definition of justification. He had no qualifier built in. So, if some beliefs can be 'justified' while also not being 'deduced from prior true premises' then his definition that 'justified' = deductions from prior true premises is false.

4) I'd agree that we don't have to 'demonstrate' our basic beliefs, but certainly that's not something unique to 'presuppositionalism.'

5) As a Clarkian, you don't know anything you said since you can't deduce any of it from Scripture.


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Hi Brian,

That's fine. I was assuming some familiarity with my comment. Given all the background info, I don't think that tripartite analysis of 'knowledge' to be a good one. Now of course, one can define 'justification' any way one wishes, I was just trying to stand in the mainstream. That is, given the mainstream analysis of the debate epistemologists have had, I don't think it is helpful to use the term.

Don't take offense here, but I have already adopted this perspective (with caveats of my own that don't affect the overall thrust of his project). I wasn't intending on getting involved in a lengthy discussion, I think the relevant literature sufficiently answers the main question of the thread. I merely sketched some of the conclusions of the relevant literature and also pointed others in the general direction where they could verify my conclusions for themselves.

It doesn't really push the question back if the background knowledge of some of my claims are allowed to function in as well as my explicit claims of the deontological (internalist, and/or evidentialist) constraints are read into my statement which you quote. Given the historical survey of the assumptions involved in requiring 'justification' of ones beliefs, then the talk of 'entitlement' makes perfect sense. Given this picture, filled out with notions of epistemic duties and rights, my observations should fit right in. Given the above, 'entitlement' fits right in with my brief sketch. One could say it goes hand in hand with the deontological baggage associated with talk of 'justification.'

i) Then your argument is with those epistemologists who have said this is a 4th condition (cf. Audi's discussion here in his book I cited in my original post).

ii) It wouldn't be "included" with 'justification' as classically conceived of as having deontological and internalist constraints precisely because reliabilism is a form of externalism.

iii) I think talk of 'equipment we use to justify the conclusions' is dripping with internalist assumptions. One externalist lines, we can have a belief produced by a reliable faculty, reliably aimed at producing true beliefs, in a congenial epistemic environment, etc., and still not be 'justified' in the classical sense. I may have 'knowledge' even though I haven't 'done my epistemic duty.'

iv) I think conclusions based on faulty equipment can be 'justified,' though not warranted. Plantinga shows this (as one illustration among many), if you recall, in his discussion of ‘The Case of the Epistemically Inflexible Climber.’ See here (p. 82).

Another example might be: Consider Jim. Halfway through the day Jim's co-worker asks Jim what he had for breakfast. A strong memorial belief presents itself to Jim---he had eggs and bacon. This belief is vivid and imposes himself on Jim. He can almost smell the bacon, as it were. Memorial beliefs, especially of this kind, I take it, are normally justified. Now suppose that at the exact time the friend asked Jim about his breakfast, those nasty aliens bent on raising Cain, the Alpha Centauries, shot a gamma ray down to earth and caused cognitive malfunction to occur in the part Jim's cognitive apparatus that governs memorial beliefs, producing the phenomenologically strong memorial belief that he ingested eggs and bacon while, in actuality, he had mere oatmeal (apologies to fans of the Quaker Oats Man!). So, Jim's belief was due to cognitive malfunction, but nevertheless, for him, he was justified in believing that he had eggs and bacon. Not warranted, though.

Examples can be easily supplied. Take a case of a parent teaching their child about Santa Clause. One is usually justified in basing beliefs off the testimony of another, especially ones parents. Note Thomas Reid's remarks,

"I believed by instinct whatever my parents and tutors told me, long before I had the idea of a lie, or a thought of the possibility of their deceiving me. Afterwards, upon reflection, I found that they had acted like fair and honest people, who wished me well. I found that, if I had not believed what they told me, before I could give a reason for my belief, I had to this day been little better than a changeling."

So the child would be justified, but not warranted in believing in Santa Clause. (Note that this is a case not of cognitive malfunction, but in malfunction of the cognitive environment. That all these parts must be functioning properly, I think lends support to all of Plantinga's qualifications about what it takes for a belief to have warrant.)

Those are some of my thoughts.

__________________
Regards,

J.J.
PCA
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