| Second of two 1996 post WRT John K. La Shell's work
Here is the second of two 1996 posts to the old Covie-Forum, this one on mental imaginations of Christ. Quote:
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Subject: Covie-forum (June 19, 1996) #2
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Items Posted:
1. Chris Coldwell: mental imaginations of Christ
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Item #1
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Subject: RE: mental imaginations of Christ
Date: Tue, 18 Jun 1996 22:45:23 -0500
From: Chris Coldwell <naphtali@iadfw.net>
To: "'Douglas W. Comin'" <rprev@franklin.se-iowa.net>
Covie-forum:
Early on in my posts on the topic of pictures of Christ I quoted
a fellow named La Shell. I don't remember mentioning it at the time,
but would say John La Shell's dissertation, "Imaginary Ideas of
Christ: A Scottish-American Debate" (hereafter IMAG.) is pertinent
to the discussion on mental pictures of Christ. It would be very
helpful, particularly if anything official is ever done in any
presbyteries, for those involved to get a copy of that paper.
Not all of what he says is to my agreement, nor does he completely
support the iconoclast position, but he has done the homework, whether
we choose to agree with the conclusions or not. I think it is important
to "do the homework" or read someone who has so we don't get bogged down
in questions that are just not supportable historically, nor germane to
the real question (like redefining the meaning of LC 109 - no offense Tony).
In the Great Awakening (early 1740s) a number (usually reckoned a small
percentage of the total) of those who expressed concern for their soul's
state, claimed to have experienced visions - some of the Savior. Tangential
but related to the sometimes vicious debate that waged about the validity
of the revival itself, a rather lengthy discussion ensued between several
individuals about the legitimacy of mental images of Christ. The main
protagonists were James Robe and Ralph Erskine, but much of the background
to the "pro visions" side was provided by Jonathan Edwards. Robe endorsed
and went somewhat beyond even Edwards' position. Erskine opposed all mental
images of the Savior as idolatry.
The dissertation also enters a great deal into Edwards' view and the
Puritans view of 'imagination.' La Shell writes: "Edward's assertion,
that no one is able '? to fix his thoughts on God or Christ, or the
things of another world, without imaginary ideas attending his
meditations' proved to be a bombshell." (IMAG, p. 103). He says
"In stating that imaginary ideas almost inevitably intrude into a
man's thoughts of the divine, Edwards is stepping perilously close
to the brink of acceptable Puritan dogma." (IMAG, p. 70).
La Shell writes: "In addition, the Westminster Larger Catechism,
Question 109, specifically warns against the dangers of mental
idolatry. On this basis ministers of the Secession Church in Scotland
charge the revival party with encouraging idolatry. The mental images
of Christ, experienced by some of the converts, seem to be a clear
violation of the second commandment. Edwards, however, appears unmoved
by such considerations. Why?" (IMAG, p. 72). La Shell after a lengthy
discussion helpfully summarizes Edwards:
Quote:
"In the preceding pages it has been suggested that Edwards' view may
have differed from the traditional Puritan appraisal of mental images
of Christ. Although he regarded them with a degree of caution which
often approached suspicion, he also afforded them a measure of
credibility as natural concomitants of genuine spiritual experiences.
Several reasons for his approach have been pointed out. These may be
summarized under four headings.
"Edwards' EMPIRICISM provided an openness to the evaluation of experience.
When he found that mental images of Christ were reported by some whom he
regarded as genuine converts, he was not inclined to ascribe them to
Satanic agency. Second, the PSYCHOLOGY which he adapted from Locke
treated the human soul as a unit. Because of this the imagination could
not be easily dissociated from the understanding as it sometimes had been
in Puritan psychology. There was no longer room for the distinction
between the 'sensitive' soul and the 'intellectual' soul. In addition,
it became impossible to treat the new spiritual sense of the Christian
as a separate faculty which could operate independently of the rest of
the activities of the soul. Therefore, the imagination could be operative
even during the most spiritual of experiences. Also associated with Locke's
influence is Edwards' theory of LANGUAGE. An imaginary idea of Christ may
be simply a sign used in thinking about Him. In this case, it is little
different than the word 'Christ' which fulfills the same role. Finally,
Edwards' IDEALISM provided him with a view of the world in which he could
develop new theories of typology and aesthetics. The relation of the
physical world to the spiritual world suggests that the beauty of a
mental image of Christ may (at times) function as a type of the eternal
and primary beauty of God." (IMAG, pp. 101-102)
| La Shell goes on to point out most of the Edwards material to understand
all of the above was not published in Edwards' lifetime, and turns his
attention to the Scottish debate between Robe (Established Church) and
Erskine (Secession Church).
La Shell lays out the difference between the parties: "It was this
connection posited between the senses and the understanding which
proved to be a major target for the attacks of the Seceders.
Quote:
"What part do the senses play in our knowledge of the world or of God?
Can an imaginary idea of Christ's human body be considered either
necessary or helpful to saving faith, especially since imaginary ideas
relate only to the sensible world? These issues were raised by James
Fisher [Fisher's Catechism fame -- CC] in his <Review of the Preface>:
"'?if there be the least sensible or visionary Representation of God or
of Christ formed in our Imagination, we do that very Moment think upon
a false God and a false Christ. Our Senses and Imagination, cannot assist
us at all, in thinking upon the Divine Nature and Perfections' (Fisher
1743, 13, body).
"An important part of the question is the natural constitution of man.
If it is true (as most acknowledged) "That we cannot think upon spiritual
Objects without imaginary Ideas attending our Meditations?," is it because
of our created nature, or is it "?owing to our lapsed and imperfect State"
as Willison suggests (1743, 7)? Even if imaginary ideas attend spiritual
exercises primarily because of the fall, it can be asked, 'Do you think
God hath created the Imagination, or any inferior Faculty of the Soul,
merely for the Devil's Use? Hath he not Access to the Imagination himself
when he will" (Willison 1743, 10)? Robe insists "?a natural Fruit of
Corruption?," but they arise "?from our natural Constitution, or from
our finite and corporeal Nature?, and would have been as unavoidable,
if we had continued in a State of Innocence as now?" (Robe 1743, 5-6).
Erskine was equally adamant for the opposing view. Even if they are
unavoidable, imaginary ideas of Christ's human body are sinful and
idolatrous. At one point he confesses with evident shame:
"'I must own and acknowledge, that, while I write upon this speculative
subject, I am conscious to myself of so many vain imaginations of my own,
that I am obliged to write against myself as well as Mr. Robe, and my own
imaginary ideas as well as his' (Erskine 1745, 220)
"What then are the substantive issues which divide the revivalists from
the Secession ministers? First, they are theological. Is an imaginary
idea of Christ's human body helpful to faith or is it idolatrous? Second,
there are philosophical dimensions to the problem. How is faith related
to that world of sense by which the imagination is limited. The disputants
attempted to prove their cases by appealing to approved divines and
philosophers, but they also turned to the Scriptures" (IMAG, pp. 107-108).
| La Shell turns to the two points in detail. I cannot summarize it well
here, but Robe found some wiggle room in some language of a couple of
the Puritans (which Erskine found difficult to explain away), while
Erskine (relying particularly on Owen) demonstrates the preponderance
of the support of previous authors put him in the mainstream of the issue.
Quote:
"Considering the variety of witnesses adduced by both Robe and Erskine,
it is fair to ask whether there existed a Puritan consensus regarding
mental images of Christ. ? The great respect accorded to the Westminster
standards among Presbyterians, Congregationalists and Calvinistic Baptists
(who all adopted forms of the Confession) suggests that there was something
of a consensus on basic principles?[LC 109 cited]?Puritan authors,
including those cited above, frequently denounced mental idolatry and
saw in it the evil source of all external image worship. James Robe,
by his own admission, stands within that tradition. However, the
controversy which began in 1742 appears to be the first attempt to
define precisely the limits of mental idolatry. When do the natural
and unavoidable mental symbols by which men think became idolatrous?
That is the question.
"Although there is room for disagreement, it appears that Ralph Erskine
stands within the conservative mainstream of tradition, while James Robe
is stretching its borders. Erskine is certainly harsher than some of his
predecessors when he condemns all mental imagery of spiritual things.
However, the expressions which seem so congenial to Robe's position may
not have been intended to include the vivid imaginary ideas which Robe
defends. ?
"Robe blurs the distinction between the normal symbols used in thinking
and vivid mental images. That blurring is a natural result of the
traditional definition of the imagination, which includes both kinds
of experience under the same faculty. When early Protestants adopted
Scholastic forms of thought (in spite of warnings from some of the
Reformers), they inherited a number of problems. Among these was a
potential conflict between their understanding of the imagination
and the rejection (by some groups) of mental images of God. Since
the medieval Church embraced all kinds of images, no such conflict
was possible for it. The Cambuslang revival provided a stimulus for
focusing attention on the problem, but it does not seem that either
Robe or Erskine recognized that their differences stemmed from
inherent inconsistencies in the traditions of reformed scholasticism."
(IMAG, pp. 128-129).
| La Shell summarizes the philosophical debate:
Quote:
"What then can be concluded about the philosophical background of
Ralph Erskine and James Robe? First of all, it was mixed, and that
very lack of uniformity allows both men to appeal to their common
traditions for support. Second, as noted earlier, neither Erskine
nor Robe seems willing to concede the existence of these differences.
Third, Erskine is probably closer to the mainstream of Puritan tradition
in his insistence that some knowledge of God is innate. Robe does not
appear to deny this explicitly; perhaps the arguments based on Adam's
knowledge of God and the animals were too strongly imbedded in his
background to dispute. Finally, however, Erskine's occasionalism is
a more novel answer than he recognizes. Many of the sources he cites
to prove innate knowledge or the independence of the soul from the
senses do not directly deal with this aspect of the problem?"
"Win, Lose or Draw
"In eighteenth century Scotland there was no neutral panel of judges
to determine whether Ralph Erskine or James Robe had won their debate?
"Perhaps the best way to evaluate the controversy is to consider the
points upon which the disputants agree. It is then possible to ask which
of them best adheres to the common terms of the debate. Both parties accept
the principle that external or internal images of God are idolatrous. Our
ideas of God must not be attended by any mental pictures of Him. Both also
accept the traditional definition of the imagination as the image-producing
faculty of the mind. They differ on whether an imaginary idea of the human
body of Christ should be considered idolatrous. Robe's doctrine would be
more defensible if he were content to state that such ideas are completely
neutral events with purely psychological explanations. His insistence that
imaginary ideas of Christ's human body are helpful and necessary to faith
places the matter in a far more unfavorable light from the traditional
perspective. ..
"On the other hand, Erskine's declaration that propositional truths are
not the objects of fancy is open to serious question. He believes he has
found a way to conceive of Christ as man without the aid of imaginary
ideas of corporeal objects. However, it is difficult to think of the
virgin birth without imagining a woman and a baby?Perhaps his rejection
of all imagery in thinking of spiritual objects is a case of philosophical
overkill." (IMAG, pp. 155-156).
| La Shell goes on to champion Edwards' view (receiving imagery as a
significant aspect of thought) against Erskine's denial and concludes
that the psychology of Erskine be reject while some aspect of his charge
of idolatry be maintained.
He says:
Quote:
"In these warnings concerning mental idolatry, two principles
are operative. First, the imagination is the root of all idolatry because
of its power freely to fashion images which are not in accord with reality.
Second, it is generally assumed that the same kinds of external images
which are forbidden are also prohibited in the mind.
"Exceptions
"In the controversy over mental images, Robe finds himself cast into a
defensive position. His argument amounts to an assertion that there are
exceptions to the general rule. Can that position be sustained? Perhaps
it will be helpful to review briefly the tradition which he faces. The
basic premise is that all visible representations of God are sinful.
Second, images of Christ are forbidden because His divine nature cannot
be pictured; a picture can only represent His human nature which is but
half a Christ. If it stirs up devotion, that is idolatrous worship; if
it does not, the picture serves no useful purpose. Third, even mental
images of God are specifically condemned. In order to demonstrate the
validity of some mental images of Christ, these three premises must be
weakened" (IMAG, pp. 193-194).
| La Shell goes through these three points and how they might be weakened.
Under point one, he holds out some theoretical support for gospel history
being pictured (focusing on the work of Christ and not his person).
Under the second point he states:
Quote:
"A more difficult problem arises when the mental image represents the Lord
Jesus Christ. In accepting some such images, Robe and Edwards appear to be
weakening the second premise of the Puritan position on images. The union
of Christ's two natures in one person forms the primary basis for Puritan
rejection of images of the Savior; to present the mind's eye with half a
Christ is heresy at best, or idolatry at worst. Robe's clear response is
that it is not heretical to think of the humanity of Christ apart from
His deity. Therefore, it is permissible to have an imaginary idea of His
human body. Such an idea does not preclude a simultaneous realization of
His deity. In fact, an imaginary idea of Christ as man must be combined
with an intellectual comprehension of his deity in order to arrive at a
true and complete conception of the Mediator.
"Robe's position implies conclusions which he might well have rejected.
Erskine charges Robe with teaching that external images of Christ are
also lawful (Erskine, 1745, 155). The accusation is based on an inaccurate
reading of one sentence in Robe's <Fourth Letter> (Robe 1743, 44).
Nevertheless, the connection between mental and external images does
seem to be very close. If meditation involving a mental image does not
blasphemously divide the natures of Christ; why should meditation
stimulated by a picture of the Lord be subject to that charge?"
(IMAG, pp. 195-196)
| On point three La Shell says:
Quote:
"In spite of these concessions, not all of the imaginary ideas defended
by Edwards and Robe can be justified. Reports of visions include pathetic
images of a crucified Savior and beautiful images of a glorified Savior.
In both cases the visions must be regarded as portraits rather than signs
of historical events. For this reason, it is necessary for Robe and Edwards
to defend mental images on the basis that they are involuntary. This
constitutes a weakening of the third Puritan Premise regarding religious
images - that mental images of God are sinful. Edwards appears to be
saying that vivid mental images which arise spontaneously as a result
of truly gracious affections may be beneficial (at least to the ignorant).
Those which result from elevated but non-gracious affections are deceitful
and harmful because they induce a false assurance of salvation. That is a
step in the right direction because if images are inherent in man's
thinking, it is only possible to locate the sin of idolatry in the
attitude of the imaging subject. But more must be said. He who accepts
his images as visions from heaven, he who trusts in them and rejoices
in them - that man is an idolater. Notice that such an interpretation
entails a paradox. The man who appears to benefit most from a mental
image of Christ is the one who benefits least, the one who may actually
be destroyed by what he perceives. Thus, it seems impossible to allow
Edwards' suggestion that imaginary ideas of Christ resemble Old Testament
types. They are too dangerous for such a positive evaluation."
(IMAG, pp. 198-199)
| In his wrap up La Shell concludes in relation to the subject in question:
Quote:
"The third contrast between Edwards and Erskine consists of different
responses to the problem of mental idolatry. Actually, this aspect of
the controversy is more clearly addressed by Robe than by Edwards. The
study has suggested that Robe and Edwards hold a weaker view of the
dangers of mental idolatry than many of their Puritan ancestors.
Considering the wide variety of images which they defend as valid
psychological experiences, it is difficult to know precisely which
kinds of mental images they might have condemned. Erksine's steady
rejection of all imaginary ideas of Christ seems far more in keeping
with Puritan exposition of the second commandment. Reflection on the
scriptural insights of Edwards, Erskine, the Puritans and Calvin
prompts the formulation of guidelines which seem applicable to both
external and mental images. The study suggests that portraits of any
person of the Godhead ought to be rejected, while historical pictures
of the life of Christ may have some limited validity." (IMAG, p. 219).
| My assessment. Erskine's main fault is getting entwined in a defense of
his view of occasionalism and innate knowledge. He evidently takes a
beating there. However, Edwards and Robe really never safe guard their
arguments from the fault of idolatry. La Shell favors Edwards' view of
receiving imagery as a significant aspect of thought, which I know some
will take issue with in relation to this discussion (IMAG, pp. 175-178).
Dick Bacon for one would contend that the assumption needs to be proved
(La Shell does not, but simply appeals to what appears to him to be
reasonable) and disallows its relevance to the subject. However,
despite the assumption of this theory or at least tipping the hat in
favor of it, La Shell still concludes a very limited use of actual
pictures and casts doubt on Edwards' and Robe's view of mental images.
I've quoted La Shell previously on his personal experiences with how
people feel about their pictures, so I won't repeat it but refer you
back to my earlier post.
Some may be dismayed that Edwards at least in part supports or has
conclusions that coincide with some of Tony Cowley's. Well, he can
have Edwards and we can take Erskine<g>. My point in posting from
La Shell is to show that aspects of what we've been discussing are
not new. La Shell really should be in anyone's library who may be
seriously tackling this issue in any way.
All in all, whether you agree or disagree with La Shell, or my take
of him, I commend the study as a scholarly job well done.
Regards,
Chris Coldwell
naphtali
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