Hello Anthony,
I think my time here at PB is going to become very limited. As such, I will not be able to carry on this discussion too much longer. I will have a little more time at our site.
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You definition would make more sense if it were…:
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My definition makes perfect sense, and I would like to stay with it because it captures that particular instance I am concerned about. Since your objection does not concern logical validity, I do not feel the need to adjust my definition. You will see in a moment how it fits well with particular concrete issues.
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The term "sees" in in the definition is too vague. What does "sees" mean? And how is it that person A does not see how something does not lead to a contradiction. It only makes sense if he believes that it does lead to a contradiction.
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I would be more than happy to clarify what I mean by ‘see.’ In my definition, you can equate ‘see’ with ‘understand.’ Abstractly, I may not understand how it is not the case that P --> ~Q, but still rationally believe that it is not the case that P --> ~Q. (Notice, understanding and belief are distinct. There are a lot of things I do not understand, but yet believe.) If I do not
understand how it is not the case that P --> ~Q, but for some reason believe P and Q, then by my definition I hold to an apparent contradiction. A concrete example if this is the Trinity. I do not understand how it is not the case that one being (P) does not necessarily entail one person (~Q). Yet, I believe that God is one being (P) and that God is three persons (Q). By definition, I hold to an apparent contradiction…and so do you.
As for Van Til, I am more concerned with the concept of apparent contradiction that I have provided. You have challenged my concept, and I think my concept is sound.
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There is not contradiction in "one in essence and three in person". Nor is there a contradiction in "Jesus was both fully man and fully God". So where is the contradiction in the first place?
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Two things here:
(1) "one in essence (P)" and "three in persons (Q)" are apparent contradictions if you do not understand how it is not the case that "one in essence" does not necessarily entail "one in person." If you say, I do not understand why it is not the case, but because of revelation I believe it is not the case, then you hold to an apparent contradiction. This also applies to the the Hypostatic union: "one in person" and "two in nature" versus "one person entails one nature."
(2) The issue becomes even more convoluted (again not in a prejorative sense) when you add the Hypostatic Union to the Trinity. We have one God in essence (being) made up of three persons, one of which has two natures. If one of the natures is God, then what is this God? Is this the same God when we say Jesus is one person in the being God? Or, when we say Jesus is 100% God and 100% man, is Jesus being God different in this sense than Jesus being God in being? Is Jesus one being, two beings or three beings? I have asked you to dive into this. So far you have not done so. I think if you would dive into this, then my definition of apparent contradiction would become even more apparent to you.
Your Friend,
Brian